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-rw-r--r--security/certverifier/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp193
1 files changed, 193 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/certverifier/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp b/security/certverifier/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp
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+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
+
+#include "CTObjectsExtractor.h"
+#include "CTSerialization.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/Move.h"
+
+namespace mozilla { namespace ct {
+
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+
+// Note: this moves |sct| to the target list in |result|, invalidating |sct|.
+static Result
+StoreVerifiedSct(CTVerifyResult& result,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus status)
+{
+ sct.verificationStatus = status;
+ if (!result.scts.append(Move(sct))) {
+ return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(Input publicKey)
+{
+ CTLogVerifier log;
+ Result rv = log.Init(publicKey);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ if (!mLogs.append(Move(log))) {
+ return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(Input cert,
+ Input issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ Input sctListFromCert,
+ Input sctListFromOCSPResponse,
+ Input sctListFromTLSExtension,
+ Time time,
+ CTVerifyResult& result)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(cert.GetLength() > 0);
+ result.Reset();
+
+ Result rv;
+
+ // Verify embedded SCTs
+ if (issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.GetLength() > 0 &&
+ sctListFromCert.GetLength() > 0) {
+ LogEntry precertEntry;
+ rv = GetPrecertLogEntry(cert, issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, precertEntry);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromCert, precertEntry,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin::Embedded, time,
+ result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ LogEntry x509Entry;
+ rv = GetX509LogEntry(cert, x509Entry);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ // Verify SCTs from a stapled OCSP response
+ if (sctListFromOCSPResponse.GetLength() > 0) {
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromOCSPResponse, x509Entry,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin::OCSPResponse, time,
+ result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Verify SCTs from a TLS extension
+ if (sctListFromTLSExtension.GetLength() > 0) {
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromTLSExtension, x509Entry,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin::TLSExtension, time,
+ result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(Input encodedSctList,
+ const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin,
+ Time time,
+ CTVerifyResult& result)
+{
+ Reader listReader;
+ Result rv = DecodeSCTList(encodedSctList, listReader);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ result.decodingErrors++;
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ while (!listReader.AtEnd()) {
+ Input encodedSct;
+ rv = ReadSCTListItem(listReader, encodedSct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ result.decodingErrors++;
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ Reader encodedSctReader(encodedSct);
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp sct;
+ rv = DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(encodedSctReader, sct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ result.decodingErrors++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ sct.origin = origin;
+
+ rv = VerifySingleSCT(Move(sct), expectedEntry, time, result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
+ const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
+ Time time,
+ CTVerifyResult& result)
+{
+ CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
+ for (auto& log : mLogs) {
+ if (log.keyId() == sct.logId) {
+ matchingLog = &log;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!matchingLog) {
+ // SCT does not match any known log.
+ return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::UnknownLog);
+ }
+
+ if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) {
+ // SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
+ return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidSignature);
+ }
+
+ Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, sct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
+ return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidSignature);
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ // |sct.timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
+ // ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
+ // pkix::Time, we need to round it either up or down. In our case, rounding up
+ // is more "secure", although practically it does not matter.
+ Time sctTime = TimeFromEpochInSeconds((sct.timestamp + 999u) / 1000u);
+
+ // SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate.
+ if (sctTime > time) {
+ return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::InvalidTimestamp);
+ }
+
+ return StoreVerifiedSct(result, Move(sct),
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp::VerificationStatus::OK);
+}
+
+} } // namespace mozilla::ct