diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 81 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp | 14 |
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index 458f41144..9329c558a 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ #include "nsIStreamListener.h" #include "nsIDocument.h" #include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h" -#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h" -#include "nsIURIFixup.h" -#include "nsINestedURI.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Element.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h" @@ -247,6 +244,10 @@ DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, static nsresult DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType = aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(); nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType = @@ -254,24 +255,12 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) nsCString mimeTypeGuess; nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr; - nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; - nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); - NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); - - if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT || - contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) { - // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially - // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can - // perform proper security checks. - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv)); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) { - nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI; - rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI)); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { - uri = fixedURI; - } - } - } +#ifdef DEBUG + // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads + // initiated by javascript tests. + bool skipContentTypeCheck = false; + skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion"); +#endif switch(contentPolicyType) { case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: { @@ -305,14 +294,16 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) } case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: { - mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString(); - requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); + MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet"); break; } case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: { mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html"); requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); + MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || + requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, + "type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document"); break; } @@ -456,32 +447,18 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType"); } - // For document loads we use the triggeringPrincipal as the originPrincipal. - // Note the the loadingPrincipal for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT is a nullptr. - nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = - (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT || - contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) - ? aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal() - : aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(); - int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType, uri, - principal, + aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(), requestingContext, mimeTypeGuess, nullptr, //extra, &shouldLoad, nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(), nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()); - - if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) { - if ((NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) && - (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT || - contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) { - // for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT. - return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT; - } + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) { return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED; } @@ -629,30 +606,6 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel) nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); - nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType = - loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(); - - if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT || - contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) { - // query the nested URI for security checks like in the case of view-source - nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri); - if (nestedURI) { - nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); - } - - // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially - // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can - // perform proper security checks. - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv)); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) { - nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI; - rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI)); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { - uri = fixedURI; - } - } - } - // Handle cookie policies uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy(); if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) { diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp index bc9bcf88a..8ff3e788f 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp +++ b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp @@ -1285,10 +1285,16 @@ NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(nsIChannel* aChannel, bool aReport) nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo(); MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(loadInfo, "Origin tracking only works for channels created with a loadinfo"); - // TYPE_DOCUMENT loads have a null LoadingPrincipal and can not be cross origin. - if (!loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) { - return false; - } +#ifdef DEBUG + // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads + // initiated by javascript tests. + bool skipContentTypeCheck = false; + skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion"); +#endif + + MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || + loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "calling NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin on a top level load"); // Always treat tainted channels as cross-origin. if (loadInfo->GetTainting() != LoadTainting::Basic) { |