/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "SandboxFilter.h" #include "SandboxFilterUtil.h" #include "SandboxBrokerClient.h" #include "SandboxInfo.h" #include "SandboxInternal.h" #include "SandboxLogging.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl.h" #include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_seccomp.h" #include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h" using namespace sandbox::bpf_dsl; #define CASES SANDBOX_BPF_DSL_CASES // Fill in defines in case of old headers. // (Warning: these are wrong on PA-RISC.) #ifndef MADV_NOHUGEPAGE #define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 15 #endif #ifndef MADV_DONTDUMP #define MADV_DONTDUMP 16 #endif // Added in Linux 4.5; see bug 1303813. #ifndef MADV_FREE #define MADV_FREE 8 #endif #ifndef PR_SET_PTRACER #define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61 #endif // To avoid visual confusion between "ifdef ANDROID" and "ifndef ANDROID": #ifndef ANDROID #define DESKTOP #endif // This file defines the seccomp-bpf system call filter policies. // See also SandboxFilterUtil.h, for the CASES_FOR_* macros and // SandboxFilterBase::Evaluate{Socket,Ipc}Call. // // One important difference from how Chromium bpf_dsl filters are // normally interpreted: returning -ENOSYS from a Trap() handler // indicates an unexpected system call; SigSysHandler() in Sandbox.cpp // will detect this, request a crash dump, and terminate the process. // This does not apply to using Error(ENOSYS) in the policy, so that // can be used if returning an actual ENOSYS is needed. namespace mozilla { // This class whitelists everything used by the sandbox itself, by the // core IPC code, by the crash reporter, or other core code. class SandboxPolicyCommon : public SandboxPolicyBase { protected: typedef const sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& ArgsRef; static intptr_t BlockedSyscallTrap(ArgsRef aArgs, void *aux) { MOZ_ASSERT(!aux); return -ENOSYS; } private: #if defined(ANDROID) && ANDROID_VERSION < 16 // Bug 1093893: Translate tkill to tgkill for pthread_kill; fixed in // bionic commit 10c8ce59a (in JB and up; API level 16 = Android 4.1). static intptr_t TKillCompatTrap(const sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& aArgs, void *aux) { return syscall(__NR_tgkill, getpid(), aArgs.args[0], aArgs.args[1]); } #endif static intptr_t SetNoNewPrivsTrap(ArgsRef& aArgs, void* aux) { if (gSetSandboxFilter == nullptr) { // Called after BroadcastSetThreadSandbox finished, therefore // not our doing and not expected. return BlockedSyscallTrap(aArgs, nullptr); } // Signal that the filter is already in place. return -ETXTBSY; } public: virtual ResultExpr InvalidSyscall() const override { return Trap(BlockedSyscallTrap, nullptr); } virtual ResultExpr ClonePolicy(ResultExpr failPolicy) const { // Allow use for simple thread creation (pthread_create) only. // WARNING: s390 and cris pass the flags in the second arg -- see // CLONE_BACKWARDS2 in arch/Kconfig in the kernel source -- but we // don't support seccomp-bpf on those archs yet. Arg flags(0); // The glibc source hasn't changed the thread creation clone flags // since 2004, so this *should* be safe to hard-code. Bionic's // value has changed a few times, and has converged on the same one // as glibc; allow any of them. static const int flags_common = CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM; static const int flags_modern = flags_common | CLONE_SETTLS | CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID; // Can't use CASES here because its decltype magic infers const // int instead of regular int and bizarre voluminous errors issue // forth from the depths of the standard library implementation. return Switch(flags) #ifdef ANDROID .Case(flags_common | CLONE_DETACHED, Allow()) // <= JB 4.2 .Case(flags_common, Allow()) // JB 4.3 or KK 4.4 #endif .Case(flags_modern, Allow()) // Android L or glibc .Default(failPolicy); } virtual ResultExpr PrctlPolicy() const { // Note: this will probably need PR_SET_VMA if/when it's used on // Android without being overridden by an allow-all policy, and // the constant will need to be defined locally. Arg op(0); return Switch(op) .CASES((PR_GET_SECCOMP, // BroadcastSetThreadSandbox, etc. PR_SET_NAME, // Thread creation PR_SET_DUMPABLE, // Crash reporting PR_SET_PTRACER), // Debug-mode crash handling Allow()) .Default(InvalidSyscall()); } virtual Maybe EvaluateSocketCall(int aCall) const override { switch (aCall) { case SYS_RECVMSG: case SYS_SENDMSG: return Some(Allow()); default: return Nothing(); } } virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const override { switch (sysno) { // Timekeeping case __NR_clock_gettime: { Arg clk_id(0); return If(clk_id == CLOCK_MONOTONIC, Allow()) #ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE .ElseIf(clk_id == CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE, Allow()) #endif .ElseIf(clk_id == CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, Allow()) .ElseIf(clk_id == CLOCK_REALTIME, Allow()) #ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE .ElseIf(clk_id == CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE, Allow()) #endif .ElseIf(clk_id == CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, Allow()) .Else(InvalidSyscall()); } case __NR_gettimeofday: #ifdef __NR_time case __NR_time: #endif case __NR_nanosleep: return Allow(); // Thread synchronization case __NR_futex: // FIXME: This could be more restrictive.... return Allow(); // Asynchronous I/O case __NR_epoll_wait: case __NR_epoll_pwait: case __NR_epoll_ctl: case __NR_ppoll: case __NR_poll: return Allow(); // Used when requesting a crash dump. case __NR_pipe: return Allow(); // Metadata of opened files CASES_FOR_fstat: return Allow(); // Simple I/O case __NR_write: case __NR_read: case __NR_readv: case __NR_writev: // see SandboxLogging.cpp CASES_FOR_lseek: return Allow(); // Memory mapping CASES_FOR_mmap: case __NR_munmap: return Allow(); // Signal handling #if defined(ANDROID) || defined(MOZ_ASAN) case __NR_sigaltstack: #endif CASES_FOR_sigreturn: CASES_FOR_sigprocmask: CASES_FOR_sigaction: return Allow(); // Send signals within the process (raise(), profiling, etc.) case __NR_tgkill: { Arg tgid(0); return If(tgid == getpid(), Allow()) .Else(InvalidSyscall()); } #if defined(ANDROID) && ANDROID_VERSION < 16 // Polyfill with tgkill; see above. case __NR_tkill: return Trap(TKillCompatTrap, nullptr); #endif // Yield case __NR_sched_yield: return Allow(); // Thread creation. case __NR_clone: return ClonePolicy(InvalidSyscall()); // More thread creation. #ifdef __NR_set_robust_list case __NR_set_robust_list: return Allow(); #endif #ifdef ANDROID case __NR_set_tid_address: return Allow(); #endif // prctl case __NR_prctl: { if (SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kHasSeccompTSync)) { return PrctlPolicy(); } Arg option(0); return If(option == PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, Trap(SetNoNewPrivsTrap, nullptr)) .Else(PrctlPolicy()); } // NSPR can call this when creating a thread, but it will accept a // polite "no". case __NR_getpriority: // But if thread creation races with sandbox startup, that call // could succeed, and then we get one of these: case __NR_setpriority: return Error(EACCES); // Stack bounds are obtained via pthread_getattr_np, which calls // this but doesn't actually need it: case __NR_sched_getaffinity: return Error(ENOSYS); // Read own pid/tid. case __NR_getpid: case __NR_gettid: return Allow(); // Discard capabilities case __NR_close: return Allow(); // Machine-dependent stuff #ifdef __arm__ case __ARM_NR_breakpoint: case __ARM_NR_cacheflush: case __ARM_NR_usr26: // FIXME: do we actually need this? case __ARM_NR_usr32: case __ARM_NR_set_tls: return Allow(); #endif // Needed when being debugged: case __NR_restart_syscall: return Allow(); // Terminate threads or the process case __NR_exit: case __NR_exit_group: return Allow(); #ifdef MOZ_ASAN // ASAN's error reporter wants to know if stderr is a tty. case __NR_ioctl: { Arg fd(0); return If(fd == STDERR_FILENO, Allow()) .Else(InvalidSyscall()); } // ...and before compiler-rt r209773, it will call readlink on // /proc/self/exe and use the cached value only if that fails: case __NR_readlink: case __NR_readlinkat: return Error(ENOENT); // ...and if it found an external symbolizer, it will try to run it: // (See also bug 1081242 comment #7.) CASES_FOR_stat: return Error(ENOENT); #endif default: return SandboxPolicyBase::EvaluateSyscall(sysno); } } }; // The process-type-specific syscall rules start here: #ifdef MOZ_GMP_SANDBOX // Unlike for content, the GeckoMediaPlugin seccomp-bpf policy needs // to be an effective sandbox by itself, because we allow GMP on Linux // systems where that's the only sandboxing mechanism we can use. // // Be especially careful about what this policy allows. class GMPSandboxPolicy : public SandboxPolicyCommon { static intptr_t OpenTrap(const sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& aArgs, void* aux) { auto plugin = static_cast(aux); const char* path; int flags; switch (aArgs.nr) { #ifdef __NR_open case __NR_open: path = reinterpret_cast(aArgs.args[0]); flags = static_cast(aArgs.args[1]); break; #endif case __NR_openat: // The path has to be absolute to match the pre-opened file (see // assertion in ctor) so the dirfd argument is ignored. path = reinterpret_cast(aArgs.args[1]); flags = static_cast(aArgs.args[2]); break; default: MOZ_CRASH("unexpected syscall number"); } if (strcmp(path, plugin->mPath) != 0) { SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("attempt to open file %s (flags=0%o) which is not the" " media plugin %s", path, flags, plugin->mPath); return -EPERM; } if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) { SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("non-read-only open of file %s attempted (flags=0%o)", path, flags); return -EPERM; } int fd = plugin->mFd.exchange(-1); if (fd < 0) { SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("multiple opens of media plugin file unimplemented"); return -ENOSYS; } return fd; } static intptr_t SchedTrap(const sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& aArgs, void* aux) { const pid_t tid = syscall(__NR_gettid); if (aArgs.args[0] == static_cast(tid)) { return syscall(aArgs.nr, 0, aArgs.args[1], aArgs.args[2], aArgs.args[3], aArgs.args[4], aArgs.args[5]); } SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("unsupported tid in SchedTrap"); return BlockedSyscallTrap(aArgs, nullptr); } SandboxOpenedFile* mPlugin; public: explicit GMPSandboxPolicy(SandboxOpenedFile* aPlugin) : mPlugin(aPlugin) { MOZ_ASSERT(aPlugin->mPath[0] == '/', "plugin path should be absolute"); } virtual ~GMPSandboxPolicy() { } virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const override { switch (sysno) { // Simulate opening the plugin file. #ifdef __NR_open case __NR_open: #endif case __NR_openat: return Trap(OpenTrap, mPlugin); // ipc::Shmem case __NR_mprotect: return Allow(); case __NR_madvise: { Arg advice(2); return If(advice == MADV_DONTNEED, Allow()) .ElseIf(advice == MADV_FREE, Allow()) #ifdef MOZ_ASAN .ElseIf(advice == MADV_NOHUGEPAGE, Allow()) .ElseIf(advice == MADV_DONTDUMP, Allow()) #endif .Else(InvalidSyscall()); } case __NR_brk: CASES_FOR_geteuid: return Allow(); case __NR_sched_getparam: case __NR_sched_getscheduler: case __NR_sched_get_priority_min: case __NR_sched_get_priority_max: case __NR_sched_setscheduler: { Arg pid(0); return If(pid == 0, Allow()) .Else(Trap(SchedTrap, nullptr)); } // For clock(3) on older glibcs; bug 1304220. case __NR_times: return Allow(); default: return SandboxPolicyCommon::EvaluateSyscall(sysno); } } }; UniquePtr GetMediaSandboxPolicy(SandboxOpenedFile* aPlugin) { return UniquePtr(new GMPSandboxPolicy(aPlugin)); } #endif // MOZ_GMP_SANDBOX }