From f1a0f0a56fdd0fc39f255174ce08c06b91c66c94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wolfbeast Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 11:04:39 +0100 Subject: Update NSS to 3.35-RTM --- security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c') diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c index cf6f4cb33..20404f4da 100644 --- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ /* * Gather (Read) entire SSL3 records from socket into buffer. * @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); if (gs->state == GS_INIT) { gs->state = GS_HEADER; - gs->remainder = ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders ? 2 : 5; + gs->remainder = 5; gs->offset = 0; gs->writeOffset = 0; gs->readOffset = 0; @@ -156,19 +157,7 @@ ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs) /* Should have a non-SSLv2 record header in gs->hdr. Extract * the length of the following encrypted data, and then * read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { - PRUint16 len = (gs->hdr[0] << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; - if (!(len & 0x8000)) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: incorrectly formatted header")); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); - gs->state = GS_INIT; - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); - return SECFailure; - } - gs->remainder = len & ~0x8000; - } else { - gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4]; - } + gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4]; } else { /* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any * security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get @@ -361,6 +350,9 @@ dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags) } } + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls gathered record type=%d len=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->hdr[0], gs->inbuf.len)); + memcpy(gs->inbuf.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, gs->remainder); gs->inbuf.len = gs->remainder; @@ -394,7 +386,8 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags) SSL3Ciphertext cText; PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE; - SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake")); + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake, * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the @@ -405,9 +398,12 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags) do { PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE; + PRBool processingEarlyData; ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + processingEarlyData = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted; + /* Without this, we may end up wrongly reporting * SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_* errors if we receive any records from the * peer while we are waiting to be restarted. @@ -493,18 +489,12 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags) * If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message, * ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { - cText.type = content_application_data; - cText.version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; - } else { - cText.type = (SSL3ContentType)ss->gs.hdr[0]; - cText.version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2]; - } + cText.type = (SSL3ContentType)ss->gs.hdr[0]; + cText.version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2]; if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { sslSequenceNumber seq_num; - cText.version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(cText.version); /* DTLS sequence number */ PORT_Memcpy(&seq_num, &ss->gs.hdr[3], sizeof(seq_num)); cText.seq_num = PR_ntohll(seq_num); @@ -555,12 +545,22 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags) } else { ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; } + } else if (processingEarlyData && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_done && + !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) { + /* If we were processing early data and we are no longer, then force + * the handshake to block. This ensures that early data is + * delivered to the application before the handshake completes. */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECWouldBlock; } ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); } while (keepGoing); - /* Service the DTLS timer so that the holddown timer eventually fires. */ - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Service the DTLS timer so that the post-handshake timers + * fire. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) { dtls_CheckTimer(ss); } ss->gs.readOffset = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3