From 7c759805d0fe7e8f9a3b9f188ae9ed7b3b49eb30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: janekptacijarabaci Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 23:53:22 +0200 Subject: Bug 1359204 - Do not query nested URI within CheckChannel in ContentSecurityManager --- dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'dom/security') diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index 70e574445..c6558fc93 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h" #include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h" #include "nsIURIFixup.h" -#include "nsINestedURI.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Element.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h" @@ -657,12 +656,6 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel) if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT || contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) { - // query the nested URI for security checks like in the case of view-source - nsCOMPtr nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri); - if (nestedURI) { - nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); - } - // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can // perform proper security checks. -- cgit v1.2.3