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authorwolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com>2018-02-06 11:46:26 +0100
committerwolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com>2018-02-06 11:46:26 +0100
commitf017b749ea9f1586d2308504553d40bf4cc5439d (patch)
treec6033924a0de9be1ab140596e305898c651bf57e /security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc
parent7c728b3c7680662fc4e92b5d03697b8339560b08 (diff)
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Update NSS to 3.32.1-RTM
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc199
1 files changed, 199 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc b/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc
index cf5a27fed..85b7011a1 100644
--- a/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc
+++ b/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_0rtt_unittest.cc
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, TestTls13ZeroRttNoAlpnServer) {
client_->CheckAlpn(SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE, "a");
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSLInt_Set0RttAlpn(client_->ssl_fd(), b, sizeof(b)));
client_->CheckAlpn(SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE, "b");
+ ExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
return true;
});
Handshake();
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, TestTls13ZeroRttNoAlpnClient) {
PRUint8 b[] = {'b'};
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, SSLInt_Set0RttAlpn(client_->ssl_fd(), b, 1));
client_->CheckAlpn(SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE, "b");
+ ExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
return true;
});
Handshake();
@@ -200,4 +202,201 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, TestTls13ZeroRttAlpnChangeBoth) {
CheckAlpn("b");
}
+// The client should abort the connection when sending a 0-rtt handshake but
+// the servers responds with a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. (no app data sent)
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, TestTls13ZeroRttDowngrade) {
+ ConfigureSessionCache(RESUME_BOTH, RESUME_TICKET);
+ server_->Set0RttEnabled(true); // set ticket_allow_early_data
+ Connect();
+
+ SendReceive(); // Need to read so that we absorb the session tickets.
+ CheckKeys();
+
+ Reset();
+ ConfigureSessionCache(RESUME_BOTH, RESUME_TICKET);
+ client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ client_->StartConnect();
+ server_->StartConnect();
+
+ // We will send the early data xtn without sending actual early data. Thus
+ // a 1.2 server shouldn't fail until the client sends an alert because the
+ // client sends end_of_early_data only after reading the server's flight.
+ client_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+
+ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
+ }
+ client_->Handshake();
+ server_->Handshake();
+ ASSERT_TRUE_WAIT(
+ (client_->error_code() == SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA), 2000);
+
+ // DTLS will timeout as we bump the epoch when installing the early app data
+ // cipher suite. Thus the encrypted alert will be ignored.
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ // The client sends an encrypted alert message.
+ ASSERT_TRUE_WAIT(
+ (server_->error_code() == SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA),
+ 2000);
+ }
+}
+
+// The client should abort the connection when sending a 0-rtt handshake but
+// the servers responds with a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. (with app data)
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, TestTls13ZeroRttDowngradeEarlyData) {
+ ConfigureSessionCache(RESUME_BOTH, RESUME_TICKET);
+ server_->Set0RttEnabled(true); // set ticket_allow_early_data
+ Connect();
+
+ SendReceive(); // Need to read so that we absorb the session tickets.
+ CheckKeys();
+
+ Reset();
+ ConfigureSessionCache(RESUME_BOTH, RESUME_TICKET);
+ client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ client_->StartConnect();
+ server_->StartConnect();
+
+ // Send the early data xtn in the CH, followed by early app data. The server
+ // will fail right after sending its flight, when receiving the early data.
+ client_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+ ZeroRttSendReceive(true, false, [this]() {
+ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
+ }
+ return true;
+ });
+
+ client_->Handshake();
+ server_->Handshake();
+ ASSERT_TRUE_WAIT(
+ (client_->error_code() == SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA), 2000);
+
+ // DTLS will timeout as we bump the epoch when installing the early app data
+ // cipher suite. Thus the encrypted alert will be ignored.
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ // The server sends an alert when receiving the early app data record.
+ ASSERT_TRUE_WAIT(
+ (server_->error_code() == SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA),
+ 2000);
+ }
+}
+
+static void CheckEarlyDataLimit(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& agent,
+ size_t expected_size) {
+ SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo preinfo;
+ SECStatus rv =
+ SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(agent->ssl_fd(), &preinfo, sizeof(preinfo));
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_size, static_cast<size_t>(preinfo.maxEarlyDataSize));
+}
+
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, SendTooMuchEarlyData) {
+ const char* big_message = "0123456789abcdef";
+ const size_t short_size = strlen(big_message) - 1;
+ const PRInt32 short_length = static_cast<PRInt32>(short_size);
+ SSLInt_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(static_cast<PRUint32>(short_size));
+ SetupForZeroRtt();
+
+ client_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+ server_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+ ExpectResumption(RESUME_TICKET);
+
+ ExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertEndOfEarlyData);
+ client_->Handshake();
+ CheckEarlyDataLimit(client_, short_size);
+
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ // Writing more than the limit will succeed in TLS, but fail in DTLS.
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ sent = PR_Write(client_->ssl_fd(), big_message,
+ static_cast<PRInt32>(strlen(big_message)));
+ } else {
+ sent = PR_Write(client_->ssl_fd(), big_message,
+ static_cast<PRInt32>(strlen(big_message)));
+ EXPECT_GE(0, sent);
+ EXPECT_EQ(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, PORT_GetError());
+
+ // Try an exact-sized write now.
+ sent = PR_Write(client_->ssl_fd(), big_message, short_length);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(short_length, sent);
+
+ // Even a single octet write should now fail.
+ sent = PR_Write(client_->ssl_fd(), big_message, 1);
+ EXPECT_GE(0, sent);
+ EXPECT_EQ(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, PORT_GetError());
+
+ // Process the ClientHello and read 0-RTT.
+ server_->Handshake();
+ CheckEarlyDataLimit(server_, short_size);
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> buf(short_size + 1);
+ PRInt32 read = PR_Read(server_->ssl_fd(), buf.data(), buf.capacity());
+ EXPECT_EQ(short_length, read);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(big_message, buf.data(), short_size));
+
+ // Second read fails.
+ read = PR_Read(server_->ssl_fd(), buf.data(), buf.capacity());
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECFailure, read);
+ EXPECT_EQ(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, PORT_GetError());
+
+ Handshake();
+ ExpectEarlyDataAccepted(true);
+ CheckConnected();
+ SendReceive();
+}
+
+TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, ReceiveTooMuchEarlyData) {
+ const size_t limit = 5;
+ SSLInt_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(limit);
+ SetupForZeroRtt();
+
+ client_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+ server_->Set0RttEnabled(true);
+ ExpectResumption(RESUME_TICKET);
+
+ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertEndOfEarlyData);
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
+ CheckEarlyDataLimit(client_, limit);
+
+ // Lift the limit on the client.
+ EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess,
+ SSLInt_SetSocketMaxEarlyDataSize(client_->ssl_fd(), 1000));
+
+ // Send message
+ const char* message = "0123456789abcdef";
+ const PRInt32 message_len = static_cast<PRInt32>(strlen(message));
+ EXPECT_EQ(message_len, PR_Write(client_->ssl_fd(), message, message_len));
+
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ // This error isn't fatal for DTLS.
+ ExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
+ }
+ server_->Handshake(); // Process ClientHello, send server flight.
+ server_->Handshake(); // Just to make sure that we don't read ahead.
+ CheckEarlyDataLimit(server_, limit);
+
+ // Attempt to read early data.
+ std::vector<uint8_t> buf(strlen(message) + 1);
+ EXPECT_GT(0, PR_Read(server_->ssl_fd(), buf.data(), buf.capacity()));
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+ }
+
+ client_->Handshake(); // Process the handshake.
+ client_->Handshake(); // Process the alert.
+ if (variant_ == ssl_variant_stream) {
+ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT);
+ }
+}
+
} // namespace nss_test