From 95c46082414632687e3ddd52435d476ab9dc320f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 20:38:02 +0200
Subject: Bug 1329288: Allow content policy consumers to identify contentPolicy
 checks from docshell

---
 docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp                | 14 +++++++++++++-
 dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp               |  5 +++--
 toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js | 10 ++++++++++
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index f3db4a3cb..b1fcc5c23 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
 #include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
 #include "nsStructuredCloneContainer.h"
 #include "nsIStructuredCloneContainer.h"
+#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
 #ifdef MOZ_PLACES
 #include "nsIFaviconService.h"
 #include "mozIPlacesPendingOperation.h"
@@ -9931,13 +9932,24 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
 #endif
     }
 
+    // Since Content Policy checks are performed within docShell as well as
+    // the ContentSecurityManager we need a reliable way to let certain
+    // nsIContentPolicy consumers ignore duplicate calls. Let's use the 'extra'
+    // argument to pass a specific identifier.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsString> extraStr =
+      do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_STRING_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(msg, "conPolCheckFromDocShell");
+    rv = extraStr->SetData(msg);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
     int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
     rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(contentType,
                                    aURI,
                                    aTriggeringPrincipal,
                                    requestingContext,
                                    EmptyCString(),  // mime guess
-                                   nullptr,  // extra
+                                   extraStr,  // extra
                                    &shouldLoad);
 
     if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
index a7517f65e..979bd915f 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
@@ -171,9 +171,10 @@ nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
     }
   }
 
-  // aExtra is only non-null if the channel got redirected.
-  bool wasRedirected = (aExtra != nullptr);
+  // aExtra holds the original URI of the channel if the
+  // channel got redirected (until we fix Bug 1332422).
   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI = do_QueryInterface(aExtra);
+  bool wasRedirected = originalURI;
 
   bool permitted = permitsInternal(dir,
                                    aContentLocation,
diff --git a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
index 219675e5b..f044a1cd4 100644
--- a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
+++ b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ var ContentPolicy = {
 
   shouldLoad(policyType, contentLocation, requestOrigin,
              node, mimeTypeGuess, extra, requestPrincipal) {
+
+    // Loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT perform a ConPol check
+    // within docshell as well as within the ContentSecurityManager. To avoid
+    // duplicate evaluations we ignore ConPol checks performed within docShell.
+    if (extra instanceof Ci.nsISupportsString) {
+      if (extra.data === "conPolCheckFromDocShell") {
+        return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+      }
+    }
+
     if (requestPrincipal &&
         Services.scriptSecurityManager.isSystemPrincipal(requestPrincipal)) {
       return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
-- 
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