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-rw-r--r--dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp695
1 files changed, 695 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4e1ed8e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
+#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
+#include "nsIDocument.h"
+#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
+ nsIContentSecurityManager,
+ nsIChannelEventSink)
+
+static nsresult
+ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+{
+ nsSecurityFlags securityMode = aLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+
+ if (securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
+ securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED &&
+ securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
+ securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL &&
+ securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "need one securityflag from nsILoadInfo to perform security checks");
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ // all good, found the right security flags
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static bool SchemeIs(nsIURI* aURI, const char* aScheme)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> baseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(baseURI, false);
+
+ bool isScheme = false;
+ return NS_SUCCEEDED(baseURI->SchemeIs(aScheme, &isScheme)) && isScheme;
+}
+
+
+static bool IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+{
+ // Editor apps get special treatment here, editors can load images
+ // from anywhere. This allows editor to insert images from file://
+ // into documents that are being edited.
+ nsContentPolicyType type = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+ if (type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE &&
+ type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD &&
+ type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON &&
+ type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ nsINode* node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ if (!node) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ nsIDocument* doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+ if (!doc) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem = doc->GetDocShell();
+ if (!docShellTreeItem) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
+ docShellTreeItem->GetRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(root));
+ if (!docShell || NS_FAILED(docShell->GetAppType(&appType))) {
+ appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+ return appType == nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_EDITOR;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+DoCheckLoadURIChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+{
+ // Bug 1228117: determine the correct security policy for DTD loads
+ if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(aLoadInfo)) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD;
+ if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome()) {
+ flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME;
+ }
+ if (aLoadInfo->GetDisallowScript()) {
+ flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
+ }
+
+ // Only call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() using the TriggeringPrincipal and not
+ // the LoadingPrincipal when SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* security flags are set,
+ // to allow, e.g. user stylesheets to load chrome:// URIs.
+ return nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
+ CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal(),
+ aURI,
+ flags);
+}
+
+static bool
+URIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
+{
+ bool hasFlags;
+ nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &hasFlags);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+ return hasFlags;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+DoSOPChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIChannel* aChannel)
+{
+ if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome() &&
+ (URIHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) ||
+ SchemeIs(aURI, "moz-safe-about"))) {
+ // UI resources are allowed.
+ return DoCheckLoadURIChecks(aURI, aLoadInfo);
+ }
+
+ NS_ENSURE_FALSE(NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel, true),
+ NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
+{
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aInAndOutListener, "can not perform CORS checks without a listener");
+
+ // No need to set up CORS if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
+ // For example, allow user stylesheets to load XBL from external files
+ // without requiring CORS.
+ if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+ RefPtr<nsCORSListenerProxy> corsListener =
+ new nsCORSListenerProxy(aInAndOutListener,
+ loadingPrincipal,
+ aLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() ==
+ nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE);
+ // XXX: @arg: DataURIHandling::Allow
+ // lets use DataURIHandling::Allow for now and then decide on callsite basis. see also:
+ // http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/security/nsCORSListenerProxy.h#33
+ nsresult rv = corsListener->Init(aChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ aInAndOutListener = corsListener;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult
+DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+ aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+ nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
+ aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+ nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
+ // initiated by javascript tests.
+ bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
+ skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
+#endif
+
+ switch(contentPolicyType) {
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/javascript");
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/css");
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_REFRESH: {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
+ // alias nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DATAREQUEST:
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
+
+ // We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
+ // an addon creates a request with that type.
+ if (internalContentPolicyType ==
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST ||
+ internalContentPolicyType ==
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ }
+ else {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(internalContentPolicyType ==
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE,
+ "can not set mime type guess for unexpected internal type");
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(TEXT_EVENT_STREAM);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+ "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: {
+ if (internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK) {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/vtt");
+ }
+ else {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ }
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+ "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: {
+ // Websockets have to use the proxied URI:
+ // ws:// instead of http:// for CSP checks
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal
+ = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(httpChannelInternal);
+ if (httpChannelInternal) {
+ httpChannelInternal->GetProxyURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ }
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/xml");
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST: {
+ mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/manifest+json");
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ // nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
+ }
+
+ int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+ rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType,
+ uri,
+ aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(),
+ requestingContext,
+ mimeTypeGuess,
+ nullptr, //extra,
+ &shouldLoad,
+ nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(),
+ nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager());
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+ }
+
+ if (nsMixedContentBlocker::sSendHSTSPriming) {
+ rv = nsMixedContentBlocker::MarkLoadInfoForPriming(uri,
+ requestingContext,
+ aLoadInfo);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Based on the security flags provided in the loadInfo of the channel,
+ * doContentSecurityCheck() performs the following content security checks
+ * before opening the channel:
+ *
+ * (1) Same Origin Policy Check (if applicable)
+ * (2) Allow Cross Origin but perform sanity checks whether a principal
+ * is allowed to access the following URL.
+ * (3) Perform CORS check (if applicable)
+ * (4) ContentPolicy checks (Content-Security-Policy, Mixed Content, ...)
+ *
+ * @param aChannel
+ * The channel to perform the security checks on.
+ * @param aInAndOutListener
+ * The streamListener that is passed to channel->AsyncOpen2() that is now potentially
+ * wrappend within nsCORSListenerProxy() and becomes the corsListener that now needs
+ * to be set as new streamListener on the channel.
+ */
+nsresult
+nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
+{
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+
+ if (!loadInfo) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "channel needs to have loadInfo to perform security checks");
+ return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+ }
+
+ // if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
+ // streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
+ if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // make sure that only one of the five security flags is set in the loadinfo
+ // e.g. do not require same origin and allow cross origin at the same time
+ nsresult rv = ValidateSecurityFlags(loadInfo);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // since aChannel was openend using asyncOpen2() we have to make sure
+ // that redirects of that channel also get openend using asyncOpen2()
+ // please note that some implementations of ::AsyncOpen2 might already
+ // have set that flag to true (e.g. nsViewSourceChannel) in which case
+ // we just set the flag again.
+ loadInfo->SetEnforceSecurity(true);
+
+ if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
+ rv = DoCORSChecks(aChannel, loadInfo, aInAndOutListener);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ }
+
+ rv = CheckChannel(aChannel);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // Perform all ContentPolicy checks (MixedContent, CSP, ...)
+ rv = DoContentSecurityChecks(aChannel, loadInfo);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // now lets set the initalSecurityFlag for subsequent calls
+ loadInfo->SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(true);
+
+ // all security checks passed - lets allow the load
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
+ nsIChannel* aNewChannel,
+ uint32_t aRedirFlags,
+ nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *aCb)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+ // Are we enforcing security using LoadInfo?
+ if (loadInfo && loadInfo->GetEnforceSecurity()) {
+ nsresult rv = CheckChannel(aNewChannel);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
+ // given URI
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
+ nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
+ GetChannelResultPrincipal(aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
+ aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI));
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newOriginalURI;
+ aNewChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(newOriginalURI));
+
+ NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI && newOriginalURI);
+
+ const uint32_t flags =
+ nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
+ nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
+ nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
+ CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newURI, flags);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && newOriginalURI != newURI) {
+ rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
+ CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newOriginalURI, flags);
+ }
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static void
+AddLoadFlags(nsIRequest *aRequest, nsLoadFlags aNewFlags)
+{
+ nsLoadFlags flags;
+ aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
+ flags |= aNewFlags;
+ aRequest->SetLoadFlags(flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that this channel passes all security checks. Returns an error code
+ * if this requesst should not be permitted.
+ */
+nsresult
+nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // Handle cookie policies
+ uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
+ if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
+
+ // We shouldn't have the SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN flag for top level loads
+ MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
+ nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+
+ // It doesn't matter what we pass for the third, data-inherits, argument.
+ // Any protocol which inherits won't pay attention to cookies anyway.
+ rv = loadingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false, false);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT) {
+ AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
+ }
+
+ nsSecurityFlags securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+
+ // CORS mode is handled by nsCORSListenerProxy
+ if (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
+ if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
+ loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::CORS);
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // Allow subresource loads if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
+ // For example, allow user stylesheets to load XBL from external files.
+ if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) &&
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // if none of the REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN flags are set, then SOP does not apply
+ if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
+ (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED)) {
+ rv = DoSOPChecks(uri, loadInfo, aChannel);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ }
+
+ if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
+ (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL)) {
+ if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
+ loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::Opaque);
+ }
+ // Please note that DoCheckLoadURIChecks should only be enforced for
+ // cross origin requests. If the flag SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS is set
+ // within the loadInfo, then then CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal is performed
+ // within nsCorsListenerProxy
+ rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// ==== nsIContentSecurityManager implementation =====
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+ nsIStreamListener* aStreamListener,
+ nsIStreamListener** outStreamListener)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> inAndOutListener = aStreamListener;
+ nsresult rv = doContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, inAndOutListener);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsContentSecurityManager::IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+ bool* aIsTrustWorthy)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
+ NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aIsTrustWorthy);
+
+ if (aPrincipal->GetIsSystemPrincipal()) {
+ *aIsTrustWorthy = true;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // The following implements:
+ // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
+
+ *aIsTrustWorthy = false;
+
+ if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal->GetIsCodebasePrincipal(),
+ "Nobody is expected to call us with an nsIExpandedPrincipal");
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+
+ nsAutoCString scheme;
+ nsresult rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // Blobs are expected to inherit their principal so we don't expect to have
+ // a codebase principal with scheme 'blob' here. We can't assert that though
+ // since someone could mess with a non-blob URI to give it that scheme.
+ NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(!scheme.EqualsLiteral("blob"),
+ "IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy ignoring blob scheme");
+
+ // According to the specification, the user agent may choose to extend the
+ // trust to other, vendor-specific URL schemes. We use this for "resource:",
+ // which is technically a substituting protocol handler that is not limited to
+ // local resource mapping, but in practice is never mapped remotely as this
+ // would violate assumptions a lot of code makes.
+ if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("https") ||
+ scheme.EqualsLiteral("file") ||
+ scheme.EqualsLiteral("resource") ||
+ scheme.EqualsLiteral("app") ||
+ scheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-extension") ||
+ scheme.EqualsLiteral("wss")) {
+ *aIsTrustWorthy = true;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString host;
+ rv = uri->GetHost(host);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (host.Equals("127.0.0.1") ||
+ host.Equals("localhost") ||
+ host.Equals("::1")) {
+ *aIsTrustWorthy = true;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // If a host is not considered secure according to the default algorithm, then
+ // check to see if it has been whitelisted by the user. We only apply this
+ // whitelist for network resources, i.e., those with scheme "http" or "ws".
+ // The pref should contain a comma-separated list of hostnames.
+ if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("http") || scheme.EqualsLiteral("ws")) {
+ nsAdoptingCString whitelist = Preferences::GetCString("dom.securecontext.whitelist");
+ if (whitelist) {
+ nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(whitelist, ',');
+ while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
+ const nsCSubstring& allowedHost = tokenizer.nextToken();
+ if (host.Equals(allowedHost)) {
+ *aIsTrustWorthy = true;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}