From 5335681cd2ab05ad47e81be7722c9eee19d54065 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: adeshkp Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2019 06:20:31 -0500 Subject: Telemetry: Remove stubs and related code --- security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp | 47 --------------------------------- 1 file changed, 47 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp') diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp index b8f1b0eb7..dda936d8c 100644 --- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp +++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" -#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h" #include "mozilla/Unused.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" @@ -1072,37 +1071,6 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart) return SECSuccess; } -static void -AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits) -{ - unsigned int value = bits < 512 ? 1 : bits == 512 ? 2 - : bits < 768 ? 3 : bits == 768 ? 4 - : bits < 1024 ? 5 : bits == 1024 ? 6 - : bits < 1280 ? 7 : bits == 1280 ? 8 - : bits < 1536 ? 9 : bits == 1536 ? 10 - : bits < 2048 ? 11 : bits == 2048 ? 12 - : bits < 3072 ? 13 : bits == 3072 ? 14 - : bits < 4096 ? 15 : bits == 4096 ? 16 - : bits < 8192 ? 17 : bits == 8192 ? 18 - : bits < 16384 ? 19 : bits == 16384 ? 20 - : 0; -} - -// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In -// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available. -// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves -// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple -// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on -// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674. -static void -AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::ID probe, uint32_t bits) -{ - unsigned int value = bits == 256 ? 23 // P-256 - : bits == 384 ? 24 // P-384 - : bits == 521 ? 25 // P-521 - : 0; // Unknown -} - // In the case of session resumption, the AuthCertificate hook has been bypassed // (because we've previously successfully connected to our peer). That being the // case, we unfortunately don't know if the peer's server certificate verified @@ -1216,11 +1184,6 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)); MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); if (rv == SECSuccess) { - // Get the protocol version for telemetry - // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2 - unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF; - MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0); - SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo; rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo, sizeof cipherInfo); @@ -1231,16 +1194,10 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) { switch (channelInfo.keaType) { case ssl_kea_rsa: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; case ssl_kea_dh: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; case ssl_kea_ecdh: - AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL, - channelInfo.keaKeyBits); break; default: MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA"); @@ -1252,12 +1209,8 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) { switch (channelInfo.authType) { case ssl_auth_rsa: case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: - AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL, - channelInfo.authKeyBits); break; case ssl_auth_ecdsa: - AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL, - channelInfo.authKeyBits); break; default: MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm"); -- cgit v1.2.3