From 1b4c4256ee7705724b02919b4d432b2a391bcd04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 18:51:38 +0200
Subject: moebius#223: Consider blocking top level window data: URIs (part 1/3
without tests)
https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/223
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 16 +++-
docshell/base/nsDocShell.h | 1 +
.../en-US/chrome/security/security.properties | 3 +
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h | 5 ++
dom/security/test/general/browser.ini | 5 ++
.../browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js | 54 +++++++++++++
.../file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html | 14 ++++
.../file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html | 29 +++++++
.../file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html | 13 ++++
.../general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs | 14 ++++
.../general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html | 10 +++
.../general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs | 14 ++++
dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini | 12 +++
.../test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html | 39 ++++++++++
.../test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html | 41 ++++++++++
.../test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html | 51 ++++++++++++
.../test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++
dom/security/test/moz.build | 1 +
modules/libpref/init/all.js | 6 ++
netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp | 10 +++
netwerk/base/nsIOService.h | 4 +
22 files changed, 515 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index 58c182cbb..ae97a7c9e 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include "nsArray.h"
#include "nsArrayUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsICaptivePortalService.h"
#include "nsIDOMStorage.h"
#include "nsIContentViewer.h"
@@ -9884,6 +9885,15 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
contentType = nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT;
}
+ if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
+ aURI,
+ contentType,
+ aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ (aLoadType == LOAD_NORMAL_EXTERNAL))) {
+ // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
// If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new window,
// perform a content policy check before creating the window.
if (!targetDocShell) {
@@ -10232,8 +10242,11 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
}
}
+ bool loadFromExternal = false;
+
// Before going any further vet loads initiated by external programs.
if (aLoadType == LOAD_NORMAL_EXTERNAL) {
+ loadFromExternal = true;
// Disallow external chrome: loads targetted at content windows
bool isChrome = false;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome)) && isChrome) {
@@ -10724,7 +10737,7 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsINetworkPredictor::PREDICT_LOAD, this, nullptr);
nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
- rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, aReferrer,
+ rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, loadFromExternal, aReferrer,
!(aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_DONT_SEND_REFERRER),
aReferrerPolicy,
aTriggeringPrincipal, principalToInherit, aTypeHint,
@@ -10804,6 +10817,7 @@ nsresult
nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
bool aLoadReplace,
+ bool aLoadFromExternal,
nsIURI* aReferrerURI,
bool aSendReferrer,
uint32_t aReferrerPolicy,
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
index 3ca9e0b34..549d7f540 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ protected:
nsresult DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
bool aLoadReplace,
+ bool aLoadFromExternal,
nsIURI* aReferrer,
bool aSendReferrer,
uint32_t aReferrerPolicy,
diff --git a/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties b/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties
index 8b66cc265..c0b80996c 100644
--- a/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties
+++ b/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties
@@ -81,3 +81,6 @@ MimeTypeMismatch=The resource from “%1$S” was blocked due to MIME type misma
XCTOHeaderValueMissing=X-Content-Type-Options header warning: value was “%1$S”; did you mean to send “nosniff”?
BlockScriptWithWrongMimeType=Script from “%1$S” was blocked because of a disallowed MIME type.
+
+# LOCALIZATION NOTE: Do not translate "data: URI".
+BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation=Navigation to toplevel data: URI not allowed (Blocked loading of: “%1$S”)
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index c4e1ed8e1..069e7d6a7 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsIOService.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
@@ -15,6 +18,66 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
nsIContentSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink)
+/* static */ bool
+nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
+ nsIURI* aURI,
+ nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ bool aLoadFromExternal)
+{
+ // Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
+ // In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
+ // data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a codeBasePrincipal, or
+ // a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into
+ // the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal;
+ // we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming
+ // from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load
+ // using a codeBasePrincipal, but we want to block those loads.
+ if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (aContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ bool isDataURI =
+ (NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
+ if (!isDataURI) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ // Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs
+ nsAutoCString filePath;
+ aURI->GetFilePath(filePath);
+ if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) &&
+ !StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/svg+xml"))) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ // Whitelist data: PDFs and JSON
+ if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/pdf")) ||
+ StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"))) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (!aLoadFromExternal &&
+ nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ nsAutoCString dataSpec;
+ aURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
+ if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
+ dataSpec.Truncate(50);
+ dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
+ }
+ NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
+ const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
+ nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+ NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
+ // no doc available, log to browser console
+ nullptr,
+ nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+ "BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
+ params, ArrayLength(params));
+ return false;
+}
+
static nsresult
ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
@@ -478,6 +541,27 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
}
}
+ // Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we pass
+ // a NullPrincipal as the TriggeringPrincipal to
+ // AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI() which definitely blocks any
+ // data: URI load.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> newLoadInfo = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+ if (newLoadInfo) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullTriggeringPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
+ if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
+ uri,
+ newLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(),
+ nullTriggeringPrincipal,
+ false)) {
+ // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
+ aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+ return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+ }
+ }
+
// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
// given URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
index 912c0e89f..09b6c86aa 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ public:
static nsresult doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener);
+ static bool AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIURI* aURI,
+ nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ bool aLoadFromExternal);
+
private:
static nsresult CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..97ddae3bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+[browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js]
+support-files =
+ file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
+ file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a13a6350e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* eslint-disable mozilla/no-arbitrary-setTimeout */
+
+"use strict";
+
+const kDataBody = "toplevel navigation to data: URI allowed";
+const kDataURI = "data:text/html,<body>" + kDataBody + "</body>";
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath)
+ .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com")
+const kRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs";
+const kMetaRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html";
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri() {
+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+ });
+ await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(kDataURI, async function(browser) {
+ await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {kDataBody}, async function({kDataBody}) { // eslint-disable-line
+ is(content.document.body.innerHTML, kDataBody,
+ "data: URI navigation from system should be allowed");
+ });
+ });
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_redirect() {
+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+ });
+ let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kRedirectURI);
+ registerCleanupFunction(async function() {
+ await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+ });
+ // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked
+ await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+ await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() {
+ is(content.document.body.innerHTML, "",
+ "data: URI navigation after server redirect should be blocked");
+ });
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_meta_redirect() {
+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+ });
+ let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kMetaRedirectURI);
+ registerCleanupFunction(async function() {
+ await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+ });
+ // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked
+ await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+ await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() {
+ is(content.document.body.innerHTML, "",
+ "data: URI navigation after meta redirect should be blocked");
+ });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fbfdfdef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test1: clicking data: URI tries to navigate window<br/>
+<a id="testlink" href="data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>">click me</a>
+<script>
+ document.getElementById('testlink').click();
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e0308e1ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test2: data: URI in iframe tries to window.open(data:, _blank);<br/>
+<iframe id="testFrame" src=""></iframe>
+<script>
+ let DATA_URI = `data:text/html,<body><script>
+ var win = window.open("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>", "_blank");
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ var result = win.document.body.innerHTML === "" ? "blocked" : "navigated";
+ parent.postMessage(result, "*");
+ win.close();
+ }, 1000);
+ <\/script></body>`;
+
+ window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+ function receiveMessage(event) {
+ window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+ // propagate the information back to the caller
+ window.opener.postMessage(event.data, "*");
+ }
+ document.getElementById('testFrame').src = DATA_URI;
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..34aeddab3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test3: performing data: URI navigation through win.loc.href<br/>
+<script>
+ window.location.href = "data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64e294cab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect
+
+var DATA_URI =
+ "<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response)
+{
+ // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+ response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+ response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+ response.setHeader("Location", "data:text/html," + escape(DATA_URI), false);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f4f5deb52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+<head>
+ <meta http-equiv="refresh"
+ content="0; url='data:text/html,<body>toplevel meta redirect to data: URI should be blocked</body>'">
+</head>
+<body>
+Meta Redirect to data: URI
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..501b833e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect
+
+var DATA_URI =
+ "data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response)
+{
+ // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+ response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+ response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+ response.setHeader("Location", DATA_URI, false);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini
index 70c0c9fb6..f3bcca072 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini
@@ -3,7 +3,19 @@ support-files =
file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs
file_nosniff_testserver.sjs
file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs
+ file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
+ file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
+ file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
+ file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
[test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html]
[test_nosniff.html]
[test_block_script_wrong_mime.html]
+[test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # intermittent failure
+[test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # intermittent failure
+[test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android'
+[test_allow_opening_data_json.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1530a24e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Bug 1403814: Allow toplevel data URI navigation data:application/json</title>
+ <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function test_toplevel_data_json() {
+ const DATA_JSON = "data:application/json,{'my_json_key':'my_json_value'}";
+
+ let win = window.open(DATA_JSON);
+ let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win);
+
+ // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the JSON has loaded or not using some
+ // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that
+ // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure.
+ var jsonLoaded = setInterval(function() {
+ if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/json")) {
+ clearInterval(jsonLoaded);
+ ok(true, "navigating to data:application/json allowed");
+ wrappedWin.close();
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ }
+ }, 200);
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]]
+}, test_toplevel_data_json);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b51fe57b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Bug 1398692: Allow toplevel navigation to a data:application/pdf</title>
+ <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function test_toplevel_data_pdf() {
+ // The PDF contains one page and it is a 3/72" square, the minimum allowed by the spec
+ const DATA_PDF =
+ "data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjANCjEgMCBvYmo8PC9UeXBlL0NhdGFsb2cvUGFnZXMgMiAwIFI+PmVuZG9iaiAyIDAgb2JqPDwvVHlwZS9QYWdlcy9LaWRzWzMgMCBSXS9Db3VudCAxPj5lbmRvYmogMyAwIG9iajw8L1R5cGUvUGFnZS9NZWRpYUJveFswIDAgMyAzXT4+ZW5kb2JqDQp4cmVmDQowIDQNCjAwMDAwMDAwMDAgNjU1MzUgZg0KMDAwMDAwMDAxMCAwMDAwMCBuDQowMDAwMDAwMDUzIDAwMDAwIG4NCjAwMDAwMDAxMDIgMDAwMDAgbg0KdHJhaWxlcjw8L1NpemUgNC9Sb290IDEgMCBSPj4NCnN0YXJ0eHJlZg0KMTQ5DQolRU9G";
+
+ let win = window.open(DATA_PDF);
+ let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win);
+
+ // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the PDF has loaded or not using some
+ // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that
+ // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure.
+ var pdfLoaded = setInterval(function() {
+ if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/pdf")) {
+ clearInterval(pdfLoaded);
+ ok(true, "navigating to data:application/pdf allowed");
+ wrappedWin.close();
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ }
+ }, 200);
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]]
+}, test_toplevel_data_pdf);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2b8f62760
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Bug 1396798: Do not block toplevel data: navigation to image (except svgs)</title>
+ <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true);
+SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => {
+ SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations");
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that top level data:image loading is blocked/allowed");
+
+function test_toplevel_data_image() {
+ const DATA_PNG =
+ "";
+ let win1 = window.open(DATA_PNG);
+ let wrappedWin1 = SpecialPowers.wrap(win1);
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ let images = wrappedWin1.document.getElementsByTagName('img');
+ is(images.length, 1, "Loading data:image/png should be allowed");
+ is(images[0].src, DATA_PNG, "Sanity: img src matches");
+ wrappedWin1.close();
+ test_toplevel_data_image_svg();
+ }, 1000);
+}
+
+function test_toplevel_data_image_svg() {
+ const DATA_SVG =
+ "";
+ let win2 = window.open(DATA_SVG);
+ let wrappedWin2 = SpecialPowers.wrap(win2);
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ isnot(wrappedWin2.document.documentElement.localName, "svg",
+ "Loading data:image/svg+xml should be blocked");
+ wrappedWin2.close();
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ }, 1000);
+}
+
+// fire up the tests
+test_toplevel_data_image();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc91f2ec0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Bug 1331351 - Block top level window data: URI navigations</title>
+ <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+ <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true);
+SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => {
+ SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations");
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that top level data: URI navgiation is blocked");
+
+function test1() {
+ // simple data: URI click navigation should be prevented
+ let TEST_FILE = "file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html";
+ let win1 = window.open(TEST_FILE);
+ var readyStateCheckInterval = setInterval(function() {
+ let state = win1.document.readyState;
+ if (state === "interactive" || state === "complete") {
+ clearInterval(readyStateCheckInterval);
+ ok(win1.document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test1:") !== -1,
+ "toplevel data: URI navigation through click() should be blocked");
+ win1.close();
+ test2();
+ }
+ }, 200);
+}
+
+function test2() {
+ // data: URI in iframe which opens data: URI in _blank should be blocked
+ let win2 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html");
+ window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+ function receiveMessage(event) {
+ window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+ is(event.data, "blocked",
+ "data: URI navigation using _blank from data: URI should be blocked");
+ win2.close();
+ test3();
+ }
+}
+
+function test3() {
+ // navigating to a data: URI using window.location.href should be blocked
+ let win3 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html");
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ ok(win3.document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test3:") !== -1,
+ "data: URI navigation through win.loc.href should be blocked");
+ win3.close();
+ test4();
+ }, 1000);
+}
+
+function test4() {
+ // navigating to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked
+ let win4 = window.open("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>");
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ // Please note that the data: URI will be displayed in the URL-Bar but not
+ // loaded, hence we rather rely on document.body than document.location
+ is(win4.document.body.innerHTML, "",
+ "navigating to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked");
+ test5();
+ }, 1000);
+}
+
+function test5() {
+ // navigating to a URI which redirects to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked
+ let win5 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs");
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ // Please note that the data: URI will be displayed in the URL-Bar but not
+ // loaded, hence we rather rely on document.body than document.location
+ is(SpecialPowers.wrap(win5).document.body.innerHTML, "",
+ "navigating to URI which redirects to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked");
+ win5.close();
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ }, 1000);
+}
+
+// fire up the tests
+test1();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/moz.build b/dom/security/test/moz.build
index ddb4e9b89..946959dee 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/moz.build
+++ b/dom/security/test/moz.build
@@ -27,5 +27,6 @@ MOCHITEST_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [
BROWSER_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [
'contentverifier/browser.ini',
'csp/browser.ini',
+ 'general/browser.ini',
'hsts/browser.ini',
]
diff --git a/modules/libpref/init/all.js b/modules/libpref/init/all.js
index 182de4a11..ccc59269b 100644
--- a/modules/libpref/init/all.js
+++ b/modules/libpref/init/all.js
@@ -5564,6 +5564,12 @@ pref("security.mixed_content.use_hsts", true);
// Approximately 1 week default cache for HSTS priming failures
pref ("security.mixed_content.hsts_priming_cache_timeout", 10080);
+// TODO: Bug 1380959: Block toplevel data: URI navigations
+// If true, all toplevel data: URI navigations will be blocked.
+// Please note that manually entering a data: URI in the
+// URL-Bar will not be blocked when flipping this pref.
+pref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", false);
+
// Disable Storage api in release builds.
#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD
pref("dom.storageManager.enabled", true);
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp
index 0da79c18a..8b7f31f99 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp
@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ uint32_t nsIOService::gDefaultSegmentCount = 24;
bool nsIOService::sTelemetryEnabled = false;
+bool nsIOService::sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations = false;
+
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
nsIOService::nsIOService()
@@ -251,6 +253,8 @@ nsIOService::Init()
NS_WARNING("failed to get observer service");
Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sTelemetryEnabled, "toolkit.telemetry.enabled", false);
+ Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations,
+ "security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", false);
Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&mOfflineMirrorsConnectivity, OFFLINE_MIRRORS_CONNECTIVITY, true);
gIOService = this;
@@ -1876,5 +1880,11 @@ nsIOService::SpeculativeAnonymousConnect2(nsIURI *aURI,
return SpeculativeConnectInternal(aURI, aPrincipal, aCallbacks, true);
}
+/*static*/ bool
+nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()
+{
+ return sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations;
+}
+
} // namespace net
} // namespace mozilla
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h
index 7ac23b791..e592c4d1c 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ public:
bool IsLinkUp();
+ static bool BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations();
+
// Used to trigger a recheck of the captive portal status
nsresult RecheckCaptivePortal();
private:
@@ -176,6 +178,8 @@ private:
static bool sTelemetryEnabled;
+ static bool sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations;
+
// These timestamps are needed for collecting telemetry on PR_Connect,
// PR_ConnectContinue and PR_Close blocking time. If we spend very long
// time in any of these functions we want to know if and what network
--
cgit v1.2.3
From f1e5578718ea8883438cfea06d3c55d25f5c0278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 19:03:22 +0200
Subject: moebius#226: Consider blocking top level window data: URIs (part 2/2
without tests)
https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/226
---
docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp | 9 ++++
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 10 +---
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 59 +++++++++-------------
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h | 5 +-
dom/security/test/general/browser.ini | 6 +++
.../test/general/browser_test_data_download.js | 37 ++++++++++++++
.../test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js | 37 ++++++++++++++
dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html | 14 +++++
dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html | 14 +++++
.../test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html | 18 ++++---
.../test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html | 16 +++---
ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp | 2 +
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp | 23 +++++++++
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h | 2 +
netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl | 7 +++
netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh | 1 +
16 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp
index 93ce3cb26..ee6a4dd62 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsError.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
@@ -93,6 +94,14 @@ nsDSURIContentListener::DoContent(const nsACString& aContentType,
if (aOpenedChannel) {
aOpenedChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
+
+ // block top-level data URI navigations if triggered by the web
+ if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(aOpenedChannel)) {
+ // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
+ aRequest->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+ *aAbortProcess = true;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
}
if (loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_RETARGETED_DOCUMENT_URI) {
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index ae97a7c9e..596bd5d84 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -9885,15 +9885,6 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
contentType = nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT;
}
- if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
- aURI,
- contentType,
- aTriggeringPrincipal,
- (aLoadType == LOAD_NORMAL_EXTERNAL))) {
- // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
- return NS_OK;
- }
-
// If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new window,
// perform a content policy check before creating the window.
if (!targetDocShell) {
@@ -10962,6 +10953,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
if (aPrincipalToInherit) {
loadInfo->SetPrincipalToInherit(aPrincipalToInherit);
}
+ loadInfo->SetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(aLoadFromExternal);
// We have to do this in case our OriginAttributes are different from the
// OriginAttributes of the parent document. Or in case there isn't a
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 069e7d6a7..c987fed67 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -10,20 +10,16 @@
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
-#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
nsIContentSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink)
/* static */ bool
-nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
- nsIURI* aURI,
- nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
- bool aLoadFromExternal)
+nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
// Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
// In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
@@ -36,17 +32,24 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) {
return true;
}
- if (aContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+ if (!loadInfo) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return true;
}
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
bool isDataURI =
- (NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
+ (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
// Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs
nsAutoCString filePath;
- aURI->GetFilePath(filePath);
+ uri->GetFilePath(filePath);
if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) &&
!StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/svg+xml"))) {
return true;
@@ -56,22 +59,29 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"))) {
return true;
}
- if (!aLoadFromExternal &&
- nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)) {
+ // Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make
+ // sure the RedirectChain is empty.
+ if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
+ nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) &&
+ loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
- aURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
+ uri->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
+ nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad());
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc;
+ if (tabChild) {
+ doc = static_cast<mozilla::dom::TabChild*>(tabChild.get())->GetDocument();
+ }
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
- // no doc available, log to browser console
- nullptr,
+ doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
params, ArrayLength(params));
@@ -541,27 +551,6 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
}
}
- // Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we pass
- // a NullPrincipal as the TriggeringPrincipal to
- // AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI() which definitely blocks any
- // data: URI load.
- nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> newLoadInfo = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo();
- if (newLoadInfo) {
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
- nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullTriggeringPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
- if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
- uri,
- newLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(),
- nullTriggeringPrincipal,
- false)) {
- // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
- aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
- return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
- }
- }
-
// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
// given URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
index 09b6c86aa..bab847743 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
@@ -32,10 +32,7 @@ public:
static nsresult doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener);
- static bool AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIURI* aURI,
- nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
- bool aLoadFromExternal);
+ static bool AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel);
private:
static nsresult CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
index 97ddae3bf..73ae72ddd 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
@@ -3,3 +3,9 @@
support-files =
file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
+[browser_test_data_download.js]
+support-files =
+ file_data_download.html
+[browser_test_data_text_csv.js]
+support-files =
+ file_data_text_csv.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ee8d5844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath)
+ .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com")
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_download.html";
+
+function addWindowListener(aURL, aCallback) {
+ Services.wm.addListener({
+ onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) {
+ info("window opened, waiting for focus");
+ Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+ var domwindow = aXULWindow.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIInterfaceRequestor)
+ .getInterface(Ci.nsIDOMWindow);
+ waitForFocus(function() {
+ is(domwindow.document.location.href, aURL, "should have seen the right window open");
+ aCallback(domwindow);
+ }, domwindow);
+ },
+ onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) { },
+ onWindowTitleChange(aXULWindow, aNewTitle) { }
+ });
+}
+
+function test() {
+ waitForExplicitFinish();
+ Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true);
+ registerCleanupFunction(function() {
+ Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations");
+ });
+ addWindowListener("chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xul", function(win) {
+ is(win.document.getElementById("location").value, "data-foo.html",
+ "file name of download should match");
+ win.close();
+ finish();
+ });
+ gBrowser.loadURI(kTestURI);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c45e40cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath)
+ .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com")
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_text_csv.html";
+
+function addWindowListener(aURL, aCallback) {
+ Services.wm.addListener({
+ onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) {
+ info("window opened, waiting for focus");
+ Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+ var domwindow = aXULWindow.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIInterfaceRequestor)
+ .getInterface(Ci.nsIDOMWindow);
+ waitForFocus(function() {
+ is(domwindow.document.location.href, aURL, "should have seen the right window open");
+ aCallback(domwindow);
+ }, domwindow);
+ },
+ onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) { },
+ onWindowTitleChange(aXULWindow, aNewTitle) { }
+ });
+}
+
+function test() {
+ waitForExplicitFinish();
+ Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true);
+ registerCleanupFunction(function() {
+ Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations");
+ });
+ addWindowListener("chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xul", function(win) {
+ is(win.document.getElementById("location").value, "text/csv;foo,bar,foobar",
+ "file name of download should match");
+ win.close();
+ finish();
+ });
+ gBrowser.loadURI(kTestURI);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cc92fe8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <title>Test download attribute for data: URI</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+ <a href="data:text/html,<body>data download</body>" download="data-foo.html" id="testlink">download data</a>
+ <script>
+ // click the link to have the downoad panel appear
+ let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+ testlink.click();
+ </script>
+ </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9ac369d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <title>Test open data:text/csv</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+ <a href="data:text/csv;foo,bar,foobar" id="testlink">test text/csv</a>
+ <script>
+ // click the link to have the downoad panel appear
+ let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+ testlink.click();
+ </script>
+ </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
index 2b8f62760..7f8dfc748 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
@@ -34,15 +34,17 @@ function test_toplevel_data_image_svg() {
const DATA_SVG =
"";
let win2 = window.open(DATA_SVG);
- let wrappedWin2 = SpecialPowers.wrap(win2);
- setTimeout(function () {
- isnot(wrappedWin2.document.documentElement.localName, "svg",
- "Loading data:image/svg+xml should be blocked");
- wrappedWin2.close();
- SimpleTest.finish();
- }, 1000);
+ // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the window was closed using some event,
+ // hence we are constantly polling till we see that win == null.
+ // Test times out on failure.
+ var win2Closed = setInterval(function() {
+ if (win2 == null || win2.closed) {
+ clearInterval(win2Closed);
+ ok(true, "Loading data:image/svg+xml should be blocked");
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ }
+ }, 200);
}
-
// fire up the tests
test_toplevel_data_image();
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
index fc91f2ec0..cef232b65 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
@@ -21,16 +21,12 @@ function test1() {
// simple data: URI click navigation should be prevented
let TEST_FILE = "file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html";
let win1 = window.open(TEST_FILE);
- var readyStateCheckInterval = setInterval(function() {
- let state = win1.document.readyState;
- if (state === "interactive" || state === "complete") {
- clearInterval(readyStateCheckInterval);
- ok(win1.document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test1:") !== -1,
- "toplevel data: URI navigation through click() should be blocked");
- win1.close();
- test2();
- }
- }, 200);
+ setTimeout(function () {
+ ok(SpecialPowers.wrap(win1).document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test1:") !== -1,
+ "toplevel data: URI navigation through click() should be blocked");
+ win1.close();
+ test2();
+ }, 1000);
}
function test2() {
diff --git a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
index b335f5c23..4cfbe8758 100644
--- a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
+++ b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ LoadInfoToLoadInfoArgs(nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo,
aLoadInfo->CorsUnsafeHeaders(),
aLoadInfo->GetForcePreflight(),
aLoadInfo->GetIsPreflight(),
+ aLoadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(),
aLoadInfo->GetForceHSTSPriming(),
aLoadInfo->GetMixedContentWouldBlock());
@@ -370,6 +371,7 @@ LoadInfoArgsToLoadInfo(const OptionalLoadInfoArgs& aOptionalLoadInfoArgs,
loadInfoArgs.corsUnsafeHeaders(),
loadInfoArgs.forcePreflight(),
loadInfoArgs.isPreflight(),
+ loadInfoArgs.loadTriggeredFromExternal(),
loadInfoArgs.forceHSTSPriming(),
loadInfoArgs.mixedContentWouldBlock()
);
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
index 42fdea4a1..2f10261cb 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ToJSValue.h"
#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
#include "nsFrameLoader.h"
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false)
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
+ , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(false)
, mForceHSTSPriming(false)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(false)
{
@@ -235,6 +237,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false) // NB: TYPE_DOCUMENT implies not third-party.
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
+ , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(false)
, mForceHSTSPriming(false)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(false)
{
@@ -297,6 +300,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs)
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(rhs.mCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(rhs.mForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(rhs.mIsPreflight)
+ , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(rhs.mLoadTriggeredFromExternal)
, mForceHSTSPriming(rhs.mForceHSTSPriming)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(rhs.mMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
@@ -325,6 +329,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aCorsUnsafeHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight,
bool aIsPreflight,
+ bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal,
bool aForceHSTSPriming,
bool aMixedContentWouldBlock)
: mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingPrincipal)
@@ -348,6 +353,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(aCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(aForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(aIsPreflight)
+ , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(aLoadTriggeredFromExternal)
, mForceHSTSPriming (aForceHSTSPriming)
, mMixedContentWouldBlock(aMixedContentWouldBlock)
{
@@ -872,6 +878,23 @@ LoadInfo::GetIsPreflight(bool* aIsPreflight)
return NS_OK;
}
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+LoadInfo::SetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!aLoadTriggeredFromExternal ||
+ mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "can only set load triggered from external for TYPE_DOCUMENT");
+ mLoadTriggeredFromExternal = aLoadTriggeredFromExternal;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+LoadInfo::GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(bool* aLoadTriggeredFromExternal)
+{
+ *aLoadTriggeredFromExternal = mLoadTriggeredFromExternal;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceHSTSPriming(bool* aForceHSTSPriming)
{
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
index 3e1b92ff4..99deae2d2 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ private:
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aUnsafeHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight,
bool aIsPreflight,
+ bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal,
bool aForceHSTSPriming,
bool aMixedContentWouldBlock);
LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs);
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ private:
nsTArray<nsCString> mCorsUnsafeHeaders;
bool mForcePreflight;
bool mIsPreflight;
+ bool mLoadTriggeredFromExternal;
bool mForceHSTSPriming : 1;
bool mMixedContentWouldBlock : 1;
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
index 78433c8b8..5b5eb425a 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
@@ -574,6 +574,13 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone;
+ /**
+ * Returns true if the load was triggered from an external application
+ * (e.g. Thunderbird). Please note that this flag will only ever be true
+ * if the load is of TYPE_DOCUMENT.
+ */
+ [infallible] attribute boolean loadTriggeredFromExternal;
+
/**
* Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the principal of the
* channel [before the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo,
diff --git a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
index 9365397d1..e1438cacc 100644
--- a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
+++ b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct LoadInfoArgs
nsCString[] corsUnsafeHeaders;
bool forcePreflight;
bool isPreflight;
+ bool loadTriggeredFromExternal;
bool forceHSTSPriming;
bool mixedContentWouldBlock;
};
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 660d01438a6a29ebd43f592ac7d6df2dad6a6962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 20:28:18 +0200
Subject: moebius#230: Consider blocking top level window data: URIs (part 3/3
without tests)
https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/230
---
application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js | 3 ++-
.../palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js | 5 ++++
browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js | 3 ++-
browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js | 5 ++++
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 17 +++++++++++-
docshell/base/nsDocShell.h | 1 +
docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp | 15 +++++++++++
docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h | 1 +
docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl | 3 +++
docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl | 6 +++++
docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl | 6 +++++
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 4 +++
dom/security/test/general/browser.ini | 3 +++
.../browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html | 12 +++++++++
ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp | 2 ++
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp | 22 ++++++++++++++++
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h | 2 ++
netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl | 5 ++++
netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh | 1 +
20 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js
create mode 100644 dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html
diff --git a/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js b/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
index 3d5d40e4c..830c20998 100644
--- a/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
+++ b/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
@@ -909,7 +909,8 @@ nsContextMenu.prototype = {
Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DISALLOW_SCRIPT);
let doc = this.target.ownerDocument;
openUILink(viewURL, e, { disallowInheritPrincipal: true,
- referrerURI: doc.documentURIObject });
+ referrerURI: doc.documentURIObject,
+ forceAllowDataURI: true });
}
},
diff --git a/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js b/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
index b1e78d6a9..86cc5cea5 100644
--- a/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
+++ b/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ function openUILinkIn(url, where, aAllowThirdPartyFixup, aPostData, aReferrerURI
openLinkIn(url, where, params);
}
+/* eslint-disable complexity */
function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
if (!where || !url)
return;
@@ -215,6 +216,7 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
var aCharset = params.charset;
var aReferrerURI = params.referrerURI;
var aRelatedToCurrent = params.relatedToCurrent;
+ var aForceAllowDataURI = params.forceAllowDataURI;
var aInBackground = params.inBackground;
var aDisallowInheritPrincipal = params.disallowInheritPrincipal;
var aInitiatingDoc = params.initiatingDoc;
@@ -315,6 +317,9 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
}
if (aDisallowInheritPrincipal)
flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_DISALLOW_INHERIT_OWNER;
+ if (aForceAllowDataURI) {
+ flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI;
+ }
w.gBrowser.loadURIWithFlags(url, flags, aReferrerURI, null, aPostData);
break;
case "tabshifted":
diff --git a/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js b/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
index 8eb9b034f..ddf695202 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js
@@ -1158,7 +1158,8 @@ nsContextMenu.prototype = {
this.browser.contentPrincipal,
Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DISALLOW_SCRIPT);
openUILink(this.mediaURL, e, { disallowInheritPrincipal: true,
- referrerURI: referrerURI });
+ referrerURI: referrerURI,
+ forceAllowDataURI: true });
}
},
diff --git a/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js b/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
index 0b703b6f8..6ceaf773e 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ function openUILinkIn(url, where, aAllowThirdPartyFixup, aPostData, aReferrerURI
openLinkIn(url, where, params);
}
+/* eslint-disable complexity */
function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
if (!where || !url)
return;
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
params.referrerPolicy : Ci.nsIHttpChannel.REFERRER_POLICY_DEFAULT);
var aRelatedToCurrent = params.relatedToCurrent;
var aAllowMixedContent = params.allowMixedContent;
+ var aForceAllowDataURI = params.forceAllowDataURI;
var aInBackground = params.inBackground;
var aDisallowInheritPrincipal = params.disallowInheritPrincipal;
var aInitiatingDoc = params.initiatingDoc;
@@ -378,6 +380,9 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) {
if (aIndicateErrorPageLoad) {
flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_ERROR_LOAD_CHANGES_RV;
}
+ if (aForceAllowDataURI) {
+ flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI;
+ }
let {URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT} = Ci.nsIProtocolHandler;
if (aForceAboutBlankViewerInCurrent &&
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index 596bd5d84..f3db4a3cb 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -1273,6 +1273,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI,
nsCOMPtr<nsISHEntry> shEntry;
nsXPIDLString target;
nsAutoString srcdoc;
+ bool forceAllowDataURI = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> sourceDocShell;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> baseURI;
@@ -1308,6 +1309,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI,
aLoadInfo->GetSrcdocData(srcdoc);
aLoadInfo->GetSourceDocShell(getter_AddRefs(sourceDocShell));
aLoadInfo->GetBaseURI(getter_AddRefs(baseURI));
+ aLoadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI(&forceAllowDataURI);
}
#if defined(DEBUG)
@@ -1561,6 +1563,10 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI,
flags |= INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_IS_SRCDOC;
}
+ if (forceAllowDataURI) {
+ flags |= INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI;
+ }
+
return InternalLoad(aURI,
originalURI,
loadReplace,
@@ -4822,6 +4828,9 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURIWithOptions(const char16_t* aURI,
}
nsAutoPopupStatePusher statePusher(popupState);
+ bool forceAllowDataURI =
+ aLoadFlags & LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI;
+
// Don't pass certain flags that aren't needed and end up confusing
// ConvertLoadTypeToDocShellLoadInfo. We do need to ensure that they are
// passed to LoadURI though, since it uses them.
@@ -4851,6 +4860,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURIWithOptions(const char16_t* aURI,
loadInfo->SetReferrerPolicy(aReferrerPolicy);
loadInfo->SetHeadersStream(aHeaderStream);
loadInfo->SetBaseURI(aBaseURI);
+ loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(forceAllowDataURI);
if (fixupInfo) {
nsAutoString searchProvider, keyword;
@@ -10083,6 +10093,7 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
// principal to inherit is: it should be aTriggeringPrincipal.
loadInfo->SetPrincipalIsExplicit(true);
loadInfo->SetLoadType(ConvertLoadTypeToDocShellLoadInfo(LOAD_LINK));
+ loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI);
rv = win->Open(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec),
aWindowTarget, // window name
@@ -10728,7 +10739,9 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsINetworkPredictor::PREDICT_LOAD, this, nullptr);
nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
- rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, loadFromExternal, aReferrer,
+ rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, loadFromExternal,
+ (aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI),
+ aReferrer,
!(aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_DONT_SEND_REFERRER),
aReferrerPolicy,
aTriggeringPrincipal, principalToInherit, aTypeHint,
@@ -10809,6 +10822,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
bool aLoadReplace,
bool aLoadFromExternal,
+ bool aForceAllowDataURI,
nsIURI* aReferrerURI,
bool aSendReferrer,
uint32_t aReferrerPolicy,
@@ -10954,6 +10968,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
loadInfo->SetPrincipalToInherit(aPrincipalToInherit);
}
loadInfo->SetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(aLoadFromExternal);
+ loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(aForceAllowDataURI);
// We have to do this in case our OriginAttributes are different from the
// OriginAttributes of the parent document. Or in case there isn't a
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
index 549d7f540..63a4e3358 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ protected:
nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
bool aLoadReplace,
bool aLoadFromExternal,
+ bool aForceAllowDataURI,
nsIURI* aReferrer,
bool aSendReferrer,
uint32_t aReferrerPolicy,
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp
index 7d0034b04..b00e8e360 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ nsDocShellLoadInfo::nsDocShellLoadInfo()
: mLoadReplace(false)
, mInheritPrincipal(false)
, mPrincipalIsExplicit(false)
+ , mForceAllowDataURI(false)
, mSendReferrer(true)
, mReferrerPolicy(mozilla::net::RP_Default)
, mLoadType(nsIDocShellLoadInfo::loadNormal)
@@ -126,6 +127,20 @@ nsDocShellLoadInfo::SetPrincipalIsExplicit(bool aPrincipalIsExplicit)
return NS_OK;
}
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsDocShellLoadInfo::GetForceAllowDataURI(bool* aForceAllowDataURI)
+{
+ *aForceAllowDataURI = mForceAllowDataURI;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsDocShellLoadInfo::SetForceAllowDataURI(bool aForceAllowDataURI)
+{
+ mForceAllowDataURI = aForceAllowDataURI;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocShellLoadInfo::GetLoadType(nsDocShellInfoLoadType* aLoadType)
{
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h
index b7eaed832..f3ddcca1e 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ protected:
bool mLoadReplace;
bool mInheritPrincipal;
bool mPrincipalIsExplicit;
+ bool mForceAllowDataURI;
bool mSendReferrer;
nsDocShellInfoReferrerPolicy mReferrerPolicy;
nsDocShellInfoLoadType mLoadType;
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl b/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl
index 8261c45dc..e34e6adfd 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl
+++ b/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem
const long INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_NO_OPENER = 0x100;
+ // Whether a top-level data URI navigation is allowed for that load
+ const long INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI = 0x200;
+
// NB: 0x80 is available.
/**
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl b/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl
index 113c0a4c1..8804f63a3 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl
+++ b/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl
@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ interface nsIDocShellLoadInfo : nsISupports
*/
attribute boolean principalIsExplicit;
+ /**
+ * If this attribute is true, then a top-level navigation
+ * to a data URI will be allowed.
+ */
+ attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI;
+
/* these are load type enums... */
const long loadNormal = 0; // Normal Load
const long loadNormalReplace = 1; // Normal Load but replaces current history slot
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl b/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl
index 042b1c547..241d0731c 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl
+++ b/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl
@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ interface nsIWebNavigation : nsISupports
*/
const unsigned long LOAD_FLAGS_FIXUP_SCHEME_TYPOS = 0x200000;
+ /**
+ * Allows a top-level data: navigation to occur. E.g. view-image
+ * is an explicit user action which should be allowed.
+ */
+ const unsigned long LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI = 0x400000;
+
/**
* Loads a given URI. This will give priority to loading the requested URI
* in the object implementing this interface. If it can't be loaded here
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index c987fed67..9329c558a 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel)
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return true;
}
+ if (loadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI()) {
+ // if the loadinfo explicitly allows the data URI navigation, let's allow it now
+ return true;
+ }
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
index 73ae72ddd..b00baa95d 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ support-files =
[browser_test_data_text_csv.js]
support-files =
file_data_text_csv.html
+[browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js]
+support-files =
+ file_view_image_data_navigation.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22de35894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PAGE = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + "file_view_image_data_navigation.html";
+
+add_task(async function test_principal_right_click_open_link_in_new_tab() {
+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+ "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+ });
+
+ await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_PAGE, async function(browser) {
+ let loadPromise = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, true);
+
+ // simulate right-click->view-image
+ BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(document, "popupshown", false, event => {
+ // These are operations that must be executed synchronously with the event.
+ document.getElementById("context-viewimage").doCommand();
+ event.target.hidePopup();
+ return true;
+ });
+ BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter("#testimage",
+ { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },
+ gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+ await loadPromise;
+
+ await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() {
+ ok(content.document.location.toString().startsWith("data:image/svg+xml;"),
+ "data:image/svg navigation allowed through right-click view-image")
+ });
+ });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3f9acfb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="utf-8">
+ <title>Bug 1407891: Test navigation for right-click view-image on "></img>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
index 4cfbe8758..e115fa74c 100644
--- a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
+++ b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ LoadInfoToLoadInfoArgs(nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo,
aLoadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(),
aLoadInfo->GetVerifySignedContent(),
aLoadInfo->GetEnforceSRI(),
+ aLoadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI(),
aLoadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped(),
aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(),
aLoadInfo->GetOuterWindowID(),
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ LoadInfoArgsToLoadInfo(const OptionalLoadInfoArgs& aOptionalLoadInfoArgs,
loadInfoArgs.upgradeInsecureRequests(),
loadInfoArgs.verifySignedContent(),
loadInfoArgs.enforceSRI(),
+ loadInfoArgs.forceAllowDataURI(),
loadInfoArgs.forceInheritPrincipalDropped(),
loadInfoArgs.innerWindowID(),
loadInfoArgs.outerWindowID(),
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
index 2f10261cb..9923f6d30 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
+ , mForceAllowDataURI(false)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
@@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
+ , mForceAllowDataURI(false)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
@@ -285,6 +287,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(rhs.mUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(rhs.mVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(rhs.mEnforceSRI)
+ , mForceAllowDataURI(rhs.mForceAllowDataURI)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(rhs.mForceInheritPrincipalDropped)
, mInnerWindowID(rhs.mInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(rhs.mOuterWindowID)
@@ -315,6 +318,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests,
bool aVerifySignedContent,
bool aEnforceSRI,
+ bool aForceAllowDataURI,
bool aForceInheritPrincipalDropped,
uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
uint64_t aOuterWindowID,
@@ -341,6 +345,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(aUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(aVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(aEnforceSRI)
+ , mForceAllowDataURI(aForceAllowDataURI)
, mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(aForceInheritPrincipalDropped)
, mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(aOuterWindowID)
@@ -653,6 +658,23 @@ LoadInfo::GetEnforceSRI(bool* aResult)
return NS_OK;
}
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+LoadInfo::SetForceAllowDataURI(bool aForceAllowDataURI)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!mForceAllowDataURI ||
+ mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "can only allow data URI navigation for TYPE_DOCUMENT");
+ mForceAllowDataURI = aForceAllowDataURI;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+LoadInfo::GetForceAllowDataURI(bool* aForceAllowDataURI)
+{
+ *aForceAllowDataURI = mForceAllowDataURI;
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped(bool* aResult)
{
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
index 99deae2d2..86cfddc68 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ private:
bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests,
bool aVerifySignedContent,
bool aEnforceSRI,
+ bool aForceAllowDataURI,
bool aForceInheritPrincipalDropped,
uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
uint64_t aOuterWindowID,
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ private:
bool mUpgradeInsecureRequests;
bool mVerifySignedContent;
bool mEnforceSRI;
+ bool mForceAllowDataURI;
bool mForceInheritPrincipalDropped;
uint64_t mInnerWindowID;
uint64_t mOuterWindowID;
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
index 5b5eb425a..5b35736e5 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
@@ -469,6 +469,11 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean enforceSRI;
+ /**
+ * If true, toplevel data: URI navigation is allowed
+ */
+ [infallible] attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI;
+
/**
* The SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL flag may be dropped when a load info
* object is created. Specifically, it will be dropped if the SEC_SANDBOXED
diff --git a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
index e1438cacc..4f4dcf6a9 100644
--- a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
+++ b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct LoadInfoArgs
bool upgradeInsecureRequests;
bool verifySignedContent;
bool enforceSRI;
+ bool forceAllowDataURI;
bool forceInheritPrincipalDropped;
uint64_t innerWindowID;
uint64_t outerWindowID;
--
cgit v1.2.3
From a38e87d455f6ad3637deeae20d2ddc57430b498d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 20:37:09 +0200
Subject: Bug 1329288 - Test ContentPolicy blocks opening a new window
---
.../file_contentpolicy_block_window.html | 5 ++
docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini | 2 +
.../test_contentpolicy_block_window.html | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++
...est_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html | 1 +
4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html
create mode 100644 docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html
diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html b/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c51e574e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+This window should never be openend!
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini b/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini
index 0c35cf352..764e400a8 100644
--- a/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini
+++ b/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ support-files =
file_bug1300461_redirect.html
file_bug1300461_redirect.html^headers^
file_bug1300461_back.html
+ file_contentpolicy_block_window.html
[test_bug13871.html]
[test_bug270414.html]
@@ -62,3 +63,4 @@ skip-if = toolkit == 'android' #RANDOM
[test_triggeringprincipal_window_open.html]
[test_triggeringprincipal_parent_iframe_window_open.html]
[test_triggeringprincipal_iframe_iframe_window_open.html]
+[test_contentpolicy_block_window.html]
diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html b/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..651be825c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329288
+-->
+<head>
+ <title>Test for Bug 1329288</title>
+ <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+ <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329288">Mozilla Bug 1329288</a>
+
+
+<!-- have a testlink which we can use for the test to open a new window -->
+<a href="http://test1.example.org/tests/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html"
+ target="_blank"
+ id="testlink">This is a link</a>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * The test tries to open a new window and makes sure that a registered contentPolicy
+ * gets called with the right (a non null) 'context' for the TYPE_DOCUMENT load.
+ */
+
+const Cc = SpecialPowers.Cc;
+const Ci = SpecialPowers.Ci;
+
+var categoryManager = Cc["@mozilla.org/categorymanager;1"].getService(Ci.nsICategoryManager);
+var componentManager = SpecialPowers.wrap(SpecialPowers.Components).manager
+ .QueryInterface(Ci.nsIComponentRegistrar);
+
+// Content policy / factory implementation for the test
+var policyID = SpecialPowers.wrap(SpecialPowers.Components).ID("{b80e19d0-878f-d41b-2654-194714a4115c}");
+var policyName = "@mozilla.org/testpolicy;1";
+var policy = {
+ // nsISupports implementation
+ QueryInterface: function(iid) {
+ iid = SpecialPowers.wrap(iid);
+ if (iid.equals(Ci.nsISupports) ||
+ iid.equals(Ci.nsIFactory) ||
+ iid.equals(Ci.nsIContentPolicy))
+ return this;
+ throw SpecialPowers.Cr.NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
+ },
+
+ // nsIFactory implementation
+ createInstance: function(outer, iid) {
+ return this.QueryInterface(iid);
+ },
+
+ // nsIContentPolicy implementation
+ shouldLoad: function(contentType, contentLocation, requestOrigin, context, mimeTypeGuess, extra) {
+
+ if (SpecialPowers.wrap(contentLocation).spec !== document.getElementById("testlink").href) {
+ // not the URI we are looking for, allow the load
+ return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+ }
+
+ is(contentType, Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "needs to be type document load");
+ ok(context, "context is not allowed to be null");
+ ok(context.name.endsWith("test_contentpolicy_block_window.html"),
+ "context should be the current window");
+
+ // remove the policy and finish test.
+ categoryManager.deleteCategoryEntry("content-policy", policyName, false);
+
+ setTimeout(function() {
+ // Component must be unregistered delayed, otherwise other content
+ // policy will not be removed from the category correctly
+ componentManager.unregisterFactory(policyID, policy);
+ }, 0);
+
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+ return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST;
+ },
+
+ shouldProcess: function(contentType, contentLocation, requestOrigin, context, mimeTypeGuess, extra) {
+ return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+ }
+}
+
+policy = SpecialPowers.wrapCallbackObject(policy);
+componentManager.registerFactory(policyID, "Test content policy", policyName, policy);
+categoryManager.addCategoryEntry("content-policy", policyName, policyName, false, true);
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// now everything is set up, let's start the test
+document.getElementById("testlink").click()
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html
index 7b1ab72dc..3ef243824 100644
--- a/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ var policy = {
"content policy type should TYPESUBDOCUMENT");
categoryManager.deleteCategoryEntry("content-policy", POLICYNAME, false);
SimpleTest.finish();
+ return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST;
}
return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
},
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 95c46082414632687e3ddd52435d476ab9dc320f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 20:38:02 +0200
Subject: Bug 1329288: Allow content policy consumers to identify contentPolicy
checks from docshell
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 14 +++++++++++++-
dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp | 5 +++--
toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index f3db4a3cb..b1fcc5c23 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
#include "nsStructuredCloneContainer.h"
#include "nsIStructuredCloneContainer.h"
+#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
#ifdef MOZ_PLACES
#include "nsIFaviconService.h"
#include "mozIPlacesPendingOperation.h"
@@ -9931,13 +9932,24 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
#endif
}
+ // Since Content Policy checks are performed within docShell as well as
+ // the ContentSecurityManager we need a reliable way to let certain
+ // nsIContentPolicy consumers ignore duplicate calls. Let's use the 'extra'
+ // argument to pass a specific identifier.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsString> extraStr =
+ do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_STRING_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(msg, "conPolCheckFromDocShell");
+ rv = extraStr->SetData(msg);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(contentType,
aURI,
aTriggeringPrincipal,
requestingContext,
EmptyCString(), // mime guess
- nullptr, // extra
+ extraStr, // extra
&shouldLoad);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
index a7517f65e..979bd915f 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
@@ -171,9 +171,10 @@ nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
}
}
- // aExtra is only non-null if the channel got redirected.
- bool wasRedirected = (aExtra != nullptr);
+ // aExtra holds the original URI of the channel if the
+ // channel got redirected (until we fix Bug 1332422).
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI = do_QueryInterface(aExtra);
+ bool wasRedirected = originalURI;
bool permitted = permitsInternal(dir,
aContentLocation,
diff --git a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
index 219675e5b..f044a1cd4 100644
--- a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
+++ b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ var ContentPolicy = {
shouldLoad(policyType, contentLocation, requestOrigin,
node, mimeTypeGuess, extra, requestPrincipal) {
+
+ // Loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT perform a ConPol check
+ // within docshell as well as within the ContentSecurityManager. To avoid
+ // duplicate evaluations we ignore ConPol checks performed within docShell.
+ if (extra instanceof Ci.nsISupportsString) {
+ if (extra.data === "conPolCheckFromDocShell") {
+ return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+ }
+ }
+
if (requestPrincipal &&
Services.scriptSecurityManager.isSystemPrincipal(requestPrincipal)) {
return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 8af1b0c22a9c449746479b8a82494e43d60af573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 21:00:39 +0200
Subject: Bug 1329570 - Restore missing error check in
mozilla::dom::Location::GetPathname
native in moebius
---
dom/base/Location.cpp | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/base/Location.cpp b/dom/base/Location.cpp
index e3b614931..b17e733d5 100644
--- a/dom/base/Location.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/Location.cpp
@@ -577,9 +577,10 @@ Location::GetPathname(nsAString& aPathname)
aPathname.Truncate();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
- nsresult result = NS_OK;
-
- result = GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ nsresult result = GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ if (NS_FAILED(result) || !uri) {
+ return result;
+ }
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(uri));
if (url) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From dbfad99a51062e663da19266219191c0dc3521be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 21:20:53 +0200
Subject: Bug 1323683 - Fold nsIURIWithQuery into nsIURI
native in moebius
---
caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp | 26 +++++++++++++++++
dom/base/Location.cpp | 14 ++++-----
dom/url/URL.cpp | 40 ++++++--------------------
image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp | 26 +++++++++++++++++
modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp | 1 -
modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h | 1 -
netwerk/base/moz.build | 1 -
netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl | 30 --------------------
netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl | 6 ++--
netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp | 6 +---
netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h | 4 +--
netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp | 1 -
netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h | 1 -
14 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl
diff --git a/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp b/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp
index 891a29bd8..f8b867160 100644
--- a/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp
+++ b/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp
@@ -167,6 +167,32 @@ nsNullPrincipalURI::SetPath(const nsACString &aPath)
return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNullPrincipalURI::GetFilePath(nsACString &aFilePath)
+{
+ aFilePath.Truncate();
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNullPrincipalURI::SetFilePath(const nsACString &aFilePath)
+{
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNullPrincipalURI::GetQuery(nsACString &aQuery)
+{
+ aQuery.Truncate();
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNullPrincipalURI::SetQuery(const nsACString &aQuery)
+{
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNullPrincipalURI::GetRef(nsACString &_ref)
{
diff --git a/dom/base/Location.cpp b/dom/base/Location.cpp
index b17e733d5..b6b95aaa6 100644
--- a/dom/base/Location.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/Location.cpp
@@ -582,15 +582,12 @@ Location::GetPathname(nsAString& aPathname)
return result;
}
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(uri));
- if (url) {
- nsAutoCString file;
+ nsAutoCString file;
- result = url->GetFilePath(file);
+ result = uri->GetFilePath(file);
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(result)) {
- AppendUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname);
- }
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(result)) {
+ AppendUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname);
}
return result;
@@ -605,8 +602,7 @@ Location::SetPathname(const nsAString& aPathname)
return rv;
}
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(uri));
- if (url && NS_SUCCEEDED(url->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)))) {
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)))) {
return SetURI(uri);
}
diff --git a/dom/url/URL.cpp b/dom/url/URL.cpp
index 1f15e1151..c8724c359 100644
--- a/dom/url/URL.cpp
+++ b/dom/url/URL.cpp
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsHostObjectProtocolHandler.h"
#include "nsIIOService.h"
-#include "nsIURIWithQuery.h"
#include "nsIURL.h"
#include "nsNetCID.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
@@ -525,21 +524,10 @@ URLMainThread::GetPathname(nsAString& aPathname, ErrorResult& aRv) const
// Do not throw! Not having a valid URI or URL should result in an empty
// string.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI));
- if (url) {
- nsAutoCString file;
- nsresult rv = url->GetFilePath(file);
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
- CopyUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname);
- }
-
- return;
- }
-
- nsAutoCString path;
- nsresult rv = mURI->GetPath(path);
+ nsAutoCString file;
+ nsresult rv = mURI->GetFilePath(file);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
- CopyUTF8toUTF16(path, aPathname);
+ CopyUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname);
}
}
@@ -548,11 +536,7 @@ URLMainThread::SetPathname(const nsAString& aPathname, ErrorResult& aRv)
{
// Do not throw!
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI));
- if (url) {
- url->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname));
- return;
- }
+ mURI->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname));
}
void
@@ -566,13 +550,9 @@ URLMainThread::GetSearch(nsAString& aSearch, ErrorResult& aRv) const
nsAutoCString search;
nsresult rv;
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI));
- if (url) {
- rv = url->GetQuery(search);
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !search.IsEmpty()) {
- CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("?") + search, aSearch);
- }
- return;
+ rv = mURI->GetQuery(search);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !search.IsEmpty()) {
+ CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("?") + search, aSearch);
}
}
@@ -603,11 +583,7 @@ URLMainThread::SetSearchInternal(const nsAString& aSearch, ErrorResult& aRv)
{
// Ignore failures to be compatible with NS4.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> uriWithQuery(do_QueryInterface(mURI));
- if (uriWithQuery) {
- uriWithQuery->SetQuery(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aSearch));
- return;
- }
+ mURI->SetQuery(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aSearch));
}
} // anonymous namespace
diff --git a/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp b/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp
index 2c2788c8f..632a733fe 100644
--- a/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp
+++ b/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp
@@ -371,6 +371,32 @@ nsMozIconURI::SetPath(const nsACString& aPath)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMozIconURI::GetFilePath(nsACString& aFilePath)
+{
+ aFilePath.Truncate();
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMozIconURI::SetFilePath(const nsACString& aFilePath)
+{
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMozIconURI::GetQuery(nsACString& aQuery)
+{
+ aQuery.Truncate();
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMozIconURI::SetQuery(const nsACString& aQuery)
+{
+ return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsMozIconURI::GetRef(nsACString& aRef)
{
diff --git a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp
index e46e51467..d1e4b5a59 100644
--- a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp
+++ b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsJARURI)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN(nsJARURI)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_AMBIGUOUS(nsISupports, nsIJARURI)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURI)
- NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURIWithQuery)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIJARURI)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISerializable)
diff --git a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h
index 31271e4ac..d2608a5c6 100644
--- a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h
+++ b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ class nsJARURI final : public nsIJARURI,
public:
NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
NS_DECL_NSIURI
- NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY
NS_DECL_NSIURL
NS_DECL_NSIJARURI
NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE
diff --git a/netwerk/base/moz.build b/netwerk/base/moz.build
index 3b731db10..5de1eea81 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/moz.build
+++ b/netwerk/base/moz.build
@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ XPIDL_SOURCES += [
'nsIURIClassifier.idl',
'nsIURIWithBlobImpl.idl',
'nsIURIWithPrincipal.idl',
- 'nsIURIWithQuery.idl',
'nsIURL.idl',
'nsIURLParser.idl',
'nsPILoadGroupInternal.idl',
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl
index 2384c5fd9..ef163813a 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl
@@ -10,18 +10,18 @@
* provides accessors to set and query the most basic components of an URI.
* Subclasses, including nsIURL, impose greater structure on the URI.
*
- * This interface follows Tim Berners-Lee's URI spec (RFC2396) [1], where the
+ * This interface follows Tim Berners-Lee's URI spec (RFC3986) [1], where the
* basic URI components are defined as such:
* <pre>
- * ftp://username:password@hostname:portnumber/pathname#ref
- * \ / \ / \ / \ /\ \ /
- * - --------------- ------ -------- | -
- * | | | | | |
- * | | | | | Ref
- * | | | Port \ /
- * | | Host / --------
- * | UserPass / |
- * Scheme / Path
+ * ftp://username:password@hostname:portnumber/pathname?query#ref
+ * \ / \ / \ / \ /\ / \ / \ /
+ * - --------------- ------ -------- ------- --- -
+ * | | | | | | |
+ * | | | | FilePath Query Ref
+ * | | | Port \ /
+ * | | Host / ------------
+ * | UserPass / |
+ * Scheme / Path
* \ /
* --------------------------------
* |
@@ -30,13 +30,9 @@
* The definition of the URI components has been extended to allow for
* internationalized domain names [2] and the more generic IRI structure [3].
*
- * Note also that the RFC defines #-separated fragment identifiers as being
- * "not part of the URI". Despite this, we bundle them as part of the URI, for
- * convenience.
- *
- * [1] http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt
- * [2] http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idn-idna-06.txt
- * [3] http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-masinter-url-i18n-08.txt
+ * [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
+ * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890
+ * [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3987
*/
%{C++
@@ -116,7 +112,7 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports
/**
* The Scheme is the protocol to which this URI refers. The scheme is
- * restricted to the US-ASCII charset per RFC2396. Setting this is
+ * restricted to the US-ASCII charset per RFC3986. Setting this is
* highly discouraged outside of a protocol handler implementation, since
* that will generally lead to incorrect results.
*/
@@ -174,6 +170,9 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports
* empty, depending on the protocol).
*
* Some characters may be escaped.
+ *
+ * This attribute contains query and ref parts for historical reasons.
+ * Use the 'filePath' attribute if you do not want those parts included.
*/
attribute AUTF8String path;
@@ -281,10 +280,31 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports
/**
* returns a string for the current URI with the ref element cleared.
*/
- readonly attribute AUTF8String specIgnoringRef;
+ readonly attribute AUTF8String specIgnoringRef;
/**
* Returns if there is a reference portion (the part after the "#") of the URI.
*/
- readonly attribute boolean hasRef;
+ readonly attribute boolean hasRef;
+
+ /************************************************************************
+ * Additional attributes added for .query support:
+ */
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a path including the directory and file portions of a
+ * URL. For example, the filePath of "http://host/foo/bar.html#baz"
+ * is "/foo/bar.html".
+ *
+ * Some characters may be escaped.
+ */
+ attribute AUTF8String filePath;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the query portion (the part after the "?") of the URL.
+ * If there isn't one, an empty string is returned.
+ *
+ * Some characters may be escaped.
+ */
+ attribute AUTF8String query;
};
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl
deleted file mode 100644
index 749b2773d..000000000
--- a/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "nsIURI.idl"
-
-/**
- * nsIURIWithQuery is implemented by URIs which have a query parameter.
- * This is useful for the URL API.
- */
-[scriptable, uuid(367510ee-8556-435a-8f99-b5fd357e08cc)]
-interface nsIURIWithQuery : nsIURI
-{
- /**
- * Returns a path including the directory and file portions of a
- * URL. For example, the filePath of "http://host/foo/bar.html#baz"
- * is "/foo/bar.html".
- *
- * Some characters may be escaped.
- */
- attribute AUTF8String filePath;
-
- /**
- * Returns the query portion (the part after the "?") of the URL.
- * If there isn't one, an empty string is returned.
- *
- * Some characters may be escaped.
- */
- attribute AUTF8String query;
-};
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl
index aeaa3f694..9ff6c3dcd 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-#include "nsIURIWithQuery.idl"
+#include "nsIURI.idl"
/**
* The nsIURL interface provides convenience methods that further
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* filePath
*/
[scriptable, uuid(86adcd89-0b70-47a2-b0fe-5bb2c5f37e31)]
-interface nsIURL : nsIURIWithQuery
+interface nsIURL : nsIURI
{
/*************************************************************************
* The URL path is broken down into the following principal components:
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ interface nsIURL : nsIURIWithQuery
* attribute AUTF8String filePath;
* attribute AUTF8String query;
*
- * These are inherited from nsIURIWithQuery.
+ * These are inherited from nsIURI.
*/
/*************************************************************************
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp
index ae5c51a1e..dbc0dc817 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ nsSimpleURI::~nsSimpleURI()
NS_IMPL_ADDREF(nsSimpleURI)
NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsSimpleURI)
NS_INTERFACE_TABLE_HEAD(nsSimpleURI)
-NS_INTERFACE_TABLE(nsSimpleURI, nsIURI, nsIURIWithQuery, nsISerializable,
+NS_INTERFACE_TABLE(nsSimpleURI, nsIURI, nsISerializable,
nsIClassInfo, nsIMutable, nsIIPCSerializableURI)
NS_INTERFACE_TABLE_TO_MAP_SEGUE
if (aIID.Equals(kThisSimpleURIImplementationCID))
@@ -784,10 +784,6 @@ nsSimpleURI::SizeOfIncludingThis(MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const {
return aMallocSizeOf(this) + SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);
}
-//----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// nsSimpleURI::nsIURIWithQuery
-//----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSimpleURI::GetFilePath(nsACString& aFilePath)
{
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h
index 29bc9b313..842136ed6 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include "mozilla/MemoryReporting.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
-#include "nsIURIWithQuery.h"
#include "nsISerializable.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsIClassInfo.h"
@@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ namespace net {
}
class nsSimpleURI
- : public nsIURIWithQuery
+ : public nsIURI
, public nsISerializable
, public nsIClassInfo
, public nsIMutable
@@ -41,7 +40,6 @@ protected:
public:
NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
NS_DECL_NSIURI
- NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY
NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE
NS_DECL_NSICLASSINFO
NS_DECL_NSIMUTABLE
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp
index 0cdd2a7b5..e2a290e4d 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp
@@ -1182,7 +1182,6 @@ NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsStandardURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN(nsStandardURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_AMBIGUOUS(nsISupports, nsIStandardURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURI)
- NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURIWithQuery)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_CONDITIONAL(nsIFileURL, mSupportsFileURL)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIStandardURL)
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h
index 90f7f7db2..0ca345572 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ protected:
public:
NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
NS_DECL_NSIURI
- NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY
NS_DECL_NSIURL
NS_DECL_NSIFILEURL
NS_DECL_NSISTANDARDURL
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 29bd11c3cd6ff41f7167530f9bbcd9d195b7c427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 21:47:27 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569: Use AsyncOpen2 for docshell loads
native in moebius
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 23 +++---------------
dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp | 49 ++++++++++++++-------------------------
uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp | 2 +-
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index b1fcc5c23..6810d0179 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@
#include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIScrollableFrame.h"
-#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" // NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(...)
#include "nsISeekableStream.h"
#include "nsAutoPtr.h"
#include "nsQueryObject.h"
@@ -1644,7 +1643,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadStream(nsIInputStream* aStream, nsIURI* aURI,
uri,
aStream,
triggeringPrincipal,
- nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL,
+ nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL,
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER,
aContentType,
aContentCharset);
@@ -9943,23 +9942,6 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
rv = extraStr->SetData(msg);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
- rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(contentType,
- aURI,
- aTriggeringPrincipal,
- requestingContext,
- EmptyCString(), // mime guess
- extraStr, // extra
- &shouldLoad);
-
- if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) {
- return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
- }
-
- return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
- }
-
// If HSTS priming was set by nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad, and we
// would block due to mixed content, go ahead and block here. If we try to
// proceed with priming, we will error out later on.
@@ -10949,7 +10931,8 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
}
nsLoadFlags loadFlags = mDefaultLoadFlags;
- nsSecurityFlags securityFlags = nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL;
+ nsSecurityFlags securityFlags =
+ nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL;
if (aFirstParty) {
// tag first party URL loads
diff --git a/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp b/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
index cdb63f890..90171db10 100644
--- a/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
+++ b/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
#include "nsIContentViewer.h"
#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
-#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "nsJSUtils.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nsIScriptChannel.h"
@@ -336,7 +335,7 @@ public:
NS_FORWARD_SAFE_NSIPROPERTYBAG(mPropertyBag)
NS_FORWARD_SAFE_NSIPROPERTYBAG2(mPropertyBag)
- nsresult Init(nsIURI *aURI);
+ nsresult Init(nsIURI *aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
// Actually evaluate the script.
void EvaluateScript();
@@ -354,17 +353,16 @@ protected:
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mStreamChannel;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPropertyBag2> mPropertyBag;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> mListener; // Our final listener
- nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mContext; // The context passed to AsyncOpen
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> mOriginalInnerWindow; // The inner window our load
// started against.
- // If we blocked onload on a document in AsyncOpen, this is the document we
+ // If we blocked onload on a document in AsyncOpen2, this is the document we
// did it on.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn;
nsresult mStatus; // Our status
nsLoadFlags mLoadFlags;
- nsLoadFlags mActualLoadFlags; // See AsyncOpen
+ nsLoadFlags mActualLoadFlags; // See AsyncOpen2
RefPtr<nsJSThunk> mIOThunk;
PopupControlState mPopupState;
@@ -404,7 +402,7 @@ nsresult nsJSChannel::StopAll()
return rv;
}
-nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI *aURI)
+nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
RefPtr<nsJSURI> jsURI;
nsresult rv = aURI->QueryInterface(kJSURICID,
@@ -418,21 +416,13 @@ nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI *aURI)
// Remember, until AsyncOpen is called, the script will not be evaluated
// and the underlying Input Stream will not be created...
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
-
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
-
- // If the resultant script evaluation actually does return a value, we
- // treat it as html.
- // The following channel is never openend, so it does not matter what
- // securityFlags we pass; let's follow the principle of least privilege.
- rv = NS_NewInputStreamChannel(getter_AddRefs(channel),
- aURI,
- mIOThunk,
- nullPrincipal,
- nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED,
- nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER,
- NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html"));
- if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+ rv = NS_NewInputStreamChannelInternal(getter_AddRefs(channel),
+ aURI,
+ mIOThunk,
+ NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html"),
+ EmptyCString(),
+ aLoadInfo);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = mIOThunk->Init(aURI);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
@@ -563,6 +553,7 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
"security flags in loadInfo but asyncOpen2() not called");
}
#endif
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(!aContext, "please call AsyncOpen2()");
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aListener);
@@ -584,7 +575,6 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
}
mListener = aListener;
- mContext = aContext;
mIsActive = true;
@@ -655,7 +645,7 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
return mStatus;
}
- // We're returning success from asyncOpen(), but we didn't open a
+ // We're returning success from asyncOpen2(), but we didn't open a
// stream channel. We'll have to notify ourselves, but make sure to do
// it asynchronously.
method = &nsJSChannel::NotifyListener;
@@ -772,7 +762,7 @@ nsJSChannel::EvaluateScript()
return;
}
- mStatus = mStreamChannel->AsyncOpen(this, mContext);
+ mStatus = mStreamChannel->AsyncOpen2(this);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mStatus)) {
// mStreamChannel will call OnStartRequest and OnStopRequest on
// us, so we'll be sure to call them on our listener.
@@ -800,8 +790,8 @@ nsJSChannel::EvaluateScript()
void
nsJSChannel::NotifyListener()
{
- mListener->OnStartRequest(this, mContext);
- mListener->OnStopRequest(this, mContext, mStatus);
+ mListener->OnStartRequest(this, nullptr);
+ mListener->OnStopRequest(this, nullptr, mStatus);
CleanupStrongRefs();
}
@@ -810,7 +800,6 @@ void
nsJSChannel::CleanupStrongRefs()
{
mListener = nullptr;
- mContext = nullptr;
mOriginalInnerWindow = nullptr;
if (mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn) {
mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn->UnblockOnload(false);
@@ -1240,11 +1229,7 @@ nsJSProtocolHandler::NewChannel2(nsIURI* uri,
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
- rv = channel->Init(uri);
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
- // set the loadInfo on the new channel
- rv = channel->SetLoadInfo(aLoadInfo);
+ rv = channel->Init(uri, aLoadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
diff --git a/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp b/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
index 69475d68f..ea370aa37 100644
--- a/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
+++ b/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsURILoader::OpenURI(nsIChannel *channel,
// the preferred protocol handler.
// But for now, I'm going to let necko do the work for us....
- rv = channel->AsyncOpen(loader, nullptr);
+ rv = channel->AsyncOpen2(loader);
// no content from this load - that's OK.
if (rv == NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 2e33335820b2816bee111e78588ac82e401c86ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 21:51:49 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569: Update ContentSecurityManager to handle docshell loads
native in moebius
---
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp | 14 ++----
2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 9329c558a..458f41144 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsINestedURI.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
@@ -244,10 +247,6 @@ DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
static nsresult
DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
- nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
@@ -255,12 +254,24 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
- // initiated by javascript tests.
- bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
- skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
-#endif
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
+ // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
+ // perform proper security checks.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
+ rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ uri = fixedURI;
+ }
+ }
+ }
switch(contentPolicyType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
@@ -294,16 +305,14 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
- MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document");
break;
}
@@ -447,18 +456,32 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
}
+ // For document loads we use the triggeringPrincipal as the originPrincipal.
+ // Note the the loadingPrincipal for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT is a nullptr.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal =
+ (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)
+ ? aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()
+ : aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType,
uri,
- aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(),
+ principal,
requestingContext,
mimeTypeGuess,
nullptr, //extra,
&shouldLoad,
nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(),
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager());
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+ if ((NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) &&
+ (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
+ // for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
+ }
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
@@ -606,6 +629,30 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+ if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+ // query the nested URI for security checks like in the case of view-source
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri);
+ if (nestedURI) {
+ nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ }
+
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
+ // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
+ // perform proper security checks.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
+ rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ uri = fixedURI;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
// Handle cookie policies
uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
index 8ff3e788f..bc9bcf88a 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
@@ -1285,16 +1285,10 @@ NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(nsIChannel* aChannel, bool aReport)
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(loadInfo, "Origin tracking only works for channels created with a loadinfo");
-#ifdef DEBUG
- // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
- // initiated by javascript tests.
- bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
- skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
-#endif
-
- MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck ||
- loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
- "calling NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin on a top level load");
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT loads have a null LoadingPrincipal and can not be cross origin.
+ if (!loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) {
+ return false;
+ }
// Always treat tainted channels as cross-origin.
if (loadInfo->GetTainting() != LoadTainting::Basic) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 5b0f4649b3fee771379af60ec04d43b8a525cf80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 21:59:46 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569 - Skip security check for plugins using newstream
attribute
native in moebius
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
docshell/base/nsDocShell.h | 6 ++++--
docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h | 10 ++++++++--
dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp | 2 +-
dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index 6810d0179..8167a76ec 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -13888,7 +13888,8 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted);
+ bool aIsTrusted,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal);
NS_IMETHOD Run() override
{
@@ -13904,7 +13905,7 @@ public:
mHandler->OnLinkClickSync(mContent, mURI,
mTargetSpec.get(), mFileName,
mPostDataStream, mHeadersDataStream,
- nullptr, nullptr);
+ nullptr, nullptr, mTriggeringPrincipal);
}
return NS_OK;
}
@@ -13919,6 +13920,7 @@ private:
nsCOMPtr<nsIContent> mContent;
PopupControlState mPopupState;
bool mIsTrusted;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mTriggeringPrincipal;
};
OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
@@ -13928,7 +13930,8 @@ OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted)
+ bool aIsTrusted,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
: mHandler(aHandler)
, mURI(aURI)
, mTargetSpec(aTargetSpec)
@@ -13938,6 +13941,7 @@ OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
, mContent(aContent)
, mPopupState(mHandler->mScriptGlobal->GetPopupControlState())
, mIsTrusted(aIsTrusted)
+ , mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
}
@@ -13948,7 +13952,8 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted)
+ bool aIsTrusted,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
NS_ASSERTION(NS_IsMainThread(), "wrong thread");
@@ -13987,7 +13992,8 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> ev =
new OnLinkClickEvent(this, aContent, aURI, target.get(), aFileName,
- aPostDataStream, aHeadersDataStream, aIsTrusted);
+ aPostDataStream, aHeadersDataStream,
+ aIsTrusted, aTriggeringPrincipal);
return NS_DispatchToCurrentThread(ev);
}
@@ -13999,7 +14005,8 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell,
- nsIRequest** aRequest)
+ nsIRequest** aRequest,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
// Initialize the DocShell / Request
if (aDocShell) {
@@ -14122,13 +14129,18 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
+ // if the triggeringPrincipal is not passed explicitly, then we
+ // fall back to using doc->NodePrincipal() as the triggeringPrincipal.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal =
+ aTriggeringPrincipal ? aTriggeringPrincipal
+ : aContent->NodePrincipal();
+
nsresult rv = InternalLoad(clonedURI, // New URI
nullptr, // Original URI
false, // LoadReplace
referer, // Referer URI
refererPolicy, // Referer policy
- aContent->NodePrincipal(), // Triggering is our node's
- // principal
+ triggeringPrincipal,
aContent->NodePrincipal(),
flags,
target, // Window target
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
index 63a4e3358..f510a15b0 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted) override;
+ bool aIsTrusted,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal) override;
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
const char16_t* aTargetSpec,
@@ -209,7 +210,8 @@ public:
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream = 0,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream = 0,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell = 0,
- nsIRequest** aRequest = 0) override;
+ nsIRequest** aRequest = 0,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal = nullptr) override;
NS_IMETHOD OnOverLink(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
const char16_t* aTargetSpec) override;
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h b/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
index 7cdcd566d..7069f1f1d 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ public:
* @param aFileName non-null when the link should be downloaded as the given file
* @param aHeadersDataStream ???
* @param aIsTrusted false if the triggerer is an untrusted DOM event.
+ * @param aTriggeringPrincipal, if not passed explicitly we fall back to
+ * the document's principal.
*/
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
@@ -44,7 +46,8 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted) = 0;
+ bool aIsTrusted,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal) = 0;
/**
* Process a click on a link.
@@ -61,6 +64,8 @@ public:
* @param aHeadersDataStream ???
* @param aDocShell (out-param) the DocShell that the request was opened on
* @param aRequest the request that was opened
+ * @param aTriggeringPrincipal, if not passed explicitly we fall back to
+ * the document's principal.
*/
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
@@ -69,7 +74,8 @@ public:
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream = 0,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream = 0,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell = 0,
- nsIRequest** aRequest = 0) = 0;
+ nsIRequest** aRequest = 0,
+ nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal = nullptr) = 0;
/**
* Process a mouse-over a link.
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
index ef87a250e..c3ff2b4d8 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
@@ -5100,7 +5100,7 @@ nsContentUtils::TriggerLink(nsIContent *aContent, nsPresContext *aPresContext,
handler->OnLinkClick(aContent, aLinkURI,
fileName.IsVoid() ? aTargetSpec.get() : EmptyString().get(),
- fileName, nullptr, nullptr, aIsTrusted);
+ fileName, nullptr, nullptr, aIsTrusted, aContent->NodePrincipal());
}
}
diff --git a/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp b/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
index b7651be1a..7de6c2b73 100644
--- a/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
+++ b/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
@@ -535,16 +535,6 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsPluginInstanceOwner::GetURL(const char *aURL,
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), aURL, baseURI);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
- if (aDoCheckLoadURIChecks) {
- nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptSecurityManager> secMan(
- do_GetService(NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv));
- NS_ENSURE_TRUE(secMan, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
-
- rv = secMan->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(content->NodePrincipal(), uri,
- nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD);
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- }
-
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> headersDataStream;
if (aPostStream && aHeadersData) {
if (!aHeadersDataLen)
@@ -563,8 +553,21 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsPluginInstanceOwner::GetURL(const char *aURL,
Preferences::GetInt("privacy.popups.disable_from_plugins");
nsAutoPopupStatePusher popupStatePusher((PopupControlState)blockPopups);
+
+ // if security checks (in particular CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal) needs
+ // to be skipped we are creating a codebasePrincipal to make sure
+ // that security check succeeds. Please note that we do not want to
+ // fall back to using the systemPrincipal, because that would also
+ // bypass ContentPolicy checks which should still be enforced.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal;
+ if (!aDoCheckLoadURIChecks) {
+ mozilla::PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs =
+ BasePrincipal::Cast(content->NodePrincipal())->OriginAttributesRef();
+ triggeringPrincipal = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(uri, attrs);
+ }
+
rv = lh->OnLinkClick(content, uri, unitarget.get(), NullString(),
- aPostStream, headersDataStream, true);
+ aPostStream, headersDataStream, true, triggeringPrincipal);
return rv;
}
--
cgit v1.2.3
From b73225e886f84182384a2b5b09f83e51501bdc38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:02:20 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569: Update tests when converting docshell loads to use
AynscOpen2
native in moebius
---
dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js | 1 -
dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js b/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
index 1f9606c49..2727b9530 100644
--- a/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
+++ b/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ var policy = {
{
// Remember last content type seen for the test url
if (contentLocation.spec.endsWith(urlSuffix)) {
- assert.ok(frame === browserElement, "correct <browser> element");
sendAsyncMessage("shouldLoad", {contentType: contentType, isTopLevel: isTopLevel});
return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST;
}
diff --git a/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html b/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
index 04c34daaf..d18dbbff2 100644
--- a/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
+++ b/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
@@ -18,21 +18,35 @@ function f() {
</script>
<script type="application/javascript">
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout(
+ "Blocking an iframe does not cause the onerror event to be fired");
+
SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
setTestPluginEnabledState(SpecialPowers.Ci.nsIPluginTag.STATE_ENABLED);
var frameLoadCount = 0;
+
+function frameNavBlocked() {
+ isnot(SpecialPowers.wrap(window.frame1).location.href.indexOf('chrome://'),
+ 0, 'plugin shouldnt be able to cause navigation to chrome URLs');
+ SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
function frameLoaded() {
frameLoadCount++;
if (frameLoadCount == 1) {
document.getElementsByTagName("object")[0].type = "application/x-test";
document.getElementsByTagName("use")[0].setAttributeNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink", "href", location.href + "#a");
- } else if (frameLoadCount == 2) {
- isnot(SpecialPowers.wrap(window.frame1).location.href.indexOf('chrome://'),
- 0, 'plugin shouldnt be able to cause navigation to chrome URLs');
- SimpleTest.finish();
+
+ // wait two seconds and verify that frame navigation did not succeed
+ setTimeout(frameNavBlocked, 2000);
+ return;
}
+ // we should never get here, but just in case, make sure the test fails in that case.
+ ok(false, "onload() event should not fire for blocked navigation");
+ SimpleTest.finish();
}
+
</script>
<!-- Note that <svg:use> ends up creating an anonymous subtree, which means that the plugin
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 5d9ae788d5fe66da0f687e941d5ef90880641fd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:09:32 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569: Disable hsts priming for loads of type subdocument for
wpt tests
native in moebius
---
.../top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
.../iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
.../top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
.../top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
.../iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
.../top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 +++
6 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
create mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65b27a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
+ type: testharness
+ prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
--
cgit v1.2.3
From d3575bfb5b62b0c0f566233faae55e4f5f525e99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:11:33 +0200
Subject: Bug 1182569: Add credentials mode for fetch-frame-resource.https.html
wpt test
native in moebius
---
.../service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html b/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
index cc1dac472..fd7419832 100644
--- a/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
+++ b/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ async_test(function(t) {
frame.src =
scope + '?mode=cors&url=' +
encodeURIComponent(host_info['HTTPS_REMOTE_ORIGIN'] + path +
- '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN']);
+ '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN'] +
+ '&ACACredentials=true');
document.body.appendChild(frame);
return getLoadedFrameAsObject(frame);
})
@@ -183,7 +184,8 @@ async_test(function(t) {
var win = window.open(
scope + '?mode=cors&url=' +
encodeURIComponent(host_info['HTTPS_REMOTE_ORIGIN'] + path +
- '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN']));
+ '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN'] +
+ '&ACACredentials=true'));
return getLoadedWindowAsObject(win);
})
.then(function(result) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 49989d0f01e7be293cfb3f2d3c996f9c63c7118c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:16:11 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569: Add credentials mode for
fetch-frame-resource.https.html wpt test"
This reverts commit d3575bfb5b62b0c0f566233faae55e4f5f525e99.
---
.../service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html b/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
index fd7419832..cc1dac472 100644
--- a/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
+++ b/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/fetch-frame-resource.https.html
@@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ async_test(function(t) {
frame.src =
scope + '?mode=cors&url=' +
encodeURIComponent(host_info['HTTPS_REMOTE_ORIGIN'] + path +
- '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN'] +
- '&ACACredentials=true');
+ '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN']);
document.body.appendChild(frame);
return getLoadedFrameAsObject(frame);
})
@@ -184,8 +183,7 @@ async_test(function(t) {
var win = window.open(
scope + '?mode=cors&url=' +
encodeURIComponent(host_info['HTTPS_REMOTE_ORIGIN'] + path +
- '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN'] +
- '&ACACredentials=true'));
+ '?ACAOrigin=' + host_info['HTTPS_ORIGIN']));
return getLoadedWindowAsObject(win);
})
.then(function(result) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From f5545f8af22ce7199b0b82cc10989b31ecfdec01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:16:22 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569: Disable hsts priming for loads of type
subdocument for wpt tests"
This reverts commit 5d9ae788d5fe66da0f687e941d5ef90880641fd5.
---
.../top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
.../iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
.../top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
.../top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
.../iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
.../top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini | 3 ---
6 files changed, 18 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
delete mode 100644 testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/cross-origin-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/keep-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/no-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
diff --git a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini b/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
deleted file mode 100644
index c65b27a08..000000000
--- a/testing/web-platform/meta/mixed-content/blockable/no-opt-in/same-host-http/iframe-tag/top-level/swap-scheme-redirect/no-opt-in-blocks.https.html.ini
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-[no-opt-in-blocks.https.html]
- type: testharness
- prefs: [security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming:false, security.mixed_content.use_hsts:false]
--
cgit v1.2.3
From ee4f7c4aa17068cfda347fb6ce51ca0b1958fbb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:16:35 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569: Update tests when converting docshell loads to
use AynscOpen2"
This reverts commit b73225e886f84182384a2b5b09f83e51501bdc38.
---
dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js | 1 +
dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html | 22 ++++------------------
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js b/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
index 2727b9530..1f9606c49 100644
--- a/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
+++ b/dom/base/test/file_simplecontentpolicy.js
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ var policy = {
{
// Remember last content type seen for the test url
if (contentLocation.spec.endsWith(urlSuffix)) {
+ assert.ok(frame === browserElement, "correct <browser> element");
sendAsyncMessage("shouldLoad", {contentType: contentType, isTopLevel: isTopLevel});
return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST;
}
diff --git a/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html b/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
index d18dbbff2..04c34daaf 100644
--- a/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
+++ b/dom/plugins/test/mochitest/test_bug813906.html
@@ -18,35 +18,21 @@ function f() {
</script>
<script type="application/javascript">
-SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout(
- "Blocking an iframe does not cause the onerror event to be fired");
-
SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
setTestPluginEnabledState(SpecialPowers.Ci.nsIPluginTag.STATE_ENABLED);
var frameLoadCount = 0;
-
-function frameNavBlocked() {
- isnot(SpecialPowers.wrap(window.frame1).location.href.indexOf('chrome://'),
- 0, 'plugin shouldnt be able to cause navigation to chrome URLs');
- SimpleTest.finish();
-}
-
function frameLoaded() {
frameLoadCount++;
if (frameLoadCount == 1) {
document.getElementsByTagName("object")[0].type = "application/x-test";
document.getElementsByTagName("use")[0].setAttributeNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink", "href", location.href + "#a");
-
- // wait two seconds and verify that frame navigation did not succeed
- setTimeout(frameNavBlocked, 2000);
- return;
+ } else if (frameLoadCount == 2) {
+ isnot(SpecialPowers.wrap(window.frame1).location.href.indexOf('chrome://'),
+ 0, 'plugin shouldnt be able to cause navigation to chrome URLs');
+ SimpleTest.finish();
}
- // we should never get here, but just in case, make sure the test fails in that case.
- ok(false, "onload() event should not fire for blocked navigation");
- SimpleTest.finish();
}
-
</script>
<!-- Note that <svg:use> ends up creating an anonymous subtree, which means that the plugin
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 13f3978a14cb90eb01fc7f185f62b2ee2ac9f466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:16:58 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569 - Skip security check for plugins using newstream
attribute"
This reverts commit 5b0f4649b3fee771379af60ec04d43b8a525cf80.
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 28 ++++++++--------------------
docshell/base/nsDocShell.h | 6 ++----
docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h | 10 ++--------
dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp | 2 +-
dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp | 25 +++++++++++--------------
5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index 8167a76ec..6810d0179 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -13888,8 +13888,7 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal);
+ bool aIsTrusted);
NS_IMETHOD Run() override
{
@@ -13905,7 +13904,7 @@ public:
mHandler->OnLinkClickSync(mContent, mURI,
mTargetSpec.get(), mFileName,
mPostDataStream, mHeadersDataStream,
- nullptr, nullptr, mTriggeringPrincipal);
+ nullptr, nullptr);
}
return NS_OK;
}
@@ -13920,7 +13919,6 @@ private:
nsCOMPtr<nsIContent> mContent;
PopupControlState mPopupState;
bool mIsTrusted;
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mTriggeringPrincipal;
};
OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
@@ -13930,8 +13928,7 @@ OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
+ bool aIsTrusted)
: mHandler(aHandler)
, mURI(aURI)
, mTargetSpec(aTargetSpec)
@@ -13941,7 +13938,6 @@ OnLinkClickEvent::OnLinkClickEvent(nsDocShell* aHandler,
, mContent(aContent)
, mPopupState(mHandler->mScriptGlobal->GetPopupControlState())
, mIsTrusted(aIsTrusted)
- , mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
}
@@ -13952,8 +13948,7 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
+ bool aIsTrusted)
{
NS_ASSERTION(NS_IsMainThread(), "wrong thread");
@@ -13992,8 +13987,7 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> ev =
new OnLinkClickEvent(this, aContent, aURI, target.get(), aFileName,
- aPostDataStream, aHeadersDataStream,
- aIsTrusted, aTriggeringPrincipal);
+ aPostDataStream, aHeadersDataStream, aIsTrusted);
return NS_DispatchToCurrentThread(ev);
}
@@ -14005,8 +13999,7 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell,
- nsIRequest** aRequest,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal)
+ nsIRequest** aRequest)
{
// Initialize the DocShell / Request
if (aDocShell) {
@@ -14129,18 +14122,13 @@ nsDocShell::OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
- // if the triggeringPrincipal is not passed explicitly, then we
- // fall back to using doc->NodePrincipal() as the triggeringPrincipal.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal =
- aTriggeringPrincipal ? aTriggeringPrincipal
- : aContent->NodePrincipal();
-
nsresult rv = InternalLoad(clonedURI, // New URI
nullptr, // Original URI
false, // LoadReplace
referer, // Referer URI
refererPolicy, // Referer policy
- triggeringPrincipal,
+ aContent->NodePrincipal(), // Triggering is our node's
+ // principal
aContent->NodePrincipal(),
flags,
target, // Window target
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
index f510a15b0..63a4e3358 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h
@@ -201,8 +201,7 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal) override;
+ bool aIsTrusted) override;
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
const char16_t* aTargetSpec,
@@ -210,8 +209,7 @@ public:
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream = 0,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream = 0,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell = 0,
- nsIRequest** aRequest = 0,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal = nullptr) override;
+ nsIRequest** aRequest = 0) override;
NS_IMETHOD OnOverLink(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
const char16_t* aTargetSpec) override;
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h b/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
index 7069f1f1d..7cdcd566d 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
+++ b/docshell/base/nsILinkHandler.h
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ public:
* @param aFileName non-null when the link should be downloaded as the given file
* @param aHeadersDataStream ???
* @param aIsTrusted false if the triggerer is an untrusted DOM event.
- * @param aTriggeringPrincipal, if not passed explicitly we fall back to
- * the document's principal.
*/
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClick(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
@@ -46,8 +44,7 @@ public:
const nsAString& aFileName,
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream,
- bool aIsTrusted,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal) = 0;
+ bool aIsTrusted) = 0;
/**
* Process a click on a link.
@@ -64,8 +61,6 @@ public:
* @param aHeadersDataStream ???
* @param aDocShell (out-param) the DocShell that the request was opened on
* @param aRequest the request that was opened
- * @param aTriggeringPrincipal, if not passed explicitly we fall back to
- * the document's principal.
*/
NS_IMETHOD OnLinkClickSync(nsIContent* aContent,
nsIURI* aURI,
@@ -74,8 +69,7 @@ public:
nsIInputStream* aPostDataStream = 0,
nsIInputStream* aHeadersDataStream = 0,
nsIDocShell** aDocShell = 0,
- nsIRequest** aRequest = 0,
- nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal = nullptr) = 0;
+ nsIRequest** aRequest = 0) = 0;
/**
* Process a mouse-over a link.
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
index c3ff2b4d8..ef87a250e 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
@@ -5100,7 +5100,7 @@ nsContentUtils::TriggerLink(nsIContent *aContent, nsPresContext *aPresContext,
handler->OnLinkClick(aContent, aLinkURI,
fileName.IsVoid() ? aTargetSpec.get() : EmptyString().get(),
- fileName, nullptr, nullptr, aIsTrusted, aContent->NodePrincipal());
+ fileName, nullptr, nullptr, aIsTrusted);
}
}
diff --git a/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp b/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
index 7de6c2b73..b7651be1a 100644
--- a/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
+++ b/dom/plugins/base/nsPluginInstanceOwner.cpp
@@ -535,6 +535,16 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsPluginInstanceOwner::GetURL(const char *aURL,
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), aURL, baseURI);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+ if (aDoCheckLoadURIChecks) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptSecurityManager> secMan(
+ do_GetService(NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv));
+ NS_ENSURE_TRUE(secMan, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+ rv = secMan->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(content->NodePrincipal(), uri,
+ nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ }
+
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> headersDataStream;
if (aPostStream && aHeadersData) {
if (!aHeadersDataLen)
@@ -553,21 +563,8 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsPluginInstanceOwner::GetURL(const char *aURL,
Preferences::GetInt("privacy.popups.disable_from_plugins");
nsAutoPopupStatePusher popupStatePusher((PopupControlState)blockPopups);
-
- // if security checks (in particular CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal) needs
- // to be skipped we are creating a codebasePrincipal to make sure
- // that security check succeeds. Please note that we do not want to
- // fall back to using the systemPrincipal, because that would also
- // bypass ContentPolicy checks which should still be enforced.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal;
- if (!aDoCheckLoadURIChecks) {
- mozilla::PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs =
- BasePrincipal::Cast(content->NodePrincipal())->OriginAttributesRef();
- triggeringPrincipal = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(uri, attrs);
- }
-
rv = lh->OnLinkClick(content, uri, unitarget.get(), NullString(),
- aPostStream, headersDataStream, true, triggeringPrincipal);
+ aPostStream, headersDataStream, true);
return rv;
}
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 115cf1e322bdabaee001781e1d5a8ee4928992af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:17:09 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569: Update ContentSecurityManager to handle docshell
loads"
This reverts commit 2e33335820b2816bee111e78588ac82e401c86ae.
---
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 81 +++++++------------------------
netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp | 14 ++++--
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 458f41144..9329c558a 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
-#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
-#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
-#include "nsINestedURI.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
@@ -247,6 +244,10 @@ DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
static nsresult
DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
@@ -254,24 +255,12 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr;
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
- nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
- if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
- contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
- // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
- // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
- // perform proper security checks.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
- rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
- uri = fixedURI;
- }
- }
- }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
+ // initiated by javascript tests.
+ bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
+ skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
+#endif
switch(contentPolicyType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
@@ -305,14 +294,16 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
- mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
- requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
+ requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document");
break;
}
@@ -456,32 +447,18 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
}
- // For document loads we use the triggeringPrincipal as the originPrincipal.
- // Note the the loadingPrincipal for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT is a nullptr.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal =
- (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
- contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)
- ? aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()
- : aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
-
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType,
uri,
- principal,
+ aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(),
requestingContext,
mimeTypeGuess,
nullptr, //extra,
&shouldLoad,
nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(),
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager());
-
- if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
- if ((NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) &&
- (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
- contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
- // for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
- return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
- }
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
@@ -629,30 +606,6 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
- loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
-
- if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
- contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
- // query the nested URI for security checks like in the case of view-source
- nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri);
- if (nestedURI) {
- nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
- }
-
- // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
- // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
- // perform proper security checks.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
- rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
- if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
- uri = fixedURI;
- }
- }
- }
-
// Handle cookie policies
uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
index bc9bcf88a..8ff3e788f 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
@@ -1285,10 +1285,16 @@ NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(nsIChannel* aChannel, bool aReport)
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(loadInfo, "Origin tracking only works for channels created with a loadinfo");
- // TYPE_DOCUMENT loads have a null LoadingPrincipal and can not be cross origin.
- if (!loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) {
- return false;
- }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
+ // initiated by javascript tests.
+ bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
+ skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
+#endif
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck ||
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "calling NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin on a top level load");
// Always treat tainted channels as cross-origin.
if (loadInfo->GetTainting() != LoadTainting::Basic) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From 30621a6307171f009948001b3730c5b61b894048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2018 22:17:18 +0200
Subject: Revert "Bug 1182569: Use AsyncOpen2 for docshell loads"
This reverts commit 29bd11c3cd6ff41f7167530f9bbcd9d195b7c427.
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 23 +++++++++++++++---
dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp | 2 +-
3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index 6810d0179..b1fcc5c23 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIScrollableFrame.h"
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" // NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(...)
#include "nsISeekableStream.h"
#include "nsAutoPtr.h"
#include "nsQueryObject.h"
@@ -1643,7 +1644,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadStream(nsIInputStream* aStream, nsIURI* aURI,
uri,
aStream,
triggeringPrincipal,
- nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL,
+ nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL,
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER,
aContentType,
aContentCharset);
@@ -9942,6 +9943,23 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
rv = extraStr->SetData(msg);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+ rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(contentType,
+ aURI,
+ aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ requestingContext,
+ EmptyCString(), // mime guess
+ extraStr, // extra
+ &shouldLoad);
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) {
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
+ }
+
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+ }
+
// If HSTS priming was set by nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad, and we
// would block due to mixed content, go ahead and block here. If we try to
// proceed with priming, we will error out later on.
@@ -10931,8 +10949,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
}
nsLoadFlags loadFlags = mDefaultLoadFlags;
- nsSecurityFlags securityFlags =
- nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL;
+ nsSecurityFlags securityFlags = nsILoadInfo::SEC_NORMAL;
if (aFirstParty) {
// tag first party URL loads
diff --git a/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp b/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
index 90171db10..cdb63f890 100644
--- a/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
+++ b/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "nsIContentViewer.h"
#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "nsJSUtils.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nsIScriptChannel.h"
@@ -335,7 +336,7 @@ public:
NS_FORWARD_SAFE_NSIPROPERTYBAG(mPropertyBag)
NS_FORWARD_SAFE_NSIPROPERTYBAG2(mPropertyBag)
- nsresult Init(nsIURI *aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+ nsresult Init(nsIURI *aURI);
// Actually evaluate the script.
void EvaluateScript();
@@ -353,16 +354,17 @@ protected:
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mStreamChannel;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPropertyBag2> mPropertyBag;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> mListener; // Our final listener
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mContext; // The context passed to AsyncOpen
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> mOriginalInnerWindow; // The inner window our load
// started against.
- // If we blocked onload on a document in AsyncOpen2, this is the document we
+ // If we blocked onload on a document in AsyncOpen, this is the document we
// did it on.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn;
nsresult mStatus; // Our status
nsLoadFlags mLoadFlags;
- nsLoadFlags mActualLoadFlags; // See AsyncOpen2
+ nsLoadFlags mActualLoadFlags; // See AsyncOpen
RefPtr<nsJSThunk> mIOThunk;
PopupControlState mPopupState;
@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ nsresult nsJSChannel::StopAll()
return rv;
}
-nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI *aURI)
{
RefPtr<nsJSURI> jsURI;
nsresult rv = aURI->QueryInterface(kJSURICID,
@@ -416,13 +418,21 @@ nsresult nsJSChannel::Init(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
// Remember, until AsyncOpen is called, the script will not be evaluated
// and the underlying Input Stream will not be created...
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
- rv = NS_NewInputStreamChannelInternal(getter_AddRefs(channel),
- aURI,
- mIOThunk,
- NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html"),
- EmptyCString(),
- aLoadInfo);
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
+
+ // If the resultant script evaluation actually does return a value, we
+ // treat it as html.
+ // The following channel is never openend, so it does not matter what
+ // securityFlags we pass; let's follow the principle of least privilege.
+ rv = NS_NewInputStreamChannel(getter_AddRefs(channel),
+ aURI,
+ mIOThunk,
+ nullPrincipal,
+ nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED,
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER,
+ NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html"));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = mIOThunk->Init(aURI);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
@@ -553,7 +563,6 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
"security flags in loadInfo but asyncOpen2() not called");
}
#endif
- MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(!aContext, "please call AsyncOpen2()");
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aListener);
@@ -575,6 +584,7 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
}
mListener = aListener;
+ mContext = aContext;
mIsActive = true;
@@ -645,7 +655,7 @@ nsJSChannel::AsyncOpen(nsIStreamListener *aListener, nsISupports *aContext)
return mStatus;
}
- // We're returning success from asyncOpen2(), but we didn't open a
+ // We're returning success from asyncOpen(), but we didn't open a
// stream channel. We'll have to notify ourselves, but make sure to do
// it asynchronously.
method = &nsJSChannel::NotifyListener;
@@ -762,7 +772,7 @@ nsJSChannel::EvaluateScript()
return;
}
- mStatus = mStreamChannel->AsyncOpen2(this);
+ mStatus = mStreamChannel->AsyncOpen(this, mContext);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mStatus)) {
// mStreamChannel will call OnStartRequest and OnStopRequest on
// us, so we'll be sure to call them on our listener.
@@ -790,8 +800,8 @@ nsJSChannel::EvaluateScript()
void
nsJSChannel::NotifyListener()
{
- mListener->OnStartRequest(this, nullptr);
- mListener->OnStopRequest(this, nullptr, mStatus);
+ mListener->OnStartRequest(this, mContext);
+ mListener->OnStopRequest(this, mContext, mStatus);
CleanupStrongRefs();
}
@@ -800,6 +810,7 @@ void
nsJSChannel::CleanupStrongRefs()
{
mListener = nullptr;
+ mContext = nullptr;
mOriginalInnerWindow = nullptr;
if (mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn) {
mDocumentOnloadBlockedOn->UnblockOnload(false);
@@ -1229,7 +1240,11 @@ nsJSProtocolHandler::NewChannel2(nsIURI* uri,
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
- rv = channel->Init(uri, aLoadInfo);
+ rv = channel->Init(uri);
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ // set the loadInfo on the new channel
+ rv = channel->SetLoadInfo(aLoadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
diff --git a/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp b/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
index ea370aa37..69475d68f 100644
--- a/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
+++ b/uriloader/base/nsURILoader.cpp
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsURILoader::OpenURI(nsIChannel *channel,
// the preferred protocol handler.
// But for now, I'm going to let necko do the work for us....
- rv = channel->AsyncOpen2(loader);
+ rv = channel->AsyncOpen(loader, nullptr);
// no content from this load - that's OK.
if (rv == NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT) {
--
cgit v1.2.3
From ccbd5ecf57fcd53ac8b28ddf7466b6c930f764df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: janekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 00:13:56 +0200
Subject: moebius#187: DOM - nsIContentPolicy - context (document)
https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/187
---
docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp | 74 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp | 6 ++-
dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 63 +++++++++++++++++---------
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp | 15 +++++++
netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h | 7 ++-
netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl | 10 +++++
6 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
index b1fcc5c23..bd2a8a433 100644
--- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
+++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp
@@ -9896,40 +9896,29 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI,
contentType = nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT;
}
- // If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new window,
- // perform a content policy check before creating the window.
- if (!targetDocShell) {
- nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement;
+ // If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new
+ // window (or aWindowTarget is empty). Perform a content policy check before
+ // creating the window. Please note for all other docshell loads
+ // content policy checks are performed within the contentSecurityManager
+ // when the channel is about to be openend.
+ if (!targetDocShell && !aWindowTarget.IsEmpty()) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "opening a new window requires type to be TYPE_DOCUMENT");
+
nsISupports* requestingContext = nullptr;
- if (contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
- if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
- // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that
- // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome
- // process). So we just pass mScriptGlobal.
- requestingContext = ToSupports(mScriptGlobal);
- } else {
- // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various
- // sorts.
- // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null.
- requestingElement = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal();
- requestingContext = requestingElement;
- }
+ if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
+ // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that
+ // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome
+ // process). So we just pass mScriptGlobal.
+ requestingContext = ToSupports(mScriptGlobal);
} else {
- requestingElement = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal();
+ // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various
+ // sorts.
+ // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null.
+ nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement =
+ mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal();
requestingContext = requestingElement;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
- if (requestingElement) {
- // Get the docshell type for requestingElement.
- nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> requestingDoc = requestingElement->OwnerDoc();
- nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> elementDocShell = requestingDoc->GetDocShell();
-
- // requestingElement docshell type = current docshell type.
- MOZ_ASSERT(mItemType == elementDocShell->ItemType(),
- "subframes should have the same docshell type as their parent");
- }
-#endif
}
// Since Content Policy checks are performed within docShell as well as
@@ -10911,17 +10900,40 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> loadingNode;
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> loadingWindow;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> topLevelLoadingContext;
if (aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
loadingNode = nullptr;
loadingPrincipal = nullptr;
loadingWindow = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter();
+ if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
+ // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that
+ // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome
+ // process).
+ nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = GetTabChild();
+ topLevelLoadingContext = ToSupports(tabChild);
+ } else {
+ // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various
+ // sorts.
+ // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null.
+ nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement =
+ loadingWindow->GetFrameElementInternal();
+ topLevelLoadingContext = requestingElement;
+ }
} else {
loadingWindow = nullptr;
loadingNode = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal();
if (loadingNode) {
// If we have a loading node, then use that as our loadingPrincipal.
loadingPrincipal = loadingNode->NodePrincipal();
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ // Get the docshell type for requestingElement.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> requestingDoc = loadingNode->OwnerDoc();
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> elementDocShell = requestingDoc->GetDocShell();
+ // requestingElement docshell type = current docshell type.
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mItemType == elementDocShell->ItemType(),
+ "subframes should have the same docshell type as their parent");
+#endif
} else {
// If this isn't a top-level load and mScriptGlobal's frame element is
// null, then the element got removed from the DOM while we were trying
@@ -10971,7 +10983,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI,
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo =
(aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) ?
- new LoadInfo(loadingWindow, aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ new LoadInfo(loadingWindow, aTriggeringPrincipal, topLevelLoadingContext,
securityFlags) :
new LoadInfo(loadingPrincipal, aTriggeringPrincipal, loadingNode,
securityFlags, aContentPolicyType);
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp
index 337debcea..5511b9086 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "nsIDOMElement.h"
#include "nsIDOMNode.h"
#include "nsIDOMWindow.h"
+#include "nsITabChild.h"
#include "nsIContent.h"
#include "nsILoadContext.h"
#include "nsCOMArray.h"
@@ -89,8 +90,9 @@ nsContentPolicy::CheckPolicy(CPMethod policyMethod,
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMNode> node(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> window(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext));
- NS_ASSERTION(!requestingContext || node || window,
- "Context should be a DOM node or a DOM window!");
+ nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext));
+ NS_ASSERTION(!requestingContext || node || window || tabChild,
+ "Context should be a DOM node, DOM window or a tabChild!");
}
#endif
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 9329c558a..0cc4933fe 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
- nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestingContext = nullptr;
#ifdef DEBUG
// Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
@@ -327,10 +327,13 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
// alias nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DATAREQUEST:
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
-
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ }
+#endif
// We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
// an addon creates a request with that type.
if (internalContentPolicyType ==
@@ -351,18 +354,26 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
- "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+ "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
+ }
+#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ }
+#endif
break;
}
@@ -380,9 +391,13 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
}
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
- "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+ "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
+ }
+#endif
break;
}
@@ -409,18 +424,26 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/xml");
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ }
+#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+ "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
+ }
+#endif
break;
}
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
index 9923f6d30..ede825b8f 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
aTriggeringPrincipal : mLoadingPrincipal.get())
, mPrincipalToInherit(nullptr)
, mLoadingContext(do_GetWeakReference(aLoadingContext))
+ , mContextForTopLevelLoad(nullptr)
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
@@ -218,10 +219,12 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
*/
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ nsISupports* aContextForTopLevelLoad,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags)
: mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
, mPrincipalToInherit(nullptr)
+ , mContextForTopLevelLoad(do_GetWeakReference(aContextForTopLevelLoad))
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
@@ -281,6 +284,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(rhs.mTriggeringPrincipal)
, mPrincipalToInherit(rhs.mPrincipalToInherit)
, mLoadingContext(rhs.mLoadingContext)
+ , mContextForTopLevelLoad(rhs.mContextForTopLevelLoad)
, mSecurityFlags(rhs.mSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(rhs.mInternalContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(rhs.mTainting)
@@ -488,6 +492,17 @@ LoadInfo::LoadingNode()
return node;
}
+nsISupports*
+LoadInfo::ContextForTopLevelLoad()
+{
+ // Most likely you want to query LoadingNode() instead of
+ // ContextForTopLevelLoad() if this assertion fires.
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+ "should only query this context for top level document loads");
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> context = do_QueryReferent(mContextForTopLevelLoad);
+ return context;
+}
+
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags* aResult)
{
diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
index 86cfddc68..0ae6061b3 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
+++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h
@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ public:
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType);
- // Constructor used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads which have no reasonable
- // loadingNode or loadingPrincipal
+ // Constructor used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads which have a different
+ // loadingContext than other loads. This ContextForTopLevelLoad is
+ // only used for content policy checks.
LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
+ nsISupports* aContextForTopLevelLoad,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags);
// create an exact copy of the loadinfo
@@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ private:
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mTriggeringPrincipal;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mPrincipalToInherit;
nsWeakPtr mLoadingContext;
+ nsWeakPtr mContextForTopLevelLoad;
nsSecurityFlags mSecurityFlags;
nsContentPolicyType mInternalContentPolicyType;
LoadTainting mTainting;
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
index 5b35736e5..4ec29b972 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl
@@ -323,6 +323,16 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingNode)]
nsINode binaryLoadingNode();
+ /**
+ * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext for toplevel loads.
+ * Most likely you want to query the ownerDocument or LoadingNode
+ * and not this context only available for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads.
+ * Please note that except for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, this
+ * ContextForTopLevelLoad will always return null.
+ */
+ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(ContextForTopLevelLoad)]
+ nsISupports binaryContextForTopLevelLoad();
+
/**
* The securityFlags of that channel.
*/
--
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