Merge branch 'master' into Pale_Moon-release

# Conflicts:
#	application/palemoon/config/version.txt
#	js/src/jit/x86-shared/AssemblerBuffer-x86-shared.h
#	toolkit/components/search/orginal/nsSearchService.js

25 files changed, 958 insertions, 532 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h
index d3f087544..f01d16583 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ ER3(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 115),
     "SSL received a weak ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key in Server Key Exchange handshake message.")
 
 ER3(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 116),
-    "SSL received invalid NPN extension data.")
+    "SSL received invalid ALPN extension data.")
 
 ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 117),
     "SSL feature not supported for SSL 2.0 connections.")
@@ -543,3 +543,12 @@ ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 171),
 
 ER3(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 172),
     "SSL handshake has already failed. No more operations possible.")
+
+ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 173),
+    "SSL received an invalid resumption token.")
+
+ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 174),
+    "SSL received a malformed DTLS ACK")
+
+ER3(SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 175),
+    "SSL received a DH key share that's too long (>8192 bit).")
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
index aba0f62ab..de6cb47ca 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
@@ -11,6 +11,43 @@
 #include "sslimpl.h"
 #include "sslproto.h"
 
+SECStatus
+dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+                              sslBuffer *wrBuf, PRBool *needsLength)
+{
+    PRUint32 seq;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* Avoid using short records for the handshake.  We pack multiple records
+     * into the one datagram for the handshake. */
+    if (ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader &&
+        cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyHandshake) {
+        *needsLength = PR_FALSE;
+        /* The short header is comprised of two octets in the form
+         * 0b001essssssssssss where 'e' is the low bit of the epoch and 's' is
+         * the low 12 bits of the sequence number. */
+        seq = 0x2000 |
+              (((uint64_t)cwSpec->epoch & 1) << 12) |
+              (cwSpec->nextSeqNum & 0xfff);
+        return sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, seq, 2);
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, content_application_data, 1);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* The epoch and sequence number are encoded on 4 octets, with the epoch
+     * consuming the first two bits. */
+    seq = (((uint64_t)cwSpec->epoch & 3) << 30) | (cwSpec->nextSeqNum & 0x3fffffff);
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, seq, 4);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    *needsLength = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
 /* DTLS 1.3 Record map for ACK processing.
  * This represents a single fragment, so a record which includes
  * multiple fragments will have one entry for each fragment on the
@@ -82,10 +119,15 @@ dtls13_SendAck(sslSocket *ss)
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     PRCList *cursor;
     PRInt32 sent;
+    unsigned int offset;
 
     SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Sending ACK",
                  SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 
+    rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&buf, 2, &offset);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
     for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake);
          cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake;
          cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
@@ -99,6 +141,11 @@ dtls13_SendAck(sslSocket *ss)
         }
     }
 
+    rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(&buf, offset, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
     sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_ack,
                            buf.buf, buf.len, 0);
@@ -364,6 +411,7 @@ dtls13_HandleAck(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *databuf)
 {
     PRUint8 *b = databuf->buf;
     PRUint32 l = databuf->len;
+    unsigned int length;
     SECStatus rv;
 
     /* Ensure we don't loop. */
@@ -372,10 +420,19 @@ dtls13_HandleAck(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *databuf)
     PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
     if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) {
         tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE, illegal_parameter);
-        return SECSuccess;
+        return SECFailure;
     }
 
     SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Handling ACK", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &b, &l);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (length != l) {
+        tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK, decode_error);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
     while (l > 0) {
         PRUint64 seq;
         PRCList *cursor;
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h
index bf14d3bd2..ca48ef363 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #ifndef __dtls13con_h_
 #define __dtls13con_h_
 
+SECStatus dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                        ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+                                        sslBuffer *wrBuf,
+                                        PRBool *needsLength);
 SECStatus dtls13_RememberFragment(sslSocket *ss, PRCList *list,
                                   PRUint32 sequence, PRUint32 offset,
                                   PRUint32 length, DTLSEpoch epoch,
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c
index 2f335f924..a82295c66 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c
@@ -724,13 +724,16 @@ dtls_FragmentHandshake(sslSocket *ss, DTLSQueuedMessage *msg)
         PORT_Assert(end <= contentLen);
         fragmentLen = PR_MIN(end, contentLen) - fragmentOffset;
 
-        /* Reduce to the space remaining in the MTU.  Allow for any existing
-         * messages, record expansion, and the handshake header. */
+        /* Limit further by the record size limit.  Account for the header. */
+        fragmentLen = PR_MIN(fragmentLen,
+                             msg->cwSpec->recordSizeLimit - DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN);
+
+        /* Reduce to the space remaining in the MTU. */
         fragmentLen = PR_MIN(fragmentLen,
                              ss->ssl3.mtu -           /* MTU estimate. */
-                                 ss->pendingBuf.len - /* Less unsent records. */
+                                 ss->pendingBuf.len - /* Less any unsent records. */
                                  DTLS_MAX_EXPANSION - /* Allow for expansion. */
-                                 DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN);    /* + handshake header. */
+                                 DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN);    /* And the handshake header. */
         PORT_Assert(fragmentLen > 0 || fragmentOffset == 0);
 
         /* Make totally sure that we will fit in the buffer. This should be
@@ -776,7 +779,7 @@ dtls_FragmentHandshake(sslSocket *ss, DTLSQueuedMessage *msg)
         rv = dtls13_RememberFragment(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake,
                                      msgSeq, fragmentOffset, fragmentLen,
                                      msg->cwSpec->epoch,
-                                     msg->cwSpec->seqNum);
+                                     msg->cwSpec->nextSeqNum);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
         }
@@ -1319,6 +1322,107 @@ DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket, PRIntervalTime *timeout)
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
+PRBool
+dtls_IsLongHeader(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet)
+{
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+    return version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+           firstOctet == content_handshake ||
+           firstOctet == content_ack ||
+           firstOctet == content_alert;
+#else
+    return PR_TRUE;
+#endif
+}
+
+DTLSEpoch
+dtls_ReadEpoch(const ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec, const PRUint8 *hdr)
+{
+    DTLSEpoch epoch;
+    DTLSEpoch maxEpoch;
+    DTLSEpoch partial;
+
+    if (dtls_IsLongHeader(crSpec->version, hdr[0])) {
+        return ((DTLSEpoch)hdr[3] << 8) | hdr[4];
+    }
+
+    /* A lot of how we recover the epoch here will depend on how we plan to
+     * manage KeyUpdate.  In the case that we decide to install a new read spec
+     * as a KeyUpdate is handled, crSpec will always be the highest epoch we can
+     * possibly receive.  That makes this easier to manage. */
+    if ((hdr[0] & 0xe0) == 0x20) {
+        /* Use crSpec->epoch, or crSpec->epoch - 1 if the last bit differs. */
+        if (((hdr[0] >> 4) & 1) == (crSpec->epoch & 1)) {
+            return crSpec->epoch;
+        }
+        return crSpec->epoch - 1;
+    }
+
+    /* dtls_GatherData should ensure that this works. */
+    PORT_Assert(hdr[0] == content_application_data);
+
+    /* This uses the same method as is used to recover the sequence number in
+     * dtls_ReadSequenceNumber, except that the maximum value is set to the
+     * current epoch. */
+    partial = hdr[1] >> 6;
+    maxEpoch = PR_MAX(crSpec->epoch, 3);
+    epoch = (maxEpoch & 0xfffc) | partial;
+    if (partial > (maxEpoch & 0x03)) {
+        epoch -= 4;
+    }
+    return epoch;
+}
+
+static sslSequenceNumber
+dtls_ReadSequenceNumber(const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const PRUint8 *hdr)
+{
+    sslSequenceNumber cap;
+    sslSequenceNumber partial;
+    sslSequenceNumber seqNum;
+    sslSequenceNumber mask;
+
+    if (dtls_IsLongHeader(spec->version, hdr[0])) {
+        static const unsigned int seqNumOffset = 5; /* type, version, epoch */
+        static const unsigned int seqNumLength = 6;
+        sslReader r = SSL_READER(hdr + seqNumOffset, seqNumLength);
+        (void)sslRead_ReadNumber(&r, seqNumLength, &seqNum);
+        return seqNum;
+    }
+
+    /* Only the least significant bits of the sequence number is available here.
+     * This recovers the value based on the next expected sequence number.
+     *
+     * This works by determining the maximum possible sequence number, which is
+     * half the range of possible values above the expected next value (the
+     * expected next value is in |spec->seqNum|).  Then, the last part of the
+     * sequence number is replaced.  If that causes the value to exceed the
+     * maximum, subtract an entire range.
+     */
+    if ((hdr[0] & 0xe0) == 0x20) {
+        /* A 12-bit sequence number. */
+        cap = spec->nextSeqNum + (1ULL << 11);
+        partial = (((sslSequenceNumber)hdr[0] & 0xf) << 8) |
+                  (sslSequenceNumber)hdr[1];
+        mask = (1ULL << 12) - 1;
+    } else {
+        /* A 30-bit sequence number. */
+        cap = spec->nextSeqNum + (1ULL << 29);
+        partial = (((sslSequenceNumber)hdr[1] & 0x3f) << 24) |
+                  ((sslSequenceNumber)hdr[2] << 16) |
+                  ((sslSequenceNumber)hdr[3] << 8) |
+                  (sslSequenceNumber)hdr[4];
+        mask = (1ULL << 30) - 1;
+    }
+    seqNum = (cap & ~mask) | partial;
+    /* The second check prevents the value from underflowing if we get a large
+     * gap at the start of a connection, where this subtraction would cause the
+     * sequence number to wrap to near UINT64_MAX. */
+    if ((partial > (cap & mask)) && (seqNum > mask)) {
+        seqNum -= mask + 1;
+    }
+    return seqNum;
+}
+
 /*
  * DTLS relevance checks:
  * Note that this code currently ignores all out-of-epoch packets,
@@ -1336,7 +1440,7 @@ dtls_IsRelevant(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
                 const SSL3Ciphertext *cText,
                 sslSequenceNumber *seqNumOut)
 {
-    sslSequenceNumber seqNum = cText->seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MASK;
+    sslSequenceNumber seqNum = dtls_ReadSequenceNumber(spec, cText->hdr);
     if (dtls_RecordGetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, seqNum) != 0) {
         SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_IsRelevant, rejecting "
                      "potentially replayed packet",
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h
index d094380f8..45fc069b9 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ extern SSL3ProtocolVersion
 dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion tlsv);
 extern SSL3ProtocolVersion
 dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion dtlsv);
+DTLSEpoch dtls_ReadEpoch(const ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec, const PRUint8 *hdr);
 extern PRBool dtls_IsRelevant(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
                               const SSL3Ciphertext *cText,
                               sslSequenceNumber *seqNum);
 void dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(sslSocket *ss);
+PRBool dtls_IsLongHeader(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet);
 #endif
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
index 25aabbaa2..ecc4f9506 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -158,23 +158,18 @@ SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
 #define SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV 23
 #define SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING 24 /* Request OCSP stapling (client) */
 
-/* SSL_ENABLE_NPN controls whether the NPN extension is enabled for the initial
- * handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used.
- * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback or SSL_SetNextProtoNego must be used to control the
- * application layer protocol negotiation; otherwise, the NPN extension will
- * not be negotiated. SSL_ENABLE_NPN is currently enabled by default but this
- * may change in future versions.
- */
+/* SSL_ENABLE_NPN is defunct and defaults to false.
+ * Using this option will not have any effect but won't produce an error. */
 #define SSL_ENABLE_NPN 25
 
 /* SSL_ENABLE_ALPN controls whether the ALPN extension is enabled for the
  * initial handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used.
- * SSL_SetNextProtoNego (not SSL_SetNextProtoCallback) must be used to control
- * the application layer protocol negotiation; otherwise, the ALPN extension
- * will not be negotiated. ALPN is not negotiated for renegotiation handshakes,
- * even though the ALPN specification defines a way to use ALPN during
- * renegotiations. SSL_ENABLE_ALPN is currently disabled by default, but this
- * may change in future versions.
+ * SSL_SetNextProtoNego or SSL_SetNextProtoCallback can be used to control
+ * the application layer protocol negotiation;
+ * ALPN is not negotiated for renegotiation handshakes, even though the ALPN
+ * specification defines a way to use ALPN during renegotiations.
+ * SSL_ENABLE_ALPN is currently enabled by default, but this may change in
+ * future versions.
  */
 #define SSL_ENABLE_ALPN 26
 
@@ -248,12 +243,45 @@ SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
  */
 #define SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA 33
 
+/* Sets a limit to the size of encrypted records (see
+ * draft-ietf-tls-record-limit). This is the value that is advertised to peers,
+ * not a limit on the size of records that will be created.  Setting this value
+ * reduces the size of records that will be received (not sent).
+ *
+ * This limit applies to the plaintext, but the records that appear on the wire
+ * will be bigger.  This doesn't include record headers, IVs, block cipher
+ * padding, and authentication tags or MACs.
+ *
+ * NSS always advertises the record size limit extension.  If this option is not
+ * set, the extension will contain the maximum allowed size for the selected TLS
+ * version (currently this is 16384 or 2^14 for TLS 1.2 and lower and 16385 for
+ * TLS 1.3).
+ *
+ * By default, NSS creates records that are the maximum size possible, using all
+ * the data that was written by the application.  Writes larger than the maximum
+ * are split into maximum sized records, and any remainder (unless
+ * SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV is enabled and active).  If a peer advertises a record size
+ * limit then that value is used instead.
+ */
+#define SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 34
+
 /* Enables TLS 1.3 compatibility mode.  In this mode, the client includes a fake
  * session ID in the handshake and sends a ChangeCipherSpec.  A server will
  * always use the setting chosen by the client, so the value of this option has
  * no effect for a server. This setting is ignored for DTLS. */
 #define SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE 35
 
+/* Enables the sending of DTLS records using the short (two octet) record
+ * header.  Only do this if there are 2^10 or fewer packets in flight at a time;
+ * using this with a larger number of packets in flight could mean that packets
+ * are dropped if there is reordering.
+ *
+ * This applies to TLS 1.3 only.  This is not a parameter that is negotiated
+ * during the TLS handshake. Unlike other socket options, this option can be
+ * changed after a handshake is complete.
+ */
+#define SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER 36
+
 #ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION
 /* Old deprecated function names */
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_Enable(PRFileDesc *fd, int option, PRIntn on);
@@ -272,10 +300,10 @@ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn val);
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn *val);
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CertDBHandleSet(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle);
 
-/* SSLNextProtoCallback is called during the handshake for the client, when a
- * Next Protocol Negotiation (NPN) extension has been received from the server.
- * |protos| and |protosLen| define a buffer which contains the server's
- * advertisement. This data is guaranteed to be well formed per the NPN spec.
+/* SSLNextProtoCallback is called during the handshake for the server, when an
+ * Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension has been received
+ * from the client. |protos| and |protosLen| define a buffer which contains the
+ * client's advertisement.
  * |protoOut| is a buffer provided by the caller, of length 255 (the maximum
  * allowed by the protocol). On successful return, the protocol to be announced
  * to the server will be in |protoOut| and its length in |*protoOutLen|.
@@ -291,27 +319,24 @@ typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLNextProtoCallback)(
     unsigned int *protoOutLen,
     unsigned int protoMaxOut);
 
-/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback sets a callback function to handle Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. It causes a client to advertise NPN. */
+/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback sets a callback function to handle ALPN Negotiation.
+ * It causes a client to advertise ALPN. */
 SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd,
                                               SSLNextProtoCallback callback,
                                               void *arg);
 
 /* SSL_SetNextProtoNego can be used as an alternative to
- * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. It also causes a client to advertise NPN and
- * installs a default callback function which selects the first supported
- * protocol in server-preference order. If no matching protocol is found it
- * selects the first supported protocol.
+ * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback.
  *
- * Using this function also allows the client to transparently support ALPN.
+ * Using this function allows client and server to transparently support ALPN.
  * The same set of protocols will be advertised via ALPN and, if the server
  * uses ALPN to select a protocol, SSL_GetNextProto will return
  * SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED as the state.
  *
- * Since NPN uses the first protocol as the fallback protocol, when sending an
- * ALPN extension, the first protocol is moved to the end of the list. This
- * indicates that the fallback protocol is the least preferred. The other
- * protocols should be in preference order.
+ * Because the predecessor to ALPN, NPN, used the first protocol as the fallback
+ * protocol, when sending an ALPN extension, the first protocol is moved to the
+ * end of the list. This indicates that the fallback protocol is the least
+ * preferred. The other protocols should be in preference order.
  *
  * The supported protocols are specified in |data| in wire-format (8-bit
  * length-prefixed). For example: "\010http/1.1\006spdy/2". */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
index 2593bbacc..466fc296f 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -990,27 +990,22 @@ ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, unsigned int *len,
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */
     }
-
-#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
-    if (temp == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
-        (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, protocol_version);
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-    if (temp == tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
-        v = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
-    } else {
-        v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
-    }
-#else
     v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
-#endif
 
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
-        /* If this fails, we get 0 back and the next check to fails. */
         v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v);
+        /* Check for failure. */
+        if (!v || v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED) {
+            SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
     }
 
+    /* You can't negotiate TLS 1.3 this way. */
+    if (v >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
     *version = v;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
@@ -1415,7 +1410,7 @@ ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection direction,
     spec->macDef = ssl_GetMacDef(ss, suiteDef);
 
     spec->epoch = prev->epoch + 1;
-    spec->seqNum = 0;
+    spec->nextSeqNum = 0;
     if (IS_DTLS(ss) && direction == CipherSpecRead) {
         dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
     }
@@ -1481,6 +1476,13 @@ ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
         goto loser;
     }
 
+    if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) {
+        ss->ssl3.prSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+                                                  ss->opt.recordSizeLimit);
+        ss->ssl3.pwSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+                                                  ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit);
+    }
+
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
     return SECSuccess;
 
@@ -2004,6 +2006,7 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
     unsigned int ivLen = 0;
     unsigned char pseudoHeaderBuf[13];
     sslBuffer pseudoHeader = SSL_BUFFER(pseudoHeaderBuf);
+    int len;
 
     if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block &&
         cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
@@ -2013,29 +2016,32 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
          * record.
          */
         ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size;
-        if (ivLen > wrBuf->space) {
+        if (ivLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
         }
-        rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf, ivLen);
+        rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivLen);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
             return rv;
         }
         rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
-                            wrBuf->buf,         /* output */
-                            (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* outlen */
-                            ivLen,              /* max outlen */
-                            wrBuf->buf,         /* input */
-                            ivLen);             /* input len */
-        if (rv != SECSuccess || wrBuf->len != ivLen) {
+                            SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */
+                            &len,                   /* outlen */
+                            ivLen,                  /* max outlen */
+                            SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* input */
+                            ivLen);                 /* input len */
+        if (rv != SECSuccess || len != ivLen) {
             PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
         }
+
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+        PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
     }
 
     rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
-        cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->seqNum, type,
+        cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, type,
         cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->recordVersion,
         isDTLS, contentLen, &pseudoHeader);
     PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
@@ -2043,23 +2049,26 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
         const int nonceLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size;
         const int tagLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size;
 
-        if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
+        if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
         }
 
         rv = cwSpec->aead(
             &cwSpec->keyMaterial,
-            PR_FALSE,           /* do encrypt */
-            wrBuf->buf,         /* output  */
-            (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */
-            wrBuf->space,       /* max out */
-            pIn, contentLen,    /* input   */
+            PR_FALSE,                /* do encrypt */
+            SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),  /* output  */
+            &len,                    /* out len */
+            SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), /* max out */
+            pIn, contentLen,         /* input   */
             SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader));
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
         }
+
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+        PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
     } else {
         int blockSize = cwSpec->cipherDef->block_size;
 
@@ -2069,7 +2078,7 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
         rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader),
                                    SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader),
                                    pIn, contentLen,
-                                   wrBuf->buf + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen);
+                                   SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen, &macLen);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
@@ -2095,7 +2104,7 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
             PORT_Assert((fragLen % blockSize) == 0);
 
             /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */
-            pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[ivLen + fragLen - 1];
+            pBuf = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + fragLen - 1;
             for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) {
                 *pBuf-- = padding_length;
             }
@@ -2112,14 +2121,14 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
             p2Len += oddLen;
             PORT_Assert((blockSize < 2) ||
                         (p2Len % blockSize) == 0);
-            memmove(wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen);
+            memmove(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen);
         }
         if (p1Len > 0) {
             int cipherBytesPart1 = -1;
             rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
-                                wrBuf->buf + ivLen, /* output */
-                                &cipherBytesPart1,  /* actual outlen */
-                                p1Len,              /* max outlen */
+                                SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */
+                                &cipherBytesPart1,      /* actual outlen */
+                                p1Len,                  /* max outlen */
                                 pIn,
                                 p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */
             PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int)p1Len);
@@ -2127,22 +2136,24 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
                 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
                 return SECFailure;
             }
-            wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart1;
+            rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p1Len, NULL);
+            PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
         }
         if (p2Len > 0) {
             int cipherBytesPart2 = -1;
             rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
-                                wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len,
+                                SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),
                                 &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */
                                 p2Len,             /* max outlen */
-                                wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len,
+                                SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),
                                 p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/
             PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int)p2Len);
             if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int)p2Len) {
                 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
                 return SECFailure;
             }
-            wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart2;
+            rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p2Len, NULL);
+            PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
         }
     }
 
@@ -2150,16 +2161,20 @@ ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
 }
 
 /* Note: though this can report failure, it shouldn't. */
-static SECStatus
+SECStatus
 ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
-                       SSL3ContentType contentType, unsigned int len,
-                       sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+                       SSL3ContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf,
+                       PRBool *needsLength)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
 
 #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
     if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
-        cwSpec->cipherDef->calg != ssl_calg_null) {
+        cwSpec->epoch > TrafficKeyClearText) {
+        if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+            return dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(ss, cwSpec, wrBuf,
+                                                 needsLength);
+        }
         contentType = content_application_data;
     }
 #endif
@@ -2177,16 +2192,12 @@ ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
         }
-        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->seqNum, 6);
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, 6);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
         }
     }
-    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, len, 2);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-
+    *needsLength = PR_TRUE;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
@@ -2194,66 +2205,67 @@ SECStatus
 ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSL3ContentType type,
                   const PRUint8 *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf)
 {
-    unsigned int headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH
-                                         : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
-    sslBuffer protBuf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + headerLen,
-                                         SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf) - headerLen);
-    PRBool isTLS13;
+    PRBool needsLength;
+    unsigned int lenOffset;
     SECStatus rv;
 
     PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == CipherSpecWrite);
     PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0);
     PORT_Assert(cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX);
-    if (cwSpec->seqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) {
+
+    if (cwSpec->nextSeqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) {
         /* We should have automatically updated before here in TLS 1.3. */
         PORT_Assert(cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
         SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
-                    SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->seqNum));
+                    SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->nextSeqNum));
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    isTLS13 = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+    rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, type, wrBuf, &needsLength);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (needsLength) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, 2, &lenOffset);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
 
 #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
     {
         int len;
-        rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&protBuf), &len,
-                         SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(&protBuf), pIn, contentLen);
+        rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), &len,
+                         SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure; /* error was set */
         }
-        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&protBuf, len, NULL);
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
         PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
     }
 #else
-    if (isTLS13) {
-        rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, &protBuf);
+    if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
     } else {
         rv = ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), type,
-                                   pIn, contentLen, &protBuf);
+                                   pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
     }
 #endif
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure; /* error was set */
     }
 
-    PORT_Assert(protBuf.len <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + (isTLS13 ? 256 : 1024));
-
-    rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, type, SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&protBuf),
-                                wrBuf);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == headerLen);
-    rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&protBuf), NULL);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */
-        return SECFailure;
+    if (needsLength) {
+        /* Insert the length. */
+        rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(wrBuf, lenOffset, 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
     }
-    ++cwSpec->seqNum;
 
+    ++cwSpec->nextSeqNum;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
@@ -2267,7 +2279,7 @@ ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3ContentType type,
     unsigned int spaceNeeded;
     SECStatus rv;
 
-    contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+    contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, spec->recordSizeLimit);
     spaceNeeded = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE;
     if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
         spec->cipherDef->type == type_block) {
@@ -2291,6 +2303,7 @@ ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3ContentType type,
     *written = contentLen;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
+
 /* Process the plain text before sending it.
  * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent
  *  plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the
@@ -2368,7 +2381,7 @@ ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss,
         rv = ssl_ProtectNextRecord(ss, spec, type, pIn, nIn, &written);
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-            return SECFailure;
+            goto loser;
         }
 
         PORT_Assert(written > 0);
@@ -3034,7 +3047,6 @@ ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss)
             return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
         }
     } else {
-        SECStatus rv;
         rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
@@ -5567,13 +5579,20 @@ ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
     }
 
     /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */
-    enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
+    unsigned int svrPubKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
+    enc_pms.len = (svrPubKeyBits + 7) / 8;
+    /* Check that the RSA key isn't larger than 8k bit. */
+    if (svrPubKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS) {
+        (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+        goto loser;
+    }
     enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
     if (enc_pms.data == NULL) {
         goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */
     }
 
-    /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
+    /* Wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
     rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
@@ -5676,7 +5695,7 @@ ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
     };
     sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL;
     SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
-    PRUint8 dhData[1026]; /* Enough for the 8192-bit group. */
+    PRUint8 dhData[SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS / 8 + 2];
     sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER(dhData);
 
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
@@ -6208,7 +6227,6 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
     SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
     PRBool isHelloRetry;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
-    TLSExtension *versionExtension;
     const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b;
     const PRUint32 savedLength = length;
 #ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
@@ -6299,16 +6317,10 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
         }
     }
 
-    /* Update the version based on the extension, as necessary. */
-    versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
-    if (versionExtension) {
-        rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &versionExtension->data.data,
-                                   &versionExtension->data.len,
-                                   &ss->version);
-        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-            errCode = PORT_GetError();
-            goto loser; /* An alert is sent by ssl_ClientReadVersion */
-        }
+    /* Read supported_versions if present. */
+    rv = tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
     }
 
     PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange));
@@ -6332,7 +6344,7 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
     /* The server didn't pick 1.3 although we either received a
      * HelloRetryRequest, or we prepared to send early app data. */
     if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
-        if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+        if (isHelloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
             /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */
             desc = illegal_parameter;
             errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
@@ -6393,8 +6405,9 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
     /* Finally, now all the version-related checks have passed. */
     ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
     /* Update the write cipher spec to match the version. But not after
-     * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec. */
-    if (!ss->firstHsDone && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+     * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec,
+     * in which case this is a no-op. */
+    if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isHelloRetry) {
         ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
         ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
         ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
@@ -6729,6 +6742,10 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
         errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
         goto alert_loser;
     }
+    if (dh_p_bits > SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS) {
+        errCode = SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG;
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         goto loser; /* malformed. */
@@ -6938,8 +6955,10 @@ ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length,
             goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
 
         remaining -= 2;
+        if (SECITEM_MakeItem(ca_list->arena, &node->name, *b, len) != SECSuccess) {
+            goto no_mem;
+        }
         node->name.len = len;
-        node->name.data = *b;
         *b += len;
         *length -= len;
         remaining -= len;
@@ -6967,7 +6986,6 @@ ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length,
     return SECSuccess;
 
 no_mem:
-    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
     return SECFailure;
 
 alert_loser:
@@ -7332,10 +7350,6 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
      * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the
      * domain we are connecting to.
      *
-     * XXX: We should do the same for the NPN extension, but for that we
-     * need an option to give the application the ability to leak the NPN
-     * information to get better performance.
-     *
      * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive
      * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate;
      * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher
@@ -7409,14 +7423,6 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
     ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
 
     if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
-        /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
-         * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
-         */
-        rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
-        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-            goto loser; /* err code was set. */
-        }
-
         if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
             if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
                 /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
@@ -8879,12 +8885,10 @@ ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry,
     SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
     sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
 
-    if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
-        version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version);
-    } else {
-        version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+    version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+    if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+        version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
     }
-
     rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, version, 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure;
@@ -11404,6 +11408,10 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
         /* Increment the expected sequence number */
         ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++;
     }
+
+    /* Taint the message so that it's easier to detect UAFs. */
+    PORT_Memset(b, 'N', length);
+
     return rv;
 }
 
@@ -11738,7 +11746,7 @@ ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
     }
 
     for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
-        unsigned int t = paddingLength - i;
+        t = paddingLength - i;
         /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
          * 0xff.  Otherwise, mask is 0. */
         unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
@@ -11878,6 +11886,7 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
     unsigned int good;
     unsigned int ivLen = 0;
     SSL3ContentType rType;
+    SSL3ProtocolVersion rVersion;
     unsigned int minLength;
     unsigned int originalLen = 0;
     PRUint8 headerBuf[13];
@@ -11950,7 +11959,9 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    rType = cText->type;
+    rType = (SSL3ContentType)cText->hdr[0];
+    rVersion = ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) |
+               (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2];
     if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
         /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the
          * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general.
@@ -11960,8 +11971,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
             cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size -
             cipher_def->tag_size;
         rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
-            spec->epoch, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : spec->seqNum,
-            rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header);
+            spec->epoch, cText->seqNum,
+            rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header);
         PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
         rv = spec->aead(&spec->keyMaterial,
                         PR_TRUE,                /* do decrypt */
@@ -12008,8 +12019,8 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
 
         /* compute the MAC */
         rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
-            spec->epoch, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : spec->seqNum,
-            rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss),
+            spec->epoch, cText->seqNum,
+            rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss),
             plaintext->len - spec->macDef->mac_size, &header);
         PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
         if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
@@ -12059,13 +12070,19 @@ ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
-static SECStatus
+SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ContentType rType,
                               DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum,
                               sslBuffer *databuf)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
 
+    /* check for Token Presence */
+    if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 
     /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if
@@ -12111,15 +12128,16 @@ ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ContentType rType,
  * Returns NULL if no appropriate cipher spec is found.
  */
 static ssl3CipherSpec *
-ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, sslSequenceNumber seq)
+ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
     ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec = NULL;
-    DTLSEpoch epoch = seq >> 48;
+    DTLSEpoch epoch;
 
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
         return crSpec;
     }
+    epoch = dtls_ReadEpoch(crSpec, cText->hdr);
     if (crSpec->epoch == epoch) {
         return crSpec;
     }
@@ -12136,6 +12154,11 @@ ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, sslSequenceNumber seq)
     return NULL;
 }
 
+/* MAX_EXPANSION is the amount by which a record might plausibly be expanded
+ * when protected.  It's the worst case estimate, so the sum of block cipher
+ * padding (up to 256 octets) and HMAC (48 octets for SHA-384). */
+#define MAX_EXPANSION (256 + 48)
+
 /* if cText is non-null, then decipher and check the MAC of the
  * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
  * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
@@ -12159,16 +12182,16 @@ ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, sslSequenceNumber seq)
  * Application Data records.
  */
 SECStatus
-ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PRBool isTLS;
     DTLSEpoch epoch;
-    sslSequenceNumber seqNum = 0;
     ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL;
+    PRUint16 recordSizeLimit;
     PRBool outOfOrderSpec = PR_FALSE;
     SSL3ContentType rType;
-    sslBuffer *plaintext;
+    sslBuffer *plaintext = &ss->gs.buf;
     SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error;
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
 
@@ -12178,27 +12201,23 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX().
-     * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake
-     * message.
-     */
-    if (cText == NULL) {
-        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake",
-                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-        /* Note that this doesn't pass the epoch and sequence number of the
-         * record through, which DTLS 1.3 depends on.  DTLS doesn't support
-         * asynchronous certificate validation, so that should be OK. */
-        PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
-        return ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, content_handshake,
-                                             0, 0, databuf);
+    /* Clear out the buffer in case this exits early.  Any data then won't be
+     * processed twice. */
+    plaintext->len = 0;
+
+    /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted.
+     * Use the content type to tell whether this should be discarded. */
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr &&
+        cText->hdr[0] == content_application_data) {
+        PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello);
+        return SECSuccess;
     }
 
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/
-    spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText->seq_num);
+    spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText);
     if (!spec) {
         PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
-        databuf->len = 0;            /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     if (spec != ss->ssl3.crSpec) {
@@ -12209,66 +12228,68 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
     }
     isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
-        if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &seqNum)) {
+        if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &cText->seqNum)) {
             ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
-            databuf->len = 0;            /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
-
             return SECSuccess;
         }
     } else {
-        seqNum = spec->seqNum + 1;
+        cText->seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum;
     }
-    if (seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) {
+    if (cText->seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) {
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
         SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
-                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seqNum));
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->seqNum));
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    plaintext = databuf;
-    plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by Unprotect call below. */
-
-    /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted.
-     * Use the content type to tell whether this is should be discarded.
-     *
-     * XXX If we decide to remove the content type from encrypted records, this
-     *     will become much more difficult to manage. */
-    if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr &&
-        cText->type == content_application_data) {
+    recordSizeLimit = spec->recordSizeLimit;
+    if (cText->buf->len > recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION) {
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
-        PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello);
-        databuf->len = 0;
-        return SECSuccess;
+        SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+        return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) {
-        rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048);
+    if (plaintext->space < recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************/
             SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
-                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048));
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION));
             /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
             /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
             return SECFailure;
         }
     }
 
+    /* Most record types aside from protected TLS 1.3 records carry the content
+     * type in the first octet. TLS 1.3 will override this value later. */
+    rType = cText->hdr[0];
+    /* Encrypted application data records could arrive before the handshake
+     * completes in DTLS 1.3. These can look like valid TLS 1.2 application_data
+     * records in epoch 0, which is never valid. Pretend they didn't decrypt. */
+    if (spec->epoch == 0 && rType == content_application_data) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
+        alert = unexpected_message;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    } else {
 #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
-    rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
-                     plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len);
+        rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+                         plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len);
 #else
-    /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts
-     * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they
-     * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */
-    if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
-        spec->cipherDef->calg == ssl_calg_null) {
-        /* Unencrypted TLS 1.3 records use the pre-TLS 1.3 format. */
-        rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert);
-    } else {
-        rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert);
-    }
+        /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts
+         * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they
+         * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */
+        if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+            spec->epoch == 0) {
+            rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert);
+        } else {
+            rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &rType,
+                                       &alert);
+        }
 #endif
+    }
 
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
@@ -12276,39 +12297,45 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
         SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 
         /* Ensure that we don't process this data again. */
-        databuf->len = 0;
+        plaintext->len = 0;
 
-        /* Ignore a CCS if the alternative handshake is negotiated.  Note that
-         * this will fail if the server fails to negotiate the alternative
-         * handshake type in a 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that
-         * did negotiate it.  We don't care about that corner case right now. */
+        /* Ignore a CCS if compatibility mode is negotiated.  Note that this
+         * will fail if the server fails to negotiate compatibility mode in a
+         * 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that did negotiate it.
+         * We don't care about that corner case right now. */
         if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
-            cText->type == content_change_cipher_spec &&
+            cText->hdr[0] == content_change_cipher_spec &&
             ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
             cText->buf->len == 1 &&
             cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) {
             /* Ignore the CCS. */
             return SECSuccess;
         }
+
         if (IS_DTLS(ss) ||
             (ss->sec.isServer &&
              ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) {
-            /* Silently drop the packet */
+            /* Silently drop the packet unless we sent a fatal alert. */
+            if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
             return SECSuccess;
-        } else {
-            int errCode = PORT_GetError();
-            SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert);
-            /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called
-             * PORT_SetError(). */
-            PORT_SetError(errCode);
-            return SECFailure;
         }
+
+        int errCode = PORT_GetError();
+        SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert);
+        /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called
+         * PORT_SetError(). */
+        PORT_SetError(errCode);
+        return SECFailure;
     }
 
     /* SECSuccess */
-    spec->seqNum = PR_MAX(spec->seqNum, seqNum);
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
-        dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, seqNum);
+        dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, cText->seqNum);
+        spec->nextSeqNum = PR_MAX(spec->nextSeqNum, cText->seqNum + 1);
+    } else {
+        ++spec->nextSeqNum;
     }
     epoch = spec->epoch;
 
@@ -12317,19 +12344,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
     /*
      * The decrypted data is now in plaintext.
      */
-    rType = cText->type; /* This must go after decryption because TLS 1.3
-                          * has encrypted content types. */
 
     /* IMPORTANT: We are in DTLS 1.3 mode and we have processed something
      * from the wrong epoch. Divert to a divert processing function to make
      * sure we don't accidentally use the data unsafely. */
     if (outOfOrderSpec) {
         PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
-        return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, databuf);
+        return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, plaintext);
     }
 
     /* Check the length of the plaintext. */
-    if (isTLS && databuf->len > MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) {
+    if (isTLS && plaintext->len > recordSizeLimit) {
+        plaintext->len = 0;
         SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
         return SECFailure;
@@ -12344,14 +12370,16 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
         if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
             ss->sec.isServer &&
             ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) {
-            return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, databuf);
+            return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, plaintext);
         }
+        plaintext->len = 0;
         (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    return ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, seqNum, databuf);
+    return ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, cText->seqNum,
+                                         plaintext);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c
index 913a14f63..f8b9a9400 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c
@@ -548,12 +548,14 @@ ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
     if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
         rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-            goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
+            errCode = PORT_GetError();
+            goto alert_loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */
         }
         rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme,
                                                  ss->sec.peerCert);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-            goto loser;
+            errCode = PORT_GetError();
+            goto alert_loser;
         }
         hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme);
     } else {
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c
index 5a5077998..9b6c719f8 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ static const ssl3ExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = {
     { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
     { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn },
     { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
-    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
     { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn },
     { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleUseSRTPXtn },
     { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn },
@@ -51,6 +50,7 @@ static const ssl3ExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = {
     { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn },
     { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn },
     { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn },
+    { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn },
     { 0, NULL }
 };
 
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static const ssl3ExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = {
     /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */
     { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn },
     { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
-    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
     { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn },
     { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleUseSRTPXtn },
     { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn },
@@ -70,6 +69,7 @@ static const ssl3ExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = {
     { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn },
     { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn },
     { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn },
+    { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn },
     { 0, NULL }
 };
 
@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ static const sslExtensionBuilder clientHelloSendersTLS[] =
       { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, &ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn },
       { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
       { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSessionTicketXtn },
-      { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn },
       { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn },
       { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendUseSRTPXtn },
       { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn },
@@ -137,6 +136,7 @@ static const sslExtensionBuilder clientHelloSendersTLS[] =
       { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_SendSigAlgsXtn },
       { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn },
       { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn },
+      { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn },
       /* The pre_shared_key extension MUST be last. */
       { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn },
       { 0, NULL }
@@ -183,7 +183,6 @@ static const struct {
     { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only },
     { ssl_tls13_ticket_early_data_info_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only },
     { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, ssl_ext_native },
-    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, ssl_ext_none },
     { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, ssl_ext_native }
 };
 
@@ -681,7 +680,11 @@ ssl_CallCustomExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf,
         }
     }
 
-    sslBuffer_Append(buf, tail.buf, tail.len);
+    rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, tail.buf, tail.len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser; /* Code already set. */
+    }
+
     sslBuffer_Clear(&tail);
     return SECSuccess;
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h
index d0f75a599..6d77c7459 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h
@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ struct TLSExtensionDataStr {
     /* The application token contains a value that was passed to the client via
      * a session ticket, or the cookie in a HelloRetryRequest. */
     SECItem applicationToken;
+
+    /* The record size limit set by the peer. Our value is kept in ss->opt. */
+    PRUint16 recordSizeLimit;
 };
 
 typedef struct TLSExtensionStr {
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c
index e6388945e..d1f286dc3 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c
@@ -242,33 +242,11 @@ ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(const sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *tag)
     return PR_FALSE;
 }
 
-/* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */
-SECStatus
-ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
-                                  SECItem *data)
-{
-    PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
-
-    if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) {
-        /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn;
-
-    /* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling
-     * ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the
-     * extension back to the client. */
-
-    return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-/* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none
+/* ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol checks that the given block of data is valid: none
  * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of
  * the block. */
 SECStatus
-ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length)
+ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length)
 {
     unsigned int offset = 0;
 
@@ -286,7 +264,7 @@ ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length)
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
-/* protocol selection handler for ALPN (server side) and NPN (client side) */
+/* Protocol selection handler for ALPN. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                        PRUint16 extension, SECItem *data)
@@ -295,7 +273,7 @@ ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
     unsigned char resultBuffer[255];
     SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 };
 
-    rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len);
+    rv = ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(data->data, data->len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
@@ -303,11 +281,13 @@ ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
     }
 
     PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback);
-    /* For ALPN, the cipher suite isn't selected yet.  Note that extensions
+    /* The cipher suite isn't selected yet.  Note that extensions
      * sometimes affect what cipher suite is selected, e.g., for ECC. */
     PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo &
                  ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite) ==
                 (ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite));
+    /* The callback has to make sure that either rv != SECSuccess or that result
+     * is not set if there is no common protocol. */
     rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len,
                                result.data, &result.len, sizeof(resultBuffer));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -320,21 +300,20 @@ ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
      * stack. */
     if (result.len > sizeof(resultBuffer)) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
-        /* TODO: crash */
+        PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE);
 
-    if (extension == ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn &&
-        xtnData->nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
-        /* The callback might say OK, but then it picks a default value - one
-         * that was not listed.  That's OK for NPN, but not ALPN. */
+    if (result.len < 1 || !result.data) {
+        /* Check that we actually got a result. */
         ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol);
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
+    xtnData->nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED;
     xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = extension;
     return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &result);
 }
@@ -356,7 +335,7 @@ ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    /* Unlike NPN, ALPN has extra redundant length information so that
+    /* ALPN has extra redundant length information so that
      * the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello. */
     rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess || count != data->len) {
@@ -389,39 +368,6 @@ ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
 }
 
 SECStatus
-ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
-                                  SECItem *data)
-{
-    PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
-    PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
-
-    if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) {
-        /* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what
-         * protocol to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate
-         * a different one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if
-         * we've negotiated NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake
-         * message. Thus, these two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the
-         * same connection. */
-        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    /* We should only get this call if we sent the extension, so
-     * ss->nextProtoCallback needs to be non-NULL.  However, it is possible
-     * that an application erroneously cleared the callback between the time
-     * we sent the ClientHello and now. */
-    if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
-        PORT_Assert(0);
-        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK);
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    return ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, data);
-}
-
-SECStatus
 ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                              SECItem *data)
 {
@@ -475,19 +421,6 @@ ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
 }
 
 SECStatus
-ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
-                                sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
-{
-    /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
-    if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) {
-        return SECSuccess;
-    }
-
-    *added = PR_TRUE;
-    return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-SECStatus
 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                            sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
 {
@@ -499,35 +432,15 @@ ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
         return SECSuccess;
     }
 
-    /* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
-     * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So move the
-     * first protocol to the end of the list. */
-
     if (len > 0) {
         /* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */
-        unsigned int i;
-
         rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, len, 2);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
         }
-
-        i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1;
-        if (i <= len) {
-            rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i);
-            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-                return SECFailure;
-            }
-            rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i);
-            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-                return SECFailure;
-            }
-        } else {
-            /* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */
-            rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
-            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-                return SECFailure;
-            }
+        rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
         }
     }
 
@@ -1955,3 +1868,67 @@ ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
 
     return SECSuccess;
 }
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                             SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRUint32 limit;
+    PRUint32 maxLimit = (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)
+                            ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)
+                            : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH;
+
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &limit, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (data->len != 0 || limit < 64) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+        rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn,
+                                          &ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure; /* error already set. */
+        }
+    } else if (limit > maxLimit) {
+        /* The client can sensibly check the maximum. */
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* We can't enforce the maximum on a server. But we do need to ensure
+     * that we don't apply a limit that is too large. */
+    xtnData->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(maxLimit, limit);
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_record_size_limit_xtn;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                           sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    PRUint32 maxLimit;
+    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+        maxLimit = (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)
+                       ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)
+                       : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH;
+    } else {
+        maxLimit = (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)
+                       ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)
+                       : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH;
+    }
+    PRUint32 limit = PR_MIN(ss->opt.recordSizeLimit, maxLimit);
+    SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, limit, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h
index b84bd074c..eaf7f0081 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h
@@ -119,4 +119,11 @@ SECStatus ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
 SECStatus ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
                                             TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
                                             sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);
+SECStatus ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                       TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                       SECItem *data);
+SECStatus ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                     TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
index 8b323bb05..5ea7cc249 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs)
                      * the length of the following encrypted data, and then
                      * read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */
                     gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4];
+                    gs->hdrLen = SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
                 } else {
                     /* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any
                      * security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get
@@ -264,8 +265,9 @@ static int
 dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
 {
     int nb;
-    int err;
-    int rv = 1;
+    PRUint8 contentType;
+    unsigned int headerLen;
+    SECStatus rv;
 
     SSL_TRC(30, ("dtls_GatherData"));
 
@@ -285,81 +287,97 @@ dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
         ** to 13 (the size of the record header).
         */
         if (gs->dtlsPacket.space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13) {
-            err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket,
-                                 MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13);
-            if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
-                return err;
+            rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket,
+                                MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return -1; /* Code already set. */
             }
         }
 
         /* recv() needs to read a full datagram at a time */
         nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, gs->dtlsPacket.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.space, flags);
-
         if (nb > 0) {
             PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", gs->dtlsPacket.buf, nb));
         } else if (nb == 0) {
             /* EOF */
             SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-            rv = 0;
-            return rv;
+            return 0;
         } else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
             SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
                      PR_GetError()));
-            rv = SECFailure;
-            return rv;
+            return -1;
         }
 
         gs->dtlsPacket.len = nb;
     }
 
+    contentType = gs->dtlsPacket.buf[gs->dtlsPacketOffset];
+    if (dtls_IsLongHeader(ss->version, contentType)) {
+        headerLen = 13;
+    } else if (contentType == content_application_data) {
+        headerLen = 7;
+    } else if ((contentType & 0xe0) == 0x20) {
+        headerLen = 2;
+    } else {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: invalid first octet (%d) for DTLS",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
+        gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
+        gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     /* At this point we should have >=1 complete records lined up in
      * dtlsPacket. Read off the header.
      */
-    if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < 13) {
+    if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < headerLen) {
         SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet "
                  "too short to contain header",
                  SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-        PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+        PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
         gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
         gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
-        rv = SECFailure;
-        return rv;
+        return -1;
     }
-    memcpy(gs->hdr, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, 13);
-    gs->dtlsPacketOffset += 13;
+    memcpy(gs->hdr, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
+           headerLen);
+    gs->hdrLen = headerLen;
+    gs->dtlsPacketOffset += headerLen;
 
     /* Have received SSL3 record header in gs->hdr. */
-    gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[11] << 8) | gs->hdr[12];
+    if (headerLen == 13) {
+        gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[11] << 8) | gs->hdr[12];
+    } else if (headerLen == 7) {
+        gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[5] << 8) | gs->hdr[6];
+    } else {
+        PORT_Assert(headerLen == 2);
+        gs->remainder = gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset;
+    }
 
     if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < gs->remainder) {
         SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet too short "
                  "to contain rest of body",
                  SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-        PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
+        PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
         gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
         gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
-        rv = SECFailure;
-        return rv;
+        return -1;
     }
 
     /* OK, we have at least one complete packet, copy into inbuf */
-    if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
-        err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
-        if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
-            return err;
-        }
+    gs->inbuf.len = 0;
+    rv = sslBuffer_Append(&gs->inbuf,
+                          SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
+                          gs->remainder);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return -1; /* code already set. */
     }
-
-    SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls gathered record type=%d len=%d",
-                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->hdr[0], gs->inbuf.len));
-
-    memcpy(gs->inbuf.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
-           gs->remainder);
-    gs->inbuf.len = gs->remainder;
     gs->offset = gs->remainder;
     gs->dtlsPacketOffset += gs->remainder;
     gs->state = GS_INIT;
 
+    SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls gathered record type=%d len=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType, gs->inbuf.len));
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -442,7 +460,11 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
              * We need to process it now before we overwrite it with the next
              * handshake record.
              */
-            rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf);
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: resuming handshake",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
+            rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, content_handshake,
+                                               0, 0, &ss->gs.buf);
         } else {
             /* State for SSLv2 client hello support. */
             ssl2Gather ssl2gs = { PR_FALSE, 0 };
@@ -495,20 +517,14 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
                  * If it's application data, ss->gs.buf will not be empty upon return.
                  * If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message,
                  * ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess.
+                 *
+                 * cText only needs to be valid for this next function call, so
+                 * it can borrow gs.hdr.
                  */
-                cText.type = (SSL3ContentType)ss->gs.hdr[0];
-                cText.version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
-
-                if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
-                    sslSequenceNumber seq_num;
-
-                    /* DTLS sequence number */
-                    PORT_Memcpy(&seq_num, &ss->gs.hdr[3], sizeof(seq_num));
-                    cText.seq_num = PR_ntohll(seq_num);
-                }
-
+                cText.hdr = ss->gs.hdr;
+                cText.hdrLen = ss->gs.hdrLen;
                 cText.buf = &ss->gs.inbuf;
-                rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText, &ss->gs.buf);
+                rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText);
             }
         }
         if (rv < 0) {
@@ -520,7 +536,6 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
              * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
              */
             PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
-            PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
             break;
         }
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h
index d1f46db97..8e6cf2745 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ typedef PRUint16 SSL3ProtocolVersion;
 /* The TLS 1.3 draft version. Used to avoid negotiating
  * between incompatible pre-standard TLS 1.3 drafts.
  * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Remove when TLS 1.3 is published. */
-#define TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION 23
+#define TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION 28
 
 typedef PRUint16 ssl3CipherSuite;
 /* The cipher suites are defined in sslproto.h */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c
index 6cd02e402..1c3ddb0e7 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c
@@ -256,7 +256,8 @@ ssl_PopulateKeyPair(sslServerCert *sc, sslKeyPair *keyPair)
 
         /* Get the size of the cert's public key, and remember it. */
         sc->serverKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->pubKey);
-        if (sc->serverKeyBits == 0) {
+        if (sc->serverKeyBits == 0 ||
+            (keyType == rsaKey && sc->serverKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS)) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
             return SECFailure;
         }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h
index b94d0cc62..518a2b887 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h
@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ typedef enum {
     SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 171),
     SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 172),
     SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 173),
+    SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 174),
+    SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 175),
     SSL_ERROR_END_OF_LIST   /* let the c compiler determine the value of this. */
 } SSLErrorCodes;
 #endif /* NO_SECURITY_ERROR_ENUM */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
index 10d0333d9..a2209e90a 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ typedef enum { SSLAppOpRead = 0,
 /* default number of entries in namedGroupPreferences */
 #define SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT 31
 
+/* The maximum DH and RSA bit-length supported. */
+#define SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS 8192
+#define SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS 8192
+
 /* Types and names of elliptic curves used in TLS */
 typedef enum {
     ec_type_explicitPrime = 1,      /* not supported */
@@ -232,6 +236,7 @@ typedef struct sslOptionsStr {
     /* If SSL_SetNextProtoNego has been called, then this contains the
      * list of supported protocols. */
     SECItem nextProtoNego;
+    PRUint16 recordSizeLimit;
 
     PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize;
     unsigned int useSecurity : 1;
@@ -251,7 +256,6 @@ typedef struct sslOptionsStr {
     unsigned int enableFalseStart : 1;
     unsigned int cbcRandomIV : 1;
     unsigned int enableOCSPStapling : 1;
-    unsigned int enableNPN : 1;
     unsigned int enableALPN : 1;
     unsigned int reuseServerECDHEKey : 1;
     unsigned int enableFallbackSCSV : 1;
@@ -261,6 +265,7 @@ typedef struct sslOptionsStr {
     unsigned int requireDHENamedGroups : 1;
     unsigned int enable0RttData : 1;
     unsigned int enableTls13CompatMode : 1;
+    unsigned int enableDtlsShortHeader : 1;
 } sslOptions;
 
 typedef enum { sslHandshakingUndetermined = 0,
@@ -325,9 +330,11 @@ struct sslGatherStr {
     ** than into buf or inbuf, while in the GS_HEADER state.
     ** The portion of the SSL record header put here always comes off the wire
     ** as plaintext, never ciphertext.
-    ** For SSL3/TLS, the plaintext portion is 5 bytes long. For DTLS it is 13.
+    ** For SSL3/TLS, the plaintext portion is 5 bytes long. For DTLS it
+    ** varies based on version and header type.
     */
     unsigned char hdr[13];
+    unsigned int hdrLen;
 
     /* Buffer for DTLS data read off the wire as a single datagram */
     sslBuffer dtlsPacket;
@@ -440,7 +447,7 @@ struct sslSessionIDStr {
             */
             SECItem signedCertTimestamps;
 
-            /* The NPN/ALPN value negotiated in the original connection.
+            /* The ALPN value negotiated in the original connection.
              * Used for TLS 1.3. */
             SECItem alpnSelection;
 
@@ -780,9 +787,13 @@ struct ssl3StateStr {
 #define IS_DTLS(ss) (ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram)
 
 typedef struct {
-    SSL3ContentType type;
-    SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
-    sslSequenceNumber seq_num; /* DTLS only */
+    /* |seqNum| eventually contains the reconstructed sequence number. */
+    sslSequenceNumber seqNum;
+    /* The header of the cipherText. */
+    const PRUint8 *hdr;
+    unsigned int hdrLen;
+
+    /* |buf| is the payload of the ciphertext. */
     sslBuffer *buf;
 } SSL3Ciphertext;
 
@@ -805,7 +816,7 @@ struct ssl3DHParamsStr {
 };
 
 typedef struct SSLWrappedSymWrappingKeyStr {
-    PRUint8 wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey[512];
+    PRUint8 wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey[SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS / 8];
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE symWrapMechanism;
     /* unwrapped symmetric wrapping key uses this mechanism */
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism;
@@ -1375,8 +1386,11 @@ SECStatus ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type);
 /*
  * input into the SSL3 machinery from the actualy network reading code
  */
-SECStatus ssl3_HandleRecord(
-    sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cipher, sslBuffer *out);
+SECStatus ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cipher);
+SECStatus ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ContentType rType,
+                                        DTLSEpoch epoch,
+                                        sslSequenceNumber seqNum,
+                                        sslBuffer *databuf);
 SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize);
 
 int ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags);
@@ -1537,8 +1551,8 @@ SECStatus ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeys(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *keyName,
                                  PK11SymKey **encKey, PK11SymKey **macKey);
 void ssl_ResetSelfEncryptKeys();
 
-extern SECStatus ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char *data,
-                                            unsigned int length);
+extern SECStatus ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(const unsigned char *data,
+                                          unsigned int length);
 
 /* Construct a new NSPR socket for the app to use */
 extern PRFileDesc *ssl_NewPRSocket(sslSocket *ss, PRFileDesc *fd);
@@ -1636,6 +1650,9 @@ SSLHashType ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
 KeyType ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
 
 SECStatus ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes);
+SECStatus ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+                                 SSL3ContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf,
+                                 PRBool *needsLength);
 
 /* Pull in DTLS functions */
 #include "dtlscon.h"
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
index f09ec067c..a1d389214 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ tls13_CheckKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection dir)
         spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
         margin = spec->cipherDef->max_records / 4;
     }
-    seqNum = spec->seqNum;
+    seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum;
     keyUpdate = seqNum > spec->cipherDef->max_records - margin;
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
     if (!keyUpdate) {
@@ -922,21 +922,30 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
      */
     if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
         PRBool allowEarlySend = PR_FALSE;
+        PRBool firstClientWrite = PR_FALSE;
 
         ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-        if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart ||
-            (ss->opt.enable0RttData && !ss->sec.isServer)) {
+        /* The client can sometimes send before the handshake is fully
+         * complete. In TLS 1.2: false start; in TLS 1.3: 0-RTT. */
+        if (!ss->sec.isServer &&
+            (ss->opt.enableFalseStart || ss->opt.enable0RttData)) {
             ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-            /* The client can sometimes send before the handshake is fully
-             * complete. In TLS 1.2: false start; in TLS 1.3: 0-RTT. */
             zeroRtt = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent ||
                       ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted;
             allowEarlySend = ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart || zeroRtt;
+            firstClientWrite = ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake;
             ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
         }
         if (!allowEarlySend && ss->handshake) {
             rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
         }
+        if (firstClientWrite) {
+            /* Wait until after sending ClientHello and double-check 0-RTT. */
+            ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+            zeroRtt = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent ||
+                      ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted;
+            ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        }
         ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     }
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
index e08d5e232..33595ffae 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static const sslSocketOps ssl_secure_ops = { /* SSL. */
 static sslOptions ssl_defaults = {
     .nextProtoNego = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 },
     .maxEarlyDataSize = 1 << 16,
+    .recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1,
     .useSecurity = PR_TRUE,
     .useSocks = PR_FALSE,
     .requestCertificate = PR_FALSE,
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ static sslOptions ssl_defaults = {
     .enableFalseStart = PR_FALSE,
     .cbcRandomIV = PR_TRUE,
     .enableOCSPStapling = PR_FALSE,
-    .enableNPN = PR_FALSE,
     .enableALPN = PR_TRUE,
     .reuseServerECDHEKey = PR_TRUE,
     .enableFallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE,
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ static sslOptions ssl_defaults = {
     .enableSignedCertTimestamps = PR_FALSE,
     .requireDHENamedGroups = PR_FALSE,
     .enable0RttData = PR_FALSE,
-    .enableTls13CompatMode = PR_FALSE
+    .enableTls13CompatMode = PR_FALSE,
+    .enableDtlsShortHeader = PR_FALSE
 };
 
 /*
@@ -803,10 +804,23 @@ SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRIntn val)
             ss->opt.enable0RttData = val;
             break;
 
+        case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
+            if (val < 64 || val > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                rv = SECFailure;
+            } else {
+                ss->opt.recordSizeLimit = val;
+            }
+            break;
+
         case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE:
             ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode = val;
             break;
 
+        case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER:
+            ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader = val;
+            break;
+
         default:
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
             rv = SECFailure;
@@ -914,7 +928,7 @@ SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal)
             val = ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling;
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
-            val = ss->opt.enableNPN;
+            val = PR_FALSE;
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN:
             val = ss->opt.enableALPN;
@@ -940,9 +954,15 @@ SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal)
         case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA:
             val = ss->opt.enable0RttData;
             break;
+        case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
+            val = ss->opt.recordSizeLimit;
+            break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE:
             val = ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode;
             break;
+        case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER:
+            val = ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader;
+            break;
         default:
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
             rv = SECFailure;
@@ -1037,7 +1057,7 @@ SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal)
             val = ssl_defaults.enableOCSPStapling;
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_NPN:
-            val = ssl_defaults.enableNPN;
+            val = PR_FALSE;
             break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN:
             val = ssl_defaults.enableALPN;
@@ -1060,9 +1080,15 @@ SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal)
         case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA:
             val = ssl_defaults.enable0RttData;
             break;
+        case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
+            val = ssl_defaults.recordSizeLimit;
+            break;
         case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE:
             val = ssl_defaults.enableTls13CompatMode;
             break;
+        case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER:
+            val = ssl_defaults.enableDtlsShortHeader;
+            break;
         default:
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
             rv = SECFailure;
@@ -1242,10 +1268,22 @@ SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIntn val)
             ssl_defaults.enable0RttData = val;
             break;
 
+        case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
+            if (val < 64 || val > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            ssl_defaults.recordSizeLimit = val;
+            break;
+
         case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE:
             ssl_defaults.enableTls13CompatMode = val;
             break;
 
+        case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER:
+            ssl_defaults.enableDtlsShortHeader = val;
+            break;
+
         default:
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
             return SECFailure;
@@ -1895,10 +1933,7 @@ DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd)
 }
 
 /* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback is used to select an application protocol
- * for ALPN and NPN.  For ALPN, this runs on the server; for NPN it
- * runs on the client. */
-/* Note: The ALPN version doesn't allow for the use of a default, setting a
- * status of SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP is treated as a failure. */
+ * for ALPN. */
 SECStatus
 SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLNextProtoCallback callback,
                          void *arg)
@@ -1919,7 +1954,7 @@ SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLNextProtoCallback callback,
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
-/* ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback is set as an ALPN/NPN callback when
+/* ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback is set as an ALPN callback when
  * SSL_SetNextProtoNego is used.
  */
 static SECStatus
@@ -1929,7 +1964,6 @@ ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
                           unsigned int protoMaxLen)
 {
     unsigned int i, j;
-    const unsigned char *result;
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
 
     if (!ss) {
@@ -1937,37 +1971,29 @@ ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
                  SSL_GETPID(), fd));
         return SECFailure;
     }
+    PORT_Assert(protoMaxLen <= 255);
+    if (protoMaxLen > 255) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
 
-    /* For each protocol in server preference, see if we support it. */
-    for (i = 0; i < protos_len;) {
-        for (j = 0; j < ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;) {
+    /* For each protocol in client preference, see if we support it. */
+    for (j = 0; j < ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;) {
+        for (i = 0; i < protos_len;) {
             if (protos[i] == ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j] &&
                 PORT_Memcmp(&protos[i + 1], &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j + 1],
                             protos[i]) == 0) {
                 /* We found a match. */
-                ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED;
-                result = &protos[i];
-                goto found;
+                const unsigned char *result = &protos[i];
+                memcpy(protoOut, result + 1, result[0]);
+                *protoOutLen = result[0];
+                return SECSuccess;
             }
-            j += 1 + (unsigned int)ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j];
+            i += 1 + (unsigned int)protos[i];
         }
-        i += 1 + (unsigned int)protos[i];
+        j += 1 + (unsigned int)ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j];
     }
 
-    /* The other side supports the extension, and either doesn't have any
-     * protocols configured, or none of its options match ours. In this case we
-     * request our favoured protocol. */
-    /* This will be treated as a failure for ALPN. */
-    ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP;
-    result = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data;
-
-found:
-    if (protoMaxLen < result[0]) {
-        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
-        return SECFailure;
-    }
-    memcpy(protoOut, result + 1, result[0]);
-    *protoOutLen = result[0];
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
@@ -1976,8 +2002,6 @@ SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd, const unsigned char *data,
                      unsigned int length)
 {
     sslSocket *ss;
-    SECStatus rv;
-    SECItem dataItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)data, length };
 
     ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
@@ -1986,17 +2010,22 @@ SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd, const unsigned char *data,
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    if (ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data, length) != SECSuccess)
+    if (ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(data, length) != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure;
+    }
 
+    /* NPN required that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
+     * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So move the
+     * first protocol to the end of the list. */
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->opt.nextProtoNego, PR_FALSE);
-    rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego, &dataItem);
+    SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego, length);
+    size_t firstLen = data[0] + 1;
+    /* firstLen <= length is ensured by ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol. */
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data + (length - firstLen), data, firstLen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, data + firstLen, length - firstLen);
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 
-    if (rv != SECSuccess)
-        return rv;
-
     return SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(fd, ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3034,26 +3063,27 @@ ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags)
                 } else { /* handshaking as server */
                     new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ;
                 }
-            } else
+            } else if (ss->lastWriteBlocked) {
                 /* First handshake is in progress */
-                if (ss->lastWriteBlocked) {
                 if (new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) {
                     /* The caller is waiting for data to be received,
                     ** but the initial handshake is blocked on write, or the
                     ** client's first handshake record has not been written.
                     ** The code should select on write, not read.
                     */
-                    new_flags ^= PR_POLL_READ;  /* don't select on read. */
+                    new_flags &= ~PR_POLL_READ; /* don't select on read. */
                     new_flags |= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* do    select on write. */
                 }
             } else if (new_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) {
                 /* The caller is trying to write, but the handshake is
                 ** blocked waiting for data to read, and the first
                 ** handshake has been sent.  So do NOT to poll on write
-                ** unless we did false start.
+                ** unless we did false start or we are doing 0-RTT.
                 */
-                if (!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
-                    new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
+                if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ||
+                      ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent ||
+                      ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)) {
+                    new_flags &= ~PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
                 }
                 new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do    select on read. */
             }
@@ -3093,6 +3123,9 @@ ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags)
         }
     }
 
+    SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl_Poll flags %x -> %x",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), fd, how_flags, new_flags));
+
     if (new_flags && (fd->lower->methods->poll != NULL)) {
         PRInt16 lower_out_flags = 0;
         PRInt16 lower_new_flags;
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c
index 26c3eb546..7833eeab6 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ ssl_CreateCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection direction)
     spec->refCt = 1;
     spec->version = ss->version;
     spec->direction = direction;
+    spec->recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH;
     SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: new %s spec %d ct=%d",
                  SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SPEC_DIR(spec), spec,
                  spec->refCt));
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h
index 729ac1006..b25601755 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h
@@ -162,12 +162,18 @@ struct ssl3CipherSpecStr {
 
     DTLSEpoch epoch;
     const char *phase;
-    sslSequenceNumber seqNum;
+
+    /* The next sequence number to be sent or received. */
+    sslSequenceNumber nextSeqNum;
     DTLSRecvdRecords recvdRecords;
 
     /* The number of 0-RTT bytes that can be sent or received in TLS 1.3. This
      * will be zero for everything but 0-RTT. */
     PRUint32 earlyDataRemaining;
+    /* The maximum plaintext length.  This differs from the configured or
+     * negotiated value for TLS 1.3; it is reduced by one to account for the
+     * content type octet. */
+    PRUint16 recordSizeLimit;
 };
 
 typedef void (*sslCipherSpecChangedFunc)(void *arg,
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h
index e2b80fb43..bb1bec7a3 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h
@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ typedef enum {
     ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn = 18,
     ssl_padding_xtn = 21,
     ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn = 23,
+    ssl_record_size_limit_xtn = 28,
     ssl_session_ticket_xtn = 35,
     /* 40 was used in draft versions of TLS 1.3; it is now reserved. */
     ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn = 41,
@@ -454,7 +455,7 @@ typedef enum {
 /* SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS includes the maximum number of extensions that are
  * supported for any single message type.  That is, a ClientHello; ServerHello
  * and TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket and HelloRetryRequest extensions have fewer. */
-#define SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS 20
+#define SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS 21
 
 /* Deprecated */
 typedef enum {
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
index c06acc83a..4d9170fb0 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ tls13_HandleKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, unsigned int length)
             /* Only send an update if we have sent with the current spec.  This
              * prevents us from being forced to crank forward pointlessly. */
             ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
-            sendUpdate = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->seqNum > 0;
+            sendUpdate = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum > 0;
             ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
         } else {
             sendUpdate = PR_TRUE;
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
             ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
             /* Increase the write sequence number.  The read sequence number
              * will be reset after this to early data or handshake. */
-            ss->ssl3.cwSpec->seqNum = 1;
+            ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum = 1;
             ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
         }
 
@@ -2007,7 +2007,7 @@ tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss,
 
     /* We depend on this being exactly one record and one message. */
     PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 &&
-                                 ss->ssl3.cwSpec->seqNum == 1));
+                                 ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum == 1));
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 
     ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE;
@@ -2209,6 +2209,8 @@ tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg,
     } else {
         PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none);
     }
+    /* Set the spec version, because we want to send CH now with 0303 */
+    tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
 
     /* Extensions must contain more than just supported_versions.  This will
      * ensure that a HelloRetryRequest isn't a no-op: we must have at least two
@@ -2248,6 +2250,7 @@ tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg,
             goto loser;
         }
     }
+
     rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_retry);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         goto loser;
@@ -3251,6 +3254,17 @@ tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
     }
 
     tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec);
+
+    /* The record size limit is reduced by one so that the remainder of the
+     * record handling code can use the same checks for all versions. */
+    if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) {
+        spec->recordSizeLimit = ((spec->direction == CipherSpecRead)
+                                     ? ss->opt.recordSizeLimit
+                                     : ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit) -
+                                1;
+    } else {
+        spec->recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH;
+    }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
@@ -3316,7 +3330,7 @@ tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch,
         return SECFailure;
     }
     spec->epoch = epoch;
-    spec->seqNum = 0;
+    spec->nextSeqNum = 0;
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
         dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
     }
@@ -3536,14 +3550,15 @@ tls13_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
     CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
     unsigned char nonce[12];
 
+    PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen > 8);
     memset(&gcmParams, 0, sizeof(gcmParams));
     gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
     gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
-    gcmParams.pAAD = NULL;
-    gcmParams.ulAADLen = 0;
+    gcmParams.pAAD = (PRUint8 *)(additionalData + 8);
+    gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen - 8;
     gcmParams.ulTagBits = 128; /* GCM measures tag length in bits. */
 
-    tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, additionalDataLen,
+    tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, 8,
                      nonce, sizeof(nonce));
     return tls13_AEAD(keys, doDecrypt, out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen,
                       CKM_AES_GCM,
@@ -3560,14 +3575,15 @@ tls13_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt,
     CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams;
     unsigned char nonce[12];
 
+    PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen > 8);
     memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams));
     aeadParams.pNonce = nonce;
     aeadParams.ulNonceLen = sizeof(nonce);
-    aeadParams.pAAD = NULL; /* No AAD in TLS 1.3. */
-    aeadParams.ulAADLen = 0;
+    aeadParams.pAAD = (PRUint8 *)(additionalData + 8);
+    aeadParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen - 8;
     aeadParams.ulTagLen = 16; /* The Poly1305 tag is 16 octets. */
 
-    tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, additionalDataLen,
+    tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, 8,
                      nonce, sizeof(nonce));
     return tls13_AEAD(keys, doDecrypt, out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen,
                       CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
@@ -3579,7 +3595,7 @@ tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PRUint32 innerLength;
-    SECItem oldNpn = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+    SECItem oldAlpn = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
@@ -3603,11 +3619,11 @@ tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    /* If we are doing 0-RTT, then we already have an NPN value. Stash
+    /* If we are doing 0-RTT, then we already have an ALPN value. Stash
      * it for comparison. */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent &&
         ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE) {
-        oldNpn = ss->xtnData.nextProto;
+        oldAlpn = ss->xtnData.nextProto;
         ss->xtnData.nextProto.data = NULL;
         ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT;
     }
@@ -3627,8 +3643,8 @@ tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
         ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted;
 
         /* Check that the server negotiated the same ALPN (if any). */
-        if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&oldNpn, &ss->xtnData.nextProto)) {
-            SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldNpn, PR_FALSE);
+        if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&oldAlpn, &ss->xtnData.nextProto)) {
+            SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE);
             FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID,
                         illegal_parameter);
             return SECFailure;
@@ -3650,7 +3666,7 @@ tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
                      ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored));
     }
 
-    SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldNpn, PR_FALSE);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE);
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk) {
         TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished);
     } else {
@@ -3815,13 +3831,14 @@ tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
 
     rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY);
+        FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, illegal_parameter);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
     rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, ss->sec.peerCert);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         /* Error set already */
+        FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme);
@@ -4740,7 +4757,8 @@ static const struct {
     { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, _M2(client_hello, hello_retry_request) },
     { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, _M1(certificate_request) },
     { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, _M3(client_hello, server_hello,
-                                            hello_retry_request) }
+                                            hello_retry_request) },
+    { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }
 };
 
 tls13ExtensionStatus
@@ -4780,19 +4798,20 @@ tls13_ExtensionStatus(PRUint16 extension, SSLHandshakeType message)
 #undef _M2
 #undef _M3
 
-/* TLS 1.3 doesn't actually have additional data but the aead function
- * signature overloads additional data to carry the record sequence
- * number and that's what we put here. The TLS 1.3 AEAD functions
- * just use this input as the sequence number and not as additional
- * data. */
+/* We cheat a bit on additional data because the AEAD interface
+ * which doesn't have room for the record number. The AAD we
+ * format is serialized record number followed by the true AD
+ * (i.e., the record header) plus the serialized record number. */
 static SECStatus
-tls13_FormatAdditionalData(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int length,
-                           DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum)
+tls13_FormatAdditionalData(
+    sslSocket *ss,
+    const PRUint8 *header, unsigned int headerLen,
+    DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum,
+    PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int *aadLength, unsigned int maxLength)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
-    sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(aad, length);
+    sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(aad, maxLength);
 
-    PORT_Assert(length == 8);
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
         rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, epoch, 2);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@@ -4803,6 +4822,14 @@ tls13_FormatAdditionalData(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int length,
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, header, headerLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *aadLength = buf.len;
+
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
@@ -4843,43 +4870,68 @@ tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
     PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == CipherSpecWrite);
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u",
                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase,
-                cwSpec->seqNum, contentLen));
+                cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen));
 
-    if (contentLen + 1 + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
+    if (contentLen + 1 + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
     /* Copy the data into the wrBuf. We're going to encrypt in-place
      * in the AEAD branch anyway */
-    PORT_Memcpy(wrBuf->buf, pIn, contentLen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen);
 
     if (cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) {
         /* Shortcut for plaintext */
-        wrBuf->len = contentLen;
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, contentLen, NULL);
+        PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
     } else {
-        PRUint8 aad[8];
+        PRUint8 hdr[13];
+        sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+        PRBool needsLength;
+        PRUint8 aad[21];
+        unsigned int aadLen;
+        int len;
+
         PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead);
 
         /* Add the content type at the end. */
-        wrBuf->buf[contentLen] = type;
+        *(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen) = type;
 
-        rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, aad, sizeof(aad), cwSpec->epoch,
-                                        cwSpec->seqNum);
+        /* Create the header (ugly that we have to do it twice). */
+        rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, content_application_data,
+                                    &buf, &needsLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        if (needsLength) {
+            rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, contentLen + 1 +
+                                                  cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size,
+                                        2);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+        }
+        rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf),
+                                        cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum,
+                                        aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad));
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return SECFailure;
         }
         rv = cwSpec->aead(&cwSpec->keyMaterial,
-                          PR_FALSE,                   /* do encrypt */
-                          wrBuf->buf,                 /* output  */
-                          (int *)&wrBuf->len,         /* out len */
-                          wrBuf->space,               /* max out */
-                          wrBuf->buf, contentLen + 1, /* input   */
-                          aad, sizeof(aad));
+                          PR_FALSE,                /* do encrypt */
+                          SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),  /* output  */
+                          &len,                    /* out len */
+                          SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), /* max out */
+                          SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),  /* input */
+                          contentLen + 1,          /* input len */
+                          aad, aadLen);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
             return SECFailure;
         }
+        rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+        PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
     }
 
     return SECSuccess;
@@ -4897,25 +4949,22 @@ tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
 SECStatus
 tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
                       ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
-                      SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext,
+                      SSL3Ciphertext *cText,
+                      sslBuffer *plaintext,
+                      SSL3ContentType *innerType,
                       SSL3AlertDescription *alert)
 {
     const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef;
-    sslSequenceNumber seqNum;
-    PRUint8 aad[8];
+    PRUint8 aad[21];
+    unsigned int aadLen;
     SECStatus rv;
 
     *alert = bad_record_mac; /* Default alert for most issues. */
 
     PORT_Assert(spec->direction == CipherSpecRead);
-    if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
-        seqNum = cText->seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MASK;
-    } else {
-        seqNum = spec->seqNum;
-    }
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u",
-                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase, seqNum,
-                cText->buf->len));
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase,
+                cText->seqNum, cText->buf->len));
 
     /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
      * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
@@ -4927,28 +4976,38 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    /* Verify that the content type is right, even though we overwrite it. */
-    if (cText->type != content_application_data) {
+    /* Verify that the content type is right, even though we overwrite it.
+     * Also allow the DTLS short header in TLS 1.3. */
+    if (!(cText->hdr[0] == content_application_data ||
+          (IS_DTLS(ss) &&
+           ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+           (cText->hdr[0] & 0xe0) == 0x20))) {
         SSL_TRC(3,
-                ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior content type=%d",
-                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type));
+                ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0]));
         /* Do we need a better error here? */
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
-    /* Check the version number in the record. */
-    if (cText->version != spec->recordVersion) {
-        /* Do we need a better error here? */
-        SSL_TRC(3,
-                ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version",
-                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-        return SECFailure;
+    /* Check the version number in the record. Stream only. */
+    if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+        SSL3ProtocolVersion version =
+            ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) |
+            (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2];
+        if (version != spec->recordVersion) {
+            /* Do we need a better error here? */
+            SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version",
+                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
     }
 
     /* Decrypt */
     PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead);
-    rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, aad, sizeof(aad), spec->epoch, seqNum);
+    rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, cText->hdr, cText->hdrLen,
+                                    spec->epoch, cText->seqNum,
+                                    aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
@@ -4959,7 +5018,7 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
                     plaintext->space,       /* maxout */
                     cText->buf->buf,        /* in */
                     cText->buf->len,        /* inlen */
-                    aad, sizeof(aad));
+                    aad, aadLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         SSL_TRC(3,
                 ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC",
@@ -4968,6 +5027,16 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
+    /* There is a similar test in ssl3_HandleRecord, but this test is needed to
+     * account for padding.  It's safe to do this here (including the alert),
+     * because it only confirms that the record exceeded the size limit, which
+     * is apparent from the size of the ciphertext. */
+    if (plaintext->len > spec->recordSizeLimit + 1) {
+        SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
     /* The record is right-padded with 0s, followed by the true
      * content type, so read from the right until we receive a
      * nonzero byte. */
@@ -4977,9 +5046,7 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
 
     /* Bogus padding. */
     if (plaintext->len < 1) {
-        SSL_TRC(3,
-                ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record",
-                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type));
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
         /* It's safe to report this specifically because it happened
          * after the MAC has been verified. */
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
@@ -4987,12 +5054,12 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
     }
 
     /* Record the type. */
-    cText->type = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+    *innerType = (SSL3ContentType)plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
     --plaintext->len;
 
     /* Check that we haven't received too much 0-RTT data. */
     if (spec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData &&
-        cText->type == content_application_data) {
+        *innerType == content_application_data) {
         if (plaintext->len > spec->earlyDataRemaining) {
             *alert = unexpected_message;
             PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
@@ -5002,9 +5069,8 @@ tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
     }
 
     SSL_TRC(10,
-            ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d type=%d",
-             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),
-             plaintext->len, cText->type));
+            ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d",
+             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), plaintext->len, *innerType));
 
     return SECSuccess;
 }
@@ -5227,6 +5293,58 @@ tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version)
     return (PRUint16)version;
 }
 
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint32 temp;
+    SSL3ProtocolVersion v;
+    TLSExtension *versionExtension;
+    SECItem it;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* Update the version based on the extension, as necessary. */
+    versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
+    if (!versionExtension) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* Struct copy so we don't damage the extension. */
+    it = versionExtension->data;
+
+    rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &it.data, &it.len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (it.len) {
+        FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+
+    /* You cannot negotiate < TLS 1.3 with supported_versions. */
+    if (v < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
+    if (temp == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (temp == tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
+        v = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+    } else {
+        v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+    }
+#else
+    v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+#endif
+
+    ss->version = v;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
 /* Pick the highest version we support that is also advertised. */
 SECStatus
 tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, const TLSExtension *supportedVersions)
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h
index 1aaffb651..f35b20023 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef enum {
 SECStatus tls13_UnprotectRecord(
     sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
     SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext,
+    SSL3ContentType *innerType,
     SSL3AlertDescription *alert);
 
 #if defined(WIN32)
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ PRInt32 tls13_Read0RttData(sslSocket *ss, void *buf, PRInt32 len);
 SECStatus tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf);
 PRBool tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid);
 PRUint16 tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version);
+SECStatus tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(sslSocket *ss);
 SECStatus tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss,
                                  const TLSExtension *supported_versions);
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c
index 899f23827..1ab8a8e59 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c
@@ -860,12 +860,12 @@ tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
     }
 
     if (xtnData->cookie.len == 0) {
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
         return SECFailure;
     }
 
     if (data->len) {
-        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
         return SECFailure;
     }