summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c7797
1 files changed, 7797 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c696115b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7797 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
+ *
+ * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
+ * This implementation has two slots:
+ * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
+ * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
+ * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
+ * not have any token storage.
+ * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
+ * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
+ * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+ *
+ * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+ * that created or generated them.
+ */
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+#include "lowkeyi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secdig.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "alghmac.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "prenv.h"
+
+#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
+
+/*
+ * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
+ * definitions for them...
+ */
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+
+#define CK_EXTERN extern
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
+ CK_RV __PASTE(NS, func)
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
+
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+ PRUint8 client_version[2];
+ PRUint8 random[46];
+} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
+
+static void
+sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \
+ printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
+ str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \
+ for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \
+ printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \
+ } \
+ printf("\n")
+#else
+#undef EC_DEBUG
+#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
+#endif
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+/*
+ * free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert
+ * other free routines to the destroy signature.
+ */
+static void
+sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ PORT_Free(data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
+ * functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
+ * compatibility.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
+ return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+ case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
+ return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ /* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
+ return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
+ /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
+ case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+
+/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
+ return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+ default:
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(error);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for
+ * backward compatibilty.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
+ if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
+ crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
+ * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
+{
+ unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
+ unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
+ unsigned char enc_src[8];
+ unsigned char enc_dest[8];
+ unsigned int leng, i;
+ DESContext *descx;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* zero the parity bits */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
+ }
+
+ /* encrypt with key 1 */
+ descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+ if (descx == NULL)
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+ DES_DestroyContext(descx, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+
+ /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (i & 1) {
+ enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
+ } else {
+ enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* encrypt with key 2 */
+ descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+ if (descx == NULL)
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+ DES_DestroyContext(descx, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+
+ /* set the corret parity on our new des key */
+ sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
+{
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKObject *object;
+ SFTKFreeStatus status;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
+ * requested object.
+ */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject, session);
+ if (object == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
+ if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
+ (sftk_isTrue(object, CKA_PRIVATE))) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ sftk_FreeObject(object);
+ return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+ }
+
+ /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
+
+ if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
+ (sftk_isTrue(object, CKA_TOKEN))) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ sftk_FreeObject(object);
+ return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
+ }
+
+ sftk_DeleteObject(session, object);
+
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+
+ /*
+ * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
+ * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
+ * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
+ * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
+ * be in the data base.
+ */
+ status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
+
+ return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************
+ */
+/*
+ * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
+ * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
+ */
+static HASH_HashType
+GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
+ switch (mech) {
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ case CKM_SHA224:
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA224;
+ case CKM_SHA256:
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ case CKM_SHA384:
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ case CKM_SHA512:
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
+ return HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ default:
+ return HASH_AlgNULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
+ */
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
+{
+ if (!params) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
+ GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
+ */
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
+{
+ if (!params) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
+ * state:
+ * If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
+ * ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
+ */
+ if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
+ (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+ (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+ (params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
+ (params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+ */
+SFTKSessionContext *
+sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+ case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+ return session->enc_context;
+ case SFTK_HASH:
+ return session->hash_context;
+ case SFTK_SIGN:
+ case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+ case SFTK_VERIFY:
+ case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+ return session->hash_context;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+ */
+void
+sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
+ SFTKSessionContext *context)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+ case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+ session->enc_context = context;
+ break;
+ case SFTK_HASH:
+ session->hash_context = context;
+ break;
+ case SFTK_SIGN:
+ case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+ case SFTK_VERIFY:
+ case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+ session->hash_context = context;
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
+ * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
+ * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
+ * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
+ * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+ SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
+ /* make sure the context is valid */
+ if ((context == NULL) || (context->type != type) || (needMulti && !(context->multi))) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+ *contextPtr = context;
+ if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
+ *sessionPtr = session;
+ } else {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ }
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
+ * Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
+ */
+static void
+sftk_TerminateOp(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
+ SFTKSessionContext *context)
+{
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, ctype, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************
+ */
+
+/*
+ * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
+ * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+ SFTKContextType ctype, SFTKObject **keyPtr,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+ SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *att;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+
+ /* We can only init if there is not current context active */
+ if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, ctype) != NULL) {
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+ }
+
+ /* find the key */
+ if (keyPtr) {
+ key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
+ if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) || !sftk_isTrue(key, operation)) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ /* get the key type */
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ *keyPtr = key;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate the context structure */
+ context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
+ if (context == NULL) {
+ if (key)
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ context->type = ctype;
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
+ context->cipherInfo = NULL;
+ context->hashInfo = NULL;
+ context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+ context->padDataLength = 0;
+ context->key = key;
+ context->blockSize = 0;
+ context->maxLen = 0;
+
+ *contextPtr = context;
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static int
+sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
+{
+ switch (mechanism) {
+ case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+ case CKM_AES_CBC:
+ return NSS_AES_CBC;
+ case CKM_AES_ECB:
+ return NSS_AES;
+ case CKM_AES_CTS:
+ return NSS_AES_CTS;
+ case CKM_AES_CTR:
+ return NSS_AES_CTR;
+ case CKM_AES_GCM:
+ return NSS_AES_GCM;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+ HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
+ maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
+
+ return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+ (const unsigned char *)info->params->pSourceData,
+ info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
+ output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+ HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
+ maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
+
+ rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+ (const unsigned char *)info->params->pSourceData,
+ info->params->ulSourceDataLen,
+ output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keyLen,
+ const CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *params)
+{
+ SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx;
+
+ if (params->ulNonceLen != sizeof(ctx->nonce)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ctx = PORT_New(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ChaCha20Poly1305_InitContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, key, keyLen,
+ params->ulTagLen) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ctx->nonce, params->pNonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
+
+ /* AAD data and length must both be null, or both non-null. */
+ PORT_Assert((params->pAAD == NULL) == (params->ulAADLen == 0));
+
+ if (params->ulAADLen > sizeof(ctx->ad)) {
+ /* Need to allocate an overflow buffer for the additional data. */
+ ctx->adOverflow = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(params->ulAADLen);
+ if (!ctx->adOverflow) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(ctx->adOverflow, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+ } else {
+ ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+ if (params->pAAD) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(ctx->ad, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->adLen = params->ulAADLen;
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+ PRBool freeit)
+{
+ ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, PR_FALSE);
+ if (ctx->adOverflow != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx->adOverflow);
+ ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->adLen = 0;
+ if (freeit) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+ unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+
+ if (ad == NULL) {
+ ad = ctx->ad;
+ }
+
+ return ChaCha20Poly1305_Seal(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+ maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+ sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+ unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+
+ if (ad == NULL) {
+ ad = ctx->ad;
+ }
+
+ return ChaCha20Poly1305_Open(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+ maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+ sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+
+/** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
+ *
+ * Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
+ * Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
+ * ciphers MAC'ing.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+ SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ SFTKAttribute *att;
+ CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
+ SECItem rc5Key;
+#endif
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
+ unsigned char newdeskey[24];
+ PRBool useNewKey = PR_FALSE;
+ int t;
+
+ crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, &context, contextType, &key, hKey, &key_type,
+ isEncrypt ? CKO_PUBLIC_KEY : CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ if (isEncrypt) {
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
+ context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+ ? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw
+ : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
+ } else {
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+ context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+ ? sftk_RSADecryptRaw
+ : sftk_RSADecrypt);
+ }
+ context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
+ !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ if (isEncrypt) {
+ SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+ info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (info->key == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ } else {
+ SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+ info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (info->key == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ }
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_RC2_ECB:
+ case CKM_RC2_CBC:
+ context->blockSize = 8;
+ if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits + 7) / 8;
+ context->cipherInfo =
+ RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
+ pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : NSS_RC2_CBC, effectiveKeyLength);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC2_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_RC5_ECB:
+ case CKM_RC5_CBC:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize * 2;
+ rc5Key.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key, rc5_param->ulRounds,
+ rc5_param->ulWordsize, rc5_param->pIv,
+ pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC5_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case CKM_RC4:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo =
+ RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC4_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+ case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
+ case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
+ if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
+ goto finish_des;
+ case CKM_DES_ECB:
+ if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ t = NSS_DES;
+ goto finish_des;
+ case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_DES_CBC:
+ if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ t = NSS_DES_CBC;
+ goto finish_des;
+ case CKM_DES3_ECB:
+ if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
+ goto finish_des;
+ case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+ if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+ finish_des:
+ context->blockSize = 8;
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
+ (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
+ /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
+ memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
+ memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
+ useNewKey = PR_TRUE;
+ } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
+ crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue, newdeskey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ break;
+ }
+ useNewKey = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
+ useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter, t, isEncrypt);
+ if (useNewKey)
+ memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)DES_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+ case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_SEED_CBC:
+ if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+ pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_SEED_ECB:
+ context->blockSize = 16;
+ if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
+ (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
+ isEncrypt);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)SEED_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
+ if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+ pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
+ context->blockSize = 16;
+ if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
+ (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ pMechanism->mechanism ==
+ CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB
+ ? NSS_CAMELLIA
+ : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
+ isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)Camellia_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_AES_ECB:
+ case CKM_AES_CBC:
+ context->blockSize = 16;
+ case CKM_AES_CTS:
+ case CKM_AES_CTR:
+ case CKM_AES_GCM:
+ if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
+ (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
+ isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)AES_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ if (key_type != CKK_NSS_CHACHA20) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(
+ (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+ (CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt : sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
+ context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall thru */
+ case CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP:
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ context->blockSize = 8;
+ if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
+ (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
+ : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+ return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen, i;
+ unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (!pEncryptedPart) {
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
+ CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable / context->blockSize;
+
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* do padding */
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ /* deal with previous buffered data */
+ if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+ /* fill in the padded to a full block size */
+ for (i = context->padDataLength;
+ (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+ context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
+ ulPartLen--;
+ context->padDataLength++;
+ }
+
+ /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
+ if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ /* encrypt the current padded data */
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
+ &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
+ context->blockSize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
+ maxout -= padoutlen;
+ }
+ /* save the residual */
+ context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
+ if (context->padDataLength) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
+ &pPart[ulPartLen - context->padDataLength],
+ context->padDataLength);
+ ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+ }
+ /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
+ if (ulPartLen == 0) {
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
+ &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG)(outlen + padoutlen);
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen, i;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+ if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
+ /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+ if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
+ *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
+ contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
+ }
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ /* do padding */
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char)(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
+ /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
+ for (i = context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+ context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
+ }
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastEncryptedPart,
+ &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess)
+ *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+ }
+
+finish:
+ if (contextFinished)
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_RV crv2;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem pText;
+
+ pText.type = siBuffer;
+ pText.data = pData;
+ pText.len = ulDataLen;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (!pEncryptedData) {
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen : ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ if (context->multi) {
+ CK_ULONG finalLen;
+ /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+ * code deal with it */
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
+ pulEncryptedDataLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
+ maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+ pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+ finalLen = maxoutlen;
+ crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
+ if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
+ return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
+ }
+ /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
+ ** and only update. There will be no final.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
+ if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+ CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
+ CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder;
+ pText.len += padding;
+ pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+ if (pText.data) {
+ memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
+ memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
+ } else {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
+ &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
+ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+ if (pText.data != pData)
+ PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+fail:
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context);
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+ return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
+ PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0) || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
+
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ /* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
+ * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
+ * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
+ * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
+ * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
+ * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
+ */
+ if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
+ (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
+ return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!pPart) {
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ *pulPartLen =
+ ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
+ * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
+ * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
+ */
+ *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ /* first decrypt our saved buffer */
+ if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
+ maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ pPart += padoutlen;
+ maxout -= padoutlen;
+ }
+ /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, &pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
+ context->blockSize],
+ context->blockSize);
+ context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
+ ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+ }
+
+ /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &outlen,
+ maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
+ *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG)(outlen + padoutlen);
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ *pulLastPartLen = 0;
+ if (!pLastPart) {
+ /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+ if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
+ *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
+ }
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (context->doPad) {
+ /* decrypt our saved buffer */
+ if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+ /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
+ * buffer!!! */
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
+ maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ } else {
+ unsigned int padSize =
+ (unsigned int)pLastPart[context->blockSize - 1];
+ if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
+ crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
+ for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) {
+ badPadding |=
+ (unsigned int)pLastPart[context->blockSize - 1 - i] ^
+ padSize;
+ }
+ if (badPadding) {
+ crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context);
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_RV crv2;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (!pData) {
+ *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
+ CK_ULONG finalLen;
+ /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+ * code deal with it */
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
+ pData, pulDataLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ *pulDataLen = 0;
+ maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
+ pData += *pulDataLen;
+ finalLen = maxoutlen;
+ crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
+ if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
+ *pulDataLen += finalLen;
+ return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
+ }
+
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+ pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
+ /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
+ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
+ unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1];
+ if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
+ crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
+ for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
+ badPadding |= (unsigned int)pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding;
+ }
+ if (badPadding) {
+ crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ outlen -= padding;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context);
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, &context, SFTK_HASH, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+#define INIT_MECH(mech, mmm) \
+ case mech: { \
+ mmm##Context *mmm##_ctx = mmm##_NewContext(); \
+ context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm##_ctx; \
+ context->cipherInfoLen = mmm##_FlattenSize(mmm##_ctx); \
+ context->currentMech = mech; \
+ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)mmm##_Update; \
+ context->end = (SFTKEnd)mmm##_End; \
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)mmm##_DestroyContext; \
+ context->maxLen = mmm##_LENGTH; \
+ if (mmm##_ctx) \
+ mmm##_Begin(mmm##_ctx); \
+ else \
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+ break; \
+ }
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384)
+ INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512)
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int digestLen;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (pDigest == NULL) {
+ *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ /* do it: */
+ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
+ /* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
+ (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+ *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ /* do it: */
+ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+ unsigned int digestLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (pDigest != NULL) {
+ (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+ *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+ } else {
+ *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+ }
+
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
+ * that use hashes as part of their operations.
+ */
+#define DOSUB(mmm) \
+ static CK_RV \
+ sftk_doSub##mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) \
+ { \
+ mmm##Context *mmm##_ctx = mmm##_NewContext(); \
+ context->hashInfo = (void *)mmm##_ctx; \
+ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)mmm##_Update; \
+ context->end = (SFTKEnd)mmm##_End; \
+ context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy)mmm##_DestroyContext; \
+ if (!context->hashInfo) { \
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+ } \
+ mmm##_Begin(mmm##_ctx); \
+ return CKR_OK; \
+ }
+
+DOSUB(MD2)
+DOSUB(MD5)
+DOSUB(SHA1)
+DOSUB(SHA224)
+DOSUB(SHA256)
+DOSUB(SHA384)
+DOSUB(SHA512)
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SignCopy(
+ CK_ULONG *copyLen,
+ void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
+ unsigned int maxLength,
+ const unsigned char *hashResult,
+ unsigned int hashResultLength)
+{
+ unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
+ if (toCopy > maxLength) {
+ toCopy = maxLength;
+ }
+ if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
+ toCopy = hashResultLength;
+ }
+ memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
+ if (outLength) {
+ *outLength = toCopy;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+ unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ return (PORT_Memcmp(sig, hash, *copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * common HMAC initalization routine
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context, HASH_HashType hash,
+ SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+ HMACContext *HMACcontext;
+ CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash);
+ PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
+
+ /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */
+ if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length / 2)) {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (keyval == NULL)
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+
+ HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
+ (const unsigned char *)keyval->attrib.pValue,
+ keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
+ context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+ if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+ }
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)HMAC_Update;
+ context->end = (SFTKEnd)HMAC_Finish;
+
+ context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy)HMAC_Destroy;
+ intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+ if (intpointer == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ *intpointer = mac_size;
+ context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_HMACCmp;
+ context->maxLen = hashObj->length;
+ HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
+ * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
+ */
+
+/*
+ * FROM SSL:
+ * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
+ * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
+ * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
+ */
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_1[60] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_2[60] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen,
+ unsigned int maxLen, unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int out;
+
+ info->begin(info->hashContext);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, info->key, info->keySize);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, ssl_pad_2, info->padSize);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, hash, hashLen);
+ info->end(info->hashContext, tmpBuf, &out, SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(sig, tmpBuf, info->macSize);
+ *sigLen = info->macSize;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+ unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int out;
+
+ info->begin(info->hashContext);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, info->key, info->keySize);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, ssl_pad_2, info->padSize);
+ info->update(info->hashContext, hash, hashLen);
+ info->end(info->hashContext, tmpBuf, &out, SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+ return (PORT_Memcmp(sig, tmpBuf, info->macSize) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * common HMAC initalization routine
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context, SECOidTag oid,
+ SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+ SFTKBegin begin;
+ int padSize;
+ SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
+ crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ begin = (SFTKBegin)SHA1_Begin;
+ padSize = 40;
+ } else {
+ crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ begin = (SFTKBegin)MD5_Begin;
+ padSize = 48;
+ }
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+
+ keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (keyval == NULL)
+ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+
+ context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, keyval->attrib.pValue,
+ keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, ssl_pad_1, padSize);
+ sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
+ if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
+ sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
+ PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key, keyval->attrib.pValue,
+ keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
+ sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
+ sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
+ sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+ context->cipherInfo = (void *)sslmacinfo;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SSLMACSign;
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_SSLMACVerify;
+ context->maxLen = mac_size;
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
+ * @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
+ * @param keyUsage check whether key allows this usage
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+ SFTKContextType contextType)
+
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
+ CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
+ CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
+#endif
+ unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ unsigned int blockSize;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
+ if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+ mac_bytes =
+ ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_RC2_MAC:
+ /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+ * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
+ rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
+ pMechanism->pParameter)
+ ->ulEffectiveBits;
+ PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv, 0, sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
+ blockSize = 8;
+ break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes =
+ ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_RC5_MAC:
+ /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+ * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
+ rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
+ rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
+ rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
+ if ((blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize * 2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
+ break;
+#endif
+ /* add cast and idea later */
+ case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_DES_MAC:
+ blockSize = 8;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_DES3_MAC:
+ blockSize = 8;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
+ blockSize = 8;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_SEED_MAC:
+ blockSize = 16;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
+ blockSize = 16;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
+ mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_AES_MAC:
+ blockSize = 16;
+ PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+ cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+ cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+ cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ /* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
+ */
+ if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
+ mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
+ else {
+ if (mac_bytes > blockSize)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
+ keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+
+ /* this shouldn't happen! */
+ PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ context->blockSize = blockSize;
+ context->macSize = mac_bytes;
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
+ hash, hashLen);
+}
+
+/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
+static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
+ { DER_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
+ { DER_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(SECAlgorithmID, algorithm) },
+ { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
+ offsetof(SECAlgorithmID, parameters) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * XXX OLD Template. Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
+ * remove this.
+ */
+static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { DER_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
+ { DER_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digestAlgorithm),
+ SECAlgorithmIDTemplate },
+ { DER_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digest) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+ */
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem digder;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+
+ digder.data = NULL;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Construct digest info */
+ di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
+ if (!di) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
+ rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
+ ** block
+ */
+ rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
+ digder.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+ if (arena != NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+ inputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+ const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+ HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
+
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+ maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+
+ rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
+ params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+ void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+ SECItem signature, digest;
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+
+ signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+ signature.len = sigLen;
+ digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+ digest.len = dataLen;
+ return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+ unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+ void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+ SECItem signature, digest;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+
+ signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+ signature.len = maxSigLen;
+ digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+ digest.len = dataLen;
+ rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ *sigLen = signature.len;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+ void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+ SECItem signature, digest;
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+
+ signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+ signature.len = sigLen;
+ digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+ digest.len = dataLen;
+ return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+ unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+ void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+ SECItem signature, digest;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+
+ signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+ signature.len = maxSigLen;
+ digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+ digest.len = dataLen;
+ rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ *sigLen = signature.len;
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
+ * types of signing:
+ * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
+ * to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
+ * encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
+ * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
+ * some sort of signature to the end.
+ * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
+ * and only the final block is part of the mac.
+ *
+ * For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
+ * (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
+ * C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
+ * have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
+ *
+ * For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
+ * multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
+ * calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
+ * operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
+ * opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
+ * copy (as is the case with HMAC).
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+ SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
+ if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+ return crv;
+
+ /* we're not using a block cipher mac */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, &context, SFTK_SIGN, &key, hKey, &key_type,
+ CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, CKA_SIGN);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+
+#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \
+ case CKM_##mmm##_RSA_PKCS: \
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
+ crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) \
+ break; \
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSAHashSign; \
+ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \
+ if (info == NULL) { \
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \
+ goto finish_rsa;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
+ INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASign;
+ goto finish_rsa;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASignRaw;
+ finish_rsa:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
+ * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
+ * signature.
+ */
+ if (info) {
+ info->key = privKey;
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ } else {
+ context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
+ }
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+ !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+ info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (info->key == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASignPSS;
+ context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_DSA:
+ if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_DSA, &crv);
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
+ context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+ context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+
+ break;
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_ECDSA:
+ if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_EC, &crv);
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_ECDSASignStub;
+ context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+ context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \
+ case CKM_##mmm##_HMAC_GENERAL: \
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg##mmm, key, \
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
+ break; \
+ case CKM_##mmm##_HMAC: \
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg##mmm, key, mmm##_LENGTH); \
+ break;
+
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_AlgSHA1, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_AlgSHA1, key, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+ crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_MD5, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+ crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_SHA1, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+ crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case CKM_TLS_MAC: {
+ CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *tls12_mac_params;
+ HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash;
+ const char *label;
+
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ tls12_mac_params = (CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ if (tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
+ /* The TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF */
+ tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
+ if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */
+ tlsPrfHash =
+ GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism);
+ if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL ||
+ tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) {
+ label = "server finished";
+ } else if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 2) {
+ label = "client finished";
+ } else {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, tlsPrfHash,
+ tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, label, 15);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+ crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+ sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism, key);
+ CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ break;
+ }
+ intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+ if (intpointer == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+
+ context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+ context->hashInfo = ctx;
+ context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
+ context->hashUpdate = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
+ context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+ context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+ context->maxLen = 64;
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+ sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism, key);
+ CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ break;
+ }
+ intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+ if (intpointer == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(ctx);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+
+ context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+ context->hashInfo = ctx;
+ context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
+ context->hashUpdate = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
+ context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+ context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+ context->maxLen = 64;
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (info)
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** MAC one block of data by block cipher
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACBlock(SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ return (SECSuccess == (ctx->update)(ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
+ SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize))
+ ? CKR_OK
+ : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
+ *
+ * Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACFinal(SFTKSessionContext *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
+ /* pad and proceed the residual */
+ if (padLen) {
+ /* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
+ PORT_Memset(ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen);
+ return sftk_MACBlock(ctx, ctx->padBuf);
+ } else
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
+ * setup and final operations).
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, SFTKContextType type)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, type, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (context->hashInfo) {
+ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+ } else {
+ /* must be block cipher MACing */
+
+ unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
+ unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
+ context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
+ unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
+ blkSize - context->padDataLength;
+
+ /* not enough data even for one block */
+ if (ulPartLen < minInput) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, ulPartLen);
+ context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ /* MACing residual */
+ if (context->padDataLength) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, minInput);
+ ulPartLen -= minInput;
+ pPart += minInput;
+ if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, context->padBuf)))
+ goto terminate;
+ }
+ /* MACing full blocks */
+ while (ulPartLen >= blkSize) {
+ if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, pPart)))
+ goto terminate;
+ ulPartLen -= blkSize;
+ pPart += blkSize;
+ }
+ /* save the residual */
+ if ((context->padDataLength = ulPartLen))
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen);
+ } /* blk cipher MACing */
+
+ goto cleanup;
+
+terminate:
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, type, context);
+cleanup:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+ return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * returning the signature. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_SIGN, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (context->hashInfo) {
+ unsigned int digestLen;
+ unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+ if (!pSignature) {
+ outlen = context->maxLen;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+ if (SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+ &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ /* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
+ * Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
+ * application read EXACT signature length */
+ } else {
+ /* must be block cipher MACing */
+ outlen = context->macSize;
+ /* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
+ if (!pSignature || maxoutlen < outlen) {
+ if (pSignature)
+ crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context)))
+ PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen);
+ }
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+finish:
+ *pulSignatureLen = outlen;
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_SIGN, PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (!pSignature) {
+ /* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
+ *pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
+ ? context->maxLen
+ : context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
+ * sign Final */
+ if (context->multi) {
+ /* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
+ if (CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
+ crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
+ } else {
+ /* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+ if (SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+ &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+ /* "too small" here is certainly continuable */
+ if (crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+ } /* single-part */
+
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************
+ */
+/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
+ * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ return NSC_SignInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
+ * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ return NSC_Sign(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************
+ */
+
+/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
+ digestLen);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
+ const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+ const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+ unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
+ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
+ SECItem digest;
+ unsigned int bufferSize;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
+ bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
+ pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
+ if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
+ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
+
+ /* decrypt the block */
+ rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
+ &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
+ sig, sigLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else {
+ digest.data = (PRUint8 *)digestData;
+ digest.len = digestLen;
+ rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
+ digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
+ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+ unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+ unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+ HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+ HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
+
+ PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+ maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+
+ return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+ params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+ SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
+ if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+ return crv;
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, &key, hKey, &key_type,
+ CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKA_VERIFY);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+
+#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \
+ case CKM_##mmm##_RSA_PKCS: \
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
+ crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) \
+ break; \
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_hashCheckSign; \
+ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \
+ if (info == NULL) { \
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \
+ goto finish_rsa;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
+ INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSign;
+ goto finish_rsa;
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
+ finish_rsa:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ if (info)
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ if (info)
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (info) {
+ info->key = pubKey;
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+ } else {
+ context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+ !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+ info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (info->key == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = info;
+ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_DSA:
+ if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_DSA, &crv);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+ break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+ crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_ECDSA:
+ if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_EC, &crv);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+ context->verify = (SFTKVerify)nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
+ context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+ INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_AlgSHA1, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
+ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_AlgSHA1, key, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+ crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_MD5, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+ crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_SHA1, key,
+ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+ break;
+ case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+ crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+ crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (info)
+ PORT_Free(info);
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
+ * VerifyFinal */
+ if (context->multi) {
+ /* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
+ if (CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
+ crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+ } else {
+ if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+ ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+ }
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+ return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
+ * checking the signature. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (!pSignature)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ if (context->hashInfo) {
+ unsigned int digestLen;
+ unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+ (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+ if (SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+ ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ } else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
+ /* must be block cipher MACing */
+ crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
+ } else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
+ crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+ sig, sigLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+ if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+ sig, sigLen);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
+ * where the data is recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, &context, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ &key, hKey, &key_type, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+ if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+ context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+ pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+ context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+ ? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw
+ : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
+ context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+ * where the data is recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ PR_FALSE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ if (pData == NULL) {
+ /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return
+ * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
+ *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+ pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+ *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+
+ sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+finish:
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/*
+ **************************** Random Functions: ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
+ * generator. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
+ /*
+ * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
+ * seeded with enough entropy.
+ */
+ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/*
+ **************************** Key Functions: ************************
+ */
+
+/*
+ * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
+ * PKCS5 to do the work.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+ void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+ SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
+ CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+
+ *key_length = 0;
+ iv.data = NULL;
+ iv.len = 0;
+
+ if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+ pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
+ /* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
+ pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
+ } else {
+ pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
+ pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
+ }
+ pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
+ if (pbe_key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
+ *key_length = pbe_key->len;
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
+ pbe_key = NULL;
+
+ if (iv.data) {
+ if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
+ }
+ PORT_Free(iv.data);
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
+ * the official subset by freebl.
+ */
+static unsigned int
+sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
+{
+ if (primeBits <= 1024) {
+ return 160;
+ } else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
+ return 224;
+ } else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
+ return 256;
+ } else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
+ return 384;
+ } else {
+ return 512;
+ }
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+ SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+ CK_ULONG counter;
+ unsigned int seedBits = 0;
+ unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
+ unsigned int primeBits;
+ unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ PQGParams *params = NULL;
+ PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+ if (attribute == NULL) {
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME);
+ if (attribute == NULL) {
+ return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ } else {
+ primeBits = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ }
+ } else {
+ primeBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ }
+ if (primeBits < 1024) {
+ j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
+ if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+ if (attribute != NULL) {
+ seedBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ }
+
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+ if (attribute != NULL) {
+ subprimeBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ }
+
+ /* if P and Q are supplied, we want to generate a new G */
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME);
+ if (attribute != NULL) {
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ params = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(*params));
+ if (params == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ params->arena = arena;
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &params->prime, key, CKA_PRIME);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &params->subPrime,
+ key, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ vfy = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(*vfy));
+ if (vfy == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ vfy->arena = arena;
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &vfy->seed, key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &vfy->h, key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H);
+ }
+
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+
+ /* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
+ if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
+ if (seedBits == 0) {
+ rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, &params, &vfy);
+ } else {
+ rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j, seedBits / 8, &params, &vfy);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (subprimeBits == 0) {
+ subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
+ }
+ if (seedBits == 0) {
+ seedBits = primeBits;
+ }
+ rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits / 8, &params, &vfy);
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
+ params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+ params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
+ params->base.data, params->base.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ counter = vfy->counter;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER,
+ &counter, sizeof(counter));
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED,
+ vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H,
+ vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+
+loser:
+ if (params) {
+ PQG_DestroyParams(params);
+ }
+
+ if (vfy) {
+ PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
+ CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+ switch (mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_RC2;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_RC5;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_RC4;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_CDMF;
+ *key_length = 8;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_DES;
+ *key_length = 8;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_DES2;
+ *key_length = 16;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_DES3;
+ *key_length = 24;
+ break;
+ case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_SEED;
+ *key_length = 16;
+ break;
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_AES;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+ *key_type = CKK_NSS_CHACHA20;
+ if (*key_length == 0)
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+CK_RV
+nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
+{
+ SECItem salt;
+ CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ *pbe = NULL;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+ sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
+ if (params == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ params->poolp = arena;
+ params->ivLen = 0;
+ params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+ params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
+ params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
+ params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
+ pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+
+ salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+ salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+ salt.type = siBuffer;
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &params->salt, &salt);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+ params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ params->keyLen = 20;
+ break;
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
+ params->keyLen = 16;
+ break;
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
+ params->keyLen = 16;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+ *pbe = params;
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* maybe this should be table driven? */
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe,
+ CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SECOidData *oid;
+ CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
+ HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+ SECItem salt;
+ CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
+
+ *pbe = NULL;
+
+ oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
+ if (oid == NULL) {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+ pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ if (pbkd2_params == NULL) {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+ switch (pbkd2_params->prf) {
+ case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ break;
+ case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA224;
+ break;
+ case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ break;
+ case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ break;
+ case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ }
+ salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
+ salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+ iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
+ } else {
+ pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+ salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+ iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+ }
+ params = nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, hashType, &salt, iteration);
+ if (params == NULL) {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ switch (params->encAlg) {
+ case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
+ *key_type = CKK_DES;
+ *key_length = params->keyLen;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
+ *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
+ *key_length = params->keyLen;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
+ *key_type = CKK_RC2;
+ *key_length = params->keyLen;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_RC4:
+ *key_type = CKK_RC4;
+ *key_length = params->keyLen;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
+ /* key type must already be set */
+ if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
+ */
+ if (*key_length == 0) {
+ *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
+ }
+ if (*key_length == 0) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ }
+ params->keyLen = *key_length;
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ *pbe = params;
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
+ CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ int i;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ enum { nsc_pbe,
+ nsc_ssl,
+ nsc_bulk,
+ nsc_param,
+ nsc_jpake } key_gen_type;
+ NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
+ SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+ CK_VERSION *version;
+ /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
+ * generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not
+ * produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES.
+ */
+ PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
+ HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * load the template values into the object
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ulCount; i++) {
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+ key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* some algorithms need keytype specified */
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+ key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
+ /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+ key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+ checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+ case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+#endif
+ crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism, &key_type, &key_length);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
+ key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ key_length = 48;
+ key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
+ break;
+ case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+ key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+ key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
+ break;
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
+ faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
+ /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
+ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
+ case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
+ case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
+ case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
+ case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
+ key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+ crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
+ break;
+ case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
+ key_gen_type = nsc_param;
+ key_type = CKK_DSA;
+ objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
+ crv = CKR_OK;
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ goto jpake1;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ goto jpake1;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ goto jpake1;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ goto jpake1;
+ jpake1:
+ key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
+ key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
+ objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+ pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = CKR_OK;
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
+ if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
+ /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
+ * be... */
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* if there was no error,
+ * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
+ PORT_Assert(key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE);
+
+ /*
+ * now to the actual key gen.
+ */
+ switch (key_gen_type) {
+ case nsc_pbe:
+ crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
+ faultyPBE3DES);
+ nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
+ break;
+ case nsc_ssl:
+ rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
+ version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
+ rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
+ crv =
+ NSC_GenerateRandom(0, &rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
+ break;
+ case nsc_bulk:
+ /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
+ do {
+ crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
+ } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf, key_type));
+ break;
+ case nsc_param:
+ /* generate parameters */
+ *buf = 0;
+ crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type, key);
+ break;
+ case nsc_jpake:
+ crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
+ (CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ key);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* Add the class, key_type, and value */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS, &objclass, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ if (key_length != 0) {
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, key_length);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* get the session */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle the base object stuff
+ */
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ *phKey = key->handle;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
+#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
+ *
+ * This function returns
+ * CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed
+ * CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed
+ * other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be
+ * performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+ /*
+ * Key type Mechanism type
+ * --------------------------------
+ * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+ *
+ * For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA
+ * CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA
+ * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+ *
+ * None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
+ */
+ CK_MECHANISM mech = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+
+ CK_ULONG modulusLen = 0;
+ CK_ULONG subPrimeLen = 0;
+ PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
+ unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
+ unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
+ unsigned char *ciphertext;
+ unsigned char *text_compared;
+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
+ CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
+ CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
+ /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
+ unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
+ unsigned char *signature;
+ CK_ULONG signature_length;
+
+ if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
+ SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+
+ /* Get modulus length of private key. */
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+ if (attribute == NULL) {
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+ modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+ modulusLen--;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ } else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
+ SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+
+ /* Get subprime length of private key. */
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+ if (attribute == NULL) {
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+ subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+ subPrimeLen--;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ }
+
+ /**************************************************/
+ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
+ /**************************************************/
+
+ isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
+
+ /*
+ * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
+ * with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
+ */
+ if (isEncryptable) {
+ if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+ bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
+ mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+
+ /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
+ ciphertext = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
+ if (ciphertext == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
+ crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt using the public key. */
+ crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
+ known_message,
+ PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
+ ciphertext,
+ &bytes_encrypted);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
+ bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * If there was a failure, the plaintext
+ * goes at the end, therefore . . .
+ */
+ text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to ensure that ciphertext does
+ * NOT EQUAL known input message text
+ * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
+ */
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
+ bytes_compared) == 0) {
+ /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
+ crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
+ * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
+ */
+ bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt using the private key.
+ * NOTE: No need to reset the
+ * value of bytes_encrypted.
+ */
+ crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
+ ciphertext,
+ bytes_encrypted,
+ plaintext,
+ &bytes_decrypted);
+
+ /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
+ PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check to ensure that the output plaintext
+ * does EQUAL known input message text.
+ */
+ if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
+ (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
+ PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
+ /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**********************************************/
+ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
+ /**********************************************/
+
+ canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
+ /* Unfortunately CKA_SIGN is always true in lg dbs. We have to check the
+ * actual curve to determine if we can do sign/verify. */
+ if (canSignVerify && keyType == CKK_EC) {
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
+ if (privKey && privKey->u.ec.ecParams.name == ECCurve25519) {
+ canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (canSignVerify) {
+ /* Determine length of signature. */
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case CKK_RSA:
+ signature_length = modulusLen;
+ mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case CKK_DSA:
+ signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+ pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
+ mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
+ break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case CKK_EC:
+ signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+ mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space for signature data. */
+ signature = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
+ if (signature == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
+ crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(signature);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
+ known_digest,
+ pairwise_digest_length,
+ signature,
+ &signature_length);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(signature);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
+ crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(signature);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
+ known_digest,
+ pairwise_digest_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length);
+
+ /* Free signature data. */
+ PORT_Free(signature);
+
+ if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
+ (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return crv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**********************************************/
+ /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */
+ /**********************************************/
+
+ isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
+
+ if (isDerivable) {
+ /*
+ * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key -
+ * otherwise it would be here
+ * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys
+ * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise
+ * consistency check for signing/verification.
+ */
+ /*
+ * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for
+ * public and private keys used for key agreement:
+ * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the
+ * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible
+ * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both
+ * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare
+ * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are
+ * not equal, the test shall fail.
+ * This test was removed in Change Notice 3.
+ */
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
+ * creating new key objects. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
+{
+ SFTKObject *publicKey, *privateKey;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ int i;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ unsigned int bitSize;
+
+ /* RSA */
+ int public_modulus_bits = 0;
+ SECItem pubExp;
+ RSAPrivateKey *rsaPriv;
+
+ /* DSA */
+ PQGParams pqgParam;
+ DHParams dhParam;
+ DSAPrivateKey *dsaPriv;
+
+ /* Diffie Hellman */
+ DHPrivateKey *dhPriv;
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
+ SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */
+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
+ ECParams *ecParams;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (publicKey == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * load the template values into the publicKey
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+ if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
+ sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (privateKey == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now load the private key template
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+ if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
+ sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_CLASS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+
+ /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ /* format the keys */
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_1);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_2);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_1);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_2);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_COEFFICIENT);
+ key_type = CKK_RSA;
+ if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* extract the exponent */
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pubExp, publicKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
+ if (bitSize < 2) {
+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
+ PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
+ if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+ /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_1,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_2,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto kpg_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
+ kpg_done:
+ /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
+ PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+ case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+ key_type = CKK_DSA;
+
+ /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.prime, publicKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.subPrime, publicKey,
+ CKA_SUBPRIME);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
+ sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+ sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * these are checked by DSA_NewKey
+ */
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
+ pqgParam.subPrime.len);
+ if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data, pqgParam.prime.len);
+ if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data, pqgParam.base.len);
+ if ((bitSize < 2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the key */
+ rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
+
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* store the generated key into the attributes */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto dsagn_done;
+
+ /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto dsagn_done;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
+
+ dsagn_done:
+ /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+ PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+ key_type = CKK_DH;
+
+ /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
+ CKA_PRIME);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data, dhParam.prime.len);
+ if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data, dhParam.base.len);
+ if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto dhgn_done;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto dhgn_done;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
+
+ dhgn_done:
+ /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+ PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+ key_type = CKK_EC;
+
+ /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+ sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
+ rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
+ PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+ sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+ ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_plain) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+ } else {
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+ SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+ &ecPriv->publicValue,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+ if (!pubValue) {
+ crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ goto ecgn_done;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+ sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto ecgn_done;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto ecgn_done;
+
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
+ sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+ ecgn_done:
+ /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
+ * on errors and clean up at the bottom */
+ session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
+ /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
+ do {
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_CLASS, &privClass,
+ sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS, &pubClass,
+ sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+ sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+ sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ } while (0);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
+ */
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey, session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
+ * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
+ * created and linked.
+ */
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ return crv;
+ }
+ if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+ &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(publicKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+ &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+ &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(publicKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+ &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
+ crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession,
+ publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
+ char msg[128];
+ PR_snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+ "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
+ "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
+ "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
+ (PRUint32)hSession, (PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
+ (PRUint32)crv);
+ sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+ *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+ sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+ sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static SECItem *
+sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
+{
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+ void *dummy, *param = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+ SECItem *fordebug;
+#endif
+ int savelen;
+#endif
+
+ if (!key) {
+ *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if (!attribute) {
+ *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ if (!lk) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */
+ if (!arena) {
+ *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+ sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+ if (!pki) {
+ *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ pki->arena = arena;
+
+ param = NULL;
+ switch (lk->keyType) {
+ case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+ prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+ nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
+ algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+ break;
+ case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+ prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+ nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
+ prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
+ param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
+ nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
+ algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+ prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+ /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
+ * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
+ * immediately after.
+ *
+ * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
+ * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
+ * length before encoding and restore it later.
+ */
+ lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
+ savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
+ lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+ nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
+ lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
+ lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+ fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
+ SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
+ fordebug);
+#endif
+
+ param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+
+ algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+ case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+ default:
+ dummy = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
+ *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
+ (SECItem *)param);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
+ NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
+ if (!dummy) {
+ *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
+ nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
+ *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+ fordebug = encodedKey;
+ SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
+ fordebug);
+#endif
+loser:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ if (lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
+ }
+
+ if (param) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem *)param, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return encodedKey;
+}
+
+/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
+ * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
+{
+ switch (crv) {
+ case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID:
+ crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ switch (key->objclass) {
+ case CKO_SECRET_KEY: {
+ SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+ SECItem pText;
+
+ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
+ if (attribute == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+ CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pText.type = siBuffer;
+ pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+ pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+ /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
+ break;
+ if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+ unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
+ if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
+ /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
+ ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
+ ** a full block.
+ */
+ pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
+ pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+ if (pText.data)
+ memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
+ attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ else {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
+ pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+ /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
+ * we are just getting the size */
+ if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+ CK_RV lcrv;
+ lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context,
+ SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+ if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
+ PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: {
+ SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
+ SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+
+ if (!bpki) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+ CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
+ pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+ /* always force a finalize */
+ if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+ CK_RV lcrv;
+ lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context,
+ SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+ if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ }
+ }
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+
+ return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
+{
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
+ void *paramDest = NULL;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
+ if (!arena) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+ sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+ if (!pki) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+ sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
+ if (lpk == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ lpk->arena = arena;
+
+ switch (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+ keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
+ paramTemplate = NULL;
+ paramDest = NULL;
+ lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
+ prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+ keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
+ paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
+ paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
+ lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
+ prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
+ prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
+ break;
+/* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
+ paramTemplate = NULL;
+ paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+ lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
+ prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+ prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+ default:
+ keyTemplate = NULL;
+ paramTemplate = NULL;
+ paramDest = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!keyTemplate) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
+ /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
+ lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
+ &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
+ &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (paramDest && paramTemplate) {
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
+ &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ switch (lpk->keyType) {
+ case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+ keyType = CKK_RSA;
+ if (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
+ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+ sizeof(keyType));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
+ break;
+ case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+ keyType = CKK_DSA;
+ crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+ sizeof(keyType));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ break;
+#ifdef notdef
+ case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+ template = dhTemplate;
+ templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+ keyType = CKK_DH;
+ break;
+#endif
+/* what about fortezza??? */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+ keyType = CKK_EC;
+ crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+ sizeof(keyType));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+ sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ if (lpk) {
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ int i;
+ CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ SECItem bpki;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * load the template values into the object
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+ key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
+ target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hUnwrappingKey, CKA_UNWRAP,
+ CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+ }
+
+ /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
+ * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
+ * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(ulWrappedKeyLen);
+ bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+
+ crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ PORT_Free(buf);
+ return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+ }
+
+ switch (target_type) {
+ case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
+ if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
+ key_length = bsize;
+ }
+ if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* add the value */
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, key_length);
+ break;
+ case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
+ bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
+ bpki.len = bsize;
+ crv = CKR_OK;
+ if (sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* get the session */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle the base object stuff
+ */
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ *phKey = key->handle;
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
+ * details of each of these key creation.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
+ PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
+{
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+
+ crv = sftk_CopyObject(key, baseKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ if (isMacKey) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ENCRYPT, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_WRAP, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, keyBlock, keySize);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* get the session */
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ *keyHandle = key->handle;
+loser:
+ if (key)
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
+ * This is the routine that will do it..
+ */
+static void
+sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial)
+{
+ if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
+ }
+ if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
+ }
+ if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
+ }
+ if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
+ * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
+ * semantics.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey, SFTKObject *destKey)
+{
+ PRBool hasSensitive;
+ PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool hasExtractable;
+ PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SFTKAttribute *att;
+
+ hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey, CKA_SENSITIVE);
+ if (att) {
+ hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
+ sensitive = (PRBool) * (CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ }
+
+ hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+ if (att) {
+ hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
+ extractable = (PRBool) * (CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ }
+
+ /* don't make a key more accessible */
+ if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey, CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
+ (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
+ return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ }
+ if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
+ (extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
+ return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ }
+
+ /* inherit parent's sensitivity */
+ if (!hasSensitive) {
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey, CKA_SENSITIVE);
+ if (att == NULL)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey, sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ }
+ if (!hasExtractable) {
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+ if (att == NULL)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey, sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
+ * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
+ * something special. */
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
+ */
+unsigned long
+sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case CKK_CDMF:
+ return 8;
+ case CKK_DES:
+ return 8;
+ case CKK_DES2:
+ return 16;
+ case CKK_DES3:
+ return 24;
+ /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+/* Inputs:
+ * key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
+ * SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
+ * SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
+ * SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
+ * Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
+ * HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
+ * Output:
+ * key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+ SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
+ CK_ULONG HashLen)
+{
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
+ PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be
+ * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
+ * to a maximum value of 255. */
+ if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (SharedInfo == NULL)
+ SharedInfoLen = 0;
+
+ buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
+ buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ max_counter = key_len / HashLen;
+ if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
+ max_counter++;
+
+ output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
+ if (output_buffer == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
+ * where Counter is 0x00000001 */
+ PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
+ buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
+ buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
+ buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
+ buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
+ if (SharedInfo) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max_counter; i++) {
+ rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* 'Hash' should not fail. */
+ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
+ buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
+ }
+
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+ if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
+ PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
+ }
+ *key = output_buffer;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+
+loser:
+ if (buffer) {
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+ }
+ if (output_buffer) {
+ PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
+ SECItem *SharedSecret,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
+{
+ if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
+ return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+ SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
+ return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+ SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
+ else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
+ return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+ SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
+ else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
+ return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+ SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
+ else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
+ return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+ SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
+ else
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+/*
+ * SSL Key generation given pre master secret
+ */
+#define NUM_MIXERS 9
+static const char *const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
+ "A",
+ "BB",
+ "CCC",
+ "DDDD",
+ "EEEEE",
+ "FFFFFF",
+ "GGGGGGG",
+ "HHHHHHHH",
+ "IIIIIIIII"
+};
+#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
+
+/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+ SFTKObject *key;
+ SFTKObject *sourceKey;
+ SFTKAttribute *att = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *att2 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ SHA1Context *sha;
+ MD5Context *md5;
+ MD2Context *md2;
+ CK_ULONG macSize;
+ CK_ULONG tmpKeySize;
+ CK_ULONG IVSize;
+ CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = pMechanism->mechanism;
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE;
+ HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int outLen;
+ unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ PRBool isFIPS;
+ HASH_HashType hashType;
+ PRBool extractValue = PR_TRUE;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ if (!slot) {
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+ */
+ if (phKey)
+ *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+ isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
+
+ /*
+ * load the template values into the object
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+ keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ }
+ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+ keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
+ }
+
+ switch (mechanism) {
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
+ extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+ classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
+ extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_CLASS, &classType, sizeof(classType));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* look up the base key we're deriving with */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (sourceKey == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (extractValue) {
+ /* get the value of the base key */
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (mechanism) {
+ /*
+ * generate the master secret
+ */
+ case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
+ case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+ case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: {
+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
+ SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+ unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+
+ if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) ||
+ (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master =
+ (CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
+ if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) ||
+ (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) {
+ tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ }
+
+ if ((mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
+ (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+ isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if ((mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+ (mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+ (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256) ||
+ (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+ isDH = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* first do the consistency checks */
+ if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+ CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+ if (att2)
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* finally do the key gen */
+ ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
+ pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
+ ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
+ SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+ rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
+ if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
+ ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
+ ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
+ } else {
+ ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
+ ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS) {
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ crsr.data = crsrdata;
+ crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
+ master.data = key_block;
+ master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+ pms.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+ if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "master secret",
+ &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+ } else {
+ status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+ }
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* now allocate the hash contexts */
+ md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+ if (md5 == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+ if (sha == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(md5);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ SHA1_Begin(sha);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char *)mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+ SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
+ SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+
+ MD5_Begin(md5);
+ MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+ MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i * MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+ }
+ PORT_Free(md5);
+ PORT_Free(sha);
+ }
+
+ /* store the results */
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ if (isTLS) {
+ /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
+ /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts
+ * one "operation" argument. */
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Extended master key derivation [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash] */
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: {
+ CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ems_params;
+ SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem seed = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ ems_params = (CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
+ pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+ /* First do the consistency checks */
+ if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
+ (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if ((att2 == NULL) ||
+ (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+ if (att2)
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the key derivation */
+ pms.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ seed.data = ems_params->pSessionHash;
+ seed.len = ems_params->ulSessionHashLen;
+ master.data = key_block;
+ master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+ if (ems_params->prfHashMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
+ /*
+ * In this case, the session hash is the concatenation of SHA-1
+ * and MD5, so it should be 36 bytes long.
+ */
+ if (seed.len != MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "extended master secret",
+ &seed, &master, isFIPS);
+ } else {
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj;
+
+ tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism);
+ if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(tlsPrfHash);
+ if (seed.len != hashObj->length) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "extended master secret",
+ &seed, &master, isFIPS);
+ }
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Reflect the version if required */
+ if (ems_params->pVersion) {
+ SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+ rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ /* don't leak more key material than necessary for SSL to work */
+ if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
+ ems_params->pVersion->major = 0xff;
+ ems_params->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
+ } else {
+ ems_params->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
+ ems_params->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Store the results */
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
+ case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: {
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *ssl3_keys_out;
+ CK_ULONG effKeySize;
+ unsigned int block_needed;
+ unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+
+ if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
+ CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys =
+ (CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
+ if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
+ tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ }
+
+ if (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
+ isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+ CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+ if (att2)
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+ if (md5 == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+ if (sha == NULL) {
+ MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
+ ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
+ ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
+ */
+ ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+ ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ /*
+ * How much key material do we need?
+ */
+ macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits / 8;
+ effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits / 8;
+ IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits / 8;
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ effKeySize = keySize;
+ }
+
+ /* bIsExport must be false. */
+ if (ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
+ MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+ SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + IVSize);
+ PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
+ if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
+ block_needed = sizeof key_block;
+
+ /*
+ * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
+ * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
+ */
+ if (isTLS) {
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ srcr.data = srcrdata;
+ srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
+ keyblk.data = key_block;
+ keyblk.len = block_needed;
+ master.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+ if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
+ status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &master, "key expansion",
+ &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+ } else {
+ status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
+ isFIPS);
+ }
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
+ /* key_block =
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * [...];
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
+ SHA1_Begin(sha);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char *)mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+ SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
+ SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+ MD5_Begin(md5);
+ MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+ MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i * MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+ block_bytes += outLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Put the key material where it goes.
+ */
+ i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
+
+ /*
+ * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
+ * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+ */
+ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_TRUE, &key_block[i], macSize,
+ &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+
+ i += macSize;
+
+ /*
+ * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+ */
+ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_TRUE, &key_block[i], macSize,
+ &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ i += macSize;
+
+ if (keySize) {
+ /*
+ ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
+ ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ */
+ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, &key_block[i],
+ keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ i += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ */
+ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, &key_block[i],
+ keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ i += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+ */
+ if (IVSize > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
+ &key_block[i], IVSize);
+ i += IVSize;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+ */
+ if (IVSize > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
+ &key_block[i], IVSize);
+ i += IVSize;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
+ }
+
+ crv = CKR_OK;
+
+ if (0) {
+ key_and_mac_derive_fail:
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
+ }
+ MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+ SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: {
+ SFTKObject *newKey;
+
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
+ pMechanism->pParameter,
+ session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (sftk_isTrue(newKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey, CKA_SENSITIVE, &cktrue,
+ sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (att2 == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+ crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = tmpKeySize;
+ if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf + att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+ att2->attrib.pValue, att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+ sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + stringPtr->ulLen;
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = tmpKeySize;
+ if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf + att->attrib.ulValueLen, stringPtr->pData,
+ stringPtr->ulLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + stringPtr->ulLen;
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = tmpKeySize;
+ if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, stringPtr->pData, stringPtr->ulLen);
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf + stringPtr->ulLen, att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen, stringPtr->ulLen);
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = tmpKeySize;
+ if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, keySize);
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+ buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: {
+ /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
+ CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
+ CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */
+
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
+ if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
+ (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0) ? 1 : 0))) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* copy the bits we need into the new key */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+ unsigned char *value =
+ ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue) + offset + i;
+ if (shift) {
+ buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
+ } else {
+ buf[i] = value[0];
+ }
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+ PORT_ZFree(buf, keySize);
+ break;
+ }
+ case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* now allocate the hash contexts */
+ md2 = MD2_NewContext();
+ if (md2 == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ MD2_Begin(md2);
+ MD2_Update(md2, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ MD2_End(md2, key_block, &outLen, MD2_LENGTH);
+ MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ MD5_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+ case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ SHA1_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = SHA224_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ SHA224_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ SHA256_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = SHA384_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ SHA384_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
+ if (keySize == 0)
+ keySize = SHA512_LENGTH;
+ if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ SHA512_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: {
+ SECItem derived, dhPublic;
+ SECItem dhPrime, dhValue;
+ /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
+ /* get prime and value attributes */
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
+ if (crv != SECSuccess)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+ if (crv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
+ dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
+
+ /* calculate private value - oct */
+ rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
+
+ PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
+ PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
+ PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
+ } else
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
+ case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: {
+ SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint;
+ SECItem tmp;
+ PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
+ unsigned char *secret;
+ unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
+ unsigned int secretlen, pubKeyLen;
+ CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+
+ /* Check mechanism parameters */
+ mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
+ ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
+ ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
+ (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
+ if (privKey == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
+
+ ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
+ ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
+
+ pubKeyLen = EC_GetPointSize(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams);
+
+ /* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */
+ if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) {
+ goto ec_loser;
+ }
+ /* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is
+ * equal case just falls through */
+ if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
+ SECItem newPoint;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ goto ec_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
+ &ecPoint);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto ec_loser;
+ }
+ ecPoint = newPoint;
+ }
+
+ if (mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
+ withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should
+ * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup
+ * attacks.
+ */
+ if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint) != SECSuccess) {
+ goto ec_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
+ withCofactor, &tmp);
+ PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
+ ecScalar.data = NULL;
+ if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+ privKey = NULL;
+ }
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ arena = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * apply the kdf function.
+ */
+ if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
+ /*
+ * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
+ * secret and secretlen are the values we will
+ * eventually pass as our generated key.
+ */
+ secret = tmp.data;
+ secretlen = tmp.len;
+ } else {
+ secretlen = keySize;
+ crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
+ &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
+ mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
+ PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ break;
+ }
+ tmp.data = secret;
+ tmp.len = secretlen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
+ * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
+ * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
+ * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
+ * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
+ */
+ if (keySize) {
+ if (secretlen < keySize) {
+ keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
+ if (!keyData) {
+ PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
+ secret = keyData;
+ } else {
+ secret += (secretlen - keySize);
+ }
+ secretlen = keySize;
+ }
+
+ sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
+ PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+ if (keyData) {
+ PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ ec_loser:
+ crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+ PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
+ if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
+ nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+
+ /* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
+ case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ goto hkdf;
+ case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ goto hkdf;
+ case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ goto hkdf;
+ case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ goto hkdf;
+ hkdf : {
+ const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *params =
+ (const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+ const SECHashObject *rawHash;
+ unsigned hashLen;
+ CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ CK_BYTE *prk; /* psuedo-random key */
+ CK_ULONG prkLen;
+ CK_BYTE *okm; /* output keying material */
+
+ rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
+ if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) {
+ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ break;
+ }
+ hashLen = rawHash->length;
+
+ if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) ||
+ !params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
+ (params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
+ (params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block ||
+ (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
+ (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+
+ /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
+ if (params->bExtract) {
+ CK_BYTE *salt;
+ CK_ULONG saltLen;
+ HMACContext *hmac;
+ unsigned int bufLen;
+
+ salt = params->pSalt;
+ saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
+ if (salt == NULL) {
+ saltLen = hashLen;
+ salt = buf;
+ memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
+ }
+ hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
+ if (!hmac) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+ HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf));
+ HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
+ prk = buf;
+ prkLen = bufLen;
+ } else {
+ /* PRK = base key value */
+ prk = (CK_BYTE *)att->attrib.pValue;
+ prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+ }
+
+ /* HKDF-Expand */
+ if (!params->bExpand) {
+ okm = prk;
+ } else {
+ /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+ * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+ * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
+ */
+ HMACContext *hmac;
+ CK_BYTE i;
+ unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen;
+ hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
+ if (hmac == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
+ unsigned len;
+ HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+ if (i > 1) {
+ HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i - 2) * hashLen), hashLen);
+ }
+ if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
+ HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
+ }
+ HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1);
+ HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i - 1) * hashLen), &len,
+ hashLen);
+ PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
+ }
+ HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+ okm = key_block;
+ }
+ /* key material = prk */
+ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
+ break;
+ } /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */
+
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ goto jpake2;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ goto jpake2;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ goto jpake2;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ goto jpake2;
+ jpake2:
+ if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+ pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
+ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
+ (CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ sourceKey, key);
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+ goto jpakeFinal;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+ goto jpakeFinal;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+ goto jpakeFinal;
+ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
+ hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+ goto jpakeFinal;
+ jpakeFinal:
+ if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+ pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+ /* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
+ able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
+ ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
+ in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
+ in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
+ sensitive.
+ */
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
+ (CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+ sourceKey, key);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (att) {
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ }
+ sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (key)
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /* link the key object into the list */
+ if (key) {
+ SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+ PORT_Assert(sessKey);
+ /* get the session */
+ sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ *phKey = key->handle;
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
+ * in parallel with an application. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
+CK_RV
+NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session.
+ * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
+ * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
+ * can be saved */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
+{
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ /* make sure we're legal */
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+
+ *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE) + sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+ if (pOperationState == NULL) {
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+ } else {
+ if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, &context->type, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+ pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+ PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, &context->currentMech,
+ sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+ pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+ PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, context->cipherInfo, context->cipherInfoLen);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize, len) \
+ stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
+
+/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
+ * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
+{
+ SFTKSessionContext *context;
+ SFTKSession *session;
+ SFTKContextType type;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
+ /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
+ PORT_Memcpy(&type, pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+
+ /* fix up session contexts based on type */
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
+ sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
+ if (context) {
+ sftk_FreeContext(context);
+ }
+ pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+ sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+
+ /* get the mechanism structure */
+ PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism, pOperationState, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+ pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+ sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+ /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ switch (type) {
+ case SFTK_HASH:
+ crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession, &mech);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
+ NULL);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo, pOperationState,
+ context->cipherInfoLen);
+ pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
+ sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, context->cipherInfoLen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
+ crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
+ }
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+
+/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+ pulEncryptedPartLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
+ pPart, pulPartLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, pPart, *pulPartLen);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+ * encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+ pulEncryptedPartLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+ * and verify operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
+ pData, pulDataLen);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ return crv;
+ crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
+
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
+ * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ SFTKSession *session = NULL;
+ SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+ SFTKAttribute *att;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ CHECK_FORK();
+
+ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+ if (session == NULL)
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
+
+ /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
+ if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ /* get the key value */
+ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+ sftk_FreeObject(key);
+ if (!att) {
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ }
+ crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
+ att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+ sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+ return crv;
+}