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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp')
-rw-r--r--toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp665
1 files changed, 665 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4cf68c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,665 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsEscape.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsUrlClassifierUtils.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "plbase64.h"
+#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
+#include "safebrowsing.pb.h"
+#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
+#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION "2.2"
+
+static char int_to_hex_digit(int32_t i)
+{
+ NS_ASSERTION((i >= 0) && (i <= 15), "int too big in int_to_hex_digit");
+ return static_cast<char>(((i < 10) ? (i + '0') : ((i - 10) + 'A')));
+}
+
+static bool
+IsDecimal(const nsACString & num)
+{
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+ if (!isdigit(num[i])) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool
+IsHex(const nsACString & num)
+{
+ if (num.Length() < 3) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (num[0] != '0' || !(num[1] == 'x' || num[1] == 'X')) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ for (uint32_t i = 2; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+ if (!isxdigit(num[i])) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool
+IsOctal(const nsACString & num)
+{
+ if (num.Length() < 2) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (num[0] != '0') {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ for (uint32_t i = 1; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+ if (!isdigit(num[i]) || num[i] == '8' || num[i] == '9') {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// SafeBrowsing V4 related utits.
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace safebrowsing {
+
+static PlatformType
+GetPlatformType()
+{
+#if defined(ANDROID)
+ return ANDROID_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_MACOSX)
+ return OSX_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_LINUX)
+ return LINUX_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_WIN)
+ return WINDOWS_PLATFORM;
+#else
+ return PLATFORM_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED;
+#endif
+}
+
+typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest ListUpdateRequest;
+typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest_Constraints Constraints;
+
+static void
+InitListUpdateRequest(ThreatType aThreatType,
+ const char* aStateBase64,
+ ListUpdateRequest* aListUpdateRequest)
+{
+ aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_type(aThreatType);
+ aListUpdateRequest->set_platform_type(GetPlatformType());
+ aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_entry_type(URL);
+
+ Constraints* contraints = new Constraints();
+ contraints->add_supported_compressions(RICE);
+ aListUpdateRequest->set_allocated_constraints(contraints);
+
+ // Only set non-empty state.
+ if (aStateBase64[0] != '\0') {
+ nsCString stateBinary;
+ nsresult rv = Base64Decode(nsCString(aStateBase64), stateBinary);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ aListUpdateRequest->set_state(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static ClientInfo*
+CreateClientInfo()
+{
+ ClientInfo* c = new ClientInfo();
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch =
+ do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+
+ nsXPIDLCString clientId;
+ nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref("browser.safebrowsing.id",
+ getter_Copies(clientId));
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ clientId = "Firefox"; // Use "Firefox" as fallback.
+ }
+
+ c->set_client_id(clientId.get());
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+} // end of namespace safebrowsing.
+} // end of namespace mozilla.
+
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::nsUrlClassifierUtils()
+ : mEscapeCharmap(nullptr)
+ , mProviderDictLock("nsUrlClassifierUtils.mProviderDictLock")
+{
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::Init()
+{
+ // Everything but alpha numerics, - and .
+ mEscapeCharmap = new Charmap(0xffffffff, 0xfc009fff, 0xf8000001, 0xf8000001,
+ 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff);
+ if (!mEscapeCharmap)
+ return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ // nsIUrlClassifierUtils is a thread-safe service so it's
+ // allowed to use on non-main threads. However, building
+ // the provider dictionary must be on the main thread.
+ // We forcefully load nsUrlClassifierUtils in
+ // nsUrlClassifierDBService::Init() to ensure we must
+ // now be on the main thread.
+ nsresult rv = ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // Add an observer for shutdown
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
+ mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+ if (!observerService)
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+
+ observerService->AddObserver(this, "xpcom-shutdown-threads", false);
+ Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this, "browser.safebrowsing");
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsUrlClassifierUtils,
+ nsIUrlClassifierUtils,
+ nsIObserver)
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// nsIUrlClassifierUtils
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetKeyForURI(nsIURI * uri, nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(uri);
+ if (!innerURI)
+ innerURI = uri;
+
+ nsAutoCString host;
+ innerURI->GetAsciiHost(host);
+
+ if (host.IsEmpty()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
+ }
+
+ nsresult rv = CanonicalizeHostname(host, _retval);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ nsAutoCString path;
+ rv = innerURI->GetPath(path);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // strip out anchors
+ int32_t ref = path.FindChar('#');
+ if (ref != kNotFound)
+ path.SetLength(ref);
+
+ nsAutoCString temp;
+ rv = CanonicalizePath(path, temp);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ _retval.Append(temp);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// We use "goog-*-proto" as the list name for v4, where "proto" indicates
+// it's updated (as well as hash completion) via protobuf.
+//
+// In the mozilla official build, we are allowed to use the
+// private phishing list (goog-phish-proto). See Bug 1288840.
+static const struct {
+ const char* mListName;
+ uint32_t mThreatType;
+} THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[] = {
+ { "goog-malware-proto", MALWARE_THREAT}, // 1
+ { "googpub-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2
+ { "goog-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3
+ { "goog-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING}, // 5
+
+ // For testing purpose.
+ { "test-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2
+ { "test-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3
+};
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(uint32_t aThreatType,
+ nsACString& aListNames)
+{
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
+ if (aThreatType == THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType) {
+ if (!aListNames.IsEmpty()) {
+ aListNames.AppendLiteral(",");
+ }
+ aListNames += THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return aListNames.IsEmpty() ? NS_ERROR_FAILURE : NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertListNameToThreatType(const nsACString& aListName,
+ uint32_t* aThreatType)
+{
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
+ if (aListName.EqualsASCII(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName)) {
+ *aThreatType = THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProvider(const nsACString& aTableName,
+ nsACString& aProvider)
+{
+ MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
+ nsCString* provider = nullptr;
+ if (mProviderDict.Get(aTableName, &provider)) {
+ aProvider = provider ? *provider : EmptyCString();
+ } else {
+ aProvider = EmptyCString();
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProtocolVersion(const nsACString& aProvider,
+ nsACString& aVersion)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+ if (prefBranch) {
+ nsPrintfCString prefName("browser.safebrowsing.provider.%s.pver",
+ nsCString(aProvider).get());
+ nsXPIDLCString version;
+ nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(prefName.get(), getter_Copies(version));
+
+ aVersion = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) ? version : DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ aVersion = DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeUpdateRequestV4(const char** aListNames,
+ const char** aStatesBase64,
+ uint32_t aCount,
+ nsACString &aRequest)
+{
+ using namespace mozilla::safebrowsing;
+
+ FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest r;
+ r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo());
+
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aCount; i++) {
+ nsCString listName(aListNames[i]);
+ uint32_t threatType;
+ nsresult rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(listName, &threatType);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ continue; // Unknown list name.
+ }
+ auto lur = r.mutable_list_update_requests()->Add();
+ InitListUpdateRequest(static_cast<ThreatType>(threatType), aStatesBase64[i], lur);
+ }
+
+ // Then serialize.
+ std::string s;
+ r.SerializeToString(&s);
+
+ nsCString out;
+ nsresult rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(),
+ (const uint8_t*)s.c_str(),
+ Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include,
+ out);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ aRequest = out;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// nsIObserver
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic,
+ const char16_t *aData)
+{
+ if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID)) {
+ MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
+ return ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
+ }
+
+ if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, "xpcom-shutdown-threads")) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+ return prefs->RemoveObserver("browser.safebrowsing", this);
+ }
+
+ return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// non-interface methods
+
+nsresult
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ReadProvidersFromPrefs(ProviderDictType& aDict)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "ReadProvidersFromPrefs must be on main thread");
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch;
+ nsresult rv = prefs->GetBranch("browser.safebrowsing.provider.",
+ getter_AddRefs(prefBranch));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // We've got a pref branch for "browser.safebrowsing.provider.".
+ // Enumerate all children prefs and parse providers.
+ uint32_t childCount;
+ char** childArray;
+ rv = prefBranch->GetChildList("", &childCount, &childArray);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // Collect providers from childArray.
+ nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> providers;
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < childCount; i++) {
+ nsCString child(childArray[i]);
+ auto dotPos = child.FindChar('.');
+ if (dotPos < 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ nsDependentCSubstring provider = Substring(child, 0, dotPos);
+
+ providers.PutEntry(provider);
+ }
+ NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(childCount, childArray);
+
+ // Now we have all providers. Check which one owns |aTableName|.
+ // e.g. The owning lists of provider "google" is defined in
+ // "browser.safebrowsing.provider.google.lists".
+ for (auto itr = providers.Iter(); !itr.Done(); itr.Next()) {
+ auto entry = itr.Get();
+ nsCString provider(entry->GetKey());
+ nsPrintfCString owninListsPref("%s.lists", provider.get());
+
+ nsXPIDLCString owningLists;
+ nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(owninListsPref.get(),
+ getter_Copies(owningLists));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // We've got the owning lists (represented as string) of |provider|.
+ // Build the dictionary for the owning list and the current provider.
+ nsTArray<nsCString> tables;
+ Classifier::SplitTables(owningLists, tables);
+ for (auto tableName : tables) {
+ aDict.Put(tableName, new nsCString(provider));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizeHostname(const nsACString & hostname,
+ nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ nsAutoCString unescaped;
+ if (!NS_UnescapeURL(PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(),
+ PromiseFlatCString(hostname).Length(),
+ 0, unescaped)) {
+ unescaped.Assign(hostname);
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString cleaned;
+ CleanupHostname(unescaped, cleaned);
+
+ nsAutoCString temp;
+ ParseIPAddress(cleaned, temp);
+ if (!temp.IsEmpty()) {
+ cleaned.Assign(temp);
+ }
+
+ ToLowerCase(cleaned);
+ SpecialEncode(cleaned, false, _retval);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+
+nsresult
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizePath(const nsACString & path,
+ nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ _retval.Truncate();
+
+ nsAutoCString decodedPath(path);
+ nsAutoCString temp;
+ while (NS_UnescapeURL(decodedPath.get(), decodedPath.Length(), 0, temp)) {
+ decodedPath.Assign(temp);
+ temp.Truncate();
+ }
+
+ SpecialEncode(decodedPath, true, _retval);
+ // XXX: lowercase the path?
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::CleanupHostname(const nsACString & hostname,
+ nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ _retval.Truncate();
+
+ const char* curChar = hostname.BeginReading();
+ const char* end = hostname.EndReading();
+ char lastChar = '\0';
+ while (curChar != end) {
+ unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
+ if (c == '.' && (lastChar == '\0' || lastChar == '.')) {
+ // skip
+ } else {
+ _retval.Append(*curChar);
+ }
+ lastChar = c;
+ ++curChar;
+ }
+
+ // cut off trailing dots
+ while (_retval.Length() > 0 && _retval[_retval.Length() - 1] == '.') {
+ _retval.SetLength(_retval.Length() - 1);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseIPAddress(const nsACString & host,
+ nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ _retval.Truncate();
+ nsACString::const_iterator iter, end;
+ host.BeginReading(iter);
+ host.EndReading(end);
+
+ if (host.Length() <= 15) {
+ // The Windows resolver allows a 4-part dotted decimal IP address to
+ // have a space followed by any old rubbish, so long as the total length
+ // of the string doesn't get above 15 characters. So, "10.192.95.89 xy"
+ // is resolved to 10.192.95.89.
+ // If the string length is greater than 15 characters, e.g.
+ // "10.192.95.89 xy.wildcard.example.com", it will be resolved through
+ // DNS.
+
+ if (FindCharInReadable(' ', iter, end)) {
+ end = iter;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (host.BeginReading(iter); iter != end; iter++) {
+ if (!(isxdigit(*iter) || *iter == 'x' || *iter == 'X' || *iter == '.')) {
+ // not an IP
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ host.BeginReading(iter);
+ nsTArray<nsCString> parts;
+ ParseString(PromiseFlatCString(Substring(iter, end)), '.', parts);
+ if (parts.Length() > 4) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // If any potentially-octal numbers (start with 0 but not hex) have
+ // non-octal digits, no part of the ip can be in octal
+ // XXX: this came from the old javascript implementation, is it really
+ // supposed to be like this?
+ bool allowOctal = true;
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
+ const nsCString& part = parts[i];
+ if (part[0] == '0') {
+ for (uint32_t j = 1; j < part.Length(); j++) {
+ if (part[j] == 'x') {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (part[j] == '8' || part[j] == '9') {
+ allowOctal = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
+ nsAutoCString canonical;
+
+ if (i == parts.Length() - 1) {
+ CanonicalNum(parts[i], 5 - parts.Length(), allowOctal, canonical);
+ } else {
+ CanonicalNum(parts[i], 1, allowOctal, canonical);
+ }
+
+ if (canonical.IsEmpty()) {
+ _retval.Truncate();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
+ _retval.Assign(canonical);
+ } else {
+ _retval.Append('.');
+ _retval.Append(canonical);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+void
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalNum(const nsACString& num,
+ uint32_t bytes,
+ bool allowOctal,
+ nsACString& _retval)
+{
+ _retval.Truncate();
+
+ if (num.Length() < 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t val;
+ if (allowOctal && IsOctal(num)) {
+ if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%o", &val) != 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (IsDecimal(num)) {
+ if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%u", &val) != 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (IsHex(num)) {
+ if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), num[1] == 'X' ? "0X%x" : "0x%x",
+ &val) != 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (bytes--) {
+ char buf[20];
+ SprintfLiteral(buf, "%u", val & 0xff);
+ if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
+ _retval.Assign(buf);
+ } else {
+ _retval = nsDependentCString(buf) + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".") + _retval;
+ }
+ val >>= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+// This function will encode all "special" characters in typical url
+// encoding, that is %hh where h is a valid hex digit. It will also fold
+// any duplicated slashes.
+bool
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::SpecialEncode(const nsACString & url,
+ bool foldSlashes,
+ nsACString & _retval)
+{
+ bool changed = false;
+ const char* curChar = url.BeginReading();
+ const char* end = url.EndReading();
+
+ unsigned char lastChar = '\0';
+ while (curChar != end) {
+ unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
+ if (ShouldURLEscape(c)) {
+ _retval.Append('%');
+ _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c / 16));
+ _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c % 16));
+
+ changed = true;
+ } else if (foldSlashes && (c == '/' && lastChar == '/')) {
+ // skip
+ } else {
+ _retval.Append(*curChar);
+ }
+ lastChar = c;
+ curChar++;
+ }
+ return changed;
+}
+
+bool
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ShouldURLEscape(const unsigned char c) const
+{
+ return c <= 32 || c == '%' || c >=127;
+}