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-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c1261
1 files changed, 1261 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b8c91bfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1261 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * The following code handles the storage of PKCS 11 modules used by the
+ * NSS. For the rest of NSS, only one kind of database handle exists:
+ *
+ * SFTKDBHandle
+ *
+ * There is one SFTKDBHandle for the each key database and one for each cert
+ * database. These databases are opened as associated pairs, one pair per
+ * slot. SFTKDBHandles are reference counted objects.
+ *
+ * Each SFTKDBHandle points to a low level database handle (SDB). This handle
+ * represents the underlying physical database. These objects are not
+ * reference counted, an are 'owned' by their respective SFTKDBHandles.
+ *
+ *
+ */
+#include "sftkdb.h"
+#include "sftkdbti.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+#include "sdb.h"
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "pratom.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h"
+#include "secdert.h"
+#include "prsystem.h"
+#include "lgglue.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+
+/******************************************************************
+ *
+ * Key DB password handling functions
+ *
+ * These functions manage the key db password (set, reset, initialize, use).
+ *
+ * The key is managed on 'this side' of the database. All private data is
+ * encrypted before it is sent to the database itself. Besides PBE's, the
+ * database management code can also mix in various fixed keys so the data
+ * in the database is no longer considered 'plain text'.
+ */
+
+/* take string password and turn it into a key. The key is dependent
+ * on a global salt entry acquired from the database. This salted
+ * value will be based to a pkcs5 pbe function before it is used
+ * in an actual encryption */
+static SECStatus
+sftkdb_passwordToKey(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *salt,
+ const char *pw, SECItem *key)
+{
+ SHA1Context *cx = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ key->data = PORT_Alloc(SHA1_LENGTH);
+ if (key->data == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ key->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
+
+ cx = SHA1_NewContext();
+ if (cx == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ SHA1_Begin(cx);
+ if (salt && salt->data) {
+ SHA1_Update(cx, salt->data, salt->len);
+ }
+ SHA1_Update(cx, (unsigned char *)pw, PORT_Strlen(pw));
+ SHA1_End(cx, key->data, &key->len, key->len);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (cx) {
+ SHA1_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (key->data != NULL) {
+ PORT_ZFree(key->data, key->len);
+ }
+ key->data = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher text stored in the database contains 3 elements:
+ * 1) an identifier describing the encryption algorithm.
+ * 2) an entry specific salt value.
+ * 3) the encrypted value.
+ *
+ * The following data structure represents the encrypted data in a decoded
+ * (but still encrypted) form.
+ */
+typedef struct sftkCipherValueStr sftkCipherValue;
+struct sftkCipherValueStr {
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECOidTag alg;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param;
+ SECItem salt;
+ SECItem value;
+};
+
+#define SFTK_CIPHERTEXT_VERSION 3
+
+struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr {
+ SECAlgorithmID algorithm;
+ SECItem encryptedData;
+};
+typedef struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo;
+
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
+
+const SEC_ASN1Template sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo, algorithm),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo, encryptedData) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * This parses the cipherText into cipher value. NOTE: cipherValue will point
+ * to data in cipherText, if cipherText is freed, cipherValue will be invalid.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftkdb_decodeCipherText(SECItem *cipherText, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ cipherValue->arena = NULL;
+ cipherValue->param = NULL;
+
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &edi, sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate,
+ cipherText);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ cipherValue->alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&edi.algorithm);
+ cipherValue->param = nsspkcs5_AlgidToParam(&edi.algorithm);
+ if (cipherValue->param == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ cipherValue->value = edi.encryptedData;
+ cipherValue->arena = arena;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+loser:
+ if (cipherValue->param) {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue->param);
+ cipherValue->param = NULL;
+ }
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlike decode, Encode actually allocates a SECItem the caller must free
+ * The caller can pass an optional arena to to indicate where to place
+ * the resultant cipherText.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftkdb_encodeCipherText(PLArenaPool *arena, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue,
+ SECItem **cipherText)
+{
+ SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PLArenaPool *localArena = NULL;
+
+ localArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (localArena == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ algid = nsspkcs5_CreateAlgorithmID(localArena, cipherValue->alg,
+ cipherValue->param);
+ if (algid == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(localArena, &edi.algorithm, algid);
+ SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ edi.encryptedData = cipherValue->value;
+
+ *cipherText = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &edi,
+ sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate);
+ if (*cipherText == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (localArena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(localArena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use our key to decode a cipherText block from the database.
+ *
+ * plain text is allocated by nsspkcs5_CipherData and must be freed
+ * with SECITEM_FreeItem by the caller.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SECItem *passKey, SECItem *cipherText, SECItem **plain)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
+
+ /* First get the cipher type */
+ rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(cipherText, &cipherValue);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ *plain = nsspkcs5_CipherData(cipherValue.param, passKey, &cipherValue.value,
+ PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ if (*plain == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (cipherValue.param) {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue.param);
+ }
+ if (cipherValue.arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(cipherValue.arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypt a block. This function returned the encrypted ciphertext which
+ * the caller must free. If the caller provides an arena, cipherText will
+ * be allocated out of that arena. This also generated the per entry
+ * salt automatically.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey,
+ SECItem *plainText, SECItem **cipherText)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
+ SECItem *cipher = NULL;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
+ unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+
+ cipherValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
+ cipherValue.salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ cipherValue.salt.data = saltData;
+ RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData, cipherValue.salt.len);
+
+ param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(cipherValue.alg, HASH_AlgSHA1, &cipherValue.salt,
+ 1);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ cipher = nsspkcs5_CipherData(param, passKey, plainText, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ cipherValue.value = *cipher;
+ cipherValue.param = param;
+
+ rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &cipherValue, cipherText);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (cipher) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(cipher, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (param) {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the password and the pbe parameters to generate an HMAC for the
+ * given plain text data. This is used by sftkdb_VerifyAttribute and
+ * sftkdb_SignAttribute. Signature is returned in signData. The caller
+ * must preallocate the space in the secitem.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftkdb_pbehash(SECOidTag sigOid, SECItem *passKey,
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType,
+ SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signData)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem *key = NULL;
+ HMACContext *hashCx = NULL;
+ HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj;
+ unsigned char addressData[SDB_ULONG_SIZE];
+
+ hashType = HASH_FromHMACOid(param->encAlg);
+ if (hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
+ if (hashObj == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(param, passKey, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ if (!key) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ hashCx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, key->data, key->len, PR_TRUE);
+ if (!hashCx) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ HMAC_Begin(hashCx);
+ /* Tie this value to a particular object. This is most important for
+ * the trust attributes, where and attacker could copy a value for
+ * 'validCA' from another cert in the database */
+ sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, objectID);
+ HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
+ sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, attrType);
+ HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
+
+ HMAC_Update(hashCx, plainText->data, plainText->len);
+ rv = HMAC_Finish(hashCx, signData->data, &signData->len, signData->len);
+
+loser:
+ if (hashCx) {
+ HMAC_Destroy(hashCx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (key) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use our key to verify a signText block from the database matches
+ * the plainText from the database. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
+ * plainText is the plainText of the attribute.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(SECItem *passKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType,
+ SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signText)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sftkCipherValue signValue;
+ SECItem signature;
+ unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+
+ /* First get the cipher type */
+ rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(signText, &signValue);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ signature.data = signData;
+ signature.len = sizeof(signData);
+
+ rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, signValue.param,
+ objectID, attrType, plainText, &signature);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&signValue.value, &signature) != 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (signValue.param) {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(signValue.param);
+ }
+ if (signValue.arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(signValue.arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use our key to create a signText block the plain text of an
+ * attribute. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_SignAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType,
+ SECItem *plainText, SECItem **signature)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sftkCipherValue signValue;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
+ unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ SECOidTag hmacAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; /* hash for authentication */
+ SECOidTag prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; /* hash for pb key generation */
+ HASH_HashType prfType;
+ unsigned int hmacLength;
+ unsigned int prfLength;
+
+ /* this code allows us to fetch the lengths and hashes on the fly
+ * by simply changing the OID above */
+ prfType = HASH_FromHMACOid(prfAlg);
+ PORT_Assert(prfType != HASH_AlgNULL);
+ prfLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(prfType)->length;
+ PORT_Assert(prfLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
+
+ hmacLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_FromHMACOid(hmacAlg))->length;
+ PORT_Assert(hmacLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
+
+ /* initialize our CipherValue structure */
+ signValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1;
+ signValue.salt.len = prfLength;
+ signValue.salt.data = saltData;
+ signValue.value.data = signData;
+ signValue.value.len = hmacLength;
+ RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData, prfLength);
+
+ /* initialize our pkcs5 parameter */
+ param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(signValue.alg, HASH_AlgSHA1, &signValue.salt, 1);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ param->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
+ /* set the PKCS 5 v2 parameters, not extractable from the
+ * data passed into nsspkcs5_NewParam */
+ param->encAlg = hmacAlg;
+ param->hashType = prfType;
+ param->keyLen = hmacLength;
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(param->poolp, &param->prfAlg, prfAlg, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate the mac */
+ rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, param, objectID, attrType,
+ plainText, &signValue.value);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ signValue.param = param;
+
+ /* write it out */
+ rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &signValue, signature);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (param) {
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * safely swith the passed in key for the one caches in the keydb handle
+ *
+ * A key attached to the handle tells us the the token is logged in.
+ * We can used the key attached to the handle in sftkdb_EncryptAttribute
+ * and sftkdb_DecryptAttribute calls.
+ */
+static void
+sftkdb_switchKeys(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *passKey)
+{
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int len;
+
+ if (keydb->passwordLock == NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(keydb->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* an atomic pointer set would be nice */
+ SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock));
+ data = keydb->passwordKey.data;
+ len = keydb->passwordKey.len;
+ keydb->passwordKey.data = passKey->data;
+ keydb->passwordKey.len = passKey->len;
+ passKey->data = data;
+ passKey->len = len;
+ SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock));
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns true if we are in a middle of a merge style update.
+ */
+PRBool
+sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ return keydb->updateID ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns true if we are looking for the password for the user's old source
+ * database as part of a merge style update.
+ */
+PRBool
+sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (keydb->updateDBIsInit && !keydb->updatePasswordKey) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fetch an update password key from a handle.
+ */
+SECItem *
+sftkdb_GetUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
+{
+ SECItem *key = NULL;
+
+ /* if we're a cert db, fetch it from our peer key db */
+ if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
+ handle = handle->peerDB;
+ }
+
+ /* don't have one */
+ if (!handle) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
+ if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
+ key = SECITEM_DupItem(handle->updatePasswordKey);
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * free the update password key from a handle.
+ */
+void
+sftkdb_FreeUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
+{
+ SECItem *key = NULL;
+
+ /* don't have one */
+ if (!handle) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* if we're a cert db, we don't have one */
+ if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
+ if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
+ key = handle->updatePasswordKey;
+ handle->updatePasswordKey = NULL;
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
+
+ if (key) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * what password db we use depends heavily on the update state machine
+ *
+ * 1) no update db, return the normal database.
+ * 2) update db and no merge return the update db.
+ * 3) update db and in merge:
+ * return the update db if we need the update db's password,
+ * otherwise return our normal datbase.
+ */
+static SDB *
+sftk_getPWSDB(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ if (!keydb->update) {
+ return keydb->db;
+ }
+ if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
+ return keydb->update;
+ }
+ if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
+ return keydb->update;
+ }
+ return keydb->db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return success if we have a valid password entry.
+ * This is will show up outside of PKCS #11 as CKF_USER_PIN_INIT
+ * in the token flags.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ SECItem salt, value;
+ unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SDB *db;
+
+ if (keydb == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
+ if (db == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ salt.data = saltData;
+ salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
+ value.data = valueData;
+ value.len = sizeof(valueData);
+ crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
+
+ /* If no password is set, we can update right away */
+ if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update && crv != CKR_OK) {
+ /* update the peer certdb if it exists */
+ if (keydb->peerDB) {
+ sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, NULL);
+ }
+ sftkdb_Update(keydb, NULL);
+ }
+ return (crv == CKR_OK) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+#define SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING "password-check"
+#define SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN 14
+
+/*
+ * check if the supplied password is valid
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_CheckPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, const char *pw, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem salt, value;
+ unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ SECItem key;
+ SECItem *result = NULL;
+ SDB *db;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ if (keydb == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
+ if (db == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ key.data = NULL;
+ key.len = 0;
+
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ pw = "";
+
+ /* get the entry from the database */
+ salt.data = saltData;
+ salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
+ value.data = valueData;
+ value.len = sizeof(valueData);
+ crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* get our intermediate key based on the entry salt value */
+ rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, pw, &key);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt the entry value */
+ rv = sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(&key, &value, &result);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* if it's what we expect, update our key in the database handle and
+ * return Success */
+ if ((result->len == SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) &&
+ PORT_Memcmp(result->data, SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING, SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We have a password, now lets handle any potential update cases..
+ *
+ * First, the normal case: no update. In this case we only need the
+ * the password for our only DB, which we now have, we switch
+ * the keys and fall through.
+ * Second regular (non-merge) update: The target DB does not yet have
+ * a password initialized, we now have the password for the source DB,
+ * so we can switch the keys and simply update the target database.
+ * Merge update case: This one is trickier.
+ * 1) If we need the source DB password, then we just got it here.
+ * We need to save that password,
+ * then we need to check to see if we need or have the target
+ * database password.
+ * If we have it (it's the same as the source), or don't need
+ * it (it's not set or is ""), we can start the update now.
+ * If we don't have it, we need the application to get it from
+ * the user. Clear our sessions out to simulate a token
+ * removal. C_GetTokenInfo will change the token description
+ * and the token will still appear to be logged out.
+ * 2) If we already have the source DB password, this password is
+ * for the target database. We can now move forward with the
+ * update, as we now have both required passwords.
+ *
+ */
+ PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock);
+ if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
+ /* Squirrel this special key away.
+ * This has the side effect of turning sftkdb_NeedLegacyPW off,
+ * as well as changing which database is returned from
+ * SFTK_GET_PW_DB (thus effecting both sftkdb_CheckPassword()
+ * and sftkdb_HasPasswordSet()) */
+ keydb->updatePasswordKey = SECITEM_DupItem(&key);
+ PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
+ if (keydb->updatePasswordKey == NULL) {
+ /* PORT_Error set by SECITEM_DupItem */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Simulate a token removal -- we need to do this any
+ * any case at this point so the token name is correct. */
+ *tokenRemoved = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * OK, we got the update DB password, see if we need a password
+ * for the target...
+ */
+ if (sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(keydb) == SECSuccess) {
+ /* We have a password, do we know what the password is?
+ * check 1) for the password the user supplied for the
+ * update DB,
+ * and 2) for the null password.
+ *
+ * RECURSION NOTE: we are calling ourselves here. This means
+ * any updates, switchKeys, etc will have been completed
+ * if these functions return successfully, in those cases
+ * just exit returning Success. We don't recurse infinitely
+ * because we are making this call from a NeedUpdateDBPassword
+ * block and we've already set that update password at this
+ * point. */
+ rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, pw, tokenRemoved);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ /* source and target databases have the same password, we
+ * are good to go */
+ goto done;
+ }
+ sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, "", tokenRemoved);
+
+ /*
+ * Important 'NULL' code here. At this point either we
+ * succeeded in logging in with "" or we didn't.
+ *
+ * If we did succeed at login, our machine state will be set
+ * to logged in appropriately. The application will find that
+ * it's logged in as soon as it opens a new session. We have
+ * also completed the update. Life is good.
+ *
+ * If we did not succeed, well the user still successfully
+ * logged into the update database, since we faked the token
+ * removal it's just like the user logged into his smart card
+ * then removed it. the actual login work, so we report that
+ * success back to the user, but we won't actually be
+ * logged in. The application will find this out when it
+ * checks it's login state, thus triggering another password
+ * prompt so we can get the real target DB password.
+ *
+ * summary, we exit from here with SECSuccess no matter what.
+ */
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ /* there is no password, just fall through to update.
+ * update will write the source DB's password record
+ * into the target DB just like it would in a non-merge
+ * update case. */
+ }
+ } else {
+ PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
+ }
+ /* load the keys, so the keydb can parse it's key set */
+ sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &key);
+
+ /* we need to update, do it now */
+ if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update) {
+ /* update the peer certdb if it exists */
+ if (keydb->peerDB) {
+ sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, &key);
+ }
+ sftkdb_Update(keydb, &key);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ /*PORT_SetError( bad password); */
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (key.data) {
+ PORT_ZFree(key.data, key.len);
+ }
+ if (result) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return Success if the there is a cached password key.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_PWCached(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ return keydb->passwordKey.data ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+sftk_updateMacs(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *handle,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE authAttrs[] = {
+ { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS, NULL, 0 },
+ };
+ CK_ULONG authAttrCount = sizeof(authAttrs) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+ unsigned int i, count;
+ SFTKDBHandle *keyHandle = handle;
+ SDB *keyTarget = NULL;
+
+ id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
+
+ if (handle->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
+ keyHandle = handle->peerDB;
+ }
+
+ if (keyHandle == NULL) {
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* old DB's don't have meta data, finished with MACs */
+ keyTarget = SFTK_GET_SDB(keyHandle);
+ if ((keyTarget->sdb_flags & SDB_HAS_META) == 0) {
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * STEP 1: find the MACed attributes of this object
+ */
+ (void)sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
+ count = 0;
+ /* allocate space for the attributes */
+ for (i = 0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
+ if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ count++;
+ authAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, authAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
+ if (authAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if count was zero, none were found, finished with MACs */
+ if (count == 0) {
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ (void)sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
+ /* ignore error code, we expect some possible errors */
+
+ /* GetAttributeValue just verified the old macs, safe to write
+ * them out then... */
+ for (i = 0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
+ SECItem *signText;
+ SECItem plainText;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ plainText.data = authAttrs[i].pValue;
+ plainText.len = authAttrs[i].ulValueLen;
+ rv = sftkdb_SignAttribute(arena, newKey, id,
+ authAttrs[i].type, &plainText, &signText);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ rv = sftkdb_PutAttributeSignature(handle, keyTarget, id,
+ authAttrs[i].type, signText);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *keydb,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_RV crv2;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *first, *last;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE privAttrs[] = {
+ { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0 },
+ { CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ CK_ULONG privAttrCount = sizeof(privAttrs) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+ unsigned int i, count;
+
+ /*
+ * STEP 1. Read the old attributes in the clear.
+ */
+
+ /* Get the attribute sizes.
+ * ignore the error code, we will have unknown attributes here */
+ crv2 = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, privAttrs, privAttrCount);
+
+ /*
+ * find the valid block of attributes and fill allocate space for
+ * their data */
+ first = last = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < privAttrCount; i++) {
+ /* find the block of attributes that are appropriate for this
+ * objects. There should only be once contiguous block, if not
+ * there's an error.
+ *
+ * find the first and last good entry.
+ */
+ if ((privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)) {
+ if (!first)
+ continue;
+ if (!last) {
+ /* previous entry was last good entry */
+ last = &privAttrs[i - 1];
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!first) {
+ first = &privAttrs[i];
+ }
+ if (last) {
+ /* OOPS, we've found another good entry beyond the end of the
+ * last good entry, we need to fail here. */
+ crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ privAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, privAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
+ if (privAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (first == NULL) {
+ /* no valid entries found, return error based on crv2 */
+ return crv2;
+ }
+ if (last == NULL) {
+ last = &privAttrs[privAttrCount - 1];
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ /* read the attributes */
+ count = (last - first) + 1;
+ crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, first, count);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * STEP 2: read the encrypt the attributes with the new key.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ SECItem plainText;
+ SECItem *result;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ plainText.data = first[i].pValue;
+ plainText.len = first[i].ulValueLen;
+ rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(arena, newKey, &plainText, &result);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ first[i].pValue = result->data;
+ first[i].ulValueLen = result->len;
+ /* clear our sensitive data out */
+ PORT_Memset(plainText.data, 0, plainText.len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * STEP 3: write the newly encrypted attributes out directly
+ */
+ id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
+ keydb->newKey = newKey;
+ crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, id, first, count);
+ keydb->newKey = NULL;
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+sftk_convertAttributes(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+
+ /* get a new arena to simplify cleanup */
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
+ if (!arena) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first handle the MACS
+ */
+ crv = sftk_updateMacs(arena, handle, id, newKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (handle->type == SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
+ crv = sftk_updateEncrypted(arena, handle, id, newKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* free up our mess */
+ /* NOTE: at this point we know we've cleared out any unencrypted data */
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return CKR_OK;
+
+loser:
+ /* there may be unencrypted data, clear it out down */
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * must be called with the old key active.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftkdb_convertObjects(SFTKDBHandle *handle, CK_ATTRIBUTE *template,
+ CK_ULONG count, SECItem *newKey)
+{
+ SDBFind *find = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG idCount = SFTK_MAX_IDS;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ids[SFTK_MAX_IDS];
+ CK_RV crv, crv2;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ crv = sftkdb_FindObjectsInit(handle, template, count, &find);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ while ((crv == CKR_OK) && (idCount == SFTK_MAX_IDS)) {
+ crv = sftkdb_FindObjects(handle, find, ids, SFTK_MAX_IDS, &idCount);
+ for (i = 0; (crv == CKR_OK) && (i < idCount); i++) {
+ crv = sftk_convertAttributes(handle, ids[i], newKey);
+ }
+ }
+ crv2 = sftkdb_FindObjectsFinal(handle, find);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ crv = crv2;
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * change the database password.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_ChangePassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb,
+ char *oldPin, char *newPin, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem plainText;
+ SECItem newKey;
+ SECItem *result = NULL;
+ SECItem salt, value;
+ SFTKDBHandle *certdb;
+ unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SDB *db;
+
+ if (keydb == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ db = SFTK_GET_SDB(keydb);
+ if (db == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ newKey.data = NULL;
+
+ /* make sure we have a valid old pin */
+ crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Begin)(keydb->db);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ salt.data = saltData;
+ salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
+ value.data = valueData;
+ value.len = sizeof(valueData);
+ crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, oldPin, tokenRemoved);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(salt.data, salt.len);
+ }
+
+ rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, newPin, &newKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * convert encrypted entries here.
+ */
+ crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(keydb, NULL, 0, &newKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* fix up certdb macs */
+ certdb = keydb->peerDB;
+ if (certdb) {
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE objectType = { CKA_CLASS, 0, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS) };
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS myClass = CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST;
+
+ objectType.pValue = &myClass;
+ crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ myClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ plainText.data = (unsigned char *)SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING;
+ plainText.len = SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN;
+
+ rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(NULL, &newKey, &plainText, &result);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ value.data = result->data;
+ value.len = result->len;
+ crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_PutMetaData)(keydb->db, "password", &salt, &value);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Commit)(keydb->db);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ keydb->newKey = NULL;
+
+ sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &newKey);
+
+loser:
+ if (newKey.data) {
+ PORT_ZFree(newKey.data, newKey.len);
+ }
+ if (result) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ (*keydb->db->sdb_Abort)(keydb->db);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * lose our cached password
+ */
+SECStatus
+sftkdb_ClearPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
+{
+ SECItem oldKey;
+ oldKey.data = NULL;
+ oldKey.len = 0;
+ sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &oldKey);
+ if (oldKey.data) {
+ PORT_ZFree(oldKey.data, oldKey.len);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}