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-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/Makefile48
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c528
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/config.mk14
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/exports.gyp33
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/manifest.mn33
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7common.c663
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7create.c1247
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c1914
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7encode.c1079
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.c1310
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.h137
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7.gyp29
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7t.h233
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.c800
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.h160
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secpkcs7.h606
16 files changed, 8834 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/Makefile b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9cebcfec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#! gmake
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+#######################################################################
+# (1) Include initial platform-independent assignments (MANDATORY). #
+#######################################################################
+
+include manifest.mn
+
+#######################################################################
+# (2) Include "global" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
+
+#######################################################################
+# (3) Include "component" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# (4) Include "local" platform-dependent assignments (OPTIONAL). #
+#######################################################################
+
+include config.mk
+
+#######################################################################
+# (5) Execute "global" rules. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/rules.mk
+
+#######################################################################
+# (6) Execute "component" rules. (OPTIONAL) #
+#######################################################################
+
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# (7) Execute "local" rules. (OPTIONAL). #
+#######################################################################
+
+
+
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d692f1a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_AnyTemplate)
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate)
+
+typedef struct ContentInfoStr ContentInfo;
+typedef struct DegenerateSignedDataStr DegenerateSignedData;
+
+struct ContentInfoStr {
+ SECOidTag contentTypeTag; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECItem contentType;
+ union {
+ SECItem *data;
+ DegenerateSignedData *signedData;
+ } content;
+};
+
+struct DegenerateSignedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SECItem **digestAlgorithms;
+ ContentInfo contentInfo;
+ SECItem **certificates;
+ SECItem **crls;
+ SECItem **signerInfos;
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template *
+choose_content_template(void *src_or_dest, PRBool encoding);
+
+static const SEC_ASN1TemplateChooserPtr template_chooser = choose_content_template;
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template ContentInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(ContentInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(ContentInfo, contentType) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_DYNAMIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0,
+ offsetof(ContentInfo, content),
+ &template_chooser },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template DegenerateSignedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(DegenerateSignedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, digestAlgorithms),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_AnyTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, contentInfo),
+ ContentInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 0,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, certificates),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, crls),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(DegenerateSignedData, signerInfos),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_AnyTemplate) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template PointerToDegenerateSignedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, DegenerateSignedDataTemplate }
+};
+
+static SECOidTag
+GetContentTypeTag(ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&cinfo->contentType);
+ return cinfo->contentTypeTag;
+}
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template *
+choose_content_template(void *src_or_dest, PRBool encoding)
+{
+ const SEC_ASN1Template *theTemplate;
+ ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ PORT_Assert(src_or_dest != NULL);
+ if (src_or_dest == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cinfo = (ContentInfo *)src_or_dest;
+ kind = GetContentTypeTag(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = PointerToDegenerateSignedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ }
+ return theTemplate;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+SEC_ReadPKCS7Certs(SECItem *pkcs7Item, CERTImportCertificateFunc f, void *arg)
+{
+ ContentInfo contentInfo;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem **certs;
+ int count;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memset(&contentInfo, 0, sizeof(contentInfo));
+ if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, &contentInfo, ContentInfoTemplate,
+ pkcs7Item) != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (GetContentTypeTag(&contentInfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ certs = contentInfo.content.signedData->certificates;
+ if (certs) {
+ count = 0;
+
+ while (*certs) {
+ count++;
+ certs++;
+ }
+ rv = (*f)(arg, contentInfo.content.signedData->certificates, count);
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_CertSequenceTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF | SEC_ASN1_XTRN, 0, SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_AnyTemplate) }
+};
+
+static SECStatus
+SEC_ReadCertSequence(SECItem *certsItem, CERTImportCertificateFunc f, void *arg)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem **certs;
+ int count;
+ SECItem **rawCerts = NULL;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ ContentInfo contentInfo;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memset(&contentInfo, 0, sizeof(contentInfo));
+ if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, &contentInfo, ContentInfoTemplate,
+ certsItem) != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (GetContentTypeTag(&contentInfo) != SEC_OID_NS_TYPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &rawCerts, SEC_CertSequenceTemplate,
+ contentInfo.content.data) != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ certs = rawCerts;
+ if (certs) {
+ count = 0;
+
+ while (*certs) {
+ count++;
+ certs++;
+ }
+ rv = (*f)(arg, rawCerts, count);
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+CERTCertificate *
+CERT_ConvertAndDecodeCertificate(char *certstr)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem der;
+
+ rv = ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&der, certstr);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ &der, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+
+ PORT_Free(der.data);
+ return cert;
+}
+
+static const char NS_CERT_HEADER[] = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----";
+static const char NS_CERT_TRAILER[] = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
+#define NS_CERT_HEADER_LEN ((sizeof NS_CERT_HEADER) - 1)
+#define NS_CERT_TRAILER_LEN ((sizeof NS_CERT_TRAILER) - 1)
+
+/*
+ * read an old style ascii or binary certificate chain
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_DecodeCertPackage(char *certbuf,
+ int certlen,
+ CERTImportCertificateFunc f,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ unsigned char *cp;
+ unsigned char *bincert = NULL;
+ char *ascCert = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (certbuf == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return (SECFailure);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Make sure certlen is long enough to handle the longest possible
+ * reference in the code below:
+ * 0x30 0x84 l1 l2 l3 l4 +
+ * tag 9 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8 o9
+ * where 9 is the longest length of the expected oids we are testing.
+ * 6 + 11 = 17. 17 bytes is clearly too small to code any kind of
+ * certificate (a 128 bit ECC certificate contains at least an 8 byte
+ * key and a 16 byte signature, plus coding overhead). Typically a cert
+ * is much larger. So it's safe to require certlen to be at least 17
+ * bytes.
+ */
+ if (certlen < 17) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ return (SECFailure);
+ }
+
+ cp = (unsigned char *)certbuf;
+
+ /* is a DER encoded certificate of some type? */
+ if ((*cp & 0x1f) == SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ SECItem certitem;
+ SECItem *pcertitem = &certitem;
+ PRUint64 seqLen, seqLenLen;
+
+ cp++;
+
+ if (*cp & 0x80) {
+ /* Multibyte length */
+ seqLenLen = cp[0] & 0x7f;
+
+ switch (seqLenLen) {
+ case 4:
+ seqLen = ((unsigned long)cp[1] << 24) |
+ ((unsigned long)cp[2] << 16) | (cp[3] << 8) | cp[4];
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ seqLen = ((unsigned long)cp[1] << 16) | (cp[2] << 8) | cp[3];
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ seqLen = (cp[1] << 8) | cp[2];
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ seqLen = cp[1];
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ /* indefinite length */
+ seqLen = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto notder;
+ }
+ cp += (seqLenLen + 1);
+
+ } else {
+ seqLenLen = 0;
+ seqLen = *cp;
+ cp++;
+ }
+
+ /* check entire length if definite length */
+ if (seqLen || seqLenLen) {
+ if (certlen != (seqLen + seqLenLen + 2L)) {
+ if (certlen > (seqLen + seqLenLen + 2L))
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXTRA_INPUT);
+ else
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ goto notder;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check the type oid */
+ if (cp[0] == SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID) {
+ SECOidData *oiddata;
+ SECItem oiditem;
+ /* XXX - assume DER encoding of OID len!! */
+ oiditem.len = cp[1];
+ /* if we add an oid below that is longer than 9 bytes, then we
+ * need to change the certlen check at the top of the function
+ * to prevent a buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (oiditem.len > 9) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_OID);
+ return (SECFailure);
+ }
+ oiditem.data = (unsigned char *)&cp[2];
+ oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&oiditem);
+ if (oiddata == NULL) {
+ return (SECFailure);
+ }
+
+ certitem.data = (unsigned char *)certbuf;
+ certitem.len = certlen;
+
+ switch (oiddata->offset) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ /* oid: 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02 */
+ return (SEC_ReadPKCS7Certs(&certitem, f, arg));
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_NS_TYPE_CERT_SEQUENCE:
+ /* oid: 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x86, 0xf8, 0x42, 0x02, 0x05 */
+ return (SEC_ReadCertSequence(&certitem, f, arg));
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /* it had better be a certificate by now!! */
+ certitem.data = (unsigned char *)certbuf;
+ certitem.len = certlen;
+
+ rv = (*f)(arg, &pcertitem, 1);
+ return (rv);
+ }
+ }
+
+/* now look for a netscape base64 ascii encoded cert */
+notder : {
+ unsigned char *certbegin = NULL;
+ unsigned char *certend = NULL;
+ char *pc;
+ int cl;
+
+ /* Convert the ASCII data into a nul-terminated string */
+ ascCert = (char *)PORT_Alloc(certlen + 1);
+ if (!ascCert) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ascCert, certbuf, certlen);
+ ascCert[certlen] = '\0';
+
+ pc = PORT_Strchr(ascCert, '\n'); /* find an EOL */
+ if (!pc) { /* maybe this is a MAC file */
+ pc = ascCert;
+ while (*pc && NULL != (pc = PORT_Strchr(pc, '\r'))) {
+ *pc++ = '\n';
+ }
+ }
+
+ cp = (unsigned char *)ascCert;
+ cl = certlen;
+
+ /* find the beginning marker */
+ while (cl > NS_CERT_HEADER_LEN) {
+ int found = 0;
+ if (!PORT_Strncasecmp((char *)cp, NS_CERT_HEADER,
+ NS_CERT_HEADER_LEN)) {
+ cl -= NS_CERT_HEADER_LEN;
+ cp += NS_CERT_HEADER_LEN;
+ found = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* skip to next eol */
+ while (cl && (*cp != '\n')) {
+ cp++;
+ cl--;
+ }
+
+ /* skip all blank lines */
+ while (cl && (*cp == '\n' || *cp == '\r')) {
+ cp++;
+ cl--;
+ }
+ if (cl && found) {
+ certbegin = cp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certbegin) {
+ /* find the ending marker */
+ while (cl >= NS_CERT_TRAILER_LEN) {
+ if (!PORT_Strncasecmp((char *)cp, NS_CERT_TRAILER,
+ NS_CERT_TRAILER_LEN)) {
+ certend = cp;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* skip to next eol */
+ while (cl && (*cp != '\n')) {
+ cp++;
+ cl--;
+ }
+
+ /* skip all blank lines */
+ while (cl && (*cp == '\n' || *cp == '\r')) {
+ cp++;
+ cl--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certbegin && certend) {
+ unsigned int binLen;
+
+ *certend = 0;
+ /* convert to binary */
+ bincert = ATOB_AsciiToData((char *)certbegin, &binLen);
+ if (!bincert) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* now recurse to decode the binary */
+ rv = CERT_DecodeCertPackage((char *)bincert, binLen, f, arg);
+
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+}
+
+loser:
+
+ if (bincert) {
+ PORT_Free(bincert);
+ }
+
+ if (ascCert) {
+ PORT_Free(ascCert);
+ }
+
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem cert;
+} collect_args;
+
+static SECStatus
+collect_certs(void *arg, SECItem **certs, int numcerts)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ collect_args *collectArgs;
+
+ collectArgs = (collect_args *)arg;
+
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(collectArgs->arena, &collectArgs->cert, *certs);
+
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * read an old style ascii or binary certificate
+ */
+CERTCertificate *
+CERT_DecodeCertFromPackage(char *certbuf, int certlen)
+{
+ collect_args collectArgs;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
+
+ collectArgs.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+
+ rv = CERT_DecodeCertPackage(certbuf, certlen, collect_certs,
+ (void *)&collectArgs);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ &collectArgs.cert, NULL,
+ PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(collectArgs.arena, PR_FALSE);
+
+ return (cert);
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/config.mk b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/config.mk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36f063f1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/config.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+#
+# Override TARGETS variable so that only static libraries
+# are specifed as dependencies within rules.mk.
+#
+
+TARGETS = $(LIBRARY)
+SHARED_LIBRARY =
+IMPORT_LIBRARY =
+PROGRAM =
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/exports.gyp b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/exports.gyp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5c9f0927
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/exports.gyp
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+{
+ 'includes': [
+ '../../coreconf/config.gypi'
+ ],
+ 'targets': [
+ {
+ 'target_name': 'lib_pkcs7_exports',
+ 'type': 'none',
+ 'copies': [
+ {
+ 'files': [
+ 'pkcs7t.h',
+ 'secmime.h',
+ 'secpkcs7.h'
+ ],
+ 'destination': '<(nss_public_dist_dir)/<(module)'
+ },
+ {
+ 'files': [
+ 'p7local.h'
+ ],
+ 'destination': '<(nss_private_dist_dir)/<(module)'
+ }
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ 'variables': {
+ 'module': 'nss'
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/manifest.mn b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/manifest.mn
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a6cad0f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/manifest.mn
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+CORE_DEPTH = ../..
+
+EXPORTS = \
+ secmime.h \
+ secpkcs7.h \
+ pkcs7t.h \
+ $(NULL)
+
+PRIVATE_EXPORTS = \
+ p7local.h \
+ $(NULL)
+
+MODULE = nss
+
+CSRCS = \
+ certread.c \
+ p7common.c \
+ p7create.c \
+ p7decode.c \
+ p7encode.c \
+ p7local.c \
+ secmime.c \
+ $(NULL)
+
+LIBRARY_NAME = pkcs7
+
+# This part of the code, including all sub-dirs, can be optimized for size
+export ALLOW_OPT_CODE_SIZE = 1
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7common.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a6ac033e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS7 implementation -- the exported parts that are used whether
+ * creating or decoding.
+ */
+
+#include "p7local.h"
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+
+/*
+ * Find out (saving pointer to lookup result for future reference)
+ * and return the inner content type.
+ */
+SECOidTag
+SEC_PKCS7ContentType(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL)
+ cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType));
+
+ if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL)
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+
+ return cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a PKCS7 contentInfo and all of its sub-pieces.
+ */
+void
+SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ CERTCertificate **certs;
+ CERTCertificateList **certlists;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos;
+
+ PORT_Assert(cinfo->refCount > 0);
+ if (cinfo->refCount <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ cinfo->refCount--;
+ if (cinfo->refCount > 0)
+ return;
+
+ certs = NULL;
+ certlists = NULL;
+ recipientinfos = NULL;
+ signerinfos = NULL;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *edp;
+
+ edp = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ if (edp != NULL) {
+ recipientinfos = edp->recipientInfos;
+ }
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ if (sdp != NULL) {
+ certs = sdp->certs;
+ certlists = sdp->certLists;
+ signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
+ }
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ if (saedp != NULL) {
+ certs = saedp->certs;
+ certlists = saedp->certLists;
+ recipientinfos = saedp->recipientInfos;
+ signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
+ if (saedp->sigKey != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(saedp->sigKey);
+ }
+ } break;
+ default:
+ /* XXX Anything else that needs to be "manually" freed/destroyed? */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (certs != NULL) {
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+ while ((cert = *certs++) != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certlists != NULL) {
+ CERTCertificateList *certlist;
+
+ while ((certlist = *certlists++) != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(certlist);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (recipientinfos != NULL) {
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *ri;
+
+ while ((ri = *recipientinfos++) != NULL) {
+ if (ri->cert != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (signerinfos != NULL) {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *si;
+
+ while ((si = *signerinfos++) != NULL) {
+ if (si->cert != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(si->cert);
+ if (si->certList != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(si->certList);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cinfo->poolp != NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(cinfo->poolp, PR_FALSE); /* XXX clear it? */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a copy of the given contentInfo. The copy may be virtual
+ * or may be real -- either way, the result needs to be passed to
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo later (as does the original).
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CopyContentInfo(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ PORT_Assert(cinfo->refCount > 0);
+
+ if (cinfo->created) {
+ /*
+ * Want to do a real copy of these; otherwise subsequent
+ * changes made to either copy are likely to be a surprise.
+ * XXX I suspect that this will not actually be called for yet,
+ * which is why the assert, so to notice if it is...
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ /*
+ * XXX Create a new pool here, and copy everything from
+ * within. For cert stuff, need to call the appropriate
+ * copy functions, etc.
+ */
+ }
+
+ cinfo->refCount++;
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a pointer to the actual content. In the case of those types
+ * which are encrypted, this returns the *plain* content.
+ * XXX Needs revisiting if/when we handle nested encrypted types.
+ */
+SECItem *
+SEC_PKCS7GetContent(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ return cinfo->content.data;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd;
+
+ digd = cinfo->content.digestedData;
+ if (digd == NULL)
+ break;
+ return SEC_PKCS7GetContent(&(digd->contentInfo));
+ }
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd;
+
+ encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
+ if (encd == NULL)
+ break;
+ return &(encd->encContentInfo.plainContent);
+ }
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
+
+ envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ if (envd == NULL)
+ break;
+ return &(envd->encContentInfo.plainContent);
+ }
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
+
+ sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ if (sigd == NULL)
+ break;
+ return SEC_PKCS7GetContent(&(sigd->contentInfo));
+ }
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed;
+
+ saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ if (saed == NULL)
+ break;
+ return &(saed->encContentInfo.plainContent);
+ }
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX Fix the placement and formatting of the
+ * following routines (i.e. make them consistent with the rest of
+ * the pkcs7 code -- I think some/many belong in other files and
+ * they all need a formatting/style rehaul)
+ */
+
+/* retrieve the algorithm identifier for encrypted data.
+ * the identifier returned is a copy of the algorithm identifier
+ * in the content info and needs to be freed after being used.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info for which to retrieve the
+ * encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * if the content info is not encrypted data or an error
+ * occurs NULL is returned.
+ */
+SECAlgorithmID *
+SEC_PKCS7GetEncryptionAlgorithm(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECAlgorithmID *alg = 0;
+ switch (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo)) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ alg = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ alg = &cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ alg = &cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData
+ ->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg;
+ break;
+ default:
+ alg = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return alg;
+}
+
+/* set the content of the content info. For data content infos,
+ * the data is set. For encrytped content infos, the plainContent
+ * is set, and is expected to be encrypted later.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info where the data will be set
+ *
+ * buf is a buffer of the data to set
+ *
+ * len is the length of the data being set.
+ *
+ * in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
+ * indicates the content was successfully set.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7SetContent(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ const char *buf,
+ unsigned long len)
+{
+ SECOidTag cinfo_type;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem content;
+ SECOidData *contentTypeTag = NULL;
+
+ content.type = siBuffer;
+ content.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
+ content.len = len;
+
+ cinfo_type = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+
+ /* set inner content */
+ switch (cinfo_type) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ if (content.len > 0) {
+ /* we "leak" the old content here, but as it's all in the pool */
+ /* it does not really matter */
+
+ /* create content item if necessary */
+ if (cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data == NULL)
+ cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data = SECITEM_AllocItem(cinfo->poolp, NULL, 0);
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
+ cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data,
+ &content);
+ } else {
+ cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data->data = NULL;
+ cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data->len = 0;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ goto loser;
+
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ /* XXX this forces the inner content type to be "data" */
+ /* do we really want to override without asking or reason? */
+ contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA);
+ if (contentTypeTag == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
+ &(cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.contentType),
+ &(contentTypeTag->oid));
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ goto loser;
+ if (content.len > 0) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
+ &(cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent),
+ &content);
+ } else {
+ cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent.data = NULL;
+ cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent.data = NULL;
+ cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent.len = 0;
+ cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent.len = 0;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ goto loser;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ cinfo->content.data = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (cinfo->content.data == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+ if (content.len > 0) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
+ cinfo->content.data, &content);
+ } else {
+ /* handle case with NULL content */
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ goto loser;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* the content of an encrypted data content info is encrypted.
+ * it is assumed that for encrypted data, that the data has already
+ * been set and is in the "plainContent" field of the content info.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info to encrypt
+ *
+ * key is the key with which to perform the encryption. if the
+ * algorithm is a password based encryption algorithm, the
+ * key is actually a password which will be processed per
+ * PKCS #5.
+ *
+ * in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
+ * indicates a success.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7EncryptContents(PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECItem *key,
+ void *wincx)
+{
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid = NULL;
+ SECItem *src;
+ SECItem *dest;
+ SECItem *blocked_data = NULL;
+ void *mark;
+ void *cx;
+ PK11SymKey *eKey = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+ int bs;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem *c_param = NULL;
+
+ if ((cinfo == NULL) || (key == NULL))
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ algid = SEC_PKCS7GetEncryptionAlgorithm(cinfo);
+ if (algid == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ poolp = cinfo->poolp;
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
+
+ src = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent;
+ dest = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent;
+ dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, (src->len + 64));
+ dest->len = (src->len + 64);
+ if (dest->data == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ eKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, key, PR_FALSE, wincx);
+ if (eKey == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &c_param, key);
+ if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* block according to PKCS 8 */
+ bs = PK11_GetBlockSize(cryptoMechType, c_param);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (bs) {
+ char pad_char;
+ pad_char = (char)(bs - (src->len % bs));
+ if (src->len % bs) {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ blocked_data = PK11_BlockData(src, bs);
+ if (blocked_data) {
+ PORT_Memset((blocked_data->data + blocked_data->len - (int)pad_char),
+ pad_char, (int)pad_char);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ blocked_data = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (blocked_data) {
+ blocked_data->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Realloc(
+ blocked_data->data,
+ blocked_data->len + bs);
+ if (blocked_data->data) {
+ blocked_data->len += bs;
+ PORT_Memset((blocked_data->data + src->len), (char)bs, bs);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ blocked_data = SECITEM_DupItem(src);
+ if (!blocked_data) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cryptoMechType, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ eKey, c_param);
+ if (cx == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_CipherOp((PK11Context *)cx, dest->data, (int *)(&dest->len),
+ (int)(src->len + 64), blocked_data->data,
+ (int)blocked_data->len);
+ PK11_DestroyContext((PK11Context *)cx, PR_TRUE);
+
+loser:
+ /* let success fall through */
+ if (blocked_data != NULL)
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(blocked_data, PR_TRUE);
+
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
+ else
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
+
+ if (eKey != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(eKey);
+
+ if (slot != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (c_param != NULL)
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(c_param, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* the content of an encrypted data content info is decrypted.
+ * it is assumed that for encrypted data, that the data has already
+ * been set and is in the "encContent" field of the content info.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info to decrypt
+ *
+ * key is the key with which to perform the decryption. if the
+ * algorithm is a password based encryption algorithm, the
+ * key is actually a password which will be processed per
+ * PKCS #5.
+ *
+ * in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
+ * indicates a success.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7DecryptContents(PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECItem *key,
+ void *wincx)
+{
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem *dest, *src;
+ void *mark;
+
+ PK11SymKey *eKey = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+ void *cx;
+ SECItem *c_param = NULL;
+ int bs;
+
+ if ((cinfo == NULL) || (key == NULL))
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ algid = SEC_PKCS7GetEncryptionAlgorithm(cinfo);
+ if (algid == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ poolp = cinfo->poolp;
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
+
+ src = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent;
+ dest = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent;
+ dest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, (src->len + 64));
+ dest->len = (src->len + 64);
+ if (dest->data == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ eKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, key, PR_FALSE, wincx);
+ if (eKey == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &c_param, key);
+ if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ cx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cryptoMechType, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ eKey, c_param);
+ if (cx == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_CipherOp((PK11Context *)cx, dest->data, (int *)(&dest->len),
+ (int)(src->len + 64), src->data, (int)src->len);
+ PK11_DestroyContext((PK11Context *)cx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ bs = PK11_GetBlockSize(cryptoMechType, c_param);
+ if (bs) {
+ /* check for proper badding in block algorithms. this assumes
+ * RC2 cbc or a DES cbc variant. and the padding is thus defined
+ */
+ if (((int)dest->data[dest->len - 1] <= bs) &&
+ ((int)dest->data[dest->len - 1] > 0)) {
+ dest->len -= (int)dest->data[dest->len - 1];
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ /* set an error ? */
+ }
+ }
+
+loser:
+ /* let success fall through */
+ if (rv == SECFailure)
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
+ else
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
+
+ if (eKey != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(eKey);
+
+ if (slot != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (c_param != NULL)
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(c_param, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECItem **
+SEC_PKCS7GetCertificateList(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ switch (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo)) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ return cinfo->content.signedData->rawCerts;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+SEC_PKCS7GetKeyLength(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ if (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset == SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA)
+ return cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.keysize;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7create.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7create.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fcf0cad5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7create.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1247 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS7 creation.
+ */
+
+#include "p7local.h"
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "prtime.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secpkcs5.h"
+
+const int NSS_PBE_DEFAULT_ITERATION_COUNT = 2000; /* used in p12e.c too */
+
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_init_content_info(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SECOidTag kind, PRBool detached)
+{
+ void *thing;
+ int version;
+ SECItem *versionp;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(cinfo != NULL && poolp != NULL);
+ if (cinfo == NULL || poolp == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(kind);
+ PORT_Assert(cinfo->contentTypeTag && cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset == kind);
+
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(cinfo->contentType),
+ &(cinfo->contentTypeTag->oid));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ if (detached)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SECItem));
+ cinfo->content.data = (SECItem *)thing;
+ versionp = NULL;
+ version = -1;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData));
+ cinfo->content.digestedData = (SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *)thing;
+ versionp = &(cinfo->content.digestedData->version);
+ version = SEC_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData));
+ cinfo->content.encryptedData = (SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *)thing;
+ versionp = &(cinfo->content.encryptedData->version);
+ version = SEC_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData));
+ cinfo->content.envelopedData =
+ (SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *)thing;
+ versionp = &(cinfo->content.envelopedData->version);
+ version = SEC_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData));
+ cinfo->content.signedData =
+ (SEC_PKCS7SignedData *)thing;
+ versionp = &(cinfo->content.signedData->version);
+ version = SEC_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ thing = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData));
+ cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData =
+ (SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *)thing;
+ versionp = &(cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->version);
+ version = SEC_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (thing == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (versionp != NULL) {
+ SECItem *dummy;
+
+ PORT_Assert(version >= 0);
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, versionp, version);
+ if (dummy == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+ PORT_Assert(dummy == versionp);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+sec_pkcs7_create_content_info(SECOidTag kind, PRBool detached,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ PLArenaPool *poolp;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(*cinfo));
+ if (cinfo == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cinfo->poolp = poolp;
+ cinfo->pwfn = pwfn;
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
+ cinfo->created = PR_TRUE;
+ cinfo->refCount = 1;
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_init_content_info(cinfo, poolp, kind, detached);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a signer to a PKCS7 thing, verifying the signature cert first.
+ * Any error returns SECFailure.
+ *
+ * XXX Right now this only adds the *first* signer. It fails if you try
+ * to add a second one -- this needs to be fixed.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_add_signer(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag digestalgtag,
+ SECItem *digestdata)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *signerinfo, **signerinfos, ***signerinfosp;
+ SECAlgorithmID *digestalg, **digestalgs, ***digestalgsp;
+ SECItem *digest, **digests, ***digestsp;
+ SECItem *dummy;
+ void *mark;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ digestalgsp = &(sdp->digestAlgorithms);
+ digestsp = &(sdp->digests);
+ signerinfosp = &(sdp->signerInfos);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ digestalgsp = &(saedp->digestAlgorithms);
+ digestsp = &(saedp->digests);
+ signerinfosp = &(saedp->signerInfos);
+ } break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX I think that CERT_VerifyCert should do this if *it* is passed
+ * a NULL database.
+ */
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ certdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ if (certdb == NULL)
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ if (CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage, PR_Now(),
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+ /* XXX Did CERT_VerifyCert set an error? */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX This is the check that we do not already have a signer.
+ * This is not what we really want -- we want to allow this
+ * and *add* the new signer.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(*signerinfosp == NULL && *digestalgsp == NULL && *digestsp == NULL);
+ if (*signerinfosp != NULL || *digestalgsp != NULL || *digestsp != NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(cinfo->poolp);
+
+ signerinfo = (SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo));
+ if (signerinfo == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(cinfo->poolp, &signerinfo->version,
+ SEC_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_VERSION);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(dummy == &signerinfo->version);
+
+ signerinfo->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+ if (signerinfo->cert == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ signerinfo->issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(cinfo->poolp, cert);
+ if (signerinfo->issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, &signerinfo->digestAlg,
+ digestalgtag, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, now signerinfo is all set. We just need to put it and its
+ * companions (another copy of the digest algorithm, and the digest
+ * itself if given) into the main structure.
+ *
+ * XXX If we are handling more than one signer, the following code
+ * needs to look through the digest algorithms already specified
+ * and see if the same one is there already. If it is, it does not
+ * need to be added again. Also, if it is there *and* the digest
+ * is not null, then the digest given should match the digest already
+ * specified -- if not, that is an error. Finally, the new signerinfo
+ * should be *added* to the set already found.
+ */
+
+ signerinfos = (SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *));
+ if (signerinfos == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ signerinfos[0] = signerinfo;
+ signerinfos[1] = NULL;
+
+ digestalg = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(cinfo->poolp, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID));
+ digestalgs = PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp, 2 * sizeof(SECAlgorithmID *));
+ if (digestalg == NULL || digestalgs == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, digestalg, digestalgtag, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ digestalgs[0] = digestalg;
+ digestalgs[1] = NULL;
+
+ if (digestdata != NULL) {
+ digest = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp, sizeof(SECItem));
+ digests = (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ if (digest == NULL || digests == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp, digest, digestdata);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ digests[0] = digest;
+ digests[1] = NULL;
+ } else {
+ digests = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *signerinfosp = signerinfos;
+ *digestalgsp = digestalgs;
+ *digestsp = digests;
+
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function for creating an empty signedData.
+ */
+static SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+sec_pkcs7_create_signed_data(SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ cinfo = sec_pkcs7_create_content_info(SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, PR_FALSE,
+ pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ PORT_Assert(sigd != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Might we want to allow content types other than data?
+ * If so, via what interface?
+ */
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_init_content_info(&(sigd->contentInfo), cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start a PKCS7 signing context.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert that will be used to sign the data. It will be
+ * checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the signing usage (e.g. certUsageEmailSigner)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "signing" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "digestalg" names the digest algorithm (e.g. SEC_OID_SHA1).
+ *
+ * "digest" is the actual digest of the data. It must be provided in
+ * the case of detached data or NULL if the content will be included.
+ *
+ * The return value can be passed to functions which add things to
+ * it like attributes, then eventually to SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to
+ * SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data, and finally to
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateSignedData(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag digestalg,
+ SECItem *digest,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ cinfo = sec_pkcs7_create_signed_data(pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_add_signer(cinfo, cert, certusage, certdb,
+ digestalg, digest);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+static SEC_PKCS7Attribute *
+sec_pkcs7_create_attribute(PLArenaPool *poolp, SECOidTag oidtag,
+ SECItem *value, PRBool encoded)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+ SECItem **values;
+ void *mark;
+
+ PORT_Assert(poolp != NULL);
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
+
+ attr = (SEC_PKCS7Attribute *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp,
+ sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute));
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ attr->typeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oidtag);
+ if (attr->typeTag == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(attr->type),
+ &(attr->typeTag->oid)) != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ values = (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, 2 * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ if (values == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ if (value != NULL) {
+ SECItem *copy;
+
+ copy = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, copy, value) != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ value = copy;
+ }
+
+ values[0] = value;
+ values[1] = NULL;
+ attr->values = values;
+ attr->encoded = encoded;
+
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
+ return attr;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_Assert(mark != NULL);
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_add_attribute(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute ***attrsp,
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute **attrs;
+ SECItem *ct_value;
+ void *mark;
+
+ PORT_Assert(SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ attrs = *attrsp;
+ if (attrs != NULL) {
+ int count;
+
+ /*
+ * We already have some attributes, and just need to add this
+ * new one.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We should already have the *required* attributes, which were
+ * created/added at the same time the first attribute was added.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(attrs,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE,
+ PR_FALSE) != NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(attrs,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST,
+ PR_FALSE) != NULL);
+
+ for (count = 0; attrs[count] != NULL; count++)
+ ;
+ attrs = (SEC_PKCS7Attribute **)PORT_ArenaGrow(cinfo->poolp, attrs,
+ (count + 1) * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *),
+ (count + 2) * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *));
+ if (attrs == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ attrs[count] = attr;
+ attrs[count + 1] = NULL;
+ *attrsp = attrs;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is the first time an attribute is going in.
+ * We need to create and add the required attributes, and then
+ * we will also add in the one our caller gave us.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * There are 2 required attributes, plus the one our caller wants
+ * to add, plus we always end with a NULL one. Thus, four slots.
+ */
+ attrs = (SEC_PKCS7Attribute **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ 4 * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *));
+ if (attrs == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(cinfo->poolp);
+
+ /*
+ * First required attribute is the content type of the data
+ * being signed.
+ */
+ ct_value = &(cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.contentType);
+ attrs[0] = sec_pkcs7_create_attribute(cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE,
+ ct_value, PR_FALSE);
+ /*
+ * Second required attribute is the message digest of the data
+ * being signed; we leave the value NULL for now (just create
+ * the place for it to go), and the encoder will fill it in later.
+ */
+ attrs[1] = sec_pkcs7_create_attribute(cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST,
+ NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ if (attrs[0] == NULL || attrs[1] == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ attrs[2] = attr;
+ attrs[3] = NULL;
+ *attrsp = attrs;
+
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add the signing time to the authenticated (i.e. signed) attributes
+ * of "cinfo". This is expected to be included in outgoing signed
+ * messages for email (S/MIME) but is likely useful in other situations.
+ *
+ * This should only be added once; a second call will either do
+ * nothing or replace an old signing time with a newer one.
+ *
+ * XXX This will probably just shove the current time into "cinfo"
+ * but it will not actually get signed until the entire item is
+ * processed for encoding. Is this (expected to be small) delay okay?
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData (the only kind of pkcs7 data
+ * that is allowed authenticated attributes); SECFailure will be returned
+ * if it is not.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7AddSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+ SECItem stime;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int si;
+
+ PORT_Assert(SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
+
+ /* There has to be a signer, or it makes no sense. */
+ if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = DER_EncodeTimeChoice(NULL, &stime, PR_Now());
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ attr = sec_pkcs7_create_attribute(cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME,
+ &stime, PR_FALSE);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&stime, PR_FALSE);
+
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ for (si = 0; signerinfos[si] != NULL; si++) {
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *oattr;
+
+ oattr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfos[si]->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_Assert(oattr == NULL);
+ if (oattr != NULL)
+ continue; /* XXX or would it be better to replace it? */
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_add_attribute(cinfo, &(signerinfos[si]->authAttr),
+ attr);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ break; /* could try to continue, but may as well give up now */
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add the specified attribute to the authenticated (i.e. signed) attributes
+ * of "cinfo" -- "oidtag" describes the attribute and "value" is the
+ * value to be associated with it. NOTE! "value" must already be encoded;
+ * no interpretation of "oidtag" is done. Also, it is assumed that this
+ * signedData has only one signer -- if we ever need to add attributes
+ * when there is more than one signature, we need a way to specify *which*
+ * signature should get the attribute.
+ *
+ * XXX Technically, a signed attribute can have multiple values; if/when
+ * we ever need to support an attribute which takes multiple values, we
+ * either need to change this interface or create an AddSignedAttributeValue
+ * which can be called subsequently, and would then append a value.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData (the only kind of pkcs7 data
+ * that is allowed authenticated attributes); SECFailure will be returned
+ * if it is not.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7AddSignedAttribute(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECOidTag oidtag,
+ SECItem *value)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+
+ PORT_Assert(SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
+
+ /*
+ * No signature or more than one means no deal.
+ */
+ if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL || signerinfos[1] != NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ attr = sec_pkcs7_create_attribute(cinfo->poolp, oidtag, value, PR_TRUE);
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ return sec_pkcs7_add_attribute(cinfo, &(signerinfos[0]->authAttr), attr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mark that the signer certificates and their issuing chain should
+ * be included in the encoded data. This is expected to be used
+ * in outgoing signed messages for email (S/MIME).
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL, meaning use the default database.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7IncludeCertChain(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *signerinfo, **signerinfos;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->signerInfos;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ if (signerinfos == NULL) /* no signer, no certs? */
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ certdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* XXX Should it be an error if we find no signerinfo or no certs? */
+ while ((signerinfo = *signerinfos++) != NULL) {
+ if (signerinfo->cert != NULL)
+ /* get the cert chain. don't send the root to avoid contamination
+ * of old clients with a new root that they don't trust
+ */
+ signerinfo->certList = CERT_CertChainFromCert(signerinfo->cert,
+ certUsageEmailSigner,
+ PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to add a certificate chain for inclusion in the
+ * bag of certificates in a signedData.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_add_cert_chain(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ CERTCertificateList *certlist, **certlists, ***certlistsp;
+ int count;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ certlistsp = &(sdp->certLists);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ certlistsp = &(saedp->certLists);
+ } break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ certdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ certlist = CERT_CertChainFromCert(cert, certUsageEmailSigner, PR_FALSE);
+ if (certlist == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ certlists = *certlistsp;
+ if (certlists == NULL) {
+ count = 0;
+ certlists = (CERTCertificateList **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(CERTCertificateList *));
+ } else {
+ for (count = 0; certlists[count] != NULL; count++)
+ ;
+ PORT_Assert(count); /* should be at least one already */
+ certlists = (CERTCertificateList **)PORT_ArenaGrow(cinfo->poolp,
+ certlists,
+ (count + 1) * sizeof(CERTCertificateList *),
+ (count + 2) * sizeof(CERTCertificateList *));
+ }
+
+ if (certlists == NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(certlist);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ certlists[count] = certlist;
+ certlists[count + 1] = NULL;
+
+ *certlistsp = certlists;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to add a certificate for inclusion in the bag of
+ * certificates in a signedData.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_add_certificate(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ CERTCertificate **certs, ***certsp;
+ int count;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ certsp = &(sdp->certs);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ certsp = &(saedp->certs);
+ } break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ certs = *certsp;
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ count = 0;
+ certs = (CERTCertificate **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(CERTCertificate *));
+ } else {
+ for (count = 0; certs[count] != NULL; count++)
+ ;
+ PORT_Assert(count); /* should be at least one already */
+ certs = (CERTCertificate **)PORT_ArenaGrow(cinfo->poolp, certs,
+ (count + 1) * sizeof(CERTCertificate *),
+ (count + 2) * sizeof(CERTCertificate *));
+ }
+
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ certs[count] = cert;
+ certs[count + 1] = NULL;
+
+ *certsp = certs;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a PKCS7 certs-only container.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the (first) cert that will be included.
+ *
+ * "include_chain" specifies whether the entire chain for "cert" should
+ * be included.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL in when "include_chain" is false, or when meaning
+ * use the default database.
+ *
+ * More certs and chains can be added via AddCertificate and AddCertChain.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateCertsOnly(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ PRBool include_chain,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ cinfo = sec_pkcs7_create_signed_data(NULL, NULL);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (include_chain)
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_add_cert_chain(cinfo, cert, certdb);
+ else
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_add_certificate(cinfo, cert);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add "cert" and its entire chain to the set of certs included in "cinfo".
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL, meaning use the default database.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7AddCertChain(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ if (kind != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA && kind != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+
+ return sec_pkcs7_add_cert_chain(cinfo, cert, certdb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add "cert" to the set of certs included in "cinfo".
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7AddCertificate(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ if (kind != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA && kind != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA)
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+
+ return sec_pkcs7_add_certificate(cinfo, cert);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_init_encrypted_content_info(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo,
+ PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SECOidTag kind, PRBool detached,
+ SECOidTag encalg, int keysize)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(enccinfo != NULL && poolp != NULL);
+ if (enccinfo == NULL || poolp == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Some day we may want to allow for other kinds. That needs
+ * more work and modifications to the creation interface, etc.
+ * For now, allow but notice callers who pass in other kinds.
+ * They are responsible for creating the inner type and encoding,
+ * if it is other than DATA.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(kind == SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA);
+
+ enccinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(kind);
+ PORT_Assert(enccinfo->contentTypeTag && enccinfo->contentTypeTag->offset == kind);
+
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(enccinfo->contentType),
+ &(enccinfo->contentTypeTag->oid));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /* Save keysize and algorithm for later. */
+ enccinfo->keysize = keysize;
+ enccinfo->encalg = encalg;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a recipient to a PKCS7 thing, verifying their cert first.
+ * Any error returns SECFailure.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_add_recipient(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *recipientinfo, **recipientinfos, ***recipientinfosp;
+ SECItem *dummy;
+ void *mark;
+ int count;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *edp;
+
+ edp = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ recipientinfosp = &(edp->recipientInfos);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ recipientinfosp = &(saedp->recipientInfos);
+ } break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX I think that CERT_VerifyCert should do this if *it* is passed
+ * a NULL database.
+ */
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ certdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ if (certdb == NULL)
+ return SECFailure; /* XXX set an error? */
+ }
+
+ if (CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage, PR_Now(),
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+ /* XXX Did CERT_VerifyCert set an error? */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(cinfo->poolp);
+
+ recipientinfo = (SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
+ sizeof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo));
+ if (recipientinfo == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(cinfo->poolp, &recipientinfo->version,
+ SEC_PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(dummy == &recipientinfo->version);
+
+ recipientinfo->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+ if (recipientinfo->cert == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ recipientinfo->issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(cinfo->poolp, cert);
+ if (recipientinfo->issuerAndSN == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, now recipientinfo is all set. We just need to put it into
+ * the main structure.
+ *
+ * If this is the first recipient, allocate a new recipientinfos array;
+ * otherwise, reallocate the array, making room for the new entry.
+ */
+ recipientinfos = *recipientinfosp;
+ if (recipientinfos == NULL) {
+ count = 0;
+ recipientinfos = (SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(
+ cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *));
+ } else {
+ for (count = 0; recipientinfos[count] != NULL; count++)
+ ;
+ PORT_Assert(count); /* should be at least one already */
+ recipientinfos = (SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **)PORT_ArenaGrow(
+ cinfo->poolp, recipientinfos,
+ (count + 1) * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *),
+ (count + 2) * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *));
+ }
+
+ if (recipientinfos == NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ recipientinfos[count] = recipientinfo;
+ recipientinfos[count + 1] = NULL;
+
+ *recipientinfosp = recipientinfos;
+
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start a PKCS7 enveloping context.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert for the recipient. It will be checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the encryption usage (e.g. certUsageEmailRecipient)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "recipient" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "encalg" specifies the bulk encryption algorithm to use (e.g. SEC_OID_RC2).
+ *
+ * "keysize" specifies the bulk encryption key size, in bits.
+ *
+ * The return value can be passed to functions which add things to
+ * it like more recipients, then eventually to SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to
+ * SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data, and finally to
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateEnvelopedData(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag encalg,
+ int keysize,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ cinfo = sec_pkcs7_create_content_info(SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA,
+ PR_FALSE, pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_add_recipient(cinfo, cert, certusage, certdb);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ PORT_Assert(envd != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Might we want to allow content types other than data?
+ * If so, via what interface?
+ */
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_init_encrypted_content_info(&(envd->encContentInfo),
+ cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA, PR_FALSE,
+ encalg, keysize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX Anything more to do here? */
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add another recipient to an encrypted message.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type envelopedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert for the recipient. It will be checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the encryption usage (e.g. certUsageEmailRecipient)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "recipient" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7AddRecipient(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_add_recipient(cinfo, cert, certusage, certdb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an empty PKCS7 data content info.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateData(void)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_create_content_info(SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA, PR_FALSE,
+ NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an empty PKCS7 encrypted content info.
+ *
+ * "algorithm" specifies the bulk encryption algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateEncryptedData(SECOidTag algorithm, int keysize,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *enc_data;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ cinfo = sec_pkcs7_create_content_info(SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA,
+ PR_FALSE, pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ enc_data = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
+ algid = &(enc_data->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg);
+
+ if (!SEC_PKCS5IsAlgorithmPBEAlgTag(algorithm)) {
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, algid, algorithm, NULL);
+ } else {
+ /* Assume password-based-encryption.
+ * Note: we can't generate pkcs5v2 from this interface.
+ * PK11_CreateBPEAlgorithmID generates pkcs5v2 by accepting
+ * non-PBE oids and assuming that they are pkcs5v2 oids, but
+ * NSS_CMSEncryptedData_Create accepts non-PBE oids as regular
+ * CMS encrypted data, so we can't tell SEC_PKCS7CreateEncryptedtedData
+ * to create pkcs5v2 PBEs */
+ SECAlgorithmID *pbe_algid;
+ pbe_algid = PK11_CreatePBEAlgorithmID(algorithm,
+ NSS_PBE_DEFAULT_ITERATION_COUNT,
+ NULL);
+ if (pbe_algid == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, algid, pbe_algid);
+ SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(pbe_algid, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_init_encrypted_content_info(&(enc_data->encContentInfo),
+ cinfo->poolp,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA, PR_FALSE,
+ algorithm, keysize);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..658c61e44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1914 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS7 decoding, verification.
+ */
+
+#include "p7local.h"
+
+#include "cert.h"
+/* XXX do not want to have to include */
+#include "certdb.h" /* certdb.h -- the trust stuff needed by */
+ /* the add certificate code needs to get */
+ /* rewritten/abstracted and then this */
+ /* include should be removed! */
+/*#include "cdbhdl.h" */
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "prtime.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secpkcs5.h"
+
+struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker {
+ int depth;
+ int digcnt;
+ void **digcxs;
+ const SECHashObject **digobjs;
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
+ PRBool saw_contents;
+};
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7DecoderContextStr {
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb;
+ void *cb_arg;
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn;
+ void *pwfn_arg;
+ struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker worker;
+ PLArenaPool *tmp_poolp;
+ int error;
+ SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback dkcb;
+ void *dkcb_arg;
+ SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Handle one worker, decrypting and digesting the data as necessary.
+ *
+ * XXX If/when we support nested contents, this probably needs to be
+ * revised somewhat to get passed the content-info (which unfortunately
+ * can be two different types depending on whether it is encrypted or not)
+ * corresponding to the given worker.
+ */
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker,
+ const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * We should really have data to process, or we should be trying
+ * to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid
+ * check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection
+ * proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future
+ * modifications/development, that is why it is here.)
+ */
+ PORT_Assert((data != NULL && len) || final);
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt this chunk.
+ *
+ * XXX If we get an error, we do not want to do the digest or callback,
+ * but we want to keep decoding. Or maybe we want to stop decoding
+ * altogether if there is a callback, because obviously we are not
+ * sending the data back and they want to know that.
+ */
+ if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) {
+ /* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */
+ unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being decrypted */
+ unsigned int outlen; /* length of decrypted data */
+ unsigned int buflen; /* length available for decrypted data */
+ SECItem *plain;
+
+ inlen = len;
+ buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(worker->decryptobj, inlen, final);
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ if (inlen == 0) /* no input and no output */
+ return;
+ /*
+ * No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered
+ * so we still have to call Decrypt.
+ */
+ rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0,
+ data, inlen, final);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ return; /* XXX indicate error? */
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen);
+ plain = NULL;
+ } else {
+ unsigned long oldlen;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX This assumes one level of content only.
+ * See comment above about nested content types.
+ * XXX Also, it should work for signedAndEnvelopedData, too!
+ */
+ plain = &(p7dcx->cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.plainContent);
+
+ oldlen = plain->len;
+ if (oldlen == 0) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp,
+ buflen);
+ } else {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaGrow(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp,
+ plain->data,
+ oldlen, oldlen + buflen);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ buf += oldlen;
+ }
+ plain->data = buf;
+ }
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ return; /* XXX indicate error? */
+ }
+ rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen,
+ data, inlen, final);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ return; /* XXX indicate error? */
+ }
+ if (plain != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(final || outlen == buflen);
+ plain->len += outlen;
+ }
+ data = buf;
+ len = outlen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Update the running digests.
+ */
+ if (len) {
+ for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) {
+ (*worker->digobjs[i]->update)(worker->digcxs[i], data, len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pass back the contents bytes, and free the temporary buffer.
+ */
+ if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) {
+ if (len)
+ (*p7dcx->cb)(p7dcx->cb_arg, (const char *)data, len);
+ if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(buf != NULL);
+ PORT_Free(buf);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter(void *arg, const char *data, unsigned long len,
+ int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
+ struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
+
+ /*
+ * Since we do not handle any nested contents, the only bytes we
+ * are really interested in are the actual contents bytes (not
+ * the identifier, length, or end-of-contents bytes). If we were
+ * handling nested types we would probably need to do something
+ * smarter based on depth and data_kind.
+ */
+ if (data_kind != SEC_ASN1_Contents)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The ASN.1 decoder should not even call us with a length of 0.
+ * Just being paranoid.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(len);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return;
+
+ p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg;
+
+ /*
+ * Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
+ * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
+ * would start with the first worker and loop over them.
+ */
+ worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
+
+ worker->saw_contents = PR_TRUE;
+
+ sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker,
+ (const unsigned char *)data, len, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create digest contexts for each algorithm in "digestalgs".
+ * No algorithms is not an error, we just do not do anything.
+ * An error (like trouble allocating memory), marks the error
+ * in "p7dcx" and returns SECFailure, which means that our caller
+ * should just give up altogether.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth,
+ SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs)
+{
+ int i, digcnt;
+
+ if (digestalgs == NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * Count the algorithms.
+ */
+ digcnt = 0;
+ while (digestalgs[digcnt] != NULL)
+ digcnt++;
+
+ /*
+ * No algorithms means no work to do.
+ * Just act as if there were no algorithms specified.
+ */
+ if (digcnt == 0)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ p7dcx->worker.digcxs = (void **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp,
+ digcnt * sizeof(void *));
+ p7dcx->worker.digobjs = (const SECHashObject **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp,
+ digcnt * sizeof(SECHashObject *));
+ if (p7dcx->worker.digcxs == NULL || p7dcx->worker.digobjs == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ p7dcx->worker.depth = depth;
+ p7dcx->worker.digcnt = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a digest context for each algorithm.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < digcnt; i++) {
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid = digestalgs[i];
+ SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(algid->algorithm));
+ const SECHashObject *digobj = HASH_GetHashObjectByOidTag(oidTag);
+ void *digcx;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip any algorithm we do not even recognize; obviously,
+ * this could be a problem, but if it is critical then the
+ * result will just be that the signature does not verify.
+ * We do not necessarily want to error out here, because
+ * the particular algorithm may not actually be important,
+ * but we cannot know that until later.
+ */
+ if (digobj == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->worker.digcnt--;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ digcx = (*digobj->create)();
+ if (digcx != NULL) {
+ (*digobj->begin)(digcx);
+ p7dcx->worker.digobjs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digobj;
+ p7dcx->worker.digcxs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digcx;
+ p7dcx->worker.digcnt++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p7dcx->worker.digcnt != 0)
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx,
+ sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
+ p7dcx,
+ (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Close out all of the digest contexts, storing the results in "digestsp".
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SECItem ***digestsp)
+{
+ struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
+ const SECHashObject *digobj;
+ void *digcx;
+ SECItem **digests, *digest;
+ int i;
+ void *mark;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
+ * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
+ * would want to find the last worker in the chain.
+ */
+ worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
+
+ /*
+ * If no digests, then we have nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (worker->digcnt == 0)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering.
+ * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering
+ * if we are finishing off the *last* worker.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ /*
+ * If we ended up with no contents, just destroy each
+ * digest context -- they are meaningless and potentially
+ * confusing, because their presence would imply some content
+ * was digested.
+ */
+ if (!worker->saw_contents) {
+ for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) {
+ digcx = worker->digcxs[i];
+ digobj = worker->digobjs[i];
+ (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
+
+ /*
+ * Close out each digest context, saving digest away.
+ */
+ digests =
+ (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, (worker->digcnt + 1) * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ digest = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, worker->digcnt * sizeof(SECItem));
+ if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++, digest++) {
+ digcx = worker->digcxs[i];
+ digobj = worker->digobjs[i];
+
+ digest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, digobj->length);
+ if (digest->data == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ digest->len = digobj->length;
+ (*digobj->end)(digcx, digest->data, &(digest->len), digest->len);
+ (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ digests[i] = digest;
+ }
+ digests[i] = NULL;
+ *digestsp = digests;
+
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX Need comment explaining following helper function (which is used
+ * by sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt).
+ */
+
+static PK11SymKey *
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *ri;
+ CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL;
+ SECOidTag keyalgtag, bulkalgtag, encalgtag;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+
+ if (recipientinfos == NULL || recipientinfos[0] == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT;
+ goto no_key_found;
+ }
+
+ cert = PK11_FindCertAndKeyByRecipientList(&slot, recipientinfos, &ri,
+ &privkey, p7dcx->pwfn_arg);
+ if (cert == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT;
+ goto no_key_found;
+ }
+
+ ri->cert = cert; /* so we can find it later */
+ PORT_Assert(privkey != NULL);
+
+ keyalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
+ encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->keyEncAlg));
+ if (keyalgtag != encalgtag) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH;
+ goto no_key_found;
+ }
+ bulkalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
+
+ switch (encalgtag) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+ bulkkey = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(privkey, &ri->encKey,
+ PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(bulkalgtag),
+ CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
+ if (bulkkey == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_SetError(0);
+ goto no_key_found;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
+ break;
+ }
+
+no_key_found:
+ if (privkey != NULL)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+ if (slot != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ return bulkkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX The following comment is old -- the function used to only handle
+ * EnvelopedData or SignedAndEnvelopedData but now handles EncryptedData
+ * as well (and it had all of the code of the helper function above
+ * built into it), though the comment was left as is. Fix it...
+ *
+ * We are just about to decode the content of an EnvelopedData.
+ * Set up a decryption context so we can decrypt as we go.
+ * Presumably we are one of the recipients listed in "recipientinfos".
+ * (XXX And if we are not, or if we have trouble, what should we do?
+ * It would be nice to let the decoding still work. Maybe it should
+ * be an error if there is a content callback, but not an error otherwise?)
+ * The encryption key and related information can be found in "enccinfo".
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth,
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo,
+ PK11SymKey **copy_key_for_signature)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL;
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
+
+ /*
+ * If a callback is supplied to retrieve the encryption key,
+ * for instance, for Encrypted Content infos, then retrieve
+ * the bulkkey from the callback. Otherwise, assume that
+ * we are processing Enveloped or SignedAndEnveloped data
+ * content infos.
+ *
+ * XXX Put an assert here?
+ */
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7dcx->cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA) {
+ if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) {
+ bulkkey = (*p7dcx->dkcb)(p7dcx->dkcb_arg,
+ &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
+ }
+ enccinfo->keysize = 0;
+ } else {
+ bulkkey = sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(p7dcx, recipientinfos,
+ enccinfo);
+ if (bulkkey == NULL)
+ goto no_decryption;
+ enccinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(bulkkey,
+ &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX I think following should set error in p7dcx and clear set error
+ * (as used to be done here, or as is done in get_receipient_key above.
+ */
+ if (bulkkey == NULL) {
+ goto no_decryption;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We want to make sure decryption is allowed. This is done via
+ * a callback specified in SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart().
+ */
+ if (p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb) {
+ if ((*p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb)(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg),
+ bulkkey) == PR_FALSE) {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED;
+ goto no_decryption;
+ }
+ } else {
+ p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED;
+ goto no_decryption;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When decrypting a signedAndEnvelopedData, the signature also has
+ * to be decrypted with the bulk encryption key; to avoid having to
+ * get it all over again later (and do another potentially expensive
+ * RSA operation), copy it for later signature verification to use.
+ */
+ if (copy_key_for_signature != NULL)
+ *copy_key_for_signature = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(bulkkey);
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have the bulk encryption key (in bulkkey) and the
+ * the algorithm (in enccinfo->contentEncAlg). Using those,
+ * create a decryption context.
+ */
+ decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(bulkkey,
+ &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
+
+ /*
+ * We are done with (this) bulkkey now.
+ */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey);
+
+ if (decryptobj == NULL) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_SetError(0);
+ goto no_decryption;
+ }
+
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx,
+ sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
+ p7dcx,
+ (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
+
+ p7dcx->worker.depth = depth;
+ p7dcx->worker.decryptobj = decryptobj;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+no_decryption:
+ /*
+ * For some reason (error set already, if appropriate), we cannot
+ * decrypt the content. I am not sure what exactly is the right
+ * thing to do here; in some cases we want to just stop, and in
+ * others we want to let the decoding finish even though we cannot
+ * decrypt the content. My current thinking is that if the caller
+ * set up a content callback, then they are really interested in
+ * getting (decrypted) content, and if they cannot they will want
+ * to know about it. However, if no callback was specified, then
+ * maybe it is not important that the decryption failed.
+ */
+ if (p7dcx->cb != NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+ else
+ return SECSuccess; /* Let the decoding continue. */
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo)
+{
+ struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
+ * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
+ * would want to find the last worker in the chain.
+ */
+ worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
+
+ /*
+ * If no decryption context, then we have nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (worker->decryptobj == NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering.
+ * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering
+ * if we are finishing off the *last* worker.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ /*
+ * Handle the last block.
+ */
+ sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * All done, destroy it.
+ */
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(worker->decryptobj);
+ worker->decryptobj = NULL;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify(void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd;
+ SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd;
+ PRBool after;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /*
+ * Just to make the code easier to read, create an "after" variable
+ * that is equivalent to "not before".
+ * (This used to be just the statement "after = !before", but that
+ * causes a warning on the mac; to avoid that, we do it the long way.)
+ */
+ if (before)
+ after = PR_FALSE;
+ else
+ after = PR_TRUE;
+
+ p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg;
+ if (!p7dcx) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo;
+
+ if (!cinfo) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL) {
+ if (after && dest == &(cinfo->contentType))
+ cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ if (sigd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
+ if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.contentType))
+ sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag =
+ SECOID_FindOID(&(sigd->contentInfo.contentType));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We only set up a filtering digest if the content is
+ * plain DATA; anything else needs more work because a
+ * second pass is required to produce a DER encoding from
+ * an input that can be BER encoded. (This is a requirement
+ * of PKCS7 that is unfortunate, but there you have it.)
+ *
+ * XXX Also, since we stop here if this is not DATA, the
+ * inner content is not getting processed at all. Someday
+ * we may want to fix that.
+ */
+ if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag->offset != SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA) {
+ /* XXX Set an error in p7dcx->error */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Just before the content, we want to set up a digest context
+ * for each digest algorithm listed, and start a filter which
+ * will run all of the contents bytes through that digest.
+ */
+ if (before && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) {
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth,
+ sigd->digestAlgorithms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX To handle nested types, here is where we would want
+ * to check for inner boundaries that need handling.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Are we done?
+ */
+ if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) {
+ /*
+ * Close out the digest contexts. We ignore any error
+ * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
+ * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
+ */
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
+ &(sigd->digests));
+
+ /*
+ * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
+ * the worker from the chain (and free it).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Stop notify.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ if (envd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
+ if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.contentType))
+ envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag =
+ SECOID_FindOID(&(envd->encContentInfo.contentType));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption
+ * context, and start a filter which will run all of the
+ * contents bytes through it to determine the plain content.
+ */
+ if (before && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth,
+ envd->recipientInfos,
+ &(envd->encContentInfo),
+ NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Are we done?
+ */
+ if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ /*
+ * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error
+ * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
+ * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
+ */
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
+ &(envd->encContentInfo));
+
+ /*
+ * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
+ * the worker from the chain (and free it).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Stop notify.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ if (saed == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
+ if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.contentType))
+ saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag =
+ SECOID_FindOID(&(saed->encContentInfo.contentType));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption
+ * context *and* digest contexts, and start a filter which
+ * will run all of the contents bytes through both.
+ */
+ if (before && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth,
+ saed->recipientInfos,
+ &(saed->encContentInfo),
+ &(saed->sigKey));
+ if (rv == SECSuccess)
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth,
+ saed->digestAlgorithms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Are we done?
+ */
+ if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ /*
+ * Close out the decryption and digests contexts.
+ * We ignore any errors because we are stopping anyway;
+ * the error status left behind in p7dcx will be seen by
+ * outer functions.
+ *
+ * Note that the decrypt stuff must be called first;
+ * it may have a last buffer to do which in turn has
+ * to be added to the digest.
+ */
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
+ &(saed->encContentInfo));
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
+ &(saed->digests));
+
+ /*
+ * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
+ * the worker from the chain (and free it).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Stop notify.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ digd = cinfo->content.digestedData;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Want to do the digest or not? Maybe future enhancement...
+ */
+ if (before && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) {
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
+ p7dcx,
+ (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Are we done?
+ */
+ if (after && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) {
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
+
+ if (!encd) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX If the decryption key callback is set, we want to start
+ * the decryption. If the callback is not set, we will treat the
+ * content as plain data, since we do not have the key.
+ *
+ * Is this the proper thing to do?
+ */
+ if (before && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ /*
+ * Start the encryption process if the decryption key callback
+ * is present. Otherwise, treat the content like plain data.
+ */
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) {
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, NULL,
+ &(encd->encContentInfo),
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Are we done?
+ */
+ if (after && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
+ /*
+ * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error
+ * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
+ * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
+ */
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
+ &(encd->encContentInfo));
+
+ /*
+ * Stop notify.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ /*
+ * If a output callback has been specified, we want to set the filter
+ * to call the callback. This is taken care of in
+ * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt() or
+ * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests() for the other content types.
+ */
+
+ if (before && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) {
+
+ /*
+ * Set the filter proc up.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx,
+ sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
+ p7dcx,
+ (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (after && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) {
+ /*
+ * Time to clean up after ourself, stop the Notify and Filter
+ * procedures.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
+ void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ PLArenaPool *poolp;
+
+ poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(*cinfo));
+ if (cinfo == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cinfo->poolp = poolp;
+ cinfo->pwfn = pwfn;
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
+ cinfo->created = PR_FALSE;
+ cinfo->refCount = 1;
+
+ p7dcx =
+ (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext));
+ if (p7dcx == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p7dcx->tmp_poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
+ if (p7dcx->tmp_poolp == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(p7dcx);
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ dcx = SEC_ASN1DecoderStart(poolp, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate);
+ if (dcx == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_Free(p7dcx);
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderSetNotifyProc(dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify, p7dcx);
+
+ p7dcx->dcx = dcx;
+ p7dcx->cinfo = cinfo;
+ p7dcx->cb = cb;
+ p7dcx->cb_arg = cb_arg;
+ p7dcx->pwfn = pwfn;
+ p7dcx->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
+ p7dcx->dkcb = decrypt_key_cb;
+ p7dcx->dkcb_arg = decrypt_key_cb_arg;
+ p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb = decrypt_allowed_cb;
+
+ return p7dcx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the next chunk of PKCS7 decoding. If there is a problem, set
+ * an error and return a failure status. Note that in the case of
+ * an error, this routine is still prepared to be called again and
+ * again in case that is the easiest route for our caller to take.
+ * We simply detect it and do not do anything except keep setting
+ * that error in case our caller has not noticed it yet...
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ const char *buf, unsigned long len)
+{
+ if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL && p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error == 0);
+ if (p7dcx->error == 0) {
+ if (SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(p7dcx->dcx, buf, len) != SECSuccess) {
+ p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error);
+ if (p7dcx->error == 0)
+ p7dcx->error = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p7dcx->error) {
+ if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
+ (void)SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx);
+ p7dcx->dcx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(p7dcx->cinfo);
+ p7dcx->cinfo = NULL;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(p7dcx->error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+
+ cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo;
+ if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
+ if (SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx) != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ cinfo = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* free any NSS data structures */
+ if (p7dcx->worker.decryptobj) {
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(p7dcx->worker.decryptobj);
+ }
+ PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_Free(p7dcx);
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem(SECItem *p7item,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
+ void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
+
+ p7dcx = SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(cb, cb_arg, pwfn, pwfn_arg, decrypt_key_cb,
+ decrypt_key_cb_arg, decrypt_allowed_cb);
+ if (!p7dcx) {
+ /* error code is set */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ (void)SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(p7dcx, (char *)p7item->data, p7item->len);
+ return SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(p7dcx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Abort the ASN.1 stream. Used by pkcs 12
+ */
+void
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int error)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(p7dcx);
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderAbort(p7dcx->dcx, error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the thing contains any certs or crls return true; false otherwise.
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7ContainsCertsOrCrls(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SECItem **certs;
+ CERTSignedCrl **crls;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ certs = cinfo->content.signedData->rawCerts;
+ crls = cinfo->content.signedData->crls;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ certs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->rawCerts;
+ crls = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->crls;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * I know this could be collapsed, but I was in a mood to be explicit.
+ */
+ if (certs != NULL && certs[0] != NULL)
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ else if (crls != NULL && crls[0] != NULL)
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ else
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* return the content length...could use GetContent, however we
+ * need the encrypted content length
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7IsContentEmpty(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, unsigned int minLen)
+{
+ SECItem *item = NULL;
+
+ if (cinfo == NULL) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ switch (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo)) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ item = cinfo->content.data;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ item = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* add other types */
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!item) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ } else if (item->len <= minLen) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the PKCS7 content has a signature (not just *could* have a signature)
+ * return true; false otherwise. This can/should be called before calling
+ * VerifySignature, which will always indicate failure if no signature is
+ * present, but that does not mean there even was a signature!
+ * Note that the content itself can be empty (detached content was sent
+ * another way); it is the presence of the signature that matters.
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->signerInfos;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * I know this could be collapsed; but I kind of think it will get
+ * more complicated before I am finished, so...
+ */
+ if (signerinfos != NULL && signerinfos[0] != NULL)
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ else
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * sec_pkcs7_verify_signature
+ *
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good.
+ * The digest was either calculated earlier (and is stored in the
+ * contentInfo itself) or is passed in via "detached_digest".
+ *
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at
+ * - "*atTime" if "atTime" is not null, or
+ * - the signing time if the signing time is available in "cinfo", or
+ * - the current time (as returned by PR_Now).
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ *
+ * XXX Each place which returns PR_FALSE should be sure to have a good
+ * error set for inspection by the caller. Alternatively, we could create
+ * an enumeration of success and each type of failure and return that
+ * instead of a boolean. For now, the default in a bad situation is to
+ * set the error to SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE. But this should be
+ * reviewed; better (more specific) errors should be possible (to distinguish
+ * a signature failure from a badly-formed pkcs7 signedData, for example).
+ * Some of the errors should probably just be SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ * but that has a less helpful error string associated with it right now;
+ * if/when that changes, review and change these as needed.
+ *
+ * XXX This is broken wrt signedAndEnvelopedData. In that case, the
+ * message digest is doubly encrypted -- first encrypted with the signer
+ * private key but then again encrypted with the bulk encryption key used
+ * to encrypt the content. So before we can pass the digest to VerifyDigest,
+ * we need to decrypt it with the bulk encryption key. Also, in this case,
+ * there should be NO authenticatedAttributes (signerinfo->authAttr should
+ * be NULL).
+ */
+static PRBool
+sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ const SECItem *detached_digest,
+ HASH_HashType digest_type,
+ PRBool keepcerts,
+ const PRTime *atTime)
+{
+ SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs, *bulkid;
+ const SECItem *digest;
+ SECItem **digests;
+ SECItem **rawcerts;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos, *signerinfo;
+ CERTCertificate *cert, **certs;
+ PRBool goodsig;
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb, *defaultdb;
+ SECOidTag encTag, digestTag;
+ HASH_HashType found_type;
+ int i, certcount;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *publickey;
+ SECItem *content_type;
+ PK11SymKey *sigkey;
+ SECItem *encoded_stime;
+ PRTime stime;
+ PRTime verificationTime;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /*
+ * Everything needed in order to "goto done" safely.
+ */
+ goodsig = PR_FALSE;
+ certcount = 0;
+ cert = NULL;
+ certs = NULL;
+ certdb = NULL;
+ defaultdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+ publickey = NULL;
+
+ if (!SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(cinfo)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(cinfo->contentTypeTag != NULL);
+
+ switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ /* Could only get here if SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned is broken. */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms;
+ digests = sdp->digests;
+ rawcerts = sdp->rawCerts;
+ signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
+ content_type = &(sdp->contentInfo.contentType);
+ sigkey = NULL;
+ bulkid = NULL;
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms;
+ digests = saedp->digests;
+ rawcerts = saedp->rawCerts;
+ signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
+ content_type = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentType);
+ sigkey = saedp->sigKey;
+ bulkid = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg);
+ } break;
+ }
+
+ if ((signerinfos == NULL) || (signerinfos[0] == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Need to handle multiple signatures; checking them is easy,
+ * but what should be the semantics here (like, return value)?
+ */
+ if (signerinfos[1] != NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ signerinfo = signerinfos[0];
+
+ /*
+ * XXX I would like to just pass the issuerAndSN, along with the rawcerts
+ * and crls, to some function that did all of this certificate stuff
+ * (open/close the database if necessary, verifying the certs, etc.)
+ * and gave me back a cert pointer if all was good.
+ */
+ certdb = defaultdb;
+ if (certdb == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ certcount = 0;
+ if (rawcerts != NULL) {
+ for (; rawcerts[certcount] != NULL; certcount++) {
+ /* just counting */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the result of this is that each cert in "certs"
+ * needs to be destroyed.
+ */
+ rv = CERT_ImportCerts(certdb, certusage, certcount, rawcerts, &certs,
+ keepcerts, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This cert will also need to be freed, but since we save it
+ * in signerinfo for later, we do not want to destroy it when
+ * we leave this function -- we let the clean-up of the entire
+ * cinfo structure later do the destroy of this cert.
+ */
+ cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, signerinfo->issuerAndSN);
+ if (cert == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ signerinfo->cert = cert;
+
+ /*
+ * Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used
+ * both on the cert verification and for importing the sender
+ * email profile.
+ */
+ encoded_stime = SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(cinfo);
+ if (encoded_stime != NULL) {
+ if (DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&stime, encoded_stime) != SECSuccess)
+ encoded_stime = NULL; /* conversion failed, so pretend none */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX This uses the signing time, if available. Additionally, we
+ * might want to, if there is no signing time, get the message time
+ * from the mail header itself, and use that. That would require
+ * a change to our interface though, and for S/MIME callers to pass
+ * in a time (and for non-S/MIME callers to pass in nothing, or
+ * maybe make them pass in the current time, always?).
+ */
+ if (atTime) {
+ verificationTime = *atTime;
+ } else if (encoded_stime != NULL) {
+ verificationTime = stime;
+ } else {
+ verificationTime = PR_Now();
+ }
+ if (CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage, verificationTime,
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+ /*
+ * XXX Give the user an option to check the signature anyway?
+ * If we want to do this, need to give a way to leave and display
+ * some dialog and get the answer and come back through (or do
+ * the rest of what we do below elsewhere, maybe by putting it
+ * in a function that we call below and could call from a dialog
+ * finish handler).
+ */
+ goto savecert;
+ }
+
+ publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+ if (publickey == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX No! If digests is empty, see if we can create it now by
+ * digesting the contents. This is necessary if we want to allow
+ * somebody to do a simple decode (without filtering, etc.) and
+ * then later call us here to do the verification.
+ * OR, we can just specify that the interface to this routine
+ * *requires* that the digest(s) be done before calling and either
+ * stashed in the struct itself or passed in explicitly (as would
+ * be done for detached contents).
+ */
+ if ((digests == NULL || digests[0] == NULL) && (detached_digest == NULL || detached_digest->data == NULL))
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * Find and confirm digest algorithm.
+ */
+ digestTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestAlg.algorithm));
+
+ /* make sure we understand the digest type first */
+ found_type = HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(digestTag);
+ if ((digestTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || (found_type == HASH_AlgNULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (detached_digest != NULL) {
+ unsigned int hashLen = HASH_ResultLen(found_type);
+
+ if (digest_type != found_type ||
+ detached_digest->len != hashLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ digest = detached_digest;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(digestalgs != NULL && digestalgs[0] != NULL);
+ if (digestalgs == NULL || digestalgs[0] == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * pick digest matching signerinfo->digestAlg from digests
+ */
+ for (i = 0; digestalgs[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(digestalgs[i]->algorithm)) == digestTag)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (digestalgs[i] == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ digest = digests[i];
+ }
+
+ encTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg.algorithm));
+ if (encTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) {
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+ SECItem *value;
+ SECItem encoded_attrs;
+
+ /*
+ * We have a sigkey only for signedAndEnvelopedData, which is
+ * not supposed to have any authenticated attributes.
+ */
+ if (sigkey != NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * PKCS #7 says that if there are any authenticated attributes,
+ * then there must be one for content type which matches the
+ * content type of the content being signed, and there must
+ * be one for message digest which matches our message digest.
+ * So check these things first.
+ * XXX Might be nice to have a compare-attribute-value function
+ * which could collapse the following nicely.
+ */
+ attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, PR_TRUE);
+ value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr);
+ if (value == NULL || value->len != content_type->len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, content_type->data, value->len) != 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, PR_TRUE);
+ value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr);
+ if (value == NULL || value->len != digest->len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, digest->data, value->len) != 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, we met the constraints of the basic attributes.
+ * Now check the signature, which is based on a digest of
+ * the DER-encoded authenticated attributes. So, first we
+ * encode and then we digest/verify.
+ */
+ encoded_attrs.data = NULL;
+ encoded_attrs.len = 0;
+ if (sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(NULL, &encoded_attrs,
+ &(signerinfo->authAttr)) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (encoded_attrs.data == NULL || encoded_attrs.len == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDataDirect(encoded_attrs.data,
+ encoded_attrs.len,
+ publickey, &(signerinfo->encDigest),
+ encTag, digestTag, NULL,
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess);
+ PORT_Free(encoded_attrs.data);
+ } else {
+ SECItem *sig;
+ SECItem holder;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /*
+ * No authenticated attributes.
+ * The signature is based on the plain message digest.
+ */
+
+ sig = &(signerinfo->encDigest);
+ if (sig->len == 0) { /* bad signature */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (sigkey != NULL) {
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
+ unsigned int buflen;
+
+ /*
+ * For signedAndEnvelopedData, we first must decrypt the encrypted
+ * digest with the bulk encryption key. The result is the normal
+ * encrypted digest (aka the signature).
+ */
+ decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(sigkey, bulkid);
+ if (decryptobj == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(decryptobj, sig->len, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Assert(buflen);
+ if (buflen == 0) { /* something is wrong */
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ holder.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen);
+ if (holder.data == NULL) {
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(decryptobj, holder.data, &holder.len, buflen,
+ sig->data, sig->len, PR_TRUE);
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ sig = &holder;
+ }
+
+ goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(digest, publickey, sig,
+ encTag, digestTag, cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess);
+
+ if (sigkey != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(sig == &holder);
+ PORT_ZFree(holder.data, holder.len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!goodsig) {
+ /*
+ * XXX Change the generic error into our specific one, because
+ * in that case we get a better explanation out of the Security
+ * Advisor. This is really a bug in our error strings (the
+ * "generic" error has a lousy/wrong message associated with it
+ * which assumes the signature verification was done for the
+ * purposes of checking the issuer signature on a certificate)
+ * but this is at least an easy workaround and/or in the
+ * Security Advisor, which specifically checks for the error
+ * SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE and gives more explanation
+ * in that case but does not similarly check for
+ * SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. It probably should, but then would
+ * probably say the wrong thing in the case that it *was* the
+ * certificate signature check that failed during the cert
+ * verification done above. Our error handling is really a mess.
+ */
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ }
+
+savecert:
+ /*
+ * Only save the smime profile if we are checking an email message and
+ * the cert has an email address in it.
+ */
+ if (cert->emailAddr && cert->emailAddr[0] &&
+ ((certusage == certUsageEmailSigner) ||
+ (certusage == certUsageEmailRecipient))) {
+ SECItem *profile = NULL;
+ int save_error;
+
+ /*
+ * Remember the current error set because we do not care about
+ * anything set by the functions we are about to call.
+ */
+ save_error = PORT_GetError();
+
+ if (goodsig && (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL)) {
+ /*
+ * If the signature is good, then we can save the S/MIME profile,
+ * if we have one.
+ */
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+
+ attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES,
+ PR_TRUE);
+ profile = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr);
+ }
+
+ rv = CERT_SaveSMimeProfile(cert, profile, encoded_stime);
+
+ /*
+ * Restore the saved error in case the calls above set a new
+ * one that we do not actually care about.
+ */
+ PORT_SetError(save_error);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Failure is not indicated anywhere -- the signature
+ * verification itself is unaffected by whether or not the
+ * profile was successfully saved.
+ */
+ }
+
+done:
+
+ /*
+ * See comment above about why we do not want to destroy cert
+ * itself here.
+ */
+
+ if (certs != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertArray(certs, certcount);
+
+ if (publickey != NULL)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
+
+ return goodsig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good.
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ PRBool keepcerts)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage,
+ NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, keepcerts, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches
+ * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents).
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ const SECItem *detached_digest,
+ HASH_HashType digest_type,
+ PRBool keepcerts)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage,
+ detached_digest, digest_type,
+ keepcerts, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches
+ * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents).
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at time "atTime".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ const SECItem *detached_digest,
+ HASH_HashType digest_type,
+ PRBool keepcerts,
+ PRTime atTime)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage,
+ detached_digest, digest_type,
+ keepcerts, &atTime);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the asked-for portion of the name of the signer of a PKCS7
+ * signed object.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to allocated memory, which must be freed.
+ * A NULL return value is an error.
+ */
+
+#define sec_common_name 1
+#define sec_email_address 2
+
+static char *
+sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, int selector)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+ CERTCertificate *signercert;
+ char *container;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return NULL;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
+ } break;
+ }
+
+ if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert;
+
+ /*
+ * No cert there; see if we can find one by calling verify ourselves.
+ */
+ if (signercert == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The cert usage does not matter in this case, because we do not
+ * actually care about the verification itself, but we have to pick
+ * some valid usage to pass in.
+ */
+ (void)sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certUsageEmailSigner,
+ NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+ signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert;
+ if (signercert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (selector) {
+ case sec_common_name:
+ container = CERT_GetCommonName(&signercert->subject);
+ break;
+ case sec_email_address:
+ if (signercert->emailAddr && signercert->emailAddr[0]) {
+ container = PORT_Strdup(signercert->emailAddr);
+ } else {
+ container = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ container = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return container;
+}
+
+char *
+SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_common_name);
+}
+
+char *
+SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_email_address);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the signing time, in UTCTime format, of a PKCS7 contentInfo.
+ */
+SECItem *
+SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+
+ if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
+
+ /*
+ * No signature, or more than one, means no deal.
+ */
+ if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL || signerinfos[1] != NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfos[0]->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME, PR_TRUE);
+ return sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr);
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7encode.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bdbc343d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1079 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS7 encoding.
+ */
+
+#include "p7local.h"
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */
+
+struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output {
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn;
+ void *outputarg;
+};
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7EncoderContextStr {
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderContext *ecx;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output output;
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *encryptobj;
+ const SECHashObject *digestobj;
+ void *digestcx;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The little output function that the ASN.1 encoder calls to hand
+ * us bytes which we in turn hand back to our caller (via the callback
+ * they gave us).
+ */
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_out(void *arg, const char *buf, unsigned long len,
+ int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind)
+{
+ struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output *output;
+
+ output = (struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output *)arg;
+ output->outputfn(output->outputarg, buf, len);
+}
+
+static sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_encrypt(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *orig_bulkkey)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *encryptobj;
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, *ri;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *publickey = NULL;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *ourPrivKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey;
+ void *mark;
+ int i;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ recipientinfos = NULL;
+ enccinfo = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encdp;
+
+ /* To do EncryptedData we *must* be given a bulk key. */
+ PORT_Assert(orig_bulkkey != NULL);
+ if (orig_bulkkey == NULL) {
+ /* XXX error? */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ encdp = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
+ recipientinfos = NULL;
+ enccinfo = &(encdp->encContentInfo);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envdp;
+
+ envdp = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ recipientinfos = envdp->recipientInfos;
+ enccinfo = &(envdp->encContentInfo);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ recipientinfos = saedp->recipientInfos;
+ enccinfo = &(saedp->encContentInfo);
+ } break;
+ }
+
+ if (enccinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ bulkkey = orig_bulkkey;
+ if (bulkkey == NULL) {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(enccinfo->encalg);
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, cinfo->pwfn_arg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ bulkkey = PK11_KeyGen(slot, type, NULL, enccinfo->keysize / 8,
+ cinfo->pwfn_arg);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (bulkkey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ encryptobj = NULL;
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(cinfo->poolp);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the bulk key with the public key of each recipient.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; recipientinfos && (ri = recipientinfos[i]) != NULL; i++) {
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ SECOidTag certalgtag, encalgtag;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int data_len;
+ SECItem *params = NULL;
+
+ cert = ri->cert;
+ PORT_Assert(cert != NULL);
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Want an interface that takes a cert and some data and
+ * fills in an algorithmID and encrypts the data with the public
+ * key from the cert. Or, give me two interfaces -- one which
+ * gets the algorithm tag from a cert (I should not have to go
+ * down into the subjectPublicKeyInfo myself) and another which
+ * takes a public key and algorithm tag and data and encrypts
+ * the data. Or something like that. The point is that all
+ * of the following hardwired RSA stuff should be done elsewhere.
+ */
+
+ certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
+
+ switch (certalgtag) {
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+ encalgtag = certalgtag;
+ publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+ if (publickey == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ data_len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(publickey);
+ ri->encKey.data =
+ (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(cinfo->poolp, data_len);
+ ri->encKey.len = data_len;
+ if (ri->encKey.data == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(certalgtag), publickey,
+ bulkkey, &ri->encKey);
+
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
+ publickey = NULL;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ params = NULL; /* paranoia */
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(cinfo->poolp, &ri->keyEncAlg, encalgtag,
+ params);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ arena = NULL;
+ }
+
+ encryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject(cinfo->poolp, bulkkey,
+ enccinfo->encalg,
+ &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
+ if (encryptobj != NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ mark = NULL; /* good one; do not want to release */
+ }
+/* fallthru */
+
+loser:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ if (publickey) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
+ }
+ if (ourPrivKey) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
+ }
+ if (mark != NULL) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(cinfo->poolp, mark);
+ }
+ if (orig_bulkkey == NULL) {
+ if (bulkkey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey);
+ }
+
+ return encryptobj;
+}
+
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_notify(void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ PRBool before_content;
+
+ /*
+ * We want to notice just before the content field. After fields are
+ * not interesting to us.
+ */
+ if (!before)
+ return;
+
+ p7ecx = (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *)arg;
+ cinfo = p7ecx->cinfo;
+
+ before_content = PR_FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Watch for the content field, at which point we want to instruct
+ * the ASN.1 encoder to start taking bytes from the buffer.
+ *
+ * XXX The following assumes the inner content type is data;
+ * if/when we want to handle fully nested types, this will have
+ * to recurse until reaching the innermost data content.
+ */
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ if (dest == &(cinfo->content.data))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd;
+
+ digd = cinfo->content.digestedData;
+ if (digd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ } break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd;
+
+ encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
+ if (encd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ } break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
+
+ envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
+ if (envd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ } break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
+
+ sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ if (sigd == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ } break;
+
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed;
+
+ saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ if (saed == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent))
+ before_content = PR_TRUE;
+ } break;
+ }
+
+ if (before_content) {
+ /*
+ * This will cause the next SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate to take the
+ * contents bytes from the passed-in buffer.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderSetTakeFromBuf(p7ecx->ecx);
+ /*
+ * And that is all we needed this notify function for.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderClearNotifyProc(p7ecx->ecx);
+ }
+}
+
+static SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ PRBool encrypt;
+ SECItem **digests;
+ SECAlgorithmID *digestalg, **digestalgs;
+
+ p7ecx =
+ (SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext));
+ if (p7ecx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ digests = NULL;
+ digestalg = NULL;
+ digestalgs = NULL;
+ encrypt = PR_FALSE;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ digestalg = &(cinfo->content.digestedData->digestAlg);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ digests = cinfo->content.signedData->digests;
+ digestalgs = cinfo->content.signedData->digestAlgorithms;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ encrypt = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ digests = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digests;
+ digestalgs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digestAlgorithms;
+ encrypt = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypt) {
+ p7ecx->encryptobj = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_encrypt(cinfo, bulkkey);
+ if (p7ecx->encryptobj == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (digestalgs != NULL) {
+ if (digests != NULL) {
+ /* digests already created (probably for detached data) */
+ digestalg = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * XXX Some day we should handle multiple digests; for now,
+ * assume only one will be done.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(digestalgs[0] != NULL && digestalgs[1] == NULL);
+ digestalg = digestalgs[0];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (digestalg != NULL) {
+ SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(digestalg->algorithm));
+
+ p7ecx->digestobj = HASH_GetHashObjectByOidTag(oidTag);
+ if (p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
+ p7ecx->digestcx = (*p7ecx->digestobj->create)();
+ if (p7ecx->digestcx == NULL)
+ p7ecx->digestobj = NULL;
+ else
+ (*p7ecx->digestobj->begin)(p7ecx->digestcx);
+ }
+ if (p7ecx->digestobj == NULL) {
+ if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL)
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject(p7ecx->encryptobj);
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p7ecx->cinfo = cinfo;
+ return p7ecx;
+}
+
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
+ void *outputarg,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ p7ecx = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts(cinfo, bulkkey);
+ if (p7ecx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ p7ecx->output.outputfn = outputfn;
+ p7ecx->output.outputarg = outputarg;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the BER encoder.
+ */
+ p7ecx->ecx = SEC_ASN1EncoderStart(cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate,
+ sec_pkcs7_encoder_out, &(p7ecx->output));
+ if (p7ecx->ecx == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Indicate that we are streaming. We will be streaming until we
+ * get past the contents bytes.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderSetStreaming(p7ecx->ecx);
+
+ /*
+ * The notify function will watch for the contents field.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderSetNotifyProc(p7ecx->ecx, sec_pkcs7_encoder_notify, p7ecx);
+
+ /*
+ * This will encode everything up to the content bytes. (The notify
+ * function will then cause the encoding to stop there.) Then our
+ * caller can start passing contents bytes to our Update, which we
+ * will pass along.
+ */
+ rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate(p7ecx->ecx, NULL, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return p7ecx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX If/when we support nested contents, this needs to be revised.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx, SECItem *dest,
+ const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = SECSuccess; /* may as well be optimistic */
+
+ /*
+ * We should really have data to process, or we should be trying
+ * to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid
+ * check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection
+ * proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future
+ * modifications/development, that is why it is here.)
+ */
+ PORT_Assert((data != NULL && len) || final);
+
+ /*
+ * Update the running digest.
+ * XXX This needs modification if/when we handle multiple digests.
+ */
+ if (len && p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
+ (*p7ecx->digestobj->update)(p7ecx->digestcx, data, len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt this chunk.
+ */
+ if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
+ /* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */
+ unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being encrypted */
+ unsigned int outlen; /* length of encrypted data */
+ unsigned int buflen; /* length available for encrypted data */
+
+ inlen = len;
+ buflen = sec_PKCS7EncryptLength(p7ecx->encryptobj, inlen, final);
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered
+ * so we still have to call Encrypt.
+ */
+ rv = sec_PKCS7Encrypt(p7ecx->encryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0,
+ data, inlen, final);
+ if (final) {
+ len = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (dest != NULL)
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7ecx->cinfo->poolp, buflen);
+ else
+ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen);
+
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ rv = sec_PKCS7Encrypt(p7ecx->encryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen,
+ data, inlen, final);
+ data = buf;
+ len = outlen;
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (final)
+ goto done;
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p7ecx->ecx != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Encode the contents bytes.
+ */
+ if (len) {
+ rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate(p7ecx->ecx, (const char *)data, len);
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
+ if (final)
+ sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject(p7ecx->encryptobj);
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ dest->data = buf;
+ dest->len = len;
+ } else if (buf != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (final && p7ecx->digestobj != NULL) {
+ SECItem *digest, **digests, ***digestsp;
+ unsigned char *digdata;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7ecx->cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ digest = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.digestedData->digest);
+ digestsp = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ digest = NULL;
+ digestsp = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedData->digests);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ digest = NULL;
+ digestsp = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->digests);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ digdata = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
+ p7ecx->digestobj->length);
+ if (digdata == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (digestsp != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert(digest == NULL);
+
+ digest = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
+ sizeof(SECItem));
+ digests = (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7ecx->cinfo->poolp,
+ 2 * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ digests[0] = digest;
+ digests[1] = NULL;
+
+ *digestsp = digests;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(digest != NULL);
+
+ digest->data = digdata;
+ digest->len = p7ecx->digestobj->length;
+
+ (*p7ecx->digestobj->end)(p7ecx->digestcx, digest->data,
+ &(digest->len), digest->len);
+ (*p7ecx->digestobj->destroy)(p7ecx->digestcx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
+ const char *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+ /* XXX Error handling needs help. Return what? Do "Finish" on failure? */
+ return sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data(p7ecx, NULL,
+ (const unsigned char *)data, len,
+ PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfnarg)
+{
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ CERTCertificate **certs;
+ CERTCertificateList **certlists;
+ SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs;
+ SECItem **digests;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo *signerinfo, **signerinfos;
+ SECItem **rawcerts, ***rawcertsp;
+ PLArenaPool *poolp;
+ int certcount;
+ int ci, cli, rci, si;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ certs = NULL;
+ certlists = NULL;
+ digestalgs = NULL;
+ digests = NULL;
+ signerinfos = NULL;
+ rawcertsp = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
+
+ sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
+ certs = sdp->certs;
+ certlists = sdp->certLists;
+ digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms;
+ digests = sdp->digests;
+ signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
+ rawcertsp = &(sdp->rawCerts);
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: {
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
+
+ saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ certs = saedp->certs;
+ certlists = saedp->certLists;
+ digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms;
+ digests = saedp->digests;
+ signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
+ rawcertsp = &(saedp->rawCerts);
+ } break;
+ }
+
+ if (certs == NULL && certlists == NULL && signerinfos == NULL)
+ return SECSuccess; /* nothing for us to do! */
+
+ poolp = cinfo->poolp;
+ certcount = 0;
+
+ if (signerinfos != NULL) {
+ SECOidTag digestalgtag;
+ int di;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey;
+ SECItem signature;
+ SECOidTag signalgtag;
+
+ PORT_Assert(digestalgs != NULL && digests != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If one fails, we bail right then. If we want to continue and
+ * try to do subsequent signatures, this loop, and the departures
+ * from it, will need to be reworked.
+ */
+ for (si = 0; signerinfos[si] != NULL; si++) {
+
+ signerinfo = signerinfos[si];
+
+ /* find right digest */
+ digestalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(signerinfo->digestAlg));
+ for (di = 0; digestalgs[di] != NULL; di++) {
+ /* XXX Should I be comparing more than the tag? */
+ if (digestalgtag == SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(digestalgs[di]))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (digestalgs[di] == NULL) {
+ /* XXX oops; do what? set an error? */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(digests[di] != NULL);
+
+ cert = signerinfo->cert;
+ privkey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, pwfnarg);
+ if (privkey == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this,
+ * so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo...
+ */
+ signalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
+
+ if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) {
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
+ SECItem encoded_attrs;
+ SECItem *dummy;
+ SECOidTag algid;
+
+ /*
+ * First, find and fill in the message digest attribute.
+ */
+ attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr,
+ SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST,
+ PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Assert(attr != NULL);
+ if (attr == NULL) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX The second half of the following assertion prevents
+ * the encoder from being called twice on the same content.
+ * Either just remove the second half the assertion, or
+ * change the code to check if the value already there is
+ * the same as digests[di], whichever seems more right.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(attr->values != NULL && attr->values[0] == NULL);
+ attr->values[0] = digests[di];
+
+ /*
+ * Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they
+ * are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required
+ * to have a specific order and that is what must be used for
+ * the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building
+ * it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do
+ * such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses
+ * EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken"
+ * implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee
+ * that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not
+ * to expect to receive them.
+ */
+ rv = sec_PKCS7ReorderAttributes(signerinfo->authAttr);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ encoded_attrs.data = NULL;
+ encoded_attrs.len = 0;
+ dummy = sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(NULL, &encoded_attrs,
+ &(signerinfo->authAttr));
+ if (dummy == NULL) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ algid = SEC_GetSignatureAlgorithmOidTag(privkey->keyType,
+ digestalgtag);
+ if (algid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = SEC_SignData(&signature,
+ encoded_attrs.data, encoded_attrs.len,
+ privkey,
+ algid);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&encoded_attrs, PR_FALSE);
+ } else {
+ rv = SGN_Digest(privkey, digestalgtag, &signature,
+ digests[di]);
+ }
+
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE);
+
+ rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg),
+ signalgtag, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * Count the cert chain for this signer.
+ */
+ if (signerinfo->certList != NULL)
+ certcount += signerinfo->certList->len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certs != NULL) {
+ for (ci = 0; certs[ci] != NULL; ci++)
+ certcount++;
+ }
+
+ if (certlists != NULL) {
+ for (cli = 0; certlists[cli] != NULL; cli++)
+ certcount += certlists[cli]->len;
+ }
+
+ if (certcount == 0)
+ return SECSuccess; /* signing done; no certs */
+
+ /*
+ * Combine all of the certs and cert chains into rawcerts.
+ * Note: certcount is an upper bound; we may not need that many slots
+ * but we will allocate anyway to avoid having to do another pass.
+ * (The temporary space saving is not worth it.)
+ */
+ rawcerts = (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp,
+ (certcount + 1) * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ if (rawcerts == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Want to check for duplicates and not add *any* cert that is
+ * already in the set. This will be more important when we start
+ * dealing with larger sets of certs, dual-key certs (signing and
+ * encryption), etc. For the time being we can slide by...
+ */
+ rci = 0;
+ if (signerinfos != NULL) {
+ for (si = 0; signerinfos[si] != NULL; si++) {
+ signerinfo = signerinfos[si];
+ for (ci = 0; ci < signerinfo->certList->len; ci++)
+ rawcerts[rci++] = &(signerinfo->certList->certs[ci]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (certs != NULL) {
+ for (ci = 0; certs[ci] != NULL; ci++)
+ rawcerts[rci++] = &(certs[ci]->derCert);
+ }
+
+ if (certlists != NULL) {
+ for (cli = 0; certlists[cli] != NULL; cli++) {
+ for (ci = 0; ci < certlists[cli]->len; ci++)
+ rawcerts[rci++] = &(certlists[cli]->certs[ci]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rawcerts[rci] = NULL;
+ *rawcertsp = rawcerts;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfnarg)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /*
+ * Flush out any remaining data.
+ */
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data(p7ecx, NULL, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * Turn off streaming stuff.
+ */
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderClearTakeFromBuf(p7ecx->ecx);
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderClearStreaming(p7ecx->ecx);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs(p7ecx->cinfo, pwfn, pwfnarg);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ rv = SEC_ASN1EncoderUpdate(p7ecx->ecx, NULL, 0);
+
+loser:
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderFinish(p7ecx->ecx);
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Abort the ASN.1 stream. Used by pkcs 12
+ */
+void
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx, int error)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(p7ecx);
+ SEC_ASN1EncoderAbort(p7ecx->ecx, error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * After this routine is called, the entire PKCS7 contentInfo is ready
+ * to be encoded. This is used internally, but can also be called from
+ * elsewhere for those who want to be able to just have pointers to
+ * the ASN1 template for pkcs7 contentInfo built into their own encodings.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx;
+ SECItem *content, *enc_content;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ p7ecx = sec_pkcs7_encoder_start_contexts(cinfo, bulkkey);
+ if (p7ecx == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ content = SEC_PKCS7GetContent(cinfo);
+
+ if (p7ecx->encryptobj != NULL) {
+ SECOidTag kind;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo;
+
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7ecx->cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ enccinfo = &(p7ecx->cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->encContentInfo);
+ break;
+ }
+ enc_content = &(enccinfo->encContent);
+ } else {
+ enc_content = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (content != NULL && content->data != NULL && content->len) {
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_work_data(p7ecx, enc_content,
+ content->data, content->len, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = sec_pkcs7_encoder_sig_and_certs(cinfo, pwfn, pwfnarg);
+
+loser:
+ PORT_Free(p7ecx);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
+ * of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
+ * already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
+ * or there is no data at all (certs-only).
+ *
+ * "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
+ *
+ * "outputfn" is where the encoded bytes will be passed.
+ *
+ * "outputarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ *
+ * "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
+ * can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
+ * be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
+ * for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
+ *
+ * "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
+ * private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
+ * that no signing is going to be done.
+ *
+ * "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ */
+SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7Encode(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
+ void *outputarg,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode(cinfo, bulkkey, pwfn, pwfnarg);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ struct sec_pkcs7_encoder_output outputcx;
+
+ outputcx.outputfn = outputfn;
+ outputcx.outputarg = outputarg;
+
+ rv = SEC_ASN1Encode(cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate,
+ sec_pkcs7_encoder_out, &outputcx);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
+ * of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
+ * already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
+ * or there is no data at all (certs-only). The output, rather than
+ * being passed to an output function as is done above, is all put
+ * into a SECItem.
+ *
+ * "pool" specifies a pool from which to allocate the result.
+ * It can be NULL, in which case memory is allocated generically.
+ *
+ * "dest" specifies a SECItem in which to put the result data.
+ * It can be NULL, in which case the entire item is allocated, too.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
+ *
+ * "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
+ * can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
+ * be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
+ * for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
+ *
+ * "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
+ * private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
+ * that no signing is going to be done.
+ *
+ * "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ */
+SECItem *
+SEC_PKCS7EncodeItem(PLArenaPool *pool,
+ SECItem *dest,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode(cinfo, bulkkey, pwfn, pwfnarg);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, dest, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate);
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..182e385b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1310 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Support routines for PKCS7 implementation, none of which are exported.
+ * This file should only contain things that are needed by both the
+ * encoding/creation side *and* the decoding/decryption side. Anything
+ * else should be static routines in the appropriate file.
+ */
+
+#include "p7local.h"
+
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secpkcs5.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+/*
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Cipher stuff.
+ */
+
+typedef SECStatus (*sec_pkcs7_cipher_function)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ unsigned *,
+ unsigned int,
+ const unsigned char *,
+ unsigned int);
+typedef SECStatus (*sec_pkcs7_cipher_destroy)(void *, PRBool);
+
+#define BLOCK_SIZE 4096
+
+struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object {
+ void *cx;
+ sec_pkcs7_cipher_function doit;
+ sec_pkcs7_cipher_destroy destroy;
+ PRBool encrypt;
+ int block_size;
+ int pad_size;
+ int pending_count;
+ unsigned char pending_buf[BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(CERT_IssuerAndSNTemplate)
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(CERT_SetOfSignedCrlTemplate)
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate)
+SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate)
+
+/*
+ * Create a cipher object to do decryption, based on the given bulk
+ * encryption key and algorithm identifier (which may include an iv).
+ *
+ * XXX This interface, or one similar, would be really nice available
+ * in general... I tried to keep the pkcs7-specific stuff (mostly
+ * having to do with padding) out of here.
+ *
+ * XXX Once both are working, it might be nice to combine this and the
+ * function below (for starting up encryption) into one routine, and just
+ * have two simple cover functions which call it.
+ */
+sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
+sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid)
+{
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *result;
+ SECOidTag algtag;
+ void *ciphercx;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ SECItem *param = NULL;
+
+ result = (struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object *)
+ PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object));
+ if (result == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ciphercx = NULL;
+ algtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+
+ if (SEC_PKCS5IsAlgorithmPBEAlg(algid)) {
+ SECItem *pwitem;
+
+ pwitem = (SECItem *)PK11_GetSymKeyUserData(key);
+ if (!pwitem) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &param, pwitem);
+ if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(algtag);
+ param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result->pad_size = PK11_GetBlockSize(cryptoMechType, param);
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(key);
+ result->block_size = PK11_IsHW(slot) ? BLOCK_SIZE : result->pad_size;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ ciphercx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cryptoMechType, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ key, param);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ if (ciphercx == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ result->cx = ciphercx;
+ result->doit = (sec_pkcs7_cipher_function)PK11_CipherOp;
+ result->destroy = (sec_pkcs7_cipher_destroy)PK11_DestroyContext;
+ result->encrypt = PR_FALSE;
+ result->pending_count = 0;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a cipher object to do encryption, based on the given bulk
+ * encryption key and algorithm tag. Fill in the algorithm identifier
+ * (which may include an iv) appropriately.
+ *
+ * XXX This interface, or one similar, would be really nice available
+ * in general... I tried to keep the pkcs7-specific stuff (mostly
+ * having to do with padding) out of here.
+ *
+ * XXX Once both are working, it might be nice to combine this and the
+ * function above (for starting up decryption) into one routine, and just
+ * have two simple cover functions which call it.
+ */
+sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
+sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject(PLArenaPool *poolp, PK11SymKey *key,
+ SECOidTag algtag, SECAlgorithmID *algid)
+{
+ sec_PKCS7CipherObject *result;
+ void *ciphercx;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ SECItem *param = NULL;
+ PRBool needToEncodeAlgid = PR_FALSE;
+
+ result = (struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object *)
+ PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object));
+ if (result == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ciphercx = NULL;
+ if (SEC_PKCS5IsAlgorithmPBEAlg(algid)) {
+ SECItem *pwitem;
+
+ pwitem = (SECItem *)PK11_GetSymKeyUserData(key);
+ if (!pwitem) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &param, pwitem);
+ if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cryptoMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(algtag);
+ param = PK11_GenerateNewParam(cryptoMechType, key);
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ needToEncodeAlgid = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ result->pad_size = PK11_GetBlockSize(cryptoMechType, param);
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(key);
+ result->block_size = PK11_IsHW(slot) ? BLOCK_SIZE : result->pad_size;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ ciphercx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cryptoMechType, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ key, param);
+ if (ciphercx == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * These are placed after the CreateContextBySymKey() because some
+ * mechanisms have to generate their IVs from their card (i.e. FORTEZZA).
+ * Don't move it from here.
+ */
+ if (needToEncodeAlgid) {
+ rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(algtag, param, poolp, algid);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(result);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ciphercx, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+
+ result->cx = ciphercx;
+ result->doit = (sec_pkcs7_cipher_function)PK11_CipherOp;
+ result->destroy = (sec_pkcs7_cipher_destroy)PK11_DestroyContext;
+ result->encrypt = PR_TRUE;
+ result->pending_count = 0;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy the cipher object.
+ */
+static void
+sec_pkcs7_destroy_cipher(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj)
+{
+ (*obj->destroy)(obj->cx, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Free(obj);
+}
+
+void
+sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(obj != NULL);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return;
+ PORT_Assert(!obj->encrypt);
+ sec_pkcs7_destroy_cipher(obj);
+}
+
+void
+sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(obj != NULL);
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ return;
+ PORT_Assert(obj->encrypt);
+ sec_pkcs7_destroy_cipher(obj);
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX I think all of the following lengths should be longs instead
+ * of ints, but our current crypto interface uses ints, so I did too.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * What will be the output length of the next call to decrypt?
+ * Result can be used to perform memory allocations. Note that the amount
+ * is exactly accurate only when not doing a block cipher or when final
+ * is false, otherwise it is an upper bound on the amount because until
+ * we see the data we do not know how many padding bytes there are
+ * (always between 1 and bsize).
+ *
+ * Note that this can return zero, which does not mean that the decrypt
+ * operation can be skipped! (It simply means that there are not enough
+ * bytes to make up an entire block; the bytes will be reserved until
+ * there are enough to encrypt/decrypt at least one block.) However,
+ * if zero is returned it *does* mean that no output buffer need be
+ * passed in to the subsequent decrypt operation, as no output bytes
+ * will be stored.
+ */
+unsigned int
+sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj, unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ int blocks, block_size;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!obj->encrypt);
+
+ block_size = obj->block_size;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is not a block cipher, then we always have the same
+ * number of output bytes as we had input bytes.
+ */
+ if (block_size == 0)
+ return input_len;
+
+ /*
+ * On the final call, we will always use up all of the pending
+ * bytes plus all of the input bytes, *but*, there will be padding
+ * at the end and we cannot predict how many bytes of padding we
+ * will end up removing. The amount given here is actually known
+ * to be at least 1 byte too long (because we know we will have
+ * at least 1 byte of padding), but seemed clearer/better to me.
+ */
+ if (final)
+ return obj->pending_count + input_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, this amount is exactly what we will output on the
+ * next cipher operation. We will always hang onto the last
+ * 1 - block_size bytes for non-final operations. That is,
+ * we will do as many complete blocks as we can *except* the
+ * last block (complete or partial). (This is because until
+ * we know we are at the end, we cannot know when to interpret
+ * and removing the padding byte(s), which are guaranteed to
+ * be there.)
+ */
+ blocks = (obj->pending_count + input_len - 1) / block_size;
+ return blocks * block_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * What will be the output length of the next call to encrypt?
+ * Result can be used to perform memory allocations.
+ *
+ * Note that this can return zero, which does not mean that the encrypt
+ * operation can be skipped! (It simply means that there are not enough
+ * bytes to make up an entire block; the bytes will be reserved until
+ * there are enough to encrypt/decrypt at least one block.) However,
+ * if zero is returned it *does* mean that no output buffer need be
+ * passed in to the subsequent encrypt operation, as no output bytes
+ * will be stored.
+ */
+unsigned int
+sec_PKCS7EncryptLength(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj, unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ int blocks, block_size;
+ int pad_size;
+
+ PORT_Assert(obj->encrypt);
+
+ block_size = obj->block_size;
+ pad_size = obj->pad_size;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is not a block cipher, then we always have the same
+ * number of output bytes as we had input bytes.
+ */
+ if (block_size == 0)
+ return input_len;
+
+ /*
+ * On the final call, we only send out what we need for
+ * remaining bytes plus the padding. (There is always padding,
+ * so even if we have an exact number of blocks as input, we
+ * will add another full block that is just padding.)
+ */
+ if (final) {
+ if (pad_size == 0) {
+ return obj->pending_count + input_len;
+ } else {
+ blocks = (obj->pending_count + input_len) / pad_size;
+ blocks++;
+ return blocks * pad_size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now, count the number of complete blocks of data we have.
+ */
+ blocks = (obj->pending_count + input_len) / block_size;
+
+ return blocks * block_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt a given length of input buffer (starting at "input" and
+ * containing "input_len" bytes), placing the decrypted bytes in
+ * "output" and storing the output length in "*output_len_p".
+ * "obj" is the return value from sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject.
+ * When "final" is true, this is the last of the data to be decrypted.
+ *
+ * This is much more complicated than it sounds when the cipher is
+ * a block-type, meaning that the decryption function will only
+ * operate on whole blocks. But our caller is operating stream-wise,
+ * and can pass in any number of bytes. So we need to keep track
+ * of block boundaries. We save excess bytes between calls in "obj".
+ * We also need to determine which bytes are padding, and remove
+ * them from the output. We can only do this step when we know we
+ * have the final block of data. PKCS #7 specifies that the padding
+ * used for a block cipher is a string of bytes, each of whose value is
+ * the same as the length of the padding, and that all data is padded.
+ * (Even data that starts out with an exact multiple of blocks gets
+ * added to it another block, all of which is padding.)
+ */
+SECStatus
+sec_PKCS7Decrypt(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *output_len_p, unsigned int max_output_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ unsigned int blocks, bsize, pcount, padsize;
+ unsigned int max_needed, ifraglen, ofraglen, output_len;
+ unsigned char *pbuf;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!obj->encrypt);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we have enough room for the output. Our caller should
+ * already handle this; failure is really an internal error (i.e. bug).
+ */
+ max_needed = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(obj, input_len, final);
+ PORT_Assert(max_output_len >= max_needed);
+ if (max_output_len < max_needed) {
+ /* PORT_SetError (XXX); */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * hardware encryption does not like small decryption sizes here, so we
+ * allow both blocking and padding.
+ */
+ bsize = obj->block_size;
+ padsize = obj->pad_size;
+
+ /*
+ * When no blocking or padding work to do, we can simply call the
+ * cipher function and we are done.
+ */
+ if (bsize == 0) {
+ return (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, output_len_p, max_output_len,
+ input, input_len);
+ }
+
+ pcount = obj->pending_count;
+ pbuf = obj->pending_buf;
+
+ output_len = 0;
+
+ if (pcount) {
+ /*
+ * Try to fill in an entire block, starting with the bytes
+ * we already have saved away.
+ */
+ while (input_len && pcount < bsize) {
+ pbuf[pcount++] = *input++;
+ input_len--;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have at most a whole block and this is not our last call,
+ * then we are done for now. (We do not try to decrypt a lone
+ * single block because we cannot interpret the padding bytes
+ * until we know we are handling the very last block of all input.)
+ */
+ if (input_len == 0 && !final) {
+ obj->pending_count = pcount;
+ if (output_len_p)
+ *output_len_p = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Given the logic above, we expect to have a full block by now.
+ * If we do not, there is something wrong, either with our own
+ * logic or with (length of) the data given to us.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert((padsize == 0) || (pcount % padsize) == 0);
+ if ((padsize != 0) && (pcount % padsize) != 0) {
+ PORT_Assert(final);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the block.
+ */
+ rv = (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, &ofraglen, max_output_len,
+ pbuf, pcount);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /*
+ * For now anyway, all of our ciphers have the same number of
+ * bytes of output as they do input. If this ever becomes untrue,
+ * then sec_PKCS7DecryptLength needs to be made smarter!
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ofraglen == pcount);
+
+ /*
+ * Account for the bytes now in output.
+ */
+ max_output_len -= ofraglen;
+ output_len += ofraglen;
+ output += ofraglen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this is our last call, we expect to have an exact number of
+ * blocks left to be decrypted; we will decrypt them all.
+ *
+ * If not our last call, we always save between 1 and bsize bytes
+ * until next time. (We must do this because we cannot be sure
+ * that none of the decrypted bytes are padding bytes until we
+ * have at least another whole block of data. You cannot tell by
+ * looking -- the data could be anything -- you can only tell by
+ * context, knowing you are looking at the last block.) We could
+ * decrypt a whole block now but it is easier if we just treat it
+ * the same way we treat partial block bytes.
+ */
+ if (final) {
+ if (padsize) {
+ blocks = input_len / padsize;
+ ifraglen = blocks * padsize;
+ } else
+ ifraglen = input_len;
+ PORT_Assert(ifraglen == input_len);
+
+ if (ifraglen != input_len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ blocks = (input_len - 1) / bsize;
+ ifraglen = blocks * bsize;
+ PORT_Assert(ifraglen < input_len);
+
+ pcount = input_len - ifraglen;
+ PORT_Memcpy(pbuf, input + ifraglen, pcount);
+ obj->pending_count = pcount;
+ }
+
+ if (ifraglen) {
+ rv = (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, &ofraglen, max_output_len,
+ input, ifraglen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /*
+ * For now anyway, all of our ciphers have the same number of
+ * bytes of output as they do input. If this ever becomes untrue,
+ * then sec_PKCS7DecryptLength needs to be made smarter!
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ifraglen == ofraglen);
+ if (ifraglen != ofraglen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ output_len += ofraglen;
+ } else {
+ ofraglen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we just did our very last block, "remove" the padding by
+ * adjusting the output length.
+ */
+ if (final && (padsize != 0)) {
+ unsigned int padlen = *(output + ofraglen - 1);
+ if (padlen == 0 || padlen > padsize) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ output_len -= padlen;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(output_len_p != NULL || output_len == 0);
+ if (output_len_p != NULL)
+ *output_len_p = output_len;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt a given length of input buffer (starting at "input" and
+ * containing "input_len" bytes), placing the encrypted bytes in
+ * "output" and storing the output length in "*output_len_p".
+ * "obj" is the return value from sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject.
+ * When "final" is true, this is the last of the data to be encrypted.
+ *
+ * This is much more complicated than it sounds when the cipher is
+ * a block-type, meaning that the encryption function will only
+ * operate on whole blocks. But our caller is operating stream-wise,
+ * and can pass in any number of bytes. So we need to keep track
+ * of block boundaries. We save excess bytes between calls in "obj".
+ * We also need to add padding bytes at the end. PKCS #7 specifies
+ * that the padding used for a block cipher is a string of bytes,
+ * each of whose value is the same as the length of the padding,
+ * and that all data is padded. (Even data that starts out with
+ * an exact multiple of blocks gets added to it another block,
+ * all of which is padding.)
+ *
+ * XXX I would kind of like to combine this with the function above
+ * which does decryption, since they have a lot in common. But the
+ * tricky parts about padding and filling blocks would be much
+ * harder to read that way, so I left them separate. At least for
+ * now until it is clear that they are right.
+ */
+SECStatus
+sec_PKCS7Encrypt(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *output_len_p, unsigned int max_output_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final)
+{
+ int blocks, bsize, padlen, pcount, padsize;
+ unsigned int max_needed, ifraglen, ofraglen, output_len;
+ unsigned char *pbuf;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(obj->encrypt);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we have enough room for the output. Our caller should
+ * already handle this; failure is really an internal error (i.e. bug).
+ */
+ max_needed = sec_PKCS7EncryptLength(obj, input_len, final);
+ PORT_Assert(max_output_len >= max_needed);
+ if (max_output_len < max_needed) {
+ /* PORT_SetError (XXX); */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ bsize = obj->block_size;
+ padsize = obj->pad_size;
+
+ /*
+ * When no blocking and padding work to do, we can simply call the
+ * cipher function and we are done.
+ */
+ if (bsize == 0) {
+ return (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, output_len_p, max_output_len,
+ input, input_len);
+ }
+
+ pcount = obj->pending_count;
+ pbuf = obj->pending_buf;
+
+ output_len = 0;
+
+ if (pcount) {
+ /*
+ * Try to fill in an entire block, starting with the bytes
+ * we already have saved away.
+ */
+ while (input_len && pcount < bsize) {
+ pbuf[pcount++] = *input++;
+ input_len--;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we do not have a full block and we know we will be
+ * called again, then we are done for now.
+ */
+ if (pcount < bsize && !final) {
+ obj->pending_count = pcount;
+ if (output_len_p != NULL)
+ *output_len_p = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have a whole block available, encrypt it.
+ */
+ if ((padsize == 0) || (pcount % padsize) == 0) {
+ rv = (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, &ofraglen, max_output_len,
+ pbuf, pcount);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /*
+ * For now anyway, all of our ciphers have the same number of
+ * bytes of output as they do input. If this ever becomes untrue,
+ * then sec_PKCS7EncryptLength needs to be made smarter!
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ofraglen == pcount);
+
+ /*
+ * Account for the bytes now in output.
+ */
+ max_output_len -= ofraglen;
+ output_len += ofraglen;
+ output += ofraglen;
+
+ pcount = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (input_len) {
+ PORT_Assert(pcount == 0);
+
+ blocks = input_len / bsize;
+ ifraglen = blocks * bsize;
+
+ if (ifraglen) {
+ rv = (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, &ofraglen, max_output_len,
+ input, ifraglen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /*
+ * For now anyway, all of our ciphers have the same number of
+ * bytes of output as they do input. If this ever becomes untrue,
+ * then sec_PKCS7EncryptLength needs to be made smarter!
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ifraglen == ofraglen);
+
+ max_output_len -= ofraglen;
+ output_len += ofraglen;
+ output += ofraglen;
+ }
+
+ pcount = input_len - ifraglen;
+ PORT_Assert(pcount < bsize);
+ if (pcount)
+ PORT_Memcpy(pbuf, input + ifraglen, pcount);
+ }
+
+ if (final) {
+ if (padsize) {
+ padlen = padsize - (pcount % padsize);
+ PORT_Memset(pbuf + pcount, padlen, padlen);
+ } else {
+ padlen = 0;
+ }
+ rv = (*obj->doit)(obj->cx, output, &ofraglen, max_output_len,
+ pbuf, pcount + padlen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ /*
+ * For now anyway, all of our ciphers have the same number of
+ * bytes of output as they do input. If this ever becomes untrue,
+ * then sec_PKCS7EncryptLength needs to be made smarter!
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ofraglen == (pcount + padlen));
+ output_len += ofraglen;
+ } else {
+ obj->pending_count = pcount;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(output_len_p != NULL || output_len == 0);
+ if (output_len_p != NULL)
+ *output_len_p = output_len;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * End of cipher stuff.
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * XXX The following Attribute stuff really belongs elsewhere.
+ * The Attribute type is *not* part of pkcs7 but rather X.501.
+ * But for now, since PKCS7 is the only customer of attributes,
+ * we define them here. Once there is a use outside of PKCS7,
+ * then change the attribute types and functions from internal
+ * to external naming convention, and move them elsewhere!
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Look through a set of attributes and find one that matches the
+ * specified object ID. If "only" is true, then make sure that
+ * there is not more than one attribute of the same type. Otherwise,
+ * just return the first one found. (XXX Does anybody really want
+ * that first-found behavior? It was like that when I found it...)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7Attribute *
+sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(SEC_PKCS7Attribute **attrs, SECOidTag oidtag,
+ PRBool only)
+{
+ SECOidData *oid;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr1, *attr2;
+
+ if (attrs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oidtag);
+ if (oid == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ while ((attr1 = *attrs++) != NULL) {
+ if (attr1->type.len == oid->oid.len && PORT_Memcmp(attr1->type.data, oid->oid.data, oid->oid.len) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (attr1 == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!only)
+ return attr1;
+
+ while ((attr2 = *attrs++) != NULL) {
+ if (attr2->type.len == oid->oid.len && PORT_Memcmp(attr2->type.data, oid->oid.data, oid->oid.len) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (attr2 != NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return attr1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the single attribute value, doing some sanity checking first:
+ * - Multiple values are *not* expected.
+ * - Empty values are *not* expected.
+ */
+SECItem *
+sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr)
+{
+ SECItem *value;
+
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ value = attr->values[0];
+
+ if (value == NULL || value->data == NULL || value->len == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (attr->values[1] != NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return value;
+}
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template *
+sec_attr_choose_attr_value_template(void *src_or_dest, PRBool encoding)
+{
+ const SEC_ASN1Template *theTemplate;
+
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attribute;
+ SECOidData *oiddata;
+ PRBool encoded;
+
+ PORT_Assert(src_or_dest != NULL);
+ if (src_or_dest == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ attribute = (SEC_PKCS7Attribute *)src_or_dest;
+
+ if (encoding && attribute->encoded)
+ return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
+
+ oiddata = attribute->typeTag;
+ if (oiddata == NULL) {
+ oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&attribute->type);
+ attribute->typeTag = oiddata;
+ }
+
+ if (oiddata == NULL) {
+ encoded = PR_TRUE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
+ } else {
+ switch (oiddata->offset) {
+ default:
+ encoded = PR_TRUE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL_ADDRESS:
+ case SEC_OID_RFC1274_MAIL:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS9_UNSTRUCTURED_NAME:
+ encoded = PR_FALSE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_IA5StringTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE:
+ encoded = PR_FALSE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST:
+ encoded = PR_FALSE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME:
+ encoded = PR_FALSE;
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_TimeChoiceTemplate);
+ break;
+ /* XXX Want other types here, too */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (encoding) {
+ /*
+ * If we are encoding and we think we have an already-encoded value,
+ * then the code which initialized this attribute should have set
+ * the "encoded" property to true (and we would have returned early,
+ * up above). No devastating error, but that code should be fixed.
+ * (It could indicate that the resulting encoded bytes are wrong.)
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(!encoded);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We are decoding; record whether the resulting value is
+ * still encoded or not.
+ */
+ attribute->encoded = encoded;
+ }
+ return theTemplate;
+}
+
+static const SEC_ASN1TemplateChooserPtr sec_attr_chooser = sec_attr_choose_attr_value_template;
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template sec_pkcs7_attribute_template[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute, type) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_DYNAMIC | SEC_ASN1_SET_OF,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute, values),
+ &sec_attr_chooser },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template sec_pkcs7_set_of_attribute_template[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF, 0, sec_pkcs7_attribute_template },
+};
+
+/*
+ * If you are wondering why this routine does not reorder the attributes
+ * first, and might be tempted to make it do so, see the comment by the
+ * call to ReorderAttributes in p7encode.c. (Or, see who else calls this
+ * and think long and hard about the implications of making it always
+ * do the reordering.)
+ */
+SECItem *
+sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(PLArenaPool *poolp, SECItem *dest, void *src)
+{
+ return SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, dest, src,
+ sec_pkcs7_set_of_attribute_template);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that the order of the attributes guarantees valid DER
+ * (which must be in lexigraphically ascending order for a SET OF);
+ * if reordering is necessary it will be done in place (in attrs).
+ */
+SECStatus
+sec_PKCS7ReorderAttributes(SEC_PKCS7Attribute **attrs)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *poolp;
+ int num_attrs, i, pass, besti;
+ unsigned int j;
+ SECItem **enc_attrs;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute **new_attrs;
+
+ /*
+ * I think we should not be called with NULL. But if we are,
+ * call it a success anyway, because the order *is* okay.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(attrs != NULL);
+ if (attrs == NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * Count how many attributes we are dealing with here.
+ */
+ num_attrs = 0;
+ while (attrs[num_attrs] != NULL)
+ num_attrs++;
+
+ /*
+ * Again, I think we should have some attributes here.
+ * But if we do not, or if there is only one, then call it
+ * a success because it also already has a fine order.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(num_attrs);
+ if (num_attrs == 0 || num_attrs == 1)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an arena for us to work with, so it is easy to
+ * clean up all of the memory (fairly small pieces, really).
+ */
+ poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ return SECFailure; /* no memory; nothing we can do... */
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate arrays to hold the individual encodings which we will use
+ * for comparisons and the reordered attributes as they are sorted.
+ */
+ enc_attrs = (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, num_attrs * sizeof(SECItem *));
+ new_attrs = (SEC_PKCS7Attribute **)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp,
+ num_attrs * sizeof(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *));
+ if (enc_attrs == NULL || new_attrs == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * DER encode each individual attribute.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_attrs; i++) {
+ enc_attrs[i] = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, NULL, attrs[i],
+ sec_pkcs7_attribute_template);
+ if (enc_attrs[i] == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now compare and sort them; this is not the most efficient sorting
+ * method, but it is just fine for the problem at hand, because the
+ * number of attributes is (always) going to be small.
+ */
+ for (pass = 0; pass < num_attrs; pass++) {
+ /*
+ * Find the first not-yet-accepted attribute. (Once one is
+ * sorted into the other array, it is cleared from enc_attrs.)
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_attrs; i++) {
+ if (enc_attrs[i] != NULL)
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(i < num_attrs);
+ besti = i;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the lowest (lexigraphically) encoding. One that is
+ * shorter than all the rest is known to be "less" because each
+ * attribute is of the same type (a SEQUENCE) and so thus the
+ * first octet of each is the same, and the second octet is
+ * the length (or the length of the length with the high bit
+ * set, followed by the length, which also works out to always
+ * order the shorter first). Two (or more) that have the
+ * same length need to be compared byte by byte until a mismatch
+ * is found.
+ */
+ for (i = besti + 1; i < num_attrs; i++) {
+ if (enc_attrs[i] == NULL) /* slot already handled */
+ continue;
+
+ if (enc_attrs[i]->len != enc_attrs[besti]->len) {
+ if (enc_attrs[i]->len < enc_attrs[besti]->len)
+ besti = i;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < enc_attrs[i]->len; j++) {
+ if (enc_attrs[i]->data[j] < enc_attrs[besti]->data[j]) {
+ besti = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For this not to be true, we would have to have encountered
+ * two *identical* attributes, which I think we should not see.
+ * So assert if it happens, but even if it does, let it go
+ * through; the ordering of the two does not matter.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(j < enc_attrs[i]->len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have found the next-lowest one; copy it over and
+ * remove it from enc_attrs.
+ */
+ new_attrs[pass] = attrs[besti];
+ enc_attrs[besti] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now new_attrs has the attributes in the order we want;
+ * copy them back into the attrs array we started with.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_attrs; i++)
+ attrs[i] = new_attrs[i];
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * End of attribute stuff.
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Templates and stuff. Keep these at the end of the file.
+ */
+
+/* forward declaration */
+static const SEC_ASN1Template *
+sec_pkcs7_choose_content_template(void *src_or_dest, PRBool encoding);
+
+static const SEC_ASN1TemplateChooserPtr sec_pkcs7_chooser = sec_pkcs7_choose_content_template;
+
+const SEC_ASN1Template sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo, contentType) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_DYNAMIC | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo, content),
+ &sec_pkcs7_chooser },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+/* XXX These names should change from external to internal convention. */
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7SignerInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, issuerAndSN),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(CERT_IssuerAndSNTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, digestAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, authAttr),
+ sec_pkcs7_set_of_attribute_template },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, digestEncAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, encDigest) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo, unAuthAttr),
+ sec_pkcs7_set_of_attribute_template },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7SignedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, digestAlgorithms),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, contentInfo),
+ sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 0,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, rawCerts),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, crls),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(CERT_SetOfSignedCrlTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedData, signerInfos),
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfoTemplate },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PointerToPKCS7SignedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, SEC_PKCS7SignedDataTemplate }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo, issuerAndSN),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(CERT_IssuerAndSNTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo, keyEncAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo, encKey) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo, contentType) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo, contentEncAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 0,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo, encContent),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData, recipientInfos),
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData, encContentInfo),
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoTemplate },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PointerToPKCS7EnvelopedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedDataTemplate }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, recipientInfos),
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, digestAlgorithms),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, encContentInfo),
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 0,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, rawCerts),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_SetOfAnyTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+ SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, crls),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(CERT_SetOfSignedCrlTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_SET_OF,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData, signerInfos),
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfoTemplate },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template
+ SEC_PointerToPKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataTemplate }
+ };
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7DigestedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData, digestAlg),
+ SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData, contentInfo),
+ sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7DigestedData, digest) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PointerToPKCS7DigestedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, SEC_PKCS7DigestedDataTemplate }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PKCS7EncryptedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE | SEC_ASN1_MAY_STREAM,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData, version) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+ offsetof(SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData, encContentInfo),
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoTemplate },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_PointerToPKCS7EncryptedDataTemplate[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_POINTER, 0, SEC_PKCS7EncryptedDataTemplate }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template *
+sec_pkcs7_choose_content_template(void *src_or_dest, PRBool encoding)
+{
+ const SEC_ASN1Template *theTemplate;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECOidTag kind;
+
+ PORT_Assert(src_or_dest != NULL);
+ if (src_or_dest == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *)src_or_dest;
+ kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
+ switch (kind) {
+ default:
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_PointerToPKCS7SignedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_PointerToPKCS7EnvelopedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_PointerToPKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_PointerToPKCS7DigestedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+ theTemplate = SEC_PointerToPKCS7EncryptedDataTemplate;
+ break;
+ }
+ return theTemplate;
+}
+
+/*
+ * End of templates. Do not add stuff after this; put new code
+ * up above the start of the template definitions.
+ */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.h b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad37c3aad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7local.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Support routines for PKCS7 implementation, none of which are exported.
+ * This file should only contain things that are needed by both the
+ * encoding/creation side *and* the decoding/decryption side. Anything
+ * else should just be static routines in the appropriate file.
+ *
+ * Do not export this file! If something in here is really needed outside
+ * of pkcs7 code, first try to add a PKCS7 interface which will do it for
+ * you. If that has a problem, then just move out what you need, changing
+ * its name as appropriate!
+ */
+
+#ifndef _P7LOCAL_H_
+#define _P7LOCAL_H_
+
+#include "secpkcs7.h"
+#include "secasn1t.h"
+
+extern const SEC_ASN1Template sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate[];
+
+/* opaque objects */
+typedef struct sec_pkcs7_cipher_object sec_PKCS7CipherObject;
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
+
+/*
+ * Look through a set of attributes and find one that matches the
+ * specified object ID. If "only" is true, then make sure that
+ * there is not more than one attribute of the same type. Otherwise,
+ * just return the first one found. (XXX Does anybody really want
+ * that first-found behavior? It was like that when I found it...)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7Attribute *sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(SEC_PKCS7Attribute **attrs,
+ SECOidTag oidtag,
+ PRBool only);
+/*
+ * Return the single attribute value, doing some sanity checking first:
+ * - Multiple values are *not* expected.
+ * - Empty values are *not* expected.
+ */
+extern SECItem *sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr);
+
+/*
+ * Encode a set of attributes (found in "src").
+ */
+extern SECItem *sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SECItem *dest, void *src);
+
+/*
+ * Make sure that the order of the attributes guarantees valid DER
+ * (which must be in lexigraphically ascending order for a SET OF);
+ * if reordering is necessary it will be done in place (in attrs).
+ */
+extern SECStatus sec_PKCS7ReorderAttributes(SEC_PKCS7Attribute **attrs);
+
+/*
+ * Create a context for decrypting, based on the given key and algorithm.
+ */
+extern sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
+sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid);
+
+/*
+ * Create a context for encrypting, based on the given key and algorithm,
+ * and fill in the algorithm id.
+ */
+extern sec_PKCS7CipherObject *
+sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject(PLArenaPool *poolp, PK11SymKey *key,
+ SECOidTag algtag, SECAlgorithmID *algid);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy the given decryption or encryption object.
+ */
+extern void sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj);
+extern void sec_PKCS7DestroyEncryptObject(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj);
+
+/*
+ * What will be the output length of the next call to encrypt/decrypt?
+ * Result can be used to perform memory allocations. Note that the amount
+ * is exactly accurate only when not doing a block cipher or when final
+ * is false, otherwise it is an upper bound on the amount because until
+ * we see the data we do not know how many padding bytes there are
+ * (always between 1 and the cipher block size).
+ *
+ * Note that this can return zero, which does not mean that the cipher
+ * operation can be skipped! (It simply means that there are not enough
+ * bytes to make up an entire block; the bytes will be reserved until
+ * there are enough to encrypt/decrypt at least one block.) However,
+ * if zero is returned it *does* mean that no output buffer need be
+ * passed in to the subsequent cipher operation, as no output bytes
+ * will be stored.
+ */
+extern unsigned int sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj,
+ unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final);
+extern unsigned int sec_PKCS7EncryptLength(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj,
+ unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final);
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt a given length of input buffer (starting at "input" and
+ * containing "input_len" bytes), placing the decrypted bytes in
+ * "output" and storing the output length in "*output_len_p".
+ * "obj" is the return value from sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject.
+ * When "final" is true, this is the last of the data to be decrypted.
+ */
+extern SECStatus sec_PKCS7Decrypt(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *output_len_p,
+ unsigned int max_output_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final);
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt a given length of input buffer (starting at "input" and
+ * containing "input_len" bytes), placing the encrypted bytes in
+ * "output" and storing the output length in "*output_len_p".
+ * "obj" is the return value from sec_PKCS7CreateEncryptObject.
+ * When "final" is true, this is the last of the data to be encrypted.
+ */
+extern SECStatus sec_PKCS7Encrypt(sec_PKCS7CipherObject *obj,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int *output_len_p,
+ unsigned int max_output_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned int input_len,
+ PRBool final);
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_END_PROTOS
+
+#endif /* _P7LOCAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7.gyp b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7.gyp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a73a2934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7.gyp
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+{
+ 'includes': [
+ '../../coreconf/config.gypi'
+ ],
+ 'targets': [
+ {
+ 'target_name': 'pkcs7',
+ 'type': 'static_library',
+ 'sources': [
+ 'certread.c',
+ 'p7common.c',
+ 'p7create.c',
+ 'p7decode.c',
+ 'p7encode.c',
+ 'p7local.c',
+ 'secmime.c'
+ ],
+ 'dependencies': [
+ '<(DEPTH)/exports.gyp:nss_exports'
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ 'variables': {
+ 'module': 'nss'
+ }
+} \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7t.h b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7t.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4ef89027b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/pkcs7t.h
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Header for pkcs7 types.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS7T_H_
+#define _PKCS7T_H_
+
+#include "plarena.h"
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secoidt.h"
+#include "certt.h"
+#include "secmodt.h"
+
+/* Opaque objects */
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7DecoderContextStr SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7EncoderContextStr SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext;
+
+/* legacy defines that haven't been active for years */
+typedef void *(*SECKEYGetPasswordKey)(void *arg, void *handle);
+
+/* Non-opaque objects. NOTE, though: I want them to be treated as
+ * opaque as much as possible. If I could hide them completely,
+ * I would. (I tried, but ran into trouble that was taking me too
+ * much time to get out of.) I still intend to try to do so.
+ * In fact, the only type that "outsiders" should even *name* is
+ * SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo, and they should not reference its fields.
+ */
+/* rjr: PKCS #11 cert handling (pk11cert.c) does use SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo's.
+ * This is because when we search the recipient list for the cert and key we
+ * want, we need to invert the order of the loops we used to have. The old
+ * loops were:
+ *
+ * For each recipient {
+ * find_cert = PK11_Find_AllCert(recipient->issuerSN);
+ * [which unrolls to... ]
+ * For each slot {
+ * Log into slot;
+ * search slot for cert;
+ * }
+ * }
+ *
+ * the new loop searchs all the recipients at once on a slot. this allows
+ * PKCS #11 to order slots in such a way that logout slots don't get checked
+ * if we can find the cert on a logged in slot. This eliminates lots of
+ * spurious password prompts when smart cards are installed... so why this
+ * comment? If you make SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo completely opaque, you need
+ * to provide a non-opaque list of issuerSN's (the only field PKCS#11 needs
+ * and fix up pk11cert.c first. NOTE: Only S/MIME calls this special PKCS #11
+ * function.
+ */
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7ContentInfoStr SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7SignedDataStr SEC_PKCS7SignedData;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoStr SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedDataStr SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataStr
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7SignerInfoStr SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfoStr SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7DigestedDataStr SEC_PKCS7DigestedData;
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7EncryptedDataStr SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData;
+/*
+ * The following is not actually a PKCS7 type, but for now it is only
+ * used by PKCS7, so we have adopted it. If someone else *ever* needs
+ * it, its name should be changed and it should be moved out of here.
+ * Do not dare to use it without doing so!
+ */
+typedef struct SEC_PKCS7AttributeStr SEC_PKCS7Attribute;
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7ContentInfoStr {
+ PLArenaPool *poolp; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ PRBool created; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ int refCount; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECOidData *contentTypeTag; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ void *pwfn_arg; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECItem contentType;
+ union {
+ SECItem *data;
+ SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digestedData;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encryptedData;
+ SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envelopedData;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedData *signedData;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ } content;
+};
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7SignedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SECAlgorithmID **digestAlgorithms;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo contentInfo;
+ SECItem **rawCerts;
+ CERTSignedCrl **crls;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerInfos;
+ SECItem **digests; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ CERTCertificate **certs; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ CERTCertificateList **certLists; /* local; not part of encoding */
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA_VERSION 1 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfoStr {
+ SECOidData *contentTypeTag; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECItem contentType;
+ SECAlgorithmID contentEncAlg;
+ SECItem encContent;
+ SECItem plainContent; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ /* bytes not encrypted, but encoded */
+ int keysize; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ /* size of bulk encryption key
+ * (only used by creation code) */
+ SECOidTag encalg; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ /* oid tag of encryption algorithm
+ * (only used by creation code) */
+};
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientInfos;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo encContentInfo;
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION 0 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientInfos;
+ SECAlgorithmID **digestAlgorithms;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo encContentInfo;
+ SECItem **rawCerts;
+ CERTSignedCrl **crls;
+ SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerInfos;
+ SECItem **digests; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ CERTCertificate **certs; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ CERTCertificateList **certLists; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ PK11SymKey *sigKey; /* local; not part of encoding */
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION 1 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7SignerInfoStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ CERTIssuerAndSN *issuerAndSN;
+ SECAlgorithmID digestAlg;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute **authAttr;
+ SECAlgorithmID digestEncAlg;
+ SECItem encDigest;
+ SEC_PKCS7Attribute **unAuthAttr;
+ CERTCertificate *cert; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ CERTCertificateList *certList; /* local; not part of encoding */
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_VERSION 1 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfoStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ CERTIssuerAndSN *issuerAndSN;
+ SECAlgorithmID keyEncAlg;
+ SECItem encKey;
+ CERTCertificate *cert; /* local; not part of encoding */
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION 0 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7DigestedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SECAlgorithmID digestAlg;
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo contentInfo;
+ SECItem digest;
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA_VERSION 0 /* what we *create* */
+
+struct SEC_PKCS7EncryptedDataStr {
+ SECItem version;
+ SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo encContentInfo;
+};
+#define SEC_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA_VERSION 0 /* what we *create* */
+
+/*
+ * See comment above about this type not really belonging to PKCS7.
+ */
+struct SEC_PKCS7AttributeStr {
+ /* The following fields make up an encoded Attribute: */
+ SECItem type;
+ SECItem **values; /* data may or may not be encoded */
+ /* The following fields are not part of an encoded Attribute: */
+ SECOidData *typeTag;
+ PRBool encoded; /* when true, values are encoded */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Type of function passed to SEC_PKCS7Decode or SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart.
+ * If specified, this is where the content bytes (only) will be "sent"
+ * as they are recovered during the decoding.
+ *
+ * XXX Should just combine this with SEC_PKCS7EncoderContentCallback type
+ * and use a simpler, common name.
+ */
+typedef void (*SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback)(void *arg,
+ const char *buf,
+ unsigned long len);
+
+/*
+ * Type of function passed to SEC_PKCS7Encode or SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart.
+ * This is where the encoded bytes will be "sent".
+ *
+ * XXX Should just combine this with SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback type
+ * and use a simpler, common name.
+ */
+typedef void (*SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback)(void *arg,
+ const char *buf,
+ unsigned long len);
+
+/*
+ * Type of function passed to SEC_PKCS7Decode or SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart
+ * to retrieve the decryption key. This function is inteded to be
+ * used for EncryptedData content info's which do not have a key available
+ * in a certificate, etc.
+ */
+typedef PK11SymKey *(*SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback)(void *arg,
+ SECAlgorithmID *algid);
+
+/*
+ * Type of function passed to SEC_PKCS7Decode or SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart.
+ * This function in intended to be used to verify that decrypting a
+ * particular crypto algorithm is allowed. Content types which do not
+ * require decryption will not need the callback. If the callback
+ * is not specified for content types which require decryption, the
+ * decryption will be disallowed.
+ */
+typedef PRBool (*SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback)(SECAlgorithmID *algid,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey);
+
+#endif /* _PKCS7T_H_ */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca1046aa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Stuff specific to S/MIME policy and interoperability.
+ * Depends on PKCS7, but there should be no dependency the other way around.
+ */
+
+#include "secmime.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "ciferfam.h" /* for CIPHER_FAMILY symbols */
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+typedef struct smime_cipher_map_struct {
+ unsigned long cipher;
+ SECOidTag algtag;
+ SECItem *parms;
+} smime_cipher_map;
+
+/*
+ * These are macros because I think some subsequent parameters,
+ * like those for RC5, will want to use them, too, separately.
+ */
+#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_16 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x10
+#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_40 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x28
+#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_64 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x01, 0x40
+#define SMIME_DER_INTVAL_128 SEC_ASN1_INTEGER, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80
+
+#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5 /* will be needed; quiet unused warning for now */
+static unsigned char smime_int16[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_16 };
+#endif
+static unsigned char smime_int40[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_40 };
+static unsigned char smime_int64[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_64 };
+static unsigned char smime_int128[] = { SMIME_DER_INTVAL_128 };
+
+static SECItem smime_rc2p40 = { siBuffer, smime_int40, sizeof(smime_int40) };
+static SECItem smime_rc2p64 = { siBuffer, smime_int64, sizeof(smime_int64) };
+static SECItem smime_rc2p128 = { siBuffer, smime_int128, sizeof(smime_int128) };
+
+static smime_cipher_map smime_cipher_maps[] = {
+ { SMIME_RC2_CBC_40, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p40 },
+ { SMIME_RC2_CBC_64, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p64 },
+ { SMIME_RC2_CBC_128, SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, &smime_rc2p128 },
+#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
+ { SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_40, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p40 },
+ { SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_64, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p64 },
+ { SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_128, SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD, &smime_rc5p128 },
+#endif
+ { SMIME_DES_CBC_56, SEC_OID_DES_CBC, NULL },
+ { SMIME_DES_EDE3_168, SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Note, the following value really just needs to be an upper bound
+ * on the ciphers.
+ */
+static const int smime_symmetric_count = sizeof(smime_cipher_maps) / sizeof(smime_cipher_map);
+
+static unsigned long *smime_prefs, *smime_newprefs;
+static int smime_current_pref_index = 0;
+static PRBool smime_prefs_complete = PR_FALSE;
+static PRBool smime_prefs_changed = PR_TRUE;
+
+static unsigned long smime_policy_bits = 0;
+
+static int
+smime_mapi_by_cipher(unsigned long cipher)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smime_symmetric_count; i++) {
+ if (smime_cipher_maps[i].cipher == cipher)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == smime_symmetric_count)
+ return -1;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this function locally records the user's preference
+ */
+SECStatus
+SECMIME_EnableCipher(long which, int on)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+
+ if (smime_newprefs == NULL || smime_prefs_complete) {
+ /*
+ * This is either the very first time, or we are starting over.
+ */
+ smime_newprefs = (unsigned long *)PORT_ZAlloc(smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(*smime_newprefs));
+ if (smime_newprefs == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+ smime_current_pref_index = 0;
+ smime_prefs_complete = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ mask = which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
+ if (mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) {
+ /*
+ * This call signifies that all preferences have been set.
+ * Move "newprefs" over, after checking first whether or
+ * not the new ones are different from the old ones.
+ */
+ if (smime_prefs != NULL) {
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(smime_prefs, smime_newprefs,
+ smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(*smime_prefs)) == 0)
+ smime_prefs_changed = PR_FALSE;
+ else
+ smime_prefs_changed = PR_TRUE;
+ PORT_Free(smime_prefs);
+ }
+
+ smime_prefs = smime_newprefs;
+ smime_prefs_complete = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(mask == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME);
+ if (mask != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) {
+ /* XXX set an error! */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (on) {
+ PORT_Assert(smime_current_pref_index < smime_symmetric_count);
+ if (smime_current_pref_index >= smime_symmetric_count) {
+ /* XXX set an error! */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ smime_newprefs[smime_current_pref_index++] = which;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this function locally records the export policy
+ */
+SECStatus
+SECMIME_SetPolicy(long which, int on)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+
+ PORT_Assert((which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) == CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME);
+ if ((which & CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK) != CIPHER_FAMILYID_SMIME) {
+ /* XXX set an error! */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ which &= ~CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
+
+ PORT_Assert(which < 32); /* bits in the long */
+ if (which >= 32) {
+ /* XXX set an error! */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ mask = 1UL << which;
+
+ if (on) {
+ smime_policy_bits |= mask;
+ } else {
+ smime_policy_bits &= ~mask;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Based on the given algorithm (including its parameters, in some cases!)
+ * and the given key (may or may not be inspected, depending on the
+ * algorithm), find the appropriate policy algorithm specification
+ * and return it. If no match can be made, -1 is returned.
+ */
+static long
+smime_policy_algorithm(SECAlgorithmID *algid, PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ SECOidTag algtag;
+
+ algtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
+ switch (algtag) {
+ case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC: {
+ unsigned int keylen_bits;
+
+ keylen_bits = PK11_GetKeyStrength(key, algid);
+ switch (keylen_bits) {
+ case 40:
+ return SMIME_RC2_CBC_40;
+ case 64:
+ return SMIME_RC2_CBC_64;
+ case 128:
+ return SMIME_RC2_CBC_128;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ } break;
+ case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
+ return SMIME_DES_CBC_56;
+ case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
+ return SMIME_DES_EDE3_168;
+#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
+ case SEC_OID_RC5_CBC_PAD:
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* XXX need to pull out parameters and match */
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+smime_cipher_allowed(unsigned long which)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+
+ which &= ~CIPHER_FAMILYID_MASK;
+ PORT_Assert(which < 32); /* bits per long (min) */
+ if (which >= 32)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ mask = 1UL << which;
+ if ((mask & smime_policy_bits) == 0)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+SECMIME_DecryptionAllowed(SECAlgorithmID *algid, PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ long which;
+
+ which = smime_policy_algorithm(algid, key);
+ if (which < 0)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ return smime_cipher_allowed((unsigned long)which);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Does the current policy allow *any* S/MIME encryption (or decryption)?
+ *
+ * This tells whether or not *any* S/MIME encryption can be done,
+ * according to policy. Callers may use this to do nicer user interface
+ * (say, greying out a checkbox so a user does not even try to encrypt
+ * a message when they are not allowed to) or for any reason they want
+ * to check whether S/MIME encryption (or decryption, for that matter)
+ * may be done.
+ *
+ * It takes no arguments. The return value is a simple boolean:
+ * PR_TRUE means encryption (or decryption) is *possible*
+ * (but may still fail due to other reasons, like because we cannot
+ * find all the necessary certs, etc.; PR_TRUE is *not* a guarantee)
+ * PR_FALSE means encryption (or decryption) is not permitted
+ *
+ * There are no errors from this routine.
+ */
+PRBool
+SECMIME_EncryptionPossible(void)
+{
+ if (smime_policy_bits != 0)
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX Would like the "parameters" field to be a SECItem *, but the
+ * encoder is having trouble with optional pointers to an ANY. Maybe
+ * once that is fixed, can change this back...
+ */
+typedef struct smime_capability_struct {
+ unsigned long cipher; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECOidTag capIDTag; /* local; not part of encoding */
+ SECItem capabilityID;
+ SECItem parameters;
+} smime_capability;
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template smime_capability_template[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, NULL, sizeof(smime_capability) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(smime_capability, capabilityID) },
+ { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_ANY,
+ offsetof(smime_capability, parameters) },
+ { 0 }
+};
+
+static const SEC_ASN1Template smime_capabilities_template[] = {
+ { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, smime_capability_template }
+};
+
+static void
+smime_fill_capability(smime_capability *cap)
+{
+ unsigned long cipher;
+ SECOidTag algtag;
+ int i;
+
+ algtag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(cap->capabilityID));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smime_symmetric_count; i++) {
+ if (smime_cipher_maps[i].algtag != algtag)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * XXX If SECITEM_CompareItem allowed NULLs as arguments (comparing
+ * 2 NULLs as equal and NULL and non-NULL as not equal), we could
+ * use that here instead of all of the following comparison code.
+ */
+ if (cap->parameters.data != NULL) {
+ if (smime_cipher_maps[i].parms == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (cap->parameters.len != smime_cipher_maps[i].parms->len)
+ continue;
+ if (PORT_Memcmp(cap->parameters.data,
+ smime_cipher_maps[i].parms->data,
+ cap->parameters.len) == 0)
+ break;
+ } else if (smime_cipher_maps[i].parms == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (i == smime_symmetric_count)
+ cipher = 0;
+ else
+ cipher = smime_cipher_maps[i].cipher;
+
+ cap->cipher = cipher;
+ cap->capIDTag = algtag;
+}
+
+static long
+smime_choose_cipher(CERTCertificate *scert, CERTCertificate **rcerts)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *poolp;
+ long chosen_cipher;
+ int *cipher_abilities;
+ int *cipher_votes;
+ int strong_mapi;
+ int rcount, mapi, max;
+
+ if (smime_policy_bits == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_EXPORT_ALGORITHM);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ chosen_cipher = SMIME_RC2_CBC_40; /* the default, LCD */
+
+ poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
+ if (poolp == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ cipher_abilities = (int *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp,
+ smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(int));
+ if (cipher_abilities == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ cipher_votes = (int *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp,
+ smime_symmetric_count * sizeof(int));
+ if (cipher_votes == NULL)
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Should have a #define somewhere which specifies default
+ * strong cipher. (Or better, a way to configure.)
+ */
+
+ /* Make triple-DES the strong cipher. */
+ strong_mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(SMIME_DES_EDE3_168);
+
+ PORT_Assert(strong_mapi >= 0);
+
+ for (rcount = 0; rcerts[rcount] != NULL; rcount++) {
+ SECItem *profile;
+ smime_capability **caps;
+ int capi, pref;
+ SECStatus dstat;
+
+ pref = smime_symmetric_count;
+ profile = CERT_FindSMimeProfile(rcerts[rcount]);
+ if (profile != NULL && profile->data != NULL && profile->len > 0) {
+ caps = NULL;
+ dstat = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(poolp, &caps,
+ smime_capabilities_template,
+ profile);
+ if (dstat == SECSuccess && caps != NULL) {
+ for (capi = 0; caps[capi] != NULL; capi++) {
+ smime_fill_capability(caps[capi]);
+ mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(caps[capi]->cipher);
+ if (mapi >= 0) {
+ cipher_abilities[mapi]++;
+ cipher_votes[mapi] += pref;
+ --pref;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+ unsigned int pklen_bits;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX This is probably only good for RSA keys. What I would
+ * really like is a function to just say; Is the public key in
+ * this cert an export-length key? Then I would not have to
+ * know things like the value 512, or the kind of key, or what
+ * a subjectPublicKeyInfo is, etc.
+ */
+ key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(rcerts[rcount]);
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ pklen_bits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(key) * 8;
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
+
+ if (pklen_bits > 512) {
+ cipher_abilities[strong_mapi]++;
+ cipher_votes[strong_mapi] += pref;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (profile != NULL)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(profile, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ max = 0;
+ for (mapi = 0; mapi < smime_symmetric_count; mapi++) {
+ if (cipher_abilities[mapi] != rcount)
+ continue;
+ if (!smime_cipher_allowed(smime_cipher_maps[mapi].cipher))
+ continue;
+ if (cipher_votes[mapi] > max) {
+ chosen_cipher = smime_cipher_maps[mapi].cipher;
+ max = cipher_votes[mapi];
+ } /* XXX else if a tie, let scert break it? */
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (poolp != NULL)
+ PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE);
+
+ return chosen_cipher;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX This is a hack for now to satisfy our current interface.
+ * Eventually, with more parameters needing to be specified, just
+ * looking up the keysize is not going to be sufficient.
+ */
+static int
+smime_keysize_by_cipher(unsigned long which)
+{
+ int keysize;
+
+ switch (which) {
+ case SMIME_RC2_CBC_40:
+ keysize = 40;
+ break;
+ case SMIME_RC2_CBC_64:
+ keysize = 64;
+ break;
+ case SMIME_RC2_CBC_128:
+ keysize = 128;
+ break;
+#ifdef SMIME_DOES_RC5
+ case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_40:
+ case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_64:
+ case SMIME_RC5PAD_64_16_128:
+ /* XXX See comment above; keysize is not enough... */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ keysize = -1;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SMIME_DES_CBC_56:
+ case SMIME_DES_EDE3_168:
+ /*
+ * These are special; since the key size is fixed, we actually
+ * want to *avoid* specifying a key size.
+ */
+ keysize = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ keysize = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return keysize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start an S/MIME encrypting context.
+ *
+ * "scert" is the cert for the sender. It will be checked for validity.
+ * "rcerts" are the certs for the recipients. They will also be checked.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the certs.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
+ * and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
+ * SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
+ * and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SECMIME_CreateEncrypted(CERTCertificate *scert,
+ CERTCertificate **rcerts,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ long cipher;
+ SECOidTag encalg;
+ int keysize;
+ int mapi, rci;
+
+ cipher = smime_choose_cipher(scert, rcerts);
+ if (cipher < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(cipher);
+ if (mapi < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX This is stretching it -- CreateEnvelopedData should probably
+ * take a cipher itself of some sort, because we cannot know what the
+ * future will bring in terms of parameters for each type of algorithm.
+ * For example, just an algorithm and keysize is *not* sufficient to
+ * fully specify the usage of RC5 (which also needs to know rounds and
+ * block size). Work this out into a better API!
+ */
+ encalg = smime_cipher_maps[mapi].algtag;
+ keysize = smime_keysize_by_cipher(cipher);
+ if (keysize < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cinfo = SEC_PKCS7CreateEnvelopedData(scert, certUsageEmailRecipient,
+ certdb, encalg, keysize,
+ pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (rci = 0; rcerts[rci] != NULL; rci++) {
+ if (rcerts[rci] == scert)
+ continue;
+ if (SEC_PKCS7AddRecipient(cinfo, rcerts[rci], certUsageEmailRecipient,
+ NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
+
+static smime_capability **smime_capabilities;
+static SECItem *smime_encoded_caps;
+
+static SECStatus
+smime_init_caps(void)
+{
+ smime_capability *cap;
+ smime_cipher_map *map;
+ SECOidData *oiddata;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+
+ if (smime_encoded_caps != NULL && (!smime_prefs_changed))
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ if (smime_encoded_caps != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(smime_encoded_caps, PR_TRUE);
+ smime_encoded_caps = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (smime_capabilities == NULL) {
+ smime_capabilities = (smime_capability **)PORT_ZAlloc(
+ (smime_symmetric_count + 1) * sizeof(smime_capability *));
+ if (smime_capabilities == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ The process of creating the encoded PKCS7 cipher capability list
+ involves two basic steps:
+
+ (a) Convert our internal representation of cipher preferences
+ (smime_prefs) into an array containing cipher OIDs and
+ parameter data (smime_capabilities). This step is
+ performed here.
+
+ (b) Encode, using ASN.1, the cipher information in
+ smime_capabilities, leaving the encoded result in
+ smime_encoded_caps.
+
+ (In the process of performing (a), Lisa put in some optimizations
+ which allow us to avoid needlessly re-populating elements in
+ smime_capabilities as we walk through smime_prefs.)
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < smime_current_pref_index; i++) {
+ int mapi;
+
+ /* Get the next cipher preference in smime_prefs. */
+ mapi = smime_mapi_by_cipher(smime_prefs[i]);
+ if (mapi < 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* Find the corresponding entry in the cipher map. */
+ PORT_Assert(mapi < smime_symmetric_count);
+ map = &(smime_cipher_maps[mapi]);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the next preference found in smime_prefs into an
+ * smime_capability.
+ */
+
+ cap = smime_capabilities[i];
+ if (cap == NULL) {
+ cap = (smime_capability *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(smime_capability));
+ if (cap == NULL)
+ break;
+ smime_capabilities[i] = cap;
+ } else if (cap->cipher == smime_prefs[i]) {
+ continue; /* no change to this one */
+ }
+
+ cap->capIDTag = map->algtag;
+ oiddata = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(map->algtag);
+ if (oiddata == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ if (cap->capabilityID.data != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&(cap->capabilityID), PR_FALSE);
+ cap->capabilityID.data = NULL;
+ cap->capabilityID.len = 0;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &(cap->capabilityID), &(oiddata->oid));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ break;
+
+ if (map->parms == NULL) {
+ cap->parameters.data = NULL;
+ cap->parameters.len = 0;
+ } else {
+ cap->parameters.data = map->parms->data;
+ cap->parameters.len = map->parms->len;
+ }
+
+ cap->cipher = smime_prefs[i];
+ }
+
+ if (i != smime_current_pref_index)
+ return rv;
+
+ while (i < smime_symmetric_count) {
+ cap = smime_capabilities[i];
+ if (cap != NULL) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&(cap->capabilityID), PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_Free(cap);
+ }
+ smime_capabilities[i] = NULL;
+ i++;
+ }
+ smime_capabilities[i] = NULL;
+
+ smime_encoded_caps = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &smime_capabilities,
+ smime_capabilities_template);
+ if (smime_encoded_caps == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+smime_add_profile(CERTCertificate *cert, SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(smime_prefs_complete);
+ if (!smime_prefs_complete)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /* For that matter, if capabilities haven't been initialized yet,
+ do so now. */
+ if (smime_encoded_caps == NULL || smime_prefs_changed) {
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = smime_init_caps();
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(smime_encoded_caps != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return SEC_PKCS7AddSignedAttribute(cinfo, SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES,
+ smime_encoded_caps);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start an S/MIME signing context.
+ *
+ * "scert" is the cert that will be used to sign the data. It will be
+ * checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "ecert" is the signer's encryption cert. If it is different from
+ * scert, then it will be included in the signed message so that the
+ * recipient can save it for future encryptions.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "digestalg" names the digest algorithm (e.g. SEC_OID_SHA1).
+ * XXX There should be SECMIME functions for hashing, or the hashing should
+ * be built into this interface, which we would like because we would
+ * support more smartcards that way, and then this argument should go away.)
+ *
+ * "digest" is the actual digest of the data. It must be provided in
+ * the case of detached data or NULL if the content will be included.
+ *
+ * This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
+ * and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
+ * SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
+ * and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+
+SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SECMIME_CreateSigned(CERTCertificate *scert,
+ CERTCertificate *ecert,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag digestalg,
+ SECItem *digest,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfn_arg)
+{
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* See note in header comment above about digestalg. */
+ /* Doesn't explain this. PORT_Assert (digestalg == SEC_OID_SHA1); */
+
+ cinfo = SEC_PKCS7CreateSignedData(scert, certUsageEmailSigner,
+ certdb, digestalg, digest,
+ pwfn, pwfn_arg);
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (SEC_PKCS7IncludeCertChain(cinfo, NULL) != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* if the encryption cert and the signing cert differ, then include
+ * the encryption cert too.
+ */
+ /* it is ok to compare the pointers since we ref count, and the same
+ * cert will always have the same pointer
+ */
+ if ((ecert != NULL) && (ecert != scert)) {
+ rv = SEC_PKCS7AddCertificate(cinfo, ecert);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Add the signing time. But if it fails for some reason,
+ * may as well not give up altogether -- just assert.
+ */
+ rv = SEC_PKCS7AddSigningTime(cinfo);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the email profile. Again, if it fails for some reason,
+ * may as well not give up altogether -- just assert.
+ */
+ rv = smime_add_profile(ecert, cinfo);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+
+ return cinfo;
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.h b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..683cd8db4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secmime.h
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Header file for routines specific to S/MIME. Keep things that are pure
+ * pkcs7 out of here; this is for S/MIME policy, S/MIME interoperability, etc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECMIME_H_
+#define _SECMIME_H_ 1
+
+#include "secpkcs7.h"
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the local recording of the user S/MIME cipher preferences.
+ * This function is called once for each cipher, the order being
+ * important (first call records greatest preference, and so on).
+ * When finished, it is called with a "which" of CIPHER_FAMILID_MASK.
+ * If the function is called again after that, it is assumed that
+ * the preferences are being reset, and the old preferences are
+ * discarded.
+ *
+ * XXX This is for a particular user, and right now the storage is
+ * XXX local, static. The preference should be stored elsewhere to allow
+ * XXX for multiple uses of one library? How does SSL handle this;
+ * XXX it has something similar?
+ *
+ * - The "which" values are defined in ciferfam.h (the SMIME_* values,
+ * for example SMIME_DES_CBC_56).
+ * - If "on" is non-zero then the named cipher is enabled, otherwise
+ * it is disabled. (It is not necessary to call the function for
+ * ciphers that are disabled, however, as that is the default.)
+ *
+ * If the cipher preference is successfully recorded, SECSuccess
+ * is returned. Otherwise SECFailure is returned. The only errors
+ * are due to failure allocating memory or bad parameters/calls:
+ * SEC_ERROR_XXX ("which" is not in the S/MIME cipher family)
+ * SEC_ERROR_XXX (function is being called more times than there
+ * are known/expected ciphers)
+ */
+extern SECStatus SECMIME_EnableCipher(long which, int on);
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the local recording of the S/MIME policy.
+ * This function is called to enable/disable a particular cipher.
+ * (S/MIME encryption or decryption using a particular cipher is only
+ * allowed if that cipher is currently enabled.) At startup, all S/MIME
+ * ciphers are disabled. From that point, this function can be called
+ * to enable a cipher -- it is not necessary to call this to disable
+ * a cipher unless that cipher was previously, explicitly enabled via
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * XXX This is for a the current module, I think, so local, static storage
+ * XXX is okay. Is that correct, or could multiple uses of the same
+ * XXX library expect to operate under different policies?
+ *
+ * - The "which" values are defined in ciferfam.h (the SMIME_* values,
+ * for example SMIME_DES_CBC_56).
+ * - If "on" is non-zero then the named cipher is enabled, otherwise
+ * it is disabled.
+ *
+ * If the cipher is successfully enabled/disabled, SECSuccess is
+ * returned. Otherwise SECFailure is returned. The only errors
+ * are due to bad parameters:
+ * SEC_ERROR_XXX ("which" is not in the S/MIME cipher family)
+ * SEC_ERROR_XXX ("which" exceeds expected maximum cipher; this is
+ * really an internal error)
+ */
+extern SECStatus SECMIME_SetPolicy(long which, int on);
+
+/*
+ * Does the current policy allow S/MIME decryption of this particular
+ * algorithm and keysize?
+ */
+extern PRBool SECMIME_DecryptionAllowed(SECAlgorithmID *algid, PK11SymKey *key);
+
+/*
+ * Does the current policy allow *any* S/MIME encryption (or decryption)?
+ *
+ * This tells whether or not *any* S/MIME encryption can be done,
+ * according to policy. Callers may use this to do nicer user interface
+ * (say, greying out a checkbox so a user does not even try to encrypt
+ * a message when they are not allowed to) or for any reason they want
+ * to check whether S/MIME encryption (or decryption, for that matter)
+ * may be done.
+ *
+ * It takes no arguments. The return value is a simple boolean:
+ * PR_TRUE means encryption (or decryption) is *possible*
+ * (but may still fail due to other reasons, like because we cannot
+ * find all the necessary certs, etc.; PR_TRUE is *not* a guarantee)
+ * PR_FALSE means encryption (or decryption) is not permitted
+ *
+ * There are no errors from this routine.
+ */
+extern PRBool SECMIME_EncryptionPossible(void);
+
+/*
+ * Start an S/MIME encrypting context.
+ *
+ * "scert" is the cert for the sender. It will be checked for validity.
+ * "rcerts" are the certs for the recipients. They will also be checked.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the certs.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
+ * and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
+ * SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
+ * and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *SECMIME_CreateEncrypted(CERTCertificate *scert,
+ CERTCertificate **rcerts,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfn_arg);
+
+/*
+ * Start an S/MIME signing context.
+ *
+ * "scert" is the cert that will be used to sign the data. It will be
+ * checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "digestalg" names the digest algorithm. (It should be SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ * XXX There should be SECMIME functions for hashing, or the hashing should
+ * be built into this interface, which we would like because we would
+ * support more smartcards that way, and then this argument should go away.)
+ *
+ * "digest" is the actual digest of the data. It must be provided in
+ * the case of detached data or NULL if the content will be included.
+ *
+ * This function already does all of the stuff specific to S/MIME protocol
+ * and local policy; the return value just needs to be passed to
+ * SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data,
+ * and finally to SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *SECMIME_CreateSigned(CERTCertificate *scert,
+ CERTCertificate *ecert,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag digestalg,
+ SECItem *digest,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfn_arg);
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_END_PROTOS
+
+#endif /* _SECMIME_H_ */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secpkcs7.h b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secpkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d95c7d891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/secpkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/*
+ * Interface to the PKCS7 implementation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECPKCS7_H_
+#define _SECPKCS7_H_
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+
+#include "secoidt.h"
+#include "certt.h"
+#include "keyt.h"
+#include "hasht.h"
+#include "pkcs7t.h"
+
+extern const SEC_ASN1Template sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate[];
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * Miscellaneous
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Returns the content type of the given contentInfo.
+ */
+extern SECOidTag SEC_PKCS7ContentType(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a PKCS7 contentInfo and all of its sub-pieces.
+ */
+extern void SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *contentInfo);
+
+/*
+ * Copy a PKCS7 contentInfo. A Destroy is needed on *each* copy.
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CopyContentInfo(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *contentInfo);
+
+/*
+ * Return a pointer to the actual content. In the case of those types
+ * which are encrypted, this returns the *plain* content.
+ */
+extern SECItem *SEC_PKCS7GetContent(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * PKCS7 Decoding, Verification, etc..
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+extern SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback callback,
+ void *callback_arg,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
+ void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb);
+
+extern SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
+ const char *buf, unsigned long len);
+
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx);
+
+/* Abort the underlying ASN.1 stream & set an error */
+void SEC_PKCS7DecoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int error);
+
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem(SECItem *p7item,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
+ void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
+ SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb);
+
+extern PRBool SEC_PKCS7ContainsCertsOrCrls(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/* checks to see if the contents of the content info is
+ * empty. it so, PR_TRUE is returned. PR_FALSE, otherwise.
+ *
+ * minLen is used to specify a minimum size. if content size <= minLen,
+ * content is assumed empty.
+ */
+extern PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7IsContentEmpty(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, unsigned int minLen);
+
+extern PRBool SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * If the PKCS7 content has a signature (not just *could* have a signature)
+ * return true; false otherwise. This can/should be called before calling
+ * VerifySignature, which will always indicate failure if no signature is
+ * present, but that does not mean there even was a signature!
+ * Note that the content itself can be empty (detached content was sent
+ * another way); it is the presence of the signature that matters.
+ */
+extern PRBool SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good.
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+extern PRBool SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ PRBool keepcerts);
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches
+ * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents).
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+extern PRBool SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ const SECItem *detached_digest,
+ HASH_HashType digest_type,
+ PRBool keepcerts);
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime
+ * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches
+ * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents).
+ * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
+ * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at time "atTime".
+ *
+ * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
+ * into our local database.
+ */
+extern PRBool
+SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ const SECItem *detached_digest,
+ HASH_HashType digest_type,
+ PRBool keepcerts,
+ PRTime atTime);
+
+/*
+ * SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName, SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress
+ * The passed-in contentInfo is espected to be Signed, and these
+ * functions return the specified portion of the full signer name.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to allocated memory, which must be freed.
+ * A NULL return value is an error.
+ */
+extern char *SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+extern char *SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * Return the the signing time, in UTCTime format, of a PKCS7 contentInfo.
+ */
+extern SECItem *SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * PKCS7 Creation and Encoding.
+ ************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Start a PKCS7 signing context.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert that will be used to sign the data. It will be
+ * checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the signing usage (e.g. certUsageEmailSigner)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "signing" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "digestalg" names the digest algorithm (e.g. SEC_OID_SHA1).
+ *
+ * "digest" is the actual digest of the data. It must be provided in
+ * the case of detached data or NULL if the content will be included.
+ *
+ * The return value can be passed to functions which add things to
+ * it like attributes, then eventually to SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to
+ * SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data, and finally to
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateSignedData(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag digestalg,
+ SECItem *digest,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg);
+
+/*
+ * Create a PKCS7 certs-only container.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the (first) cert that will be included.
+ *
+ * "include_chain" specifies whether the entire chain for "cert" should
+ * be included.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL in when "include_chain" is false, or when meaning
+ * use the default database.
+ *
+ * More certs and chains can be added via AddCertficate and AddCertChain.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateCertsOnly(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ PRBool include_chain,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb);
+
+/*
+ * Start a PKCS7 enveloping context.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert for the recipient. It will be checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the encryption usage (e.g. certUsageEmailRecipient)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "recipient" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ *
+ * "encalg" specifies the bulk encryption algorithm to use (e.g. SEC_OID_RC2).
+ *
+ * "keysize" specifies the bulk encryption key size, in bits.
+ *
+ * The return value can be passed to functions which add things to
+ * it like more recipients, then eventually to SEC_PKCS7Encode() or to
+ * SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart() to create the encoded data, and finally to
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo().
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateEnvelopedData(CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+ SECOidTag encalg,
+ int keysize,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg);
+
+/*
+ * XXX There will be a similar routine for creating signedAndEnvelopedData.
+ * But its parameters will be different and I have no plans to implement
+ * it any time soon because we have no current need for it.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Create an empty PKCS7 data content info.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *SEC_PKCS7CreateData(void);
+
+/*
+ * Create an empty PKCS7 encrypted content info.
+ *
+ * "algorithm" specifies the bulk encryption algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * An error results in a return value of NULL and an error set.
+ * (Retrieve specific errors via PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().)
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
+SEC_PKCS7CreateEncryptedData(SECOidTag algorithm, int keysize,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg);
+
+/*
+ * All of the following things return SECStatus to signal success or failure.
+ * Failure should have a more specific error status available via
+ * PORT_GetError()/XP_GetError().
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Add the specified attribute to the authenticated (i.e. signed) attributes
+ * of "cinfo" -- "oidtag" describes the attribute and "value" is the
+ * value to be associated with it. NOTE! "value" must already be encoded;
+ * no interpretation of "oidtag" is done. Also, it is assumed that this
+ * signedData has only one signer -- if we ever need to add attributes
+ * when there is more than one signature, we need a way to specify *which*
+ * signature should get the attribute.
+ *
+ * XXX Technically, a signed attribute can have multiple values; if/when
+ * we ever need to support an attribute which takes multiple values, we
+ * either need to change this interface or create an AddSignedAttributeValue
+ * which can be called subsequently, and would then append a value.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData (the only kind of pkcs7 data
+ * that is allowed authenticated attributes); SECFailure will be returned
+ * if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddSignedAttribute(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECOidTag oidtag,
+ SECItem *value);
+
+/*
+ * Add "cert" and its entire chain to the set of certs included in "cinfo".
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL, meaning use the default database.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddCertChain(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb);
+
+/*
+ * Add "cert" to the set of certs included in "cinfo".
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddCertificate(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert);
+
+/*
+ * Add another recipient to an encrypted message.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type envelopedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ *
+ * "cert" is the cert for the recipient. It will be checked for validity.
+ *
+ * "certusage" describes the encryption usage (e.g. certUsageEmailRecipient)
+ * XXX Maybe SECCertUsage should be split so that our caller just says
+ * "email" and *we* add the "recipient" part -- otherwise our caller
+ * could be lying about the usage; we do not want to allow encryption
+ * certs for signing or vice versa.
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for verifying the cert.
+ * It can be NULL if a default database is available (like in the client).
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddRecipient(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECCertUsage certusage,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb);
+
+/*
+ * Add the signing time to the authenticated (i.e. signed) attributes
+ * of "cinfo". This is expected to be included in outgoing signed
+ * messages for email (S/MIME) but is likely useful in other situations.
+ *
+ * This should only be added once; a second call will either do
+ * nothing or replace an old signing time with a newer one.
+ *
+ * XXX This will probably just shove the current time into "cinfo"
+ * but it will not actually get signed until the entire item is
+ * processed for encoding. Is this (expected to be small) delay okay?
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData (the only kind of pkcs7 data
+ * that is allowed authenticated attributes); SECFailure will be returned
+ * if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * Add the signer's symmetric capabilities to the authenticated
+ * (i.e. signed) attributes of "cinfo". This is expected to be
+ * included in outgoing signed messages for email (S/MIME).
+ *
+ * This can only be added once; a second call will return SECFailure.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7AddSymmetricCapabilities(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/*
+ * Mark that the signer's certificate and its issuing chain should
+ * be included in the encoded data. This is expected to be used
+ * in outgoing signed messages for email (S/MIME).
+ *
+ * "certdb" is the cert database to use for finding the chain.
+ * It can be NULL, meaning use the default database.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" should be of type signedData or signedAndEnvelopedData;
+ * SECFailure will be returned if it is not.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7IncludeCertChain(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ CERTCertDBHandle *certdb);
+
+/*
+ * Set the content; it will be included and also hashed and/or encrypted
+ * as appropriate. This is for in-memory content (expected to be "small")
+ * that will be included in the PKCS7 object. All others should stream the
+ * content through when encoding (see SEC_PKCS7Encoder{Start,Update,Finish}).
+ *
+ * "buf" points to data of length "len"; it will be copied.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7SetContent(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ const char *buf, unsigned long len);
+
+/*
+ * Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
+ * of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
+ * already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
+ * or there is no data at all (certs-only).
+ *
+ * "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
+ *
+ * "outputfn" is where the encoded bytes will be passed.
+ *
+ * "outputarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ *
+ * "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
+ * can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
+ * be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
+ * for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
+ *
+ * "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
+ * private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
+ * that no signing is going to be done.
+ *
+ * "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7Encode(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
+ void *outputarg,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg);
+
+/*
+ * Encode a PKCS7 object, in one shot. All necessary components
+ * of the object must already be specified. Either the data has
+ * already been included (via SetContent), or the data is detached,
+ * or there is no data at all (certs-only). The output, rather than
+ * being passed to an output function as is done above, is all put
+ * into a SECItem.
+ *
+ * "pool" specifies a pool from which to allocate the result.
+ * It can be NULL, in which case memory is allocated generically.
+ *
+ * "dest" specifies a SECItem in which to put the result data.
+ * It can be NULL, in which case the entire item is allocated, too.
+ *
+ * "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
+ *
+ * "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
+ * can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
+ * be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
+ * for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
+ *
+ * "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
+ * private key of the signer. This argument can be NULL if it is known
+ * that no signing is going to be done.
+ *
+ * "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ */
+extern SECItem *SEC_PKCS7EncodeItem(PLArenaPool *pool,
+ SECItem *dest,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg);
+
+/*
+ * For those who want to simply point to the pkcs7 contentInfo ASN.1
+ * template, and *not* call the encoding functions directly, the
+ * following function can be used -- after it is called, the entire
+ * PKCS7 contentInfo is ready to be encoded.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7PrepareForEncode(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg);
+
+/*
+ * Start the process of encoding a PKCS7 object. The first part of
+ * the encoded object will be passed to the output function right away;
+ * after that it is expected that SEC_PKCS7EncoderUpdate will be called,
+ * streaming in the actual content that is getting included as well as
+ * signed or encrypted (or both).
+ *
+ * "cinfo" specifies the object to be encoded.
+ *
+ * "outputfn" is where the encoded bytes will be passed.
+ *
+ * "outputarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ *
+ * "bulkkey" specifies the bulk encryption key to use. This argument
+ * can be NULL if no encryption is being done, or if the bulk key should
+ * be generated internally (usually the case for EnvelopedData but never
+ * for EncryptedData, which *must* provide a bulk encryption key).
+ *
+ * Returns an object to be passed to EncoderUpdate and EncoderFinish.
+ */
+extern SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *
+SEC_PKCS7EncoderStart(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SEC_PKCS7EncoderOutputCallback outputfn,
+ void *outputarg,
+ PK11SymKey *bulkkey);
+
+/*
+ * Encode more contents, hashing and/or encrypting along the way.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7EncoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
+ const char *buf,
+ unsigned long len);
+
+/*
+ * No more contents; finish the signature creation, if appropriate,
+ * and then the encoding.
+ *
+ * "pwfn" is a callback for getting the password which protects the
+ * signer's private key. This argument can be NULL if it is known
+ * that no signing is going to be done.
+ *
+ * "pwfnarg" is an opaque argument to the above callback.
+ */
+extern SECStatus SEC_PKCS7EncoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7ecx,
+ SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn,
+ void *pwfnarg);
+
+/* Abort the underlying ASN.1 stream & set an error */
+void SEC_PKCS7EncoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7EncoderContext *p7dcx, int error);
+
+/* retrieve the algorithm ID used to encrypt the content info
+ * for encrypted and enveloped data. The SECAlgorithmID pointer
+ * returned needs to be freed as it is a copy of the algorithm
+ * id in the content info.
+ */
+extern SECAlgorithmID *
+SEC_PKCS7GetEncryptionAlgorithm(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/* the content of an encrypted data content info is encrypted.
+ * it is assumed that for encrypted data, that the data has already
+ * been set and is in the "plainContent" field of the content info.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info to encrypt
+ *
+ * key is the key with which to perform the encryption. if the
+ * algorithm is a password based encryption algorithm, the
+ * key is actually a password which will be processed per
+ * PKCS #5.
+ *
+ * in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
+ * indicates a success.
+ */
+extern SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7EncryptContents(PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECItem *key,
+ void *wincx);
+
+/* the content of an encrypted data content info is decrypted.
+ * it is assumed that for encrypted data, that the data has already
+ * been set and is in the "encContent" field of the content info.
+ *
+ * cinfo is the content info to decrypt
+ *
+ * key is the key with which to perform the decryption. if the
+ * algorithm is a password based encryption algorithm, the
+ * key is actually a password which will be processed per
+ * PKCS #5.
+ *
+ * in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
+ * indicates a success.
+ */
+extern SECStatus
+SEC_PKCS7DecryptContents(PLArenaPool *poolp,
+ SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
+ SECItem *key,
+ void *wincx);
+
+/* retrieve the certificate list from the content info. the list
+ * is a pointer to the list in the content info. this should not
+ * be deleted or freed in any way short of calling
+ * SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo
+ */
+extern SECItem **
+SEC_PKCS7GetCertificateList(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/* Returns the key length (in bits) of the algorithm used to encrypt
+ this object. Returns 0 if it's not encrypted, or the key length is
+ irrelevant. */
+extern int
+SEC_PKCS7GetKeyLength(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo);
+
+/************************************************************************/
+SEC_END_PROTOS
+
+#endif /* _SECPKCS7_H_ */
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