diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 13350 |
1 files changed, 13350 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..186ce23f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -0,0 +1,13350 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "sechash.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "nssoptions.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "blapi.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB +#include "zlib.h" +#endif + +#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x, id, v, l) \ + (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue = (v); \ + (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#endif + +static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + SECItem *comps, + sslSessionID *sid); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr); +static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); + +static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, + int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, + int inputLen); + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType); +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash); +PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); + +#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ +#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 + +/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. + * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites + * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c) + * + * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher + * suites to this list. + */ +/* clang-format off */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { + /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */ + /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */ + { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around + * bug 946147. + */ + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* RSA */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */ + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* ciphersuites with no encryption */ + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +/* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the + * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine + * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that + * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The + * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for + * cipher suites just for consistency. + */ +static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = { + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha256, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha384, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha512, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha1 +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <= + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); + +/* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order. + */ +#ifdef DEBUG +void +ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() +{ + unsigned int i; + + PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites)); + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) { + PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite); + } +} +#endif + +/* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we + * implement. + */ +static const SSLCompressionMethod ssl_compression_methods[] = { +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB + ssl_compression_deflate, +#endif + ssl_compression_null +}; + +static const unsigned int ssl_compression_method_count = + PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_compression_methods); + +/* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled + * for the given SSL socket. */ +static PRBool +ssl_CompressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + if (compression == ssl_compression_null) { + return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */ + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* We can't easily check that the client didn't attempt TLS 1.3, + * so this will have to do. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + version = ss->version; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_FALSE; + } +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB + if (compression == ssl_compression_deflate) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return ss->opt.enableDeflate; + } +#endif + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { + ct_RSA_sign, + ct_ECDSA_sign, + ct_DSS_sign, +}; + +/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by +** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(). +*/ +CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL; +static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; + +/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher. + * + * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than + * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the + * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only + * rarely hit this limit. See bug 1268745 for details. + */ +#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX /* 2^48-1 */ +#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */ +#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20) /* For weak ciphers. */ +/* clang-format off */ +static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = { + /* |--------- Lengths ---------| */ + /* cipher calg : s : */ + /* : e b n */ + /* oid short_name mr : l o */ + /* k r o t n */ + /* e e i c a c */ + /* y t type v k g e */ + {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_RC4, "RC4", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, "SEED-CBC", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_chacha20, calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 12, 0,16, 0, + SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, "missing", 0U}, +}; + +static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = +{ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ + {kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0}, + {kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA}, + {kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS}, + {kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA}, + {kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS}, + {kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA}, + {kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON}, + {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA}, + {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA}, + {kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA}, + {kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA}, + {kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON}, + {kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK}, + {kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK}, + {kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY}, +}; + +/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = +{ +/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ +/* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ + + {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + +/* New TLS cipher suites */ + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384}, +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = { + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */ + CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */ + CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */ + CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */ +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size); + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */ +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size); + +typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; +} SSLCipher2Mech; + +/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ +static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { + /* calg, cmech */ + { calg_null, (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, + { calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, + { calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, + { calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, + { calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, + { calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, + { calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, + { calg_chacha20, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, + /* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ +}; + +#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L +#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC +#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC +#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC +#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC +#define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC +#define mmech_sha384_hmac CKM_SHA384_HMAC + +/* clang-format off */ +static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ + /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */ + /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ + { mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 , 0}, + { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 }, + { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, + {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5}, + {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, + {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256}, + { mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0, 0 }, + {hmac_sha384, mmech_sha384_hmac, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384} +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +const PRUint8 tls13_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; +const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random) == + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)); + +/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of + * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey + * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is + * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field + * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes. + * + * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits + * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params + * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS + * supports arbitrary curves. + */ +#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 + +typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr { + PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ + PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ + PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ + PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ + PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */ + /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */ +} ECCWrappedKeyInfo; + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg) +{ + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + return alg2Mech[calg].cmech; +} + +#if defined(TRACE) + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) +{ + char *rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch (msgType) { + case hello_request: + rv = "hello_request (0)"; + break; + case client_hello: + rv = "client_hello (1)"; + break; + case server_hello: + rv = "server_hello (2)"; + break; + case hello_verify_request: + rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; + break; + case new_session_ticket: + rv = "session_ticket (4)"; + break; + case hello_retry_request: + rv = "hello_retry_request (6)"; + break; + case encrypted_extensions: + rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)"; + break; + case certificate: + rv = "certificate (11)"; + break; + case server_key_exchange: + rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; + break; + case certificate_request: + rv = "certificate_request (13)"; + break; + case server_hello_done: + rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; + break; + case certificate_verify: + rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; + break; + case client_key_exchange: + rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; + break; + case finished: + rv = "finished (20)"; + break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) +{ + char *rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch (msgType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; + break; + case content_alert: + rv = "alert (21)"; + break; + case content_handshake: + rv = "handshake (22)"; + break; + case content_application_data: + rv = "application_data (23)"; + break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +#endif + +SSL3Statistics * +SSL_GetStatistics(void) +{ + return &ssl3stats; +} + +typedef struct tooLongStr { +#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) + PRInt32 low; + PRInt32 high; +#else + PRInt32 high; + PRInt32 low; +#endif +} tooLong; + +void +SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x) +{ + if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) { + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x); + } else { + tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x; + if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0) + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high); + } +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange( + ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + switch (cipherSuite) { + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and + * point formats.*/ + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + default: + return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + } +} + +/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + int cipher_suite_def_len = + sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite, + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &suites[i]; + } + /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +const static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite, + CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites)); +} + +static PRBool +ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + switch (keaType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + case ssl_kea_dh_psk: { + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client + * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups + * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */ + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true: + * 1. We don't require named groups. + * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups. + * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3. + * 4. The weak group is enabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } else { + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups + * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups + * are not required. */ + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh); + } + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk: + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh); + + case ssl_kea_tls13_any: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_fortezza: + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (cert->certType.authType != authType) { + continue; + } + if (!cert->serverKeyPair || + !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !cert->serverCertChain) { + continue; + } + /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be + * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement + * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the + * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(), + * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve. */ + if ((authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +const ssl3BulkCipherDef * +ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def) +{ + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(bulk_cipher_defs)); + PORT_Assert(bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].cipher == cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg); + return &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg]; +} + +/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match + * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, + * regardless of policy or user preference. + * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. + */ +int +ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; + SSLAuthType authType; + SSLKEAType keaType; + int i; + int numPresent = 0; + int numEnabled = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->enabled) { + ++numEnabled; + /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle + * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. + */ + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + if (!cipher_def) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + continue; + } + cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg; + cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg); + + /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ + suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType; + if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, authType)) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; + if (keaType != ssl_kea_null && + keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any && + !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (cipher_alg != calg_null && + !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (suite->isPresent) { + ++numPresent; + } + } + } + PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); + if (numPresent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + } + return numPresent; +} + +/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy, + * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is + * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */ +static PRBool +config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + + PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) + return PR_FALSE; + + if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent) + return PR_FALSE; + + if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) || + (suite->policy > policy)) + return PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL); + kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg]; + PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL); + if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, kea_def->authKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange); +} + +/* Return the number of cipher suites that are usable. */ +/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello */ +static int +count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) + count++; + } + if (count <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + } + return count; +} + +/* + * Null compression, mac and encryption functions + */ +static SECStatus +Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, + const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) +{ + if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) { + *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + *outputLen = inputLen; + if (input != output) + PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * SSL3 Utility functions + */ + +/* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the + * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the + * highest enabled version. + * + * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest + * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, + PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) +{ + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min || + (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); + PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, ss->version)); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Used by the client when the server produces a version number. + * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */ +SECStatus +ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, unsigned int *len, + SSL3ProtocolVersion *version) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion v; + PRInt32 temp; + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, len); + if (temp < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ + } + +#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + if (temp == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, protocol_version); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + if (temp == tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + v = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + } else { + v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + } +#else + v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; +#endif + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* If this fails, we get 0 back and the next check to fails. */ + v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v); + } + + PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); + if (ss->vrange.min > v || ss->vrange.max < v) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + (v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + *version = v; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + SECItem *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + SECItem hashItem; + + buf->data = NULL; + + switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + break; + case dsaKey: + doDerEncode = isTLS; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + case ecKey: + doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; + + if (signatureLen <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + + buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; + buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); + if (!buf->data) + goto done; /* error code was set. */ + + if (useRsaPss) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } + + rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem); + } else { + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); + rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); + } else if (doDerEncode) { + SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ + rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ + *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ + } else if (derSig.data) { + PORT_Free(derSig.data); + } + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len)); +done: + if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); + buf->data = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECItem *buf) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *key; + SECItem *signature = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem hashItem; + SECOidTag encAlg; + SECOidTag hashAlg; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", + buf->data, buf->len)); + + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (key == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case dsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 || + buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) { + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + goto loser; + } + buf = signature; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + } + break; + + case ecKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. + * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1 + * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with + * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA. + */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + } + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", + hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + if (isRsaPssScheme || + hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) { + /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded. + * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code + * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when + * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify. + */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; + + if (isRsaPssScheme) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } + + rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); + } else { + rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg, + pwArg); + } + if (signature) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + } + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; + } + +loser: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = SECSuccess; + PORT_SetError(0); +#endif + return rv; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash + * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. + * + * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, + PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECOidTag hashOID; + + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + } else { + hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg); + hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID); + if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes, + SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY) +{ + PRUint8 *hashBuf; + PRUint8 *pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen, yLen; + PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096 / 8 + 2 + 4096 / 8]; + + PORT_Assert(dh_p.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_g.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data); + + yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; + bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + + 2 + dh_p.len + + 2 + dh_g.len + + 2 + yLen; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_p.len, 2, pBuf); + memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len); + pBuf += dh_p.len; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_g.len, 2, pBuf); + memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len); + pBuf += dh_g.len; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(yLen, 2, pBuf); + if (padY && dh_p.len > dh_Ys.len) { + memset(pBuf, 0, dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len; + } + /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */ + PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len); + memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += dh_Ys.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + } else { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + } + } + + if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +/* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */ +static void +ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat) +{ + if (mat->write_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); + mat->write_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); + mat->write_mac_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + mat->write_mac_context = NULL; + } +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() +** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info +** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock. +*/ +void +ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName) +{ + /* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ + if (spec->encodeContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(spec->encodeContext, PR_TRUE); + spec->encodeContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->decodeContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(spec->decodeContext, PR_TRUE); + spec->decodeContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) { + spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1); + spec->compressContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) { + spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1); + spec->decompressContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->master_secret != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); + spec->master_secret = NULL; + } + spec->msItem.data = NULL; + spec->msItem.len = 0; + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client); + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server); + spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; +} + +/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite. +** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material. +** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello() +** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. +** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec); + + /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + + pwSpec->version = ss->version; + isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + + suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + if (suite_def == NULL) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ + PORT_Assert(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); + } + + kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; + mac = suite_def->mac_alg; + if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS) + mac += 2; + + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); + + pwSpec->cipher_def = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite_def); + + pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac]; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac); + + pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + + pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size; + + pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; + pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral); + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_aead); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB +#define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream) + +static SECStatus +ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error) +{ + switch (zlib_error) { + case Z_OK: + return SECSuccess; + default: + return SECFailure; + } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context) +{ + z_stream *context = void_context; + context->zalloc = NULL; + context->zfree = NULL; + context->opaque = NULL; + + return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION)); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context) +{ + z_stream *context = void_context; + context->zalloc = NULL; + context->zfree = NULL; + context->opaque = NULL; + context->next_in = NULL; + context->avail_in = 0; + + return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context)); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, + int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) +{ + z_stream *context = void_context; + + if (!inlen) { + *out_len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; + context->avail_in = inlen; + context->next_out = out; + context->avail_out = maxout; + if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (context->avail_out == 0) { + /* We ran out of space! */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing", + SSL_GETPID())); + return SECFailure; + } + + *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, + int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen) +{ + z_stream *context = void_context; + + if (!inlen) { + *out_len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; + context->avail_in = inlen; + context->next_out = out; + context->avail_out = maxout; + if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) +{ + deflateEnd(void_context); + PORT_Free(void_context); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) +{ + inflateEnd(void_context); + PORT_Free(void_context); + return SECSuccess; +} + +#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ + +/* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given + * CipherSpec. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec) +{ + /* Setup the compression functions */ + switch (pwSpec->compression_method) { + case ssl_compression_null: + pwSpec->compressor = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressor = NULL; + pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + break; +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB + case ssl_compression_deflate: + pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress; + pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress; + pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext; + ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext); + ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext); + break; +#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named + * PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits + */ +static SECItem * +ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits) +{ + SECItem *param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv); + if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) { + switch (mtype) { + case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: + case CKM_RC2_ECB: + case CKM_RC2_CBC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: + case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: + *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits; + default: + break; + } + } + return param; +} + +/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data + * which is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |out| and returns + * its length. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the + * definition of the AEAD additional data. + * + * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which + * pseudo-header defintiion to use should be decided based on the version of + * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT + * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed + * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version| + * argument should be the record's version value. + */ +static unsigned int +ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out, + sslSequenceNumber seq_num, + SSL3ContentType type, + PRBool includesVersion, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + PRBool isDTLS, + int length) +{ + out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 56); + out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 48); + out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 40); + out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 32); + out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 24); + out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 16); + out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 8); + out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 0); + out[8] = type; + + /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */ + if (!includesVersion) { + out[9] = MSB(length); + out[10] = LSB(length); + return 11; + } + + /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ + if (isDTLS) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version; + + dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + out[9] = MSB(dtls_version); + out[10] = LSB(dtls_version); + } else { + out[9] = MSB(version); + out[10] = LSB(version); + } + out[11] = MSB(length); + out[12] = LSB(length); + return 13; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, + PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, + int *outlen, + int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, + int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + SECItem param; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + unsigned int uOutLen; + CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; + + const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].tag_size; + const int explicitNonceLen = + bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].explicit_nonce_size; + + /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the + * nonce is formed. */ + memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4); + if (doDecrypt) { + memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen); + in += explicitNonceLen; + inlen -= explicitNonceLen; + *outlen = 0; + } else { + if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */ + memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); + memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); + out += explicitNonceLen; + maxout -= explicitNonceLen; + *outlen = explicitNonceLen; + } + + param.type = siBuffer; + param.data = (unsigned char *)&gcmParams; + param.len = sizeof(gcmParams); + gcmParams.pIv = nonce; + gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce); + gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */ + gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen; + gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8; + + if (doDecrypt) { + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + maxout, in, inlen); + } else { + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + maxout, in, inlen); + } + *outlen += (int)uOutLen; + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + size_t i; + SECItem param; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned int uOutLen; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams; + + const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_chacha20].tag_size; + + /* See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 + * for details of how the nonce is formed. */ + PORT_Memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 12); + + /* XOR the last 8 bytes of the IV with the sequence number. */ + PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen >= 8); + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + nonce[4 + i] ^= additionalData[i]; + } + + param.type = siBuffer; + param.len = sizeof(aeadParams); + param.data = (unsigned char *)&aeadParams; + memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams)); + aeadParams.pNonce = nonce; + aeadParams.ulNonceLen = sizeof(nonce); + aeadParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; + aeadParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen; + aeadParams.ulTagLen = tagSize; + + if (doDecrypt) { + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + } else { + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + } + *outlen = (int)uOutLen; + + return rv; +} + +/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. + * Master Secret already is derived. + * Caller holds Spec write lock. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + PK11Context *serverContext = NULL; + PK11Context *clientContext = NULL; + SECItem *param; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; + CK_ULONG macLength; + CK_ULONG effKeyBits; + SECItem iv; + SECItem mac_param; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; + calg = cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + pwSpec->encode = NULL; + pwSpec->decode = NULL; + pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + switch (calg) { + case calg_aes_gcm: + pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM; + break; + case calg_chacha20: + pwSpec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* + ** Now setup the MAC contexts, + ** crypto contexts are setup below. + */ + + mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; + mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; + mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); + mac_param.type = 0; + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + /* + ** Now setup the crypto contexts. + */ + + if (calg == calg_null) { + pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + return SECSuccess; + } + mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB; + + /* + * build the server context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT + : CKA_DECRYPT), + pwSpec->server.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); + if (serverContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + /* + * build the client context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + + param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT + : CKA_ENCRYPT), + pwSpec->client.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); + if (clientContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; + + pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; + pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; + + serverContext = NULL; + clientContext = NULL; + + ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); + + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + if (serverContext != NULL) + PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + } + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +HASH_HashType +ssl3_GetTls12HashType(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return HASH_AlgNULL; + } + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return HASH_AlgSHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + case ssl_hash_none: + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + return HASH_AlgSHA256; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return HASH_AlgSHA256; +} + +/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts + * for the pending Cipher Spec. + * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. + * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret. + * + * If the old master secret is reused, pms is NULL and the master secret is + * already in pwSpec->master_secret. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + + if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) { + rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */ + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret) { + rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss); + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; + } + + /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = 0; + } else { + if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many + * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The + * spec says you should be discarding the connection + * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */ + pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1; + pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = + (sslSequenceNumber)pwSpec->epoch << 48; + + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords); + } + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return rv; +} + +/* + * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. + */ +static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = { + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 +}; +static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = { + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c +}; + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord() +** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool useServerMacKey, + const unsigned char *header, + unsigned int headerLen, + const SSL3Opaque *input, + int inputLength, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLength) +{ + const ssl3MACDef *mac_def; + SECStatus rv; + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength)); + + mac_def = spec->mac_def; + if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + *outLength = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + PK11Context *mac_context = + (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context + : spec->client.write_mac_context); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength)); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord() + * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) + * + * On entry: + * originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool useServerMacKey, + const unsigned char *header, + unsigned int headerLen, + const SSL3Opaque *input, + int inputLen, + int originalLen, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLen) +{ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; + CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; + SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *key; + + PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen); + + if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + *outLen = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME; + if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; + } + + params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech; + params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen; + params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */ + params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen; + + param.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; + param.len = sizeof(params); + param.type = 0; + + inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input; + inputItem.len = inputLen; + inputItem.type = 0; + + outputItem.data = outbuf; + outputItem.len = *outLen; + outputItem.type = 0; + + key = spec->server.write_mac_key; + if (!useServerMacKey) { + key = spec->client.write_mac_key; + } + + rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, ¶m, &outputItem, &inputItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { + /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed + * from the input length already. */ + return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, + header, headerLen, + input, inputLen - spec->mac_size, + outbuf, outLen); + } + + *outLen = 0; + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + *outLen = outputItem.len; + + return rv; +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + /* we only care if we are doing client auth */ + if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* get the slot */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); + if (slot == NULL || + !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || + (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { + isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + return isPresent; +} + +/* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool isServer, + PRBool isDTLS, + PRBool capRecordVersion, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 macLen = 0; + PRUint32 fragLen; + PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; + unsigned int ivLen = 0; + unsigned char pseudoHeader[13]; + unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen; + + cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from + * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically + * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous + * record. + */ + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + if (ivLen > wrBuf->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf, ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf, /* output */ + (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* outlen */ + ivLen, /* max outlen */ + wrBuf->buf, /* input */ + ivLen); /* input len */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || wrBuf->len != ivLen) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (cwSpec->compressor) { + int outlen; + rv = cwSpec->compressor(cwSpec->compressContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen, + &outlen, wrBuf->space - ivLen, pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + pIn = wrBuf->buf + ivLen; + contentLen = outlen; + } + + pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type, + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version, + isDTLS, contentLen); + PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader)); + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; + const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + + if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = cwSpec->aead( + isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client, + PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */ + wrBuf->buf, /* output */ + (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */ + wrBuf->space, /* max out */ + pIn, contentLen, /* input */ + pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + /* + * Add the MAC + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer, pseudoHeader, + pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + p1Len = contentLen; + p2Len = macLen; + fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ + PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) + * then Encrypt it + */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + unsigned char *pBuf; + int padding_length; + int i; + + oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size; + /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ + padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); + fragLen += padding_length + 1; + PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + + /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ + pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[ivLen + fragLen - 1]; + for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { + *pBuf-- = padding_length; + } + /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ + p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; + } + if (p1Len < 256) { + oddLen = p1Len; + p1Len = 0; + } else { + p1Len -= oddLen; + } + if (oddLen) { + p2Len += oddLen; + PORT_Assert((cipher_def->block_size < 2) || + (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + memmove(wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen); + } + if (p1Len > 0) { + int cipherBytesPart1 = -1; + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen, /* output */ + &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ + p1Len, /* max outlen */ + pIn, + p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int)p1Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int)p1Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart1; + } + if (p2Len > 0) { + int cipherBytesPart2 = -1; + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, + &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ + p2Len, /* max outlen */ + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, + p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int)p2Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int)p2Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart2; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool capRecordVersion, SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + PRUint16 headerLen; + sslBuffer protBuf; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version; + PRBool isTLS13; + PRUint8 *ptr = wrBuf->buf; + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + headerLen = TLS13_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH_SHORT; + } else { + headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + protBuf.buf = wrBuf->buf + headerLen; + protBuf.len = 0; + protBuf.space = wrBuf->space - headerLen; + + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); + if ((cwSpec->write_seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MAX) >= cipher_def->max_records) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->write_seq_num)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS13 = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, protBuf.buf, (int *)&protBuf.len, protBuf.space, + pIn, contentLen); +#else + if (isTLS13) { + rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); + } else { + rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, + IS_DTLS(ss), capRecordVersion, type, + pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); + } +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error was set */ + } + + PORT_Assert(protBuf.len <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + (isTLS13 ? 256 : 1024)); + wrBuf->len = protBuf.len + headerLen; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); /* Decoder not yet implemented. */ + (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(0x8000 | protBuf.len, 2, ptr); + } else { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + if (isTLS13 && cipher_def->calg != ssl_calg_null) { + *ptr++ = content_application_data; + } else +#endif + { + *ptr++ = type; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + version = isTLS13 ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 : version; + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num, 8, ptr); + } else { + if (capRecordVersion || isTLS13) { + version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version); + } + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); + } + (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(protBuf.len, 2, ptr); + } + ++cwSpec->write_seq_num; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Process the plain text before sending it. + * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent + * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the + * output (write) buffer. + * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error. + * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock. + * + * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags: + * (no private SSL flags) + * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext + * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK, + * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty, + * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf, + * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all + * bytes are used. + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER + * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces + * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer. + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS) + * Forces the use of the provided epoch + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION + * Caps the record layer version number of TLS ClientHello to { 3, 1 } + * (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore + * ClientHello.client_version and use the record layer version number + * (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when negotiating protocol versions. In + * addition, if the record layer version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } + * (TLS 1.1) or higher, these servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, + * some F5 BIG-IP servers hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a + * version greater than { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this + * flag to work around such servers. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */ + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, /* input buffer */ + PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ + PRInt32 flags) +{ + sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRBool capRecordVersion; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), + nIn)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0); + + if (capRecordVersion) { + /* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the + * TLS initial ClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello); + } + + if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) { + /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record + ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're + ** trying to send an alert. + */ + PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + while (nIn > 0) { + PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + unsigned int spaceNeeded; + unsigned int numRecords; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + + if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + type == content_application_data && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) { + /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, + * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h + */ + numRecords = 2; + } else { + numRecords = 1; + } + + spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE); + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) { + spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size; + } + if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); + goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */ + } + } + + if (numRecords == 2) { + sslBuffer secondRecord; + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, + pIn, 1, wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto spec_locked_loser; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:", + wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); + + secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len; + secondRecord.len = 0; + secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len; + + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, + pIn + 1, contentLen - 1, &secondRecord); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:", + secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len)); + wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len; + } + } else { + if (cwSpec) { + /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of DTLS handshake + * messages. */ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && + (type == content_handshake || + type == content_change_cipher_spec)); + } else { + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + } + + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, !IS_DTLS(ss) && capRecordVersion, + type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", + wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); + } + } + + spec_locked_loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + pIn += contentLen; + nIn -= contentLen; + PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0); + + /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, + * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, + * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. + */ + if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || + (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + } + } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len, + flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); + if (sent < 0) { + if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ + sent = 0; + } + wrBuf->len -= sent; + if (wrBuf->len) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ + PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and + * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. + */ + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + totalSent += contentLen; + } + return totalSent; +} + +#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024 + +/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record. + * Returns "len" or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess. + */ +int +ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, + PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRInt32 discarded = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + /* These flags for internal use only */ + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)); + if (len < 0 || !in) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER && + !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) { + PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); + if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + in++; + len--; + discarded = 1; + } + while (len > totalSent) { + PRInt32 sent, toSend; + + if (totalSent > 0) { + /* + * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a + * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in + * the middle of a large application data write. (See + * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + } + toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + /* + * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require + * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above. + */ + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_application_data, + in + totalSent, toSend, flags); + if (sent < 0) { + if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + totalSent += sent; + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* must be a non-blocking socket */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* Must be non-blocking. */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + if (totalSent > 0) { + ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; + } + + totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; + if (totalSent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + totalSent = SECFailure; + } + return totalSent; + } + ss->appDataBuffered = 0; + return totalSent + discarded; +} + +/* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages. + * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls + * + * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS + * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS + * + * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(), + * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(), + * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), + * ssl3_SendFinished(), + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); + } else { + return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); + } +} + +/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. + * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER | + ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; + PRInt32 count = -1; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) + return SECSuccess; + + /* only these flags are allowed */ + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags)); + if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_handshake, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); + if (count < 0) { + int err = PORT_GetError(); + PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } + rv = SECFailure; + } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) { + /* short write should never happen */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; + return rv; +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when + * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request. + * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. + * SECSuccess otherwise. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't + * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no + * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure + * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the + * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we + * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. + */ + if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (!ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { + PRFileDesc *lower; + + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); + + lower = ss->fd->lower; +#ifdef _WIN32 + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); +#else + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); +#endif + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************ + * Alerts + */ + +/* +** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. +** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- +** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- +** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord +** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- +** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- +** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- +** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- +** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- +** ssl3_HandleFinished <- +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandleRecord <- +** +*/ +SECStatus +SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + PRUint8 bytes[2]; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + bytes[0] = level; + bytes[1] = desc; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (level == alert_fatal) { + if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + } + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_alert, bytes, 2, + (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); + rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE; + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ +} + +/* + * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +void +ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode) +{ + SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; + PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; + + switch (errCode) { + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: + desc = unsupported_certificate; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_expired; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_revoked; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: + desc = certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; + break; + + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: + case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + default: + desc = bad_certificate; + break; + } + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); + + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +} + +/* + * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error + : illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSL3AlertLevel level; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int error; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (buf->len != 2) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; + desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; + buf->len = 0; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: + ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; + error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; + break; + case unexpected_message: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_record_mac: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; + break; + case decryption_failed_RESERVED: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; + break; + case record_overflow: + error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; + break; + case decompression_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case handshake_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case no_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; + break; + case bad_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_revoked: + error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_expired: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unknown: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + case illegal_parameter: + error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT; + break; + case inappropriate_fallback: + error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + break; + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + case unknown_ca: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; + break; + case access_denied: + error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; + break; + case decode_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case decrypt_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case export_restriction: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; + break; + case protocol_version: + error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; + break; + case insufficient_security: + error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; + break; + case internal_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case user_canceled: + error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; + break; + case no_renegotiation: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; + break; + + /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ + case missing_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unobtainable: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; + break; + case unrecognized_name: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_status_response: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_hash_value: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; + break; + case end_of_early_data: + error = SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT; + break; + default: + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + } + if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) { + /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be + * treated as fatal. */ + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: + case user_canceled: + case end_of_early_data: + break; + default: + level = alert_fatal; + } + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && + (desc == handshake_failure)) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. + */ + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + } + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (desc == end_of_early_data) { + return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss); + } + if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Change Cipher Specs + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, + * ssl3_HandleClientHello, + * and ssl3_HandleFinished + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. + */ + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 sent; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, + ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent < 0) { + return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + } else { + rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */ + /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); + } else { + /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final + * message got lost */ + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); + } + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " + "DTLS change_cipher_spec", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + buf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + if (buf->len != 1) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; + if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { + /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + buf->len = 0; + + /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + + ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA512; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKM_SHA512; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + case ssl_hash_none: + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + return CKM_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return CKM_SHA_1; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash); +} + +static SSLHashType +ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) { + return ssl_hash_sha256; + } + return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; +} + +/* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS. +** +** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error. +** +** 2. Check the version if |pms_version| is non-zero and if wrong, +** return an error. +** +** 3. If |msp| is nonzero, return MS in |*msp|. + +** Called from: +** ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt +** tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(sslSocket *ss, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive, + CK_VERSION *pms_version, + SECItem *params, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, + PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; + + ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive, + params, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (!ms) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (pms_version && ss->opt.detectRollBack) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version; + client_version = pms_version->major << 8 | pms_version->minor; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version); + } + + if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { + /* Destroy MS. Version roll-back detected. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (msp) { + *msp = ms; + } else { + PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Compute the ordinary (pre draft-ietf-tls-session-hash) master + ** secret and return it in |*msp|. + ** + ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = + (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + /* + * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH + * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size + * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version. + */ + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + SECItem params; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; + /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */ + CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; + unsigned int master_params_len; + + if (isTLS12) { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else if (isTLS) { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = 0; + } + + if (!isDH) { + pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; + } + + master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + if (isTLS12) { + master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); + } else { + /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */ + master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); + } + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params; + params.len = master_params_len; + + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, + pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, + keyFlags, pms, msp); +} + +/* Compute the draft-ietf-tls-session-hash master +** secret and return it in |*msp|. +** +** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret +*/ +static SECStatus +tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS extended_master_params; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + /* + * Determine whether to use the DH/ECDH or RSA derivation modes. + */ + /* + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion + * mode. Bug 1198298 */ + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + SECItem params; + const CK_FLAGS keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (isDH) { + master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; + } + + if (pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + /* TLS 1.2+ */ + extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } else { + /* TLS < 1.2 */ + extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } + + extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; + extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw; + extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len; + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params; + params.len = sizeof extended_master_params; + + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, + pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, + keyFlags, pms, msp); +} + +/* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|. +** +** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + PORT_Assert(pms != NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); + } else { + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); + } +} + +/* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS +** is a PKCS11 symkey. We call ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret to do the +** computations and then modify the pwSpec->state as a side effect. +** +** This is used in all cases except the "triple bypass" with RSA key +** exchange. +** +** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec. prSpec is pwSpec. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + if (pms) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, &ms); + pwSpec->master_secret = ms; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret + * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), + * which in turn is called from + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock. + * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that. + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = + (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + int keySize; + CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a + * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */ + unsigned int key_material_params_len; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SECItem params; + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + if (!pwSpec->master_secret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* + * generate the key material + */ + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + } + + key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; + + returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + + if (skipKeysAndIVs) { + keySize = 0; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + } + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + + if (isTLS12) { + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } else if (isTLS) { + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } else { + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; + params.len = key_material_params_len; + + /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and + * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ + symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms, + bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); + if (!symKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we + * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both + * mac's map to the same keytype. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ + pwSpec->client.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (symKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in + * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from + * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(), + * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record; + } else { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + /* + * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these + * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots + * that the master secret will wind up in ... + */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* determine the hash from the prf */ + const SECOidData *hash_oid = + SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss)); + + /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash) + * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our + * PK11Context */ + PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL); + if (hash_oid == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or + * created successfully. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record && + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) { + if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + +/* + * Handshake messages + */ +/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes() +** ssl3_AppendHandshake() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() +** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es) + * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake + * messages, until we know what to do. + * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown, + * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input), + * and we stop appending to the buffer. + * + * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages, + * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for + * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use + * when signing other handshake hashes. */ + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l); + } + + PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Append Handshake functions. + * All these functions set appropriate error codes. + * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code. + **************************************************************************/ +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes) +{ + unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)void_src; + int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* protects sendBuf. */ + + if (!bytes) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, + PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char *)void_src, bytes)); + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ + + while (bytes > room) { + if (room > 0) + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, + room); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + bytes -= room; + src += room; + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); + } + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 b[4]; + PRUint8 *p = b; + + PORT_Assert(lenSize <= 4 && lenSize > 0); + if (lenSize < 4 && num >= (1L << (lenSize * 8))) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (lenSize) { + case 4: + *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; + case 3: + *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; + case 2: + *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; + case 1: + *p = num & 0xff; + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert((bytes < (1 << 8) && lenSize == 1) || + (bytes < (1L << 16) && lenSize == 2) || + (bytes < (1L << 24) && lenSize == 3)); + + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it. + * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call + * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. + */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the + * transmission code, if necessary */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; + + /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + + /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + } + + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Consume Handshake functions. + * + * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks, + * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v". + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert, + * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably + * override the generic error code by setting another. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an + * integer in network byte order. Returns the received value. + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value. + * Only positive numbers are to be received this way. + * Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRUint8 *buf = *b; + int i; + PRInt32 num = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof num); + + if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + + for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) + num = (num << 8) + buf[i]; + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return num; +} + +/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is + * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" + * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value + * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length, + * is returned in the SECItem i. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + * + * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies + * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here + * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to + * point to the values in the buffer **b. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes, + SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRInt32 count; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); + i->len = 0; + i->data = NULL; + i->type = siBuffer; + count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length); + if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */ + return SECFailure; + } + if (count > 0) { + if ((PRUint32)count > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + i->data = *b; + i->len = count; + *b += count; + *length -= count; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Helper function to encode an unsigned integer into a buffer. */ +PRUint8 * +ssl_EncodeUintX(PRUint64 value, unsigned int bytes, PRUint8 *to) +{ + PRUint64 encoded; + + PORT_Assert(bytes > 0 && bytes <= sizeof(encoded)); + + encoded = PR_htonll(value); + memcpy(to, ((unsigned char *)(&encoded)) + (sizeof(encoded) - bytes), bytes); + return to + bytes; +} + +/* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value. + * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned. + * + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +SECOidTag +ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return SEC_OID_SHA1; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return SEC_OID_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return SEC_OID_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return SEC_OID_SHA512; + default: + break; + } + return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; +} + +SSLHashType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ssl_hash_sha1; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + return ssl_hash_sha256; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + return ssl_hash_sha384; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + return ssl_hash_sha512; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */ + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return ssl_hash_none; +} + +KeyType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + return rsaKey; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ecKey; + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + return dsaKey; + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return nullKey; +} + +static SSLNamedGroup +ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1; + default: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; +} + +/* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key. + * If |allowSha1| is set, we allow the use of SHA-1. + * If |matchGroup| is set, we also check that the group and hash match. */ +static PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(PRBool allowSha1, PRBool matchGroup, + KeyType keyType, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (keyType != ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!allowSha1 && ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (keyType != ecKey) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (!ecGroup) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* If |allowSha1| is present and the scheme is ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, it's OK. + * This scheme isn't bound to a specific group. */ + if (allowSha1 && (scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (!matchGroup) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + return ecGroup->name == ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(scheme); +} + +/* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature + * algorithm identifier in |sigAndHash| is consistent with the public key in + * |cert|. It also checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature + * algorithms. If all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, + * PORT_SetError is called and SECFailure is returned. */ +SECStatus +ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + unsigned int i; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *key; + KeyType keyType; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (key == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key); + if (keyType == ecKey) { + group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key); + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + + /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing + * key type of the cipher suite. */ + if (!isTLS13 && + !ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType != keyType) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */ + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */, + isTLS13 /* matchGroup */, + keyType, group, scheme)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) { + return SECSuccess; + } + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + return PR_TRUE; + + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value + * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly. + * + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +SECStatus +ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out) +{ + PRInt32 tmp; + + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (tmp < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Consume Handshake functions. + **************************************************************************/ + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, + SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext( + ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg)); + + if (!hashContext) { + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; + } + PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + +/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. + * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify + * ssl3_SendFinished + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage + * + * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. + * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. + * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ + SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */ + PRUint32 sender) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + unsigned int outLength; + SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + PK11Context *h; + unsigned int stateLen; + unsigned char stackBuf[1024]; + unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; + + h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf, + sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen); + if (stateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto tls12_loser; + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto tls12_loser; + } + + hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss); + rv = SECSuccess; + + tls12_loser: + if (stateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (stateBuf != stackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen); + } + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss), + hashes); + } else { + PK11Context *md5; + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; + unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; + unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; + unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; + unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; + + md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, + sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); + if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; + + shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, + sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); + if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + unsigned char s[4]; + + if (!spec->master_secret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + rv = SECSuccess; + + loser: + if (md5StateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); + } + } + if (shaStateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); + } + } + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Handshake Hash functions. + * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. + **************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef TRACE +#define CHTYPE(t) \ + case client_hello_##t: \ + return #t; + +static const char * +ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type) +{ + switch (type) { + CHTYPE(initial); + CHTYPE(retry); + CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */ + CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */ + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; +} +#undef CHTYPE +#endif + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), + * ssl3_RedoHandshake() + * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) + * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE) + * + * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here: + * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello + * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving + * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3) + * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending + * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int length; + int num_suites; + int actual_count = 0; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE; + PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; + unsigned paddingExtensionLen; + unsigned numCompressionMethods; + PRUint16 version; + PRInt32 flags; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type))); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled"); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need + * to maintain the handshake hashes. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(type == client_hello_retry); + } else { + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + /* These must be reset every handshake. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ + num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (!num_suites) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ + } + + /* + * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to + * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled. + */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial); + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min || + ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup + * handles expired entries and other details. + * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then + * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. + */ + sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL + : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + + /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, + * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... + * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds + * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. + */ + if (sid) { + PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */ + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, + ss->cipherSuites); + PORT_Assert(suite); + if (!suite || !config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */ + if (sidOK && sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) { + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + } + if (slot == NULL) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (wrapKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + } + /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that + ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been + ** removed, etc. + */ + if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sidOK) { + /* Set version based on the sid. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + * + * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still + * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that + * sid->version is bounded within + * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we + * can't use sid. + */ + if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && + sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } else { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } else { + /* + * Check sid->version is OK first. + * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version, + * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the + * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback) + */ + if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || + sid->version > ss->vrange.max) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + } + } + + if (!sidOK) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + if (sid) { + requestingResume = PR_TRUE; + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits); + + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; + } else { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ + } + /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */ + sid->version = version; + } + + isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = version; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV, + * only if TLS is disabled. + */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) { + /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders, + * to suppress sending of empty RI extension. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE; + } + + /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to + * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a + * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced. + * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it + * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold + * the lock across the calls to ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders. + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + type == client_hello_initial) { + rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) { + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */ + PRInt32 extLen; + + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + total_exten_len += extLen; + + if (total_exten_len > 0) + total_exten_len += 2; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + } + + /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */ + num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy); + if (!num_suites) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ + } + + fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume || + version < sid->version); + /* make room for SCSV */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + ++num_suites; + } + if (fallbackSCSV) { + ++num_suites; + } + + /* count compression methods */ + numCompressionMethods = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) + numCompressionMethods++; + } + + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + + 1 + (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + ? 0 + : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + 2 + num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + + 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len; + } + + /* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing + * the ClientHello doesn't have a length between 256 and 511 bytes + * (inclusive). Initial, ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs + * in F5 devices. + * + * This is not done for DTLS, for renegotiation, or when there are no + * extensions. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone && total_exten_len) { + paddingExtensionLen = ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(length); + total_exten_len += paddingExtensionLen; + length += paddingExtensionLen; + } else { + paddingExtensionLen = 0; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around + * the Windows SChannel bug described above. */ + PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion); + } + ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PRUint16 dtlsVersion; + + dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, dtlsVersion, 2); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt. */ + if (type == client_hello_initial) { + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + /* Add the actual SCSV */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + actual_count++; + } + if (fallbackSCSV) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + actual_count++; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { + actual_count++; + if (actual_count > num_suites) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + /* set error card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + } + + /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and + * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to + * the server.. */ + if (actual_count != num_suites) { + /* Card removal/insertion error */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) + continue; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i], 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + + if (total_exten_len) { + PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2; + PRInt32 extLen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + + PORT_Assert(!maxBytes); + } + + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes); + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */ + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; + } + + flags = 0; + if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */ + } + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 Hello Request. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +#define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = { + CKM_DES3_ECB, + CKM_CAST5_ECB, + CKM_DES_ECB, + CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS, + CKM_IDEA_ECB, + CKM_CAST3_ECB, + CKM_CAST_ECB, + CKM_RC5_ECB, + CKM_RC2_ECB, + CKM_CDMF_ECB, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, + CKM_AES_ECB, + CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB, + CKM_SEED_ECB, + UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM +}; + +static int +ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) +{ + const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList; + + while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) { + ++pMech; + } + return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1 + : (pMech - wrapMechanismList); +} + +static PK11SymKey * +ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey, + SSLAuthType authType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + SECItem wrappedKey; + PK11SymKey *Ks; + SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; + + /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ + PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(pWswk->authType == authType); + if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || + pWswk->authType != authType) { + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + + switch (authType) { + + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + break; + + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on + * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, + * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., + * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. + * + * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined + * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + + if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + + wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, + &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, + CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } +loser: + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey + * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master + * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys + * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. + */ + +typedef struct { + PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[ssl_auth_size]; +} ssl3SymWrapKey; + +static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL; +static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; + +SECStatus +ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + if (symWrapKeysLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock); + symWrapKeysLock = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) +{ + int i, j; + + if (!symWrapKeysLock) + return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { + for (j = 0; j < ssl_auth_size; ++j) { + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; + if (*pSymWrapKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); + *pSymWrapKey = NULL; + } + } + } + + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); + return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array. + * If that fails, look for one on disk. + * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, + * Put the new key in the in-memory array. + * + * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with + * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA + * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320. + */ +PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot, + const sslServerCert *serverCert, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + SSLAuthType authType; + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + int length; + int symWrapMechIndex; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem wrappedKey; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; + PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; + + PORT_Assert(serverCert); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return NULL; /* hmm */ + } + authType = serverCert->certType.authType; + svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + + symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0); + if (symWrapMechIndex < 0) + return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ + + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[authType]; + + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); + + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; + if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { + if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + goto done; + } + /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + } + + /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ + /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ + if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, authType, &wswk)) { + /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto install; + } + } + + if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ + goto loser; + + length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, + length, pwArg); + if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, + * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. + */ + PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + + svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey; + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) + goto loser; + + /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ + switch (authType) { + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + break; + + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH + * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, + * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate + * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all + * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as + * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey); + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) { + /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( + &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); + if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Set the key size in bits */ + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { + pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); + } + + PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); + + wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - + (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset + */ + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + ec_cleanup: + if (privWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); + if (pubWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); + if (Ks) + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + break; + + default: + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); + + wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex; + wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; + wswk.authType = authType; + wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + /* put it on disk. */ + /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, + * then abandon the value we just computed and + * use the one we got from the disk. + */ + if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) { + /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk + * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard + * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. + */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + } + +install: + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + } + +loser: +done: + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE +/* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2| + * bytes to |out|. */ +static void +hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length) +{ + static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4]; + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15]; + } +} +#endif + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ + enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); + if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ + } + + /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE + if (ssl_keylog_iob) { + SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); + if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { + SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); + if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); + } +#endif + if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) { + /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ + + /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the + * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to + * fwrite. */ + char buf[4 + 8 * 2 + 1 + 48 * 2 + 1]; + + strcpy(buf, "RSA "); + hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8); + buf[20] = ' '; + hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n'; + + fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob); + fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); + } + } + } + } +#endif + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 + : enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { + PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); + } + if (pms != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + } + return rv; +} + +/* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations + * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */ +SECStatus +ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(const sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + PRBool appendLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; + + if (appendLength) { + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + while (pad) { + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + --pad; + } + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + ssl3DHParams customParams; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE + }; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ + + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Work out the parameters. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime, + &svrPubKey->u.dh.base, + &groupDef, ¶ms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group + * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups); + + customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom; + customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; + params = &customParams; + groupDef = &customGroupDef; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + goto loser; + } + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, + target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + params->prime.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (pms) + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (keyPair) + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { + serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (serverKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ + } + + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); + return rv; /* err code already set. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1) +{ + unsigned int i, j; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL; + KeyType keyType; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PRBool slotDoesPss; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */ + PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13)); + if (!pubKey || !privKey) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + slotDoesPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey); + if (keyType == ecKey) { + group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(pubKey); + } + + /* Here we look for the first local preference that the client has + * indicated support for in their signature_algorithms extension. */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + SSLHashType hashType; + SECOidTag hashOID; + SSLSignatureScheme preferred = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + PRUint32 policy; + + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */, + isTLS13 /* matchGroup */, + keyType, group, preferred)) { + continue; + } + + /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does + * not support this signature mechanism. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(preferred) && !slotDoesPss) { + continue; + } + + hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(preferred); + if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) { + continue; + } + hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType); + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) && + !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + /* we ignore hashes we don't support */ + continue; + } + + for (j = 0; j < peerSchemeCount; j++) { + if (peerSchemes[j] == preferred) { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = preferred; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the + * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using. + * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a + * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslKeyPair *keyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; + PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + + if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { + /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then + * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */ + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(keyPair->pubKey)) { + case rsaKey: + if (isTLS12) { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case ecKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + break; + case dsaKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Sets error code, if needed. */ + return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, keyPair->pubKey, keyPair->privKey, + ss->xtnData.clientSigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numClientSigScheme, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int numSchemes) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECStatus rv; + + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + PORT_Assert(pubKey); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) && + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) { + /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that + * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older + * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and + * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must + * be SHA-1. + */ + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return SECSuccess; + } + /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1, + * so fall back to the full negotiation. */ + } + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS12; + SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record && + hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + hashAlg, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */ + } + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary + * information is properly set. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite, + PRBool initHashes) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = chosenSuite; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(chosenSuite); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg]; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; + + if (!initHashes) { + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Now we've have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ + return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerHello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */ + PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + SSL3ProtocolVersion downgradeCheckVersion; +#endif + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + /* We got a HelloRetryRequest, but the server didn't pick 1.3. Scream. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did + * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for + * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have. + * (1294697). */ + if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + /* Check the ServerHello.random per + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * + * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a TLS 1.2 or below ServerHello MUST check + * that the top eight octets are not equal to either of these values. + * TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also perform this check if the ServerHello + * indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found the client MUST + * abort the handshake with a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * Disable this test during the TLS 1.3 draft version period. + */ + downgradeCheckVersion = ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion + : ss->vrange.max; + + if (downgradeCheckVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + downgradeCheckVersion > ss->version) { + /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */ + unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); + if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls13_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)) || + !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random))) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + } +#endif + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + } + + /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + PORT_Assert(i > 0); + if (i <= 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) { + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is + * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here + * in order to give a more precise error code. */ + if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + break; /* failure */ + } + + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)temp, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* find selected compression method in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + suite_found = PR_FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (temp == ssl_compression_methods[i]) { + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) { + break; /* failure */ + } + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; + } + + /* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we + * do NOT goto alert_loser. + * There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff + * after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore + * such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being + * "generous in what you accept"). + * Update: Starting in NSS 3.12.6, we handle the renegotiation_info + * extension in SSL 3.0. + */ + if (length != 0) { + SECItem extensions; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + goto alert_loser; + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensions.data, + &extensions.len, server_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */ + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode) +{ + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sid_match; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == + SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED + : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ + desc = handshake_failure; + + /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the + * key exchange algorithm. */ + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or + * not and if so it may match the one we sent. + * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... + * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. + */ + sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 && + sidBytes->len == + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && + !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len)); + + if (sid_match) { + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ + + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the + * client MUST abort the handshake. + */ + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new + * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret" + * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake. + * + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not + * used at all (bug 1176526). + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + /* unwrap master secret */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = + CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ + } + } else { + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, + &wrappedMS, NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; + } + } + + /* Got a Match */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits); + + /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* NULL value for PMS because we are reusing the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ + } + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + } + + if (sid_match) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok); + else + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses); + + /* throw the old one away */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + + /* get a new sid */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len; + if (sidBytes->len > 0) { + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len); + } + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + + /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */ + if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, + &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) { + /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e., + * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert; + } else { + /* All the remaining cipher suites must be (EC)DH_anon_* and so + * must be ephemeral. Note, if we ever add PSK this might + * change. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + *retErrCode = errCode; + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned dh_p_bits; + unsigned dh_g_bits; + PRInt32 minDH; + + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); + if (dh_p_bits < minDH) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */ + dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g); + if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, + ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) { + desc = decode_error; + } + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy. + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, + dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode)); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + default: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + } + /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */ + return rv; +} + +typedef struct dnameNode { + struct dnameNode *next; + SECItem name; +} dnameNode; + +/* + * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest + * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length, + PLArenaPool *arena, CERTDistNames *ca_list) +{ + PRInt32 remaining; + int nnames = 0; + dnameNode *node; + int i; + + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (remaining < 0) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + if ((PRUint32)remaining > *length) + goto alert_loser; + + ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + while (remaining > 0) { + PRInt32 len; + + if (remaining < 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (len <= 0) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + remaining -= 2; + if (remaining < len) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.data = *b; + *b += len; + *length -= len; + remaining -= len; + nnames++; + if (remaining <= 0) + break; /* success */ + + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + node = node->next; + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + + ca_list->nnames = nnames; + ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames); + if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head; + i < nnames; + i++, node = node->next) { + ca_list->names[i] = node->name; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +no_mem: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter + : decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena, + SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut, + unsigned int *numSchemesOut, + unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem buf; + SSLSignatureScheme *schemes; + unsigned int numSchemes = 0; + unsigned int max; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* An empty or odd-length value is invalid. */ + if (buf.len == 0 || (buf.len & 1) != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */ + max = PR_MIN(buf.len / 2, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); + + if (arena) { + schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } else { + schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } + if (!schemes) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (; max; --max) { + PRInt32 tmp; + tmp = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len); + if (tmp < 0) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { + schemes[numSchemes++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; + } + } + + if (!numSchemes) { + if (!arena) { + PORT_Free(schemes); + } + schemes = NULL; + } + + *schemesOut = schemes; + *numSchemesOut = numSchemes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL; + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0; + CERTDistNames ca_list; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena, + &signatureSchemes, + &signatureSchemeCount, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, &ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */ + + if (length != 0) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done; + + rv = ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes, + signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + PORT_Assert(0); + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto done; + +no_mem: + rv = SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto done; + +alert_loser: + if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) + desc = decode_error; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + rv = SECFailure; +done: + if (arena != NULL) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, + const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes, + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount, + CERTDistNames *ca_list) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) { + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + /* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, + ss->fd, ca_list, + &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + } else { + rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ + } + switch (rv) { + case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */ + ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECSuccess: + /* check what the callback function returned */ + if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { + /* we are missing either the key or cert */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) { + /* got a cert, but no key - free it */ + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) { + /* got a key, but no cert - free it */ + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + goto send_no_certificate; + } + /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause + * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. + */ + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + goto send_no_certificate; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, signatureSchemes, + signatureSchemeCount); + } + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECFailure: + default: + send_no_certificate: + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; + } else { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + } + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + } + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + + if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else { + PRBool maybeFalseStart; + SECStatus rv; + + /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to + * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is + * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. + * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + + if (!maybeFalseStart) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else { + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd, + ss->canFalseStartCallbackData, + &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" + : "FALSE")); + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); + } + return rv; + } + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool result; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { + case wait_new_session_ticket: + case wait_change_cipher: + case wait_finished: + result = PR_TRUE; + break; + default: + result = PR_FALSE; + break; + } + + return result; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */ + if (ws != wait_hello_done && + ws != wait_cert_request) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sendClientCert; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; + + /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before + * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client + * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the + * domain we are connecting to. + * + * XXX: We should do the same for the NPN extension, but for that we + * need an option to give the application the ability to leak the NPN + * information to get better performance. + * + * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive + * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate; + * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher + * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may + * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake + * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's + * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was + * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point + * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting + * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during + * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property + * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake + * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for + * application data. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && + (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound; + return SECWouldBlock; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else if (sendClientCert) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + + if (sendClientCert) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in + * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information + * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart + * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from + * the functions that depend on this being set. + */ + ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this + * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker. + */ + rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) { + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are + * false starting before we try to flush the client second + * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully + * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished, + * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that + * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being + * done before its false start callback is called. + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished + * message are racing each other. If the certificate + * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in + * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. + */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)); + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Routines used by servers + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + */ +static SECComparison +ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2) +{ + if (!name1 != !name2) { + return SECLessThan; + } + if (!name1) { + return SECEqual; + } + if (name1->type != name2->type) { + return SECLessThan; + } + return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2); +} + +/* Sets memory error when returning NULL. + * Called from: + * ssl3_SendClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleServerHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() + */ +sslSessionID * +ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + + sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); + if (sid == NULL) + return sid; + + if (is_server) { + const SECItem *srvName; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (srvName->len && srvName->data) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(sid); + return NULL; + } + } + sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); + sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); + sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; + sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; + sid->references = 1; + sid->cached = never_cached; + sid->version = ss->version; + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL; + sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE; + + if (is_server) { + SECStatus rv; + int pid = SSL_GETPID(); + + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } + return sid; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, + * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). + */ + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert + : wait_client_key; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */ +static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static PRBool +ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def) +{ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) { + /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the + * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Select a cipher suite. +** +** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). +** +** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client +** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS +** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure +** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all, +** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export +** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites +** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we +** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRBool initHashes) +{ + int j; + int i; + + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + return ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, initHashes); + } + } + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Call the SNI config hook. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + int ret = 0; + +#ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS +#error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS") +#endif + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec + * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */ + PRBool passed = PR_TRUE; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) { + passed = PR_FALSE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (!passed) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->sniSocketConfig) + do { /* not a loop */ + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */ + ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArr, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize, + ss->sniSocketConfigArg); + } + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* Application does not know the name or was not able to + * properly reconfigure the socket. */ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = unrecognized_name; + break; + } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) { + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf; + SECItem *cwsName; + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + if (cwsName->data) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it + * and save the name. */ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; + int configedCiphers; + SECItem *pwsName; + + /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ + /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (configedCiphers <= 0) { + /* no ciphers are working/supported */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + /* Need to tell the client that application has picked + * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. + */ + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn, + ssl3_SendServerNameXtn); + } else { + /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } while (0); + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* desc and errCode should be set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + PRCList *cursor; + + /* If the client didn't include the supported groups extension, assume just + * P-256 support and disable all the other ECDHE groups. This also affects + * ECDHE group selection, but this function is called first. */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->name != ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + } + } + } + + /* This picks the first certificate that has: + * a) the right authentication method, and + * b) the right named curve (EC only) + * + * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all + * based on what order they are configured in. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (cert->certType.authType != kea_def->authKeyType) { + continue; + } + if ((cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + + /* Found one. */ + ss->sec.serverCert = cert; + ss->sec.authType = cert->certType.authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; + + /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss); + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Client Hello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + PRInt32 tmp; + unsigned int i; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS13; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer || + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) { + /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* Get peer name of client */ + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should + * clear previous state. + */ + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (tmp < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */ + + /* Translate the version. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = + dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp); + } else { + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; + } + + /* Grab the client random data. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the list of compression methods. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if + * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been + * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension. + * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake + * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility). + */ + + if (length) { + /* Get length of hello extensions */ + PRInt32 extension_length; + extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (extension_length < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extension_length != length) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */ + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (versionExtension) { + rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + } else { + /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the + * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */ + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, + PR_MIN(version, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2), + PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + + /* You can't resume TLS 1.3 like this. */ + if (isTLS13 && sidBytes.len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Generate the Server Random now so it is available + * when we process the ClientKeyShare in TLS 1.3 */ + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE; + goto loser; + } + +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + /* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a + * client_version indicating TLS 1.2 or below MUST set the last eight + * bytes of their Random value to the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 + * + * TLS 1.2 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a + * client_version indicating TLS 1.1 or below SHOULD set the last eight + * bytes of their Random value to the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 + * + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Note this change was not added in the SSLv2 + * compat processing code since that will most likely be removed before + * we ship the final version of TLS 1.3. Bug 1306672. + */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) { + unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); + + switch (ss->vrange.max) { + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3: + PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel, + tls13_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)); + break; + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)); + break; + default: + /* Do not change random. */ + break; + } + } +#endif + + /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, client_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) + continue; + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression only include null. */ + if (isTLS13) { + if (comps.len != 1 || comps.data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV, + * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension + * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. + */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + break; + } + } + } + /* This is a second check for TLS 1.3 and re-handshake to stop us + * from re-handshake up to TLS 1.3, so it happens after version + * negotiation. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and + * either of the following conditions are satisfied: + * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or + * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an + * empty ticket. + */ + if ((ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) || + ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) { + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); + if (ssl_sid_lookup) { + sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; + goto loser; + } + } + } else if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. + * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) + * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK. + */ + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ + + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len); + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + } else { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + if (sid != NULL) { + /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. + * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, + * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, + * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), + * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. + */ + if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) && + !ss->firstHsDone))) { + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + } + +#ifdef PARANOID + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } +#endif + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid); + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, &comps, sid); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + SECItem *comps, + sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int i; + int j; + + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the + ** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before. + ** This is not a loop, despite appearances. + */ + if (sid) + do { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; +#ifdef PARANOID + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; +#endif + + /* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */ + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression)) + break; + + /* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */ + for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { + if (comps->data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression) + break; + } + if (i == comps->len) + break; + + suite = ss->cipherSuites; + /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ + for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { + if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + break; + } + PORT_Assert(j > 0); + if (j <= 0) + break; +#ifdef PARANOID + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, + * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. + * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime. + * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers. + */ + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) + break; +#else + if (!suite->enabled) + break; +#endif + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's + * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Use the cached compression method. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = + sid->u.ssl3.compression; + goto compression_found; + } + } + } while (0); +/* START A NEW SESSION */ + +#ifndef PARANOID + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } +#endif + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Select a compression algorithm. */ + for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { + SSLCompressionMethod method = (SSLCompressionMethod)comps->data[i]; + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, method)) + continue; + for (j = 0; j < ssl_compression_method_count; j++) { + if (method == ssl_compression_methods[j]) { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_methods[j]; + goto compression_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + /* null compression must be supported */ + goto alert_loser; + +compression_found: + suites->data = NULL; + comps->data = NULL; + + /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, + * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave + * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one. + * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret + * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert. + */ + if (sid != NULL) + do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */ + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite || + sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + + serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType); + if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverCert) { + /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It + * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out + * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */ + break; + } + + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the + * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it + * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in + * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session. + * + * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension, + * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake. + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } else { + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + /* Note: we do not destroy the session */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, serverCert, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ + break; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } else { + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS, + NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* + * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. + * + * XXX make sure compression still matches + */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits); + if (ss->statelessResume) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, + ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we + ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket + ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. + */ + ss->sec.serverCert = serverCert; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(serverCert->serverCert); + + /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */ + if (sid != NULL && + sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { + /* Set server name from sid */ + SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; + SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* Clean up sni name array */ + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* NULL value for PMS because we are re-using the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports + * the extension and we are unable to resume. + * + * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful + * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session + * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, + * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while + * resuming.) + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_session_ticket_xtn, + ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn); + } + + rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* The alert has already been sent. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes + * in asking to use the V3 handshake. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, + PRUint8 padding) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + unsigned char *suites; + unsigned char *random; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int j; + int sid_length; + int suite_length; + int rand_length; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; + if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; + total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; + total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + total += padding; + ss->clientHelloVersion = version; + + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3 + * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */ + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + + /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ + if (length != total) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total)); + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; + + if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || + rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy( + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0], + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); + i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (i <= 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). + ** + ** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + } + + /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI + * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. + */ + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + break; + } + } + + if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ + + /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. +** +** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; + PRUint32 length; + PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); + if (extensions_len > 0) + extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */ + + /* TLS 1.3 doesn't use the session_id or compression_method + * fields in the ServerHello. */ + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + length += 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength); + } + length += sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + length += 1; /* Compression */ + } + length += extensions_len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); + } else { + version = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(ss->version); + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + /* Random already generated in ssl3_HandleClientHello */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sid) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + if (extensions_len) { + PRInt32 sent_len; + + extensions_len -= 2; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber */ + sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, + &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); + PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len); + if (sent_len != extensions_len) { + if (sent_len >= 0) + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams *params, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) +{ + SECKEYDHParams dhParam; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data; + dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len; + dhParam.base.data = params->base.data; + dhParam.base.len = params->base.len; + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data, + dhParam.prime.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dhParam.base.data, + dhParam.base.len)); + + /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + + pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey); + if (!pair) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + + return SECFailure; + } + + *keyPair = pair; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + + if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { + /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. + See bug 1170510. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, + pubKey->u.dh.prime, + pubKey->u.dh.base, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue, + PR_TRUE /* padY */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + + length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len + + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + length += 2; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data, + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data, + pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (signed_hash.data) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_dh: { + return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: { + return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } + + case ssl_kea_rsa: + case ssl_kea_null: + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRUint8 *p = buf; + + PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2); + if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + PRUint32 policy = 0; + SSLHashType hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType( + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]); + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType); + + /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) && + !PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) { + continue; + } + + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) != SECSuccess) || + (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + p = ssl_EncodeUintX((PRUint32)ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], 2, p); + } + } + + if (p == buf) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + *len = p - buf; + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, int *calen, SECItem **names, + int *nnames) +{ + SECItem *name; + CERTDistNames *ca_list; + int i; + + *calen = 0; + *names = NULL; + *nnames = 0; + + /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */ + ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list; + if (!ca_list) { + ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list; + } + + if (ca_list != NULL) { + *names = ca_list->names; + *nnames = ca_list->nnames; + } + + for (i = 0, name = *names; i < *nnames; i++, name++) { + *calen += 2 + name->len; + } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool isTLS12; + const PRUint8 *certTypes; + SECStatus rv; + int length; + SECItem *names; + int calen; + int nnames; + SECItem *name; + int i; + int certTypesLength; + PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; + unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); + certTypes = certificate_types; + certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; + + length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs), &sigAlgsLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + length += 2 + sigAlgsLength; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + PRBool isTLS; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes localHashes; + SSL3Hashes *hashesForVerify = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (!hashes) { + PORT_Assert(0); + desc = internal_error; + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, + ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + + /* Read from the message buffer, but we need to use only up to the end + * of the previous handshake message. The length of the transcript up to + * that point is saved in |hashes->u.transcriptLen|. */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + hashes->u.transcriptLen, + hashAlg, &localHashes); + + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashesForVerify = &localHashes; + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + } else { + hashesForVerify = hashes; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, hashesForVerify, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + signed_hash.data = NULL; + + if (length != 0) { + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. + * Then generate and return the PMS. + * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use + * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. + * + * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above) + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) + * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock + */ +static PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECItem param; + CK_VERSION version; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (slot == NULL) { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on + ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null + ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + calg = spec->cipher_def->calg; + + /* First get an appropriate slot. */ + mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; + mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + return pms; /* which is NULL */ + } + } + } + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; + + temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.major = MSB(temp); + version.minor = LSB(temp); + } else { + version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + } + + param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; + param.len = sizeof version; + + pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); + if (!serverKeySlot) + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + } + return pms; +} + +/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER + * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message, + * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message. + * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly + * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS. + * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection. + * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure + * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where + * the failure must occur. + * + * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem enc_pms; + PK11SymKey *tmpPms[2] = { NULL, NULL }; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + int useFauxPms = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + + enc_pms.data = b; + enc_pms.len = length; + + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + PRInt32 kLen; + kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); + if (kLen < 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { + enc_pms.len = kLen; + } + } + +#define currentPms tmpPms[!useFauxPms] +#define unusedPms tmpPms[useFauxPms] +#define realPms tmpPms[1] +#define fauxPms tmpPms[0] + + /* + * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1 + * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface. + * + * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246 + * calls R). + * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what + * RFC 5246 calls M). + * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M + * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive + * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version + * check and length check. + * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or + * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard + * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M. + * + * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having + * a function that only performs the PMS version and length + * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF, + * which isn't necessary here. + */ + + /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + if (fauxPms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer + * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do + * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the + * unwrapped pms will be used. + */ + realPms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */ + useFauxPms |= (realPms == NULL); + + /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to + * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we + * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this + * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS + * since it is correctly formatted. */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, currentPms, NULL); + + /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS and discard the + * FPMS. Else, select the FPMS and select the true PMS */ + useFauxPms |= (rv != SECSuccess); + + if (unusedPms) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(unusedPms); + } + + /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + +#undef currentPms +#undef unusedPms +#undef realPms +#undef fauxPms + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue, + 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime, + &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + /* There should be exactly one pair. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + } else { + serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits; + } + + if (!serverKeyPair) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey); + + ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + default: + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; + } else { + /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange + * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so + * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an + * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */ + PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + } + return rv; +} + +/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int len = 0; + PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE; + const SECItem *context; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); + context = &ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + len = context->len + 1; + isTLS13 = PR_TRUE; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); +} + +/* + * NewSessionTicket + * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 }; + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, &ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Serialize the handshake message. Length = + * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, + 4 + 2 + ticket.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This is a fixed value. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Encode the ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ticket.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE); + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ticketData; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid + * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in + * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(); + if (length < 4) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = + (PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the + * existing ticket. */ + if (ticketData.len != 0) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, + &ticketData); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST +static PRInt32 connNum = 0; + +static SECStatus +get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex) +{ + PRFileDesc *cf; + char *testdir; + char *startat; + char *stopat; + const char *extension; + int fileNum; + PRInt32 numBytes = 0; + PRStatus prStatus; + PRFileInfo info; + char cfn[100]; + + pCertItem->data = 0; + if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { + return SECSuccess; + } + *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); + extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der"); + fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1; + if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) { + fileNum += atoi(startat); + } + if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL && + fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { + *pIndex = -1; + return SECSuccess; + } + sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension); + cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0); + if (!cf) { + goto loser; + } + prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info); + if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) { + PR_Close(cf); + goto loser; + } + pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size); + if (pCertItem) { + numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); + } + PR_Close(cf); + if (numBytes != info.size) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); + goto loser; + } + fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn); + *pIndex = -1; + return SECFailure; +} +#endif + +/* + * Used by both client and server. + * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int certChainLen = 0; + int i; +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + SECItem fakeCert; + int ndex = -1; +#endif + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int contextLen = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + } else { + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + } + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex); +#endif + + if (isTLS13) { + contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); + context = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + contextLen += context.len; + } + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3; + } else { + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + } +#else + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; +#endif + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, + contextLen + certChainLen + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, + context.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data, + fakeCert.len, 3); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + } +#else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Used by server only. + * single-stapling, send only a single cert status + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int len = 0; + SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL; + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) + return SECSuccess; + + /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */ + serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { + statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray; + } + if (!statusToSend) + return SECSuccess; + + /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */ + len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + statusToSend->items[0].data, + statusToSend->items[0].len, + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain + * from the cert database after they've been validated. + */ +void +ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; + ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; + + for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); + } + if (arena) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL; + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL; + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + + return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRInt32 status, len; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + + /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */ + status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); + if (status != 1 /* ocsp */) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; + } + + len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (len != length) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; + } + +#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; + } +#undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN + + /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */ + SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1); + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items) + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length); + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length; + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) || + (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3CertNode *c; + ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; + PRInt32 remaining = 0; + PRInt32 size; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; + SECItem certItem; + + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message + ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a + ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. + */ + if (length) { + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) + goto decode_loser; + } + + if (!remaining) { + if (!(isTLS && isServer)) { + desc = bad_certificate; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + /* First get the peer cert. */ + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size <= 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + if (remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the + * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. + */ + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ + while (remaining > 0) { + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size <= 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + if (remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode); + if (c == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (c->cert == NULL) { + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + c->next = NULL; + if (lastCert) { + lastCert->next = c; + } else { + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; + } + lastCert = c; + } + + if (remaining != 0) + goto decode_loser; + + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!isServer && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ + } + + return rv; + +ambiguous_err: + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + if (isTLS) { + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto loser; + } + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + goto loser; + +decode_loser: + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + int errCode; + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + /* + * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain. + */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, + PR_TRUE, isServer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + if (rv != SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->handleBadCert) { + rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); + } + } + + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS; + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + goto loser; + } + } + + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + + /* set the server authentication type and size from the value + ** in the cert. */ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* These are filled in in tls13_HandleCertificateVerify and + * tls13_HandleServerKeyShare. */ + ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + if (pubKey) { + KeyType pubKeyType; + PRInt32 minKey; + /* This partly fixes Bug 124230 and may cause problems for + * callers which depend on the old (wrong) behavior. */ + ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); + pubKeyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey); + minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + switch (pubKeyType) { + case rsaKey: + case rsaPssKey: + case rsaOaepKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; + } + break; + case dsaKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + case dhKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + + /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */ + /* We aren't checking EC here on the understanding that we only + * support curves we like, a decision that might need revisiting. */ + if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 + ? insufficient_security + : illegal_parameter); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return SECFailure; + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } else { + /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) { + /* require server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; + } else { + /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange + * details to compensate for that. */ + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL; + } + } + } else { + /* Server */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } + } + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + goto loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; + + if (error != 0) { + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error); + rv = SECSuccess; + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) { + sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; + + if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race" + " with peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + + rv = target(ss); + /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim + * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent + * calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc. + */ + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with" + " peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake); + + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart && + !ss->firstHsDone && + !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) { + /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because + * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still + * haven't received all of the server's second round yet. + */ + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + } + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool isServer, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + TLSFinished *tlsFinished) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params; + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + + if (!spec->master_secret) { + const char *label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished"; + unsigned int len = 15; + HASH_HashType hashType = ssl3_GetTls12HashType(ss); + return ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw, + hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data, + sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data, hashType); + } + + if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; + } else { + tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + } + tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12; + tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2; + param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params; + param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params); + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN, + spec->master_secret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen, + sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + + return rv; +} + +/* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate + * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for + * ss->ssl3.crSpec). + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen, HASH_HashType tls12HashType) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (spec->master_secret) { + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; + } + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, + spec->master_secret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + } else { + PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int padding_len; + static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 }; + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 || + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + + 2 + + padding_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data, + ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendFinished + * + * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a + * SECStatus. */ +static void +ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) +{ +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *keyData; + char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 /* client_random */ + + 1 /* " " */ + + 48 * 2 /* master secret */ + + 1 /* new line */]; + unsigned int j; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!ssl_keylog_iob) + return; + + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + + /* keyData does not need to be freed. */ + keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); + if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return; + } + + /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ + + /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the + * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to + * fwrite. */ + + memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14); + j = 14; + hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; + buf[j++] = ' '; + hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48); + j += 48 * 2; + buf[j++] = '\n'; + + PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf)); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + + if (fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob) != 1) + return; + fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); + return; +#endif +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + if (isTLS) { + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } else { + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss); + + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + return rv; +} + +/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID. + * Caller holds the Spec read lock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret); + if (!isServer) { + int wrapKeyIndex; + int incarnation; + + /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = + PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = + PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before + * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, + pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } else { + int keyLength; + /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. + * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot + * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, + * but we will not be able to restart this session. + */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, + keyLength, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); + } + } + } else { + /* server socket using session cache. */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + wrappingKey = + ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, ss->sec.serverCert, + mechanism, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } + } + } + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; + PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); + + if (wrappingKey) { + SECItem wmsItem; + + wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, + spec->master_secret, &wmsItem); + /* rv is examined below. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!hashes) { + PORT_Assert(0); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + if (isTLS) { + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, + hashes, &tlsFinished); + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess || + 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, + PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + } else { + if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) { + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s; + if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) { + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) || + (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { + PRInt32 flags = 0; + + /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us + * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. + * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the + * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the + * ServerHello message.) + */ + if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the + * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending + * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's + * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too. + */ + rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) + ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the + ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) + ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. + */ + if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { + flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + + if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + +xmit_loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) { + rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid); + + /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. + * The connection continues normally however. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake; + return SECWouldBlock; + } + + rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* fill in the sid */ + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->authType = ss->sec.authType; + sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; + sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + memcpy(&sid->certType, &ss->sec.serverCert->certType, sizeof(sid->certType)); + } else { + sid->certType.authType = ssl_auth_null; + } + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT && + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) { + if (SECITEM_CopyItem( + NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ + if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) { + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len; + memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, + ss->ssl3.crSpec, + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType); + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + return rv; +} + +/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs + * to have type sslRestartTarget. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + + /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid + * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server + * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until + * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished + * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid. + * + * This must be done before we call ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid) + * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also + * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and + * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket); + /* The sid took over the ticket data */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached); + ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake; + + ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 + * hanshake message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + PRBool endOfRecord) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; + SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ + SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr = NULL; /* Set when hashes are computed */ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; + PRBool computeHashes = PR_FALSE; + PRUint16 epoch; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + /* + * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the + * current message. + */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if ((type == finished) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished)) { + computeHashes = PR_TRUE; + } else if ((type == certificate_verify) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_cert_verify)) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + /* We cannot compute the hash yet. We must wait until we have + * decoded the certificate_verify message in + * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify, which will tell us which + * hash function we must use. + * + * (ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify cannot simply look at the + * buffer length itself, because at the time we reach it, + * additional handshake messages will have been added to the + * buffer, e.g. the certificate_verify message itself.) + * + * Therefore, we use SSL3Hashes.u.transcriptLen to save how much + * data there is and read directly from ss->ssl3.hs.messages + * when calculating the hashes. + * + * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify will detect + * hashType == handshake_hash_record + * and use that information to calculate the hash. + */ + hashes.u.transcriptLen = ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len; + hashesPtr = &hashes; + } else { + computeHashes = PR_TRUE; + } + } + } else { + if (type == certificate_verify) { + computeHashes = TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } else if (type == finished) { + computeHashes = + TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request, wait_finished); + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (computeHashes) { + SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; + ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? ss->ssl3.crSpec + : ss->ssl3.prSpec; + + if (type == finished) { + sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; + rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashesPtr = &hashes; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ + } + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); + + hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; + hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); + + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. Unless this is + * TLS 1.3 and we sent a HelloRetryRequest. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + /* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages + * in the handshake hashes */ + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + + /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Sequence number */ + dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); + dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); + + /* Fragment offset */ + dtlsData[2] = 0; + dtlsData[3] = 0; + dtlsData[4] = 0; + + /* Fragment length */ + dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, + sizeof(dtlsData)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + /* The message body */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status && + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) { + /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred + * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage. + * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did + * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the + * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will + * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus. + */ + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ + PORT_Assert(rv != SECWouldBlock); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case client_hello: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); + break; + default: + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + } else { + rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, + hashesPtr); + } + break; + } + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) { + /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any + * data in the input queue. */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv != SECFailure)) { + /* Increment the expected sequence number */ + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++; + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case hello_request: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); + break; + + case hello_retry_request: + /* This arrives here because - as a client - we haven't received a + * final decision on the version from the server. */ + rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + + case hello_verify_request: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_status: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_key_exchange: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_request: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello_done: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); + break; + case certificate_verify: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + break; + case client_key_exchange: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case new_session_ticket: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + break; + case finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + break; + default: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + return rv; +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record. + * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content. + * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + /* + * There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake + * state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a + * complete message or several messages followed by another portion. + * + * Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual + * message parser. + */ + sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (buf->buf == NULL) { + *buf = *origBuf; + } + while (buf->len > 0) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { + PRUint8 t; + t = *(buf->buf++); + buf->len--; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) + continue; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } +#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN + + /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, + ** even if buf->len is zero. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) + continue; + } + + /* + * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new + * data available for this message. If it can be done right out + * of the original buffer, then use it from there. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + /* handle it from input buffer */ + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf->len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code. + */ + return rv; + } + buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ + unsigned int bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); + + /* Grow the buffer if needed */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, + buf->buf, bytes); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; + buf->buf += bytes; + buf->len -= bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + + /* if we have a whole message, do it */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf->len == 0); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code. + */ + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); + break; + } + } + } /* end loop */ + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other + * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. + * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace + * them with something else for odd compilers. */ +#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ((unsigned)((int)(x) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1))) +#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) + +/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if + * rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */ +static unsigned int +SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv) +{ + unsigned int good; + /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results + * in the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */ + good = rv ^ SECSuccess; + good--; + return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); +} + +/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ +static unsigned char +ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) +{ + a -= b; + return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a); +} + +/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ +static unsigned char +ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) +{ + unsigned int c = a ^ b; + c--; + return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); +} + +/* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */ +static unsigned char +ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) +{ + return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, + unsigned int blockSize, + unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned int paddingLength, good, t; + const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; + + /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant + * time. */ + if (overhead > plaintext->len) { + return SECFailure; + } + + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */ + t = plaintext->len; + t -= paddingLength + overhead; + /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */ + good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); + /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ + t = blockSize - (paddingLength + 1); + good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); + return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i; + const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; + + /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant + * time. */ + if (overhead > plaintext->len) { + return SECFailure; + } + + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + t = plaintext->len; + t -= paddingLength + overhead; + /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */ + good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); + + /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then + * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte. + * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of + * padding. + * + * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks + * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum + * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is + * public information so we can use it.) */ + toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */ + if (toCheck > plaintext->len) { + toCheck = plaintext->len; + } + + for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) { + unsigned int t = paddingLength - i; + /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is + * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */ + unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); + unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i]; + /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value + * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ + good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b)); + } + + /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value, + * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We + * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the + * bits. */ + good &= good >> 4; + good &= good >> 2; + good &= good >> 1; + good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1; + good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); + + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); + return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); +} + +/* On entry: + * originalLength >= macSize + * macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH + * plaintext->len >= macSize + */ +static void +ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, + unsigned int originalLength, + SSL3Opaque *out, + unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the + * MAC. */ + unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len; + unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize; + /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because + * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ + unsigned scanStart = 0; + unsigned i, j; + unsigned char rotateOffset; + + if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) { + scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1); + } + + /* We want to compute + * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize + * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus + * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo + * using Barrett reduction: + * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k + * rotateOffset -= q * n + * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n + */ + rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart; + /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */ + if (macSize == 16) { + rotateOffset &= 15; + } else if (macSize == 20) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset <= 853 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 20; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20), + 20, 0); + } else if (macSize == 32) { + rotateOffset &= 31; + } else if (macSize == 48) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset < 768 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 48; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48), + 48, 0); + } else { + /* + * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never + * get here. + */ + PORT_Assert(0); + rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize; + } + + memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize); + for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) { + for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) { + unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart); + unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd); + unsigned char b = 0; + b = plaintext->buf[i]; + rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded; + } + } + + /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line + * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */ + memset(out, 0, macSize); + rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); + for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) { + out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, rotateOffset); + } + rotateOffset++; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); + } +} + +/* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext. + * + * If SECFailure is returned, we: + * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. + * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. + * + * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. + * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + PRBool isTLS; + unsigned int good; + unsigned int ivLen = 0; + SSL3ContentType rType; + unsigned int minLength; + unsigned int originalLen = 0; + unsigned char header[13]; + unsigned int headerLen; + SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque *givenHash; + unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; + SECStatus rv; + + good = ~0U; + minLength = crSpec->mac_size; + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ + minLength++; + if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ + minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; + } + } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size; + } + + /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total + * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ + if (cText->buf->len < minLength) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states + * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and + * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV + * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then + * discard it before decrypting the rest. + */ + SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + int decoded; + + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) { + *alert = internal_error; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen)); + + /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away + * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block + * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. + */ + rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded, + sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, + cText->buf->len - ivLen)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { + *alert = record_overflow; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + rType = cText->type; + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the + * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general. + * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the + * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */ + unsigned int decryptedLen = + cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size - + cipher_def->tag_size; + headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, + rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen); + PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); + rv = crSpec->aead( + ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server, + PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ + plaintext->buf, /* out */ + (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */ + plaintext->space, /* maxout */ + cText->buf->buf, /* in */ + cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ + header, headerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + good = 0; + } + } else { + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ + rv = crSpec->decode( + crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); + + originalLen = plaintext->len; + + /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; + const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size; + + if (!isTLS) { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( + plaintext, blockSize, macSize)); + } else { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding( + plaintext, macSize)); + } + } + + /* compute the MAC */ + headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, + rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), + plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( + crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, + hash, &hashBytes); + + ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, + crSpec->mac_size); + givenHash = givenHashBuf; + + /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC + * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust + * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we + * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ + plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + } else { + /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ + plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); + + /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location + * is public when a stream cipher is used. */ + givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len; + } + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || + NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { + /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ + good = 0; + } + } + + if (good == 0) { + decrypt_loser: + /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + *alert = bad_record_mac; + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the + * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) + * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf + * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, + * unless it's an application record. + * + * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and + * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL + * Handshake message. + * + * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data. + * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record. + * + * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq + * + * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock. + * + * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the + * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than + * Application Data records. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + sslSequenceNumber seq_num = 0; + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec; + SSL3ContentType rType; + sslBuffer *plaintext; + sslBuffer temp_buf; + SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error; + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX(). + * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake + * message. + */ + if (cText == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rType = content_handshake; + goto process_it; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ + crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PRBool sameEpoch; + if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, cText, &sameEpoch, &seq_num)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ + + /* Maybe retransmit if needed. */ + return dtls_MaybeRetransmitHandshake(ss, cText, sameEpoch); + } + } else { + seq_num = crSpec->read_seq_num + 1; + } + if (seq_num >= crSpec->cipher_def->max_records) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seq_num)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere + * other than into databuf */ + if (crSpec->decompressor) { + temp_buf.buf = NULL; + temp_buf.space = 0; + plaintext = &temp_buf; + } else { + plaintext = databuf; + } + + plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by Unprotect call below. */ + if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************/ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted. + * Use the content type to tell whether this is should be discarded. + * + * XXX If we decide to remove the content type from encrypted records, this + * will become much more difficult to manage. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr && + cText->type == content_application_data) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello); + databuf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); +#else + /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts + * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they + * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */ + if (crSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + crSpec->cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { + /* Unencrypted TLS 1.3 records use the pre-TLS 1.3 format. */ + rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); + } else { + rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); + } +#endif + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) || + (ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) { + /* Silently drop the packet */ + databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ + return SECSuccess; + } else { + int errCode = PORT_GetError(); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert); + /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called + * PORT_SetError(). */ + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* SECSuccess */ + crSpec->read_seq_num = seq_num; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, seq_num); + } + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ + + /* + * The decrypted data is now in plaintext. + */ + rType = cText->type; /* This must go after decryption because TLS 1.3 + * has encrypted content types. */ + + /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then + * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in + * databuf. */ + if (crSpec->decompressor) { + if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow( + databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + plaintext->len + + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext, + databuf->buf, + (int *)&databuf->len, + databuf->space, + plaintext->buf, + plaintext->len); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + isTLS ? decompression_failure + : bad_record_mac); + + /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where + * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See + * comments 93-95 of + * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744 + * + * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to + * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error + * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the + * future. + */ + if (plaintext->len >= 4) { + unsigned int len = ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[1] << 16) | + ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[2] << 8) | + (unsigned int)plaintext->buf[3]; + if (len == plaintext->len - 4) { + /* This appears to be uncompressed already */ + err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD; + } + } + + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + PORT_SetError(err); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + } + + /* + ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. + */ + if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this + ** function, not by this function. + */ + if (rType == content_application_data) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, databuf); + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + +/* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. + */ +process_it: + /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting + * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks. + */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if + ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. + */ + switch (rType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_handshake: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } else { + rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } + break; + /* + case content_application_data is handled before this switch + */ + default: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Initialization functions + */ + +void +ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec) +{ + sec->authType = ssl_auth_null; + sec->authKeyBits = 0; + sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null; + sec->keaKeyBits = 0; + sec->keaGroup = NULL; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */ +/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ +void +ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); + spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null); + spec->encode = Null_Cipher; + spec->decode = Null_Cipher; + spec->compressor = NULL; + spec->decompressor = NULL; + spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + spec->mac_size = 0; + spec->master_secret = NULL; + + spec->msItem.data = NULL; + spec->msItem.len = 0; + + spec->client.write_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->server.write_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->write_seq_num = 0; + spec->read_seq_num = 0; + spec->epoch = 0; + + spec->refCt = 128; /* Arbitrarily high number to prevent + * non-TLS 1.3 cipherSpecs from being + * GCed. This will be overwritten with + * a valid refCt for TLS 1.3. */ + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord +** ssl3_SendClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() +** +** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock. +** +** +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.initialized) + return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */ + + ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + + ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0]; + ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1]; + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.crSpec); + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec); + ss->ssl3.crSpec->version = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version = ss->vrange.max; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello; + + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0, + sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket)); + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + + ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); + + ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->policy = policy; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRInt32 policy; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + policy = suite->policy; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *oPolicy = policy; + return rv; +} + +/* record the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* return the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int count) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int supported = 0; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!count) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + ++supported; + } + } + /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */ + if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0; + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i])); + continue; + } + + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i]; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int count) +{ + SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES]; + unsigned int i; + + count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count); + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg; + } + return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!schemes || !count || + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned int i; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!algorithms || !count || + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff; + algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff; + } + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + return SECSuccess; +} + +unsigned int +SSL_SignatureMaxCount() +{ + return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; +} + +/* copy global default policy into socket. */ +void +ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites)); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes, + sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes)); + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes); +} + +/* +** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, +** then start a new handshake. +** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a +** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. +** +** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->firstHsDone || + (ss->ssl3.initialized && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER || + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid && flushCache) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + /* start off a new handshake. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss); + } else { + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */ +void +ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) +{ + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL) + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); + } + + /* clean up handshake */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + } + + /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf); + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) { + PORT_FreeArena(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; + } + + /* free up the CipherSpecs */ + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); + + /* Destroy the DTLS data */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf); + } + } + + /* Destroy remote extensions */ + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 cipher specs */ + tls13_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */ + tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + + ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE; +} + +#define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER) + +SECStatus +ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void) +{ + unsigned i; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 policy = 0; + + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { + return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */ + } + + /* disable every ciphersuite */ + for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + SECOidTag policyOid; + + policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + + policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + + if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) { + policyOid = MAP_NULL(mac_defs[suite->mac_alg].oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, + SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(); + + return rv; +} + +/* End of ssl3con.c */ |