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-rwxr-xr-xnetwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c2336
1 files changed, 2336 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..50432ad8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2336 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
+ * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c 271673 2014-09-16 14:20:33Z tuexen $");
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/sctp_os.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_header.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_var.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h>
+#include <netinet/sctputil.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_indata.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_output.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_auth.h>
+
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1)
+#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2 (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2)
+#endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */
+
+
+void
+sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist)
+{
+ bzero(chklist, sizeof(*chklist));
+ /* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */
+}
+
+sctp_auth_chklist_t *
+sctp_alloc_chunklist(void)
+{
+ sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist;
+
+ SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist),
+ SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
+ if (chklist == NULL) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n");
+ } else {
+ sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist);
+ }
+ return (chklist);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ if (list != NULL)
+ SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
+}
+
+sctp_auth_chklist_t *
+sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /* get a new list */
+ new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
+ if (new_list == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ /* copy it */
+ bcopy(list, new_list, sizeof(*new_list));
+
+ return (new_list);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * add a chunk to the required chunks list
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* is chunk restricted? */
+ if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) ||
+ (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) ||
+ (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) ||
+ (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) {
+ list->chunks[chunk] = 1;
+ list->num_chunks++;
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n",
+ chunk, chunk);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * delete a chunk from the required chunks list
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) {
+ list->chunks[chunk] = 0;
+ list->num_chunks--;
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n",
+ chunk, chunk);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+size_t
+sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ return (list->num_chunks);
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the current number and list of required chunks caller must
+ * guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes
+ */
+int
+sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int i, count = 0;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+ *ptr++ = i;
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ return (count);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int i, size = 0;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (list->num_chunks <= 32) {
+ /* just list them, one byte each */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+ *ptr++ = i;
+ size++;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ int index, offset;
+
+ /* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+ index = i / 8;
+ offset = i % 8;
+ ptr[index] |= (1 << offset);
+ }
+ }
+ size = 32;
+ }
+ return (size);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t *ptr, uint8_t num_chunks,
+ sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+ int i;
+ int size;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (num_chunks <= 32) {
+ /* just pull them, one byte each */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list);
+ }
+ size = num_chunks;
+ } else {
+ int index, offset;
+
+ /* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) {
+ if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) {
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ size = 32;
+ }
+ return (size);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * allocate structure space for a key of length keylen
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen)
+{
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+ SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen,
+ SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+ if (new_key == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ new_key->keylen = keylen;
+ return (new_key);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t *key)
+{
+ if (key != NULL)
+ SCTP_FREE(key,SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
+ return;
+ }
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
+ if (key->keylen) {
+ for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
+ } else {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
+ return;
+ }
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
+ if (key->keylen) {
+ for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
+ } else {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t *key)
+{
+ if (key != NULL)
+ return (key->keylen);
+ else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * generate a new random key of length 'keylen'
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
+{
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+ new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+ if (new_key == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
+ new_key->keylen = keylen;
+ return (new_key);
+}
+
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_set_key(uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen)
+{
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+ new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+ if (new_key == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ bcopy(key, new_key->key, keylen);
+ return (new_key);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller"
+ * returns: 1 if key1 > key2
+ * -1 if key1 < key2
+ * 0 if key1 = key2
+ */
+static int
+sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2)
+{
+ uint32_t maxlen;
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint32_t key1len, key2len;
+ uint8_t *key_1, *key_2;
+ uint8_t val1, val2;
+
+ /* sanity/length check */
+ key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1);
+ key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2);
+ if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0))
+ return (0);
+ else if (key1len == 0)
+ return (-1);
+ else if (key2len == 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (key1len < key2len) {
+ maxlen = key2len;
+ } else {
+ maxlen = key1len;
+ }
+ key_1 = key1->key;
+ key_2 = key2->key;
+ /* check for numeric equality */
+ for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) {
+ /* left-pad with zeros */
+ val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++);
+ val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++);
+ if (val1 > val2) {
+ return (1);
+ } else if (val1 < val2) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* keys are equal value, so check lengths */
+ if (key1len == key2len)
+ return (0);
+ else if (key1len < key2len)
+ return (-1);
+ else
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the
+ * shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific
+ * order for concatenation
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, sctp_key_t *shared)
+{
+ uint32_t keylen;
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+ uint8_t *key_ptr;
+
+ keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) +
+ sctp_get_keylen(shared);
+
+ if (keylen > 0) {
+ /* get space for the new key */
+ new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+ if (new_key == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ new_key->keylen = keylen;
+ key_ptr = new_key->key;
+ } else {
+ /* all keys empty/null?! */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /* concatenate the keys */
+ if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) {
+ /* key is shared + key1 + key2 */
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
+ bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
+ key_ptr += shared->keylen;
+ }
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
+ bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
+ key_ptr += key1->keylen;
+ }
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
+ bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* key is shared + key2 + key1 */
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
+ bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
+ key_ptr += shared->keylen;
+ }
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
+ bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
+ key_ptr += key2->keylen;
+ }
+ if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
+ bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
+ }
+ }
+ return (new_key);
+}
+
+
+sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key;
+
+ SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key),
+ SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+ if (new_key == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ new_key->keyid = 0;
+ new_key->key = NULL;
+ new_key->refcount = 1;
+ new_key->deactivated = 0;
+ return (new_key);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
+{
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) {
+ if (skey->key != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(skey->key);
+ SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+ }
+}
+
+sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
+ if (skey->keyid == key_id)
+ return (skey);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys,
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL))
+ return (EINVAL);
+
+ /* insert into an empty list? */
+ if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) {
+ LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */
+ LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
+ if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) {
+ /* insert it before here */
+ LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
+ return (0);
+ } else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) {
+ /* replace the existing key */
+ /* verify this key *can* be replaced */
+ if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "can't replace shared key id %u\n",
+ new_skey->keyid);
+ return (EBUSY);
+ }
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "replacing shared key id %u\n",
+ new_skey->keyid);
+ LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
+ LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+ sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) {
+ /* belongs at the end of the list */
+ LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ /* shouldn't reach here */
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ /* find the shared key */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
+
+ /* bump the ref count */
+ if (skey) {
+ atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+ "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked
+#if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
+ SCTP_UNUSED
+#endif
+)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ /* find the shared key */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
+
+ /* decrement the ref count */
+ if (skey) {
+ sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+ "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+
+ /* see if a notification should be generated */
+ if ((skey->refcount <= 1) && (skey->deactivated)) {
+ /* notify ULP that key is no longer used */
+ sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb,
+ key_id, 0, so_locked);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+ "%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey;
+
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey();
+ if (new_skey == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ if (skey->key != NULL)
+ new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen);
+ else
+ new_skey->key = NULL;
+ new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid;
+ return (new_skey);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL))
+ return (0);
+ LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) {
+ new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey);
+ if (new_skey != NULL) {
+ (void)sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey);
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ return (count);
+}
+
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint16_t num_hmacs)
+{
+ sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+ int alloc_size;
+
+ alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]);
+ SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size,
+ SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
+ if (new_list == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs;
+ new_list->num_algo = 0;
+ return (new_list);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
+{
+ if (list != NULL) {
+ SCTP_FREE(list,SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
+ list = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t hmac_id)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) &&
+ (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) {
+#else
+ if (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+#endif
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* Now is it already in the list */
+ for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
+ if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) {
+ /* already in list */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id);
+ list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
+{
+ sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+ int i;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ /* get a new list */
+ new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo);
+ if (new_list == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ /* copy it */
+ new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo;
+ new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo;
+ for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
+ new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i];
+ return (new_list);
+}
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void)
+{
+ sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2);
+#else
+ new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(1);
+#endif
+ if (new_list == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ /* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256);
+#endif
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
+ return (new_list);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order
+ * find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support
+ */
+uint16_t
+sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *peer, sctp_hmaclist_t *local)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL))
+ return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) {
+ if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) {
+ /* found the "best" one */
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n",
+ peer->hmac[i]);
+ return (peer->hmac[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* didn't find one! */
+ return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used
+ * caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space
+ */
+int
+sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint16_t hmac_id;
+
+ if (list == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
+ hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]);
+ bcopy(&hmac_id, ptr, sizeof(hmac_id));
+ ptr += sizeof(hmac_id);
+ }
+ return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id));
+}
+
+int
+sctp_verify_hmac_param (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
+ if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+sctp_authinfo_t *
+sctp_alloc_authinfo(void)
+{
+ sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo;
+
+ SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo),
+ SCTP_M_AUTH_IF);
+
+ if (new_authinfo == NULL) {
+ /* out of memory */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ bzero(new_authinfo, sizeof(*new_authinfo));
+ return (new_authinfo);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t *authinfo)
+{
+ if (authinfo == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (authinfo->random != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(authinfo->random);
+ if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random);
+ if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key);
+ if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key);
+
+ /* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */
+ /* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */
+}
+
+
+uint32_t
+sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+ int size;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ return (SCTP_SIZE32(size));
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+ switch (hmac_algo) {
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+ return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+ return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256);
+#endif
+ default:
+ /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+ return (0);
+ } /* end switch */
+}
+
+static inline int
+sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+ switch (hmac_algo) {
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+ return (64);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+ return (64);
+#endif
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+ default:
+ /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+ return (0);
+ } /* end switch */
+}
+
+#if defined(__Userspace__)
+/* __Userspace__ SHA1_Init is defined in libcrypto.a (libssl-dev on Ubuntu) */
+#endif
+static void
+sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ switch (hmac_algo) {
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+ SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1);
+ break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+ SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+ default:
+ /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+ return;
+ } /* end switch */
+}
+
+static void
+sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
+ uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen)
+{
+ switch (hmac_algo) {
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+ SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen);
+ break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+ SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+ default:
+ /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+ return;
+ } /* end switch */
+}
+
+static void
+sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
+ uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ switch (hmac_algo) {
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+ SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1);
+ break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+ SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+ default:
+ /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+ return;
+ } /* end switch */
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104)
+ *
+ * Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
+ * algorithm. Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length
+ * is returned, if the HMAC was performed.
+ *
+ * WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the
+ * resultant digest.
+ */
+uint32_t
+sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
+ uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ uint32_t blocklen;
+ sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+ uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
+ uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* sanity check the material and length */
+ if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) ||
+ (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
+ /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (digestlen == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+ blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (keylen > blocklen) {
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+ /* set the hashed key as the key */
+ keylen = digestlen;
+ key = temp;
+ }
+ /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
+ bzero(ipad, blocklen);
+ bzero(opad, blocklen);
+ bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
+ bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
+
+ /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
+ for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
+ ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+ opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+ }
+
+ /* perform inner hash */
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+
+ /* perform outer hash */
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
+
+ return (digestlen);
+}
+
+/* mbuf version */
+uint32_t
+sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
+ struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest, uint32_t trailer)
+{
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ uint32_t blocklen;
+ sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+ uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
+ uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+ uint32_t i;
+ struct mbuf *m_tmp;
+
+ /* sanity check the material and length */
+ if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
+ /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (digestlen == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+ blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (keylen > blocklen) {
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+ /* set the hashed key as the key */
+ keylen = digestlen;
+ key = temp;
+ }
+ /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
+ bzero(ipad, blocklen);
+ bzero(opad, blocklen);
+ bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
+ bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
+
+ /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
+ for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
+ ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+ opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+ }
+
+ /* perform inner hash */
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
+ /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
+ m_tmp = m;
+ while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+ m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+ m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+ }
+ /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
+ while (m_tmp != NULL) {
+ if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) {
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
+ SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer+m_offset));
+ } else {
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
+ SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
+ }
+
+ /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
+ m_offset = 0;
+ m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+ }
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+
+ /* perform outer hash */
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
+
+ return (digestlen);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * verify the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
+ * algorithm.
+ * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success.
+ */
+int
+sctp_verify_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
+ uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
+ uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
+{
+ uint32_t len;
+ uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+ /* sanity check the material and length */
+ if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) ||
+ (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
+ /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ len = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ if ((len == 0) || (digestlen != len))
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* compute the expected hash */
+ if (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key, keylen, text, textlen, temp) != len)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (memcmp(digest, temp, digestlen) != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if
+ * the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len).
+ */
+uint32_t
+sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, uint8_t *text,
+ uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ uint32_t blocklen;
+ sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+ uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+ /* sanity check */
+ if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) ||
+ (digest == NULL)) {
+ /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (digestlen == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+ blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+ /* save the hashed key as the new key */
+ key->keylen = digestlen;
+ bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
+ }
+ return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen,
+ digest));
+}
+
+/* mbuf version */
+uint32_t
+sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, struct mbuf *m,
+ uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ uint32_t blocklen;
+ sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+ uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+ /* sanity check */
+ if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
+ /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (digestlen == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+ blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+ if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
+ sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+ sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
+ sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+ /* save the hashed key as the new key */
+ key->keylen = digestlen;
+ bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
+ }
+ return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0));
+}
+
+int
+sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD))
+ return (0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
+ if (list->hmac[i] == id)
+ return (1);
+
+ /* not in the list */
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+/*-
+ * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association.
+ * the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use.
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+void
+sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ if (stcb == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) {
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) {
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on
+ * an endpoint.
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+void
+sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ struct sctp_tcb *stcb;
+
+ if (inp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */
+ LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
+ SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
+ sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
+ SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * delete a shared key from an association
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ if (stcb == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
+ if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* does the key exist? */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
+ if (skey->refcount > 1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* remove it */
+ LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+ sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
+
+ /* clear any cached keys */
+ sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deletes a shared key from the endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ if (inp == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
+ if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* does the key exist? */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
+
+ /* remove it */
+ LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+ sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
+
+ /* clear any cached keys */
+ sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * set the active key on an association
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL;
+
+ /* find the key on the assoc */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ /* that key doesn't exist */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
+ /* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* set the (new) active key */
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid;
+ /* reset the deactivated flag */
+ skey->deactivated = 0;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * set the active key on an endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ /* find the key */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ /* that key doesn't exist */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deactivates a shared key from the association
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ if (stcb == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
+ if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* does the key exist? */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
+ if (skey->refcount == 1) {
+ /* no other users, send a notification for this key */
+ sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, keyid, 0,
+ SCTP_SO_LOCKED);
+ }
+
+ /* mark the key as deactivated */
+ skey->deactivated = 1;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deactivates a shared key from the endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+ if (inp == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
+ if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* does the key exist? */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+ if (skey == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
+
+ /* remove it */
+ LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+ sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK)
+ */
+void
+sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m,
+ uint32_t offset, uint32_t length)
+{
+ struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param;
+ uint16_t plen, ptype;
+ uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL;
+ uint16_t random_len = 0;
+ uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL;
+ uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
+ uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
+ uint16_t num_chunks = 0;
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+ uint32_t keylen;
+
+ /* convert to upper bound */
+ length += offset;
+
+ phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset,
+ sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
+ while (phdr != NULL) {
+ ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
+ plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
+
+ if ((plen == 0) || (offset + plen > length))
+ break;
+
+ if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
+ if (plen > sizeof(random_store))
+ break;
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, min(plen, sizeof(random_store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL)
+ return;
+ /* save the random and length for the key */
+ p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr;
+ random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random);
+ } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
+ uint16_t num_hmacs;
+ uint16_t i;
+
+ if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store))
+ break;
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, min(plen,sizeof(hmacs_store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL)
+ return;
+ /* save the hmacs list and num for the key */
+ hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
+ hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs);
+ num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL)
+ sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
+ stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs);
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
+ ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]));
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
+ int i;
+
+ if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store))
+ break;
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL)
+ return;
+ chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
+ num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
+ /* save chunks list and num for the key */
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL)
+ sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
+ else
+ stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
+ for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+ (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i],
+ stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
+ }
+ }
+ /* get next parameter */
+ offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
+ if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length)
+ break;
+ phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr),
+ (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
+ }
+ /* concatenate the full random key */
+ keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len;
+ if (chunks != NULL) {
+ keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
+ }
+ new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+ if (new_key != NULL) {
+ /* copy in the RANDOM */
+ if (p_random != NULL) {
+ keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len;
+ bcopy(p_random, new_key->key, keylen);
+ }
+ /* append in the AUTH chunks */
+ if (chunks != NULL) {
+ bcopy(chunks, new_key->key + keylen,
+ sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks);
+ keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
+ }
+ /* append in the HMACs */
+ if (hmacs != NULL) {
+ bcopy(hmacs, new_key->key + keylen,
+ sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
+ sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
+ sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
+
+ /* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */
+ stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs,
+ stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
+
+ /* copy defaults from the endpoint */
+ /* FIX ME: put in cookie? */
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
+ /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
+ (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
+ &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
+}
+
+/*
+ * compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet
+ */
+void
+sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset,
+ struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+ sctp_key_t *key;
+
+ if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL))
+ return;
+
+ /* zero the digest + chunk padding */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id);
+ bzero(auth->hmac, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
+
+ /* is the desired key cached? */
+ if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) ||
+ (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) {
+ if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) {
+ /* free the old cached key */
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
+ }
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+ /* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */
+ if (skey != NULL)
+ key = skey->key;
+ else
+ key = NULL;
+ /* compute a new assoc key and cache it */
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key =
+ sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid;
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n",
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+ if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
+ sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
+ "Assoc Key");
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* set in the active key id */
+ auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid);
+
+ /* compute and fill in the digest */
+ (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
+ m, auth_offset, auth->hmac);
+}
+
+
+static void
+sctp_bzero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
+{
+ struct mbuf *m_tmp;
+ uint8_t *data;
+
+ /* sanity check */
+ if (m == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
+ m_tmp = m;
+ while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+ m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+ m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+ }
+ /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
+ while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
+ data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
+ if (size > (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)) {
+ bzero(data, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp));
+ size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+ } else {
+ bzero(data, size);
+ size = 0;
+ }
+ /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
+ m_offset = 0;
+ m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * process the incoming Authentication chunk
+ * return codes:
+ * -1 on any authentication error
+ * 0 on authentication verification
+ */
+int
+sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
+ struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset)
+{
+ uint16_t chunklen;
+ uint16_t shared_key_id;
+ uint16_t hmac_id;
+ sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+ uint32_t digestlen;
+ uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+ uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+ /* auth is checked for NULL by caller */
+ chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length);
+ if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) {
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth);
+
+ /* get the auth params */
+ shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id);
+ hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n",
+ shared_key_id, hmac_id);
+
+ /* is the indicated HMAC supported? */
+ if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) {
+ struct mbuf *m_err;
+ struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *err;
+
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n",
+ hmac_id);
+ /*
+ * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
+ * Identifier
+ */
+ m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 0, M_NOWAIT,
+ 1, MT_HEADER);
+ if (m_err != NULL) {
+ /* pre-reserve some space */
+ SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+ /* fill in the error */
+ err = mtod(m_err, struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *);
+ bzero(err, sizeof(*err));
+ err->ph.param_type = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
+ err->ph.param_length = htons(sizeof(*err));
+ err->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
+ SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_err) = sizeof(*err);
+ /* queue it */
+ sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, m_err);
+ }
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* get the indicated shared key, if available */
+ if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) ||
+ (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) {
+ /* find the shared key on the assoc first */
+ skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys,
+ shared_key_id);
+ /* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n",
+ shared_key_id);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* generate a notification if this is a new key id */
+ if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)
+ /*
+ * sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb,
+ * shared_key_id, (void
+ * *)stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
+ */
+ sctp_notify_authentication(stcb, SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY,
+ shared_key_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid,
+ SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED);
+ /* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */
+ if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key =
+ sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id;
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+ if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
+ sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key");
+#endif
+ }
+ /* validate the digest length */
+ digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id);
+ if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) {
+ /* invalid digest length */
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */
+ bcopy(auth->hmac, digest, digestlen);
+ sctp_bzero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
+ (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key,
+ m, offset, computed_digest);
+
+ /* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */
+ if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
+ SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate NOTIFICATION
+ */
+void
+sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
+ uint16_t keyid, uint16_t alt_keyid, int so_locked
+#if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
+ SCTP_UNUSED
+#endif
+)
+{
+ struct mbuf *m_notify;
+ struct sctp_authkey_event *auth;
+ struct sctp_queued_to_read *control;
+
+ if ((stcb == NULL) ||
+ (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_GONE) ||
+ (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_ALLGONE) ||
+ (stcb->asoc.state & SCTP_STATE_CLOSED_SOCKET)
+ ) {
+ /* If the socket is gone we are out of here */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT))
+ /* event not enabled */
+ return;
+
+ m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
+ 0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
+ if (m_notify == NULL)
+ /* no space left */
+ return;
+
+ SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
+ auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
+ memset(auth, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event));
+ auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
+ auth->auth_flags = 0;
+ auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth);
+ auth->auth_keynumber = keyid;
+ auth->auth_altkeynumber = alt_keyid;
+ auth->auth_indication = indication;
+ auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);
+
+ SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
+ SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;
+
+ /* append to socket */
+ control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
+ 0, 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify);
+ if (control == NULL) {
+ /* no memory */
+ sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
+ return;
+ }
+ control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
+ control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
+ /* not that we need this */
+ control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
+ sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
+ &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1, SCTP_READ_LOCK_NOT_HELD, so_locked);
+}
+
+
+/*-
+ * validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK
+ * Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline
+ * with sctp_load_addresses_from_init()
+ */
+int
+sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit)
+{
+ struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, parm_buf;
+ uint16_t ptype, plen;
+ int peer_supports_asconf = 0;
+ int peer_supports_auth = 0;
+ int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0;
+ uint8_t saw_asconf = 0;
+ uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0;
+
+ /* go through each of the params. */
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf, sizeof(parm_buf));
+ while (phdr) {
+ ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
+ plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
+
+ if (offset + plen > limit) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) {
+ /* A supported extension chunk */
+ struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported;
+ uint8_t local_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ int num_ent, i;
+
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store, min(plen,sizeof(local_store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr;
+ num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) {
+ switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) {
+ case SCTP_ASCONF:
+ case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK:
+ peer_supports_asconf = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* one we don't care about */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
+ got_random = 1;
+ /* enforce the random length */
+ if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) +
+ SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
+ uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs;
+ int num_hmacs;
+
+ if (plen > sizeof(store))
+ break;
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store, min(plen,sizeof(store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
+ num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) /
+ sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
+ /* validate the hmac list */
+ if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ got_hmacs = 1;
+ } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
+ int i, num_chunks;
+ uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
+ /* did the peer send a non-empty chunk list? */
+ struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+ (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store,
+ min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store)));
+ if (phdr == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /*-
+ * Flip through the list and mark that the
+ * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack.
+ */
+ chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
+ num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+ /* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */
+ if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF)
+ saw_asconf = 1;
+ if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)
+ saw_asconf_ack = 1;
+
+ }
+ if (num_chunks)
+ got_chklist = 1;
+ }
+
+ offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
+ if (offset >= limit) {
+ break;
+ }
+ phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf,
+ sizeof(parm_buf));
+ }
+ /* validate authentication required parameters */
+ if (got_random && got_hmacs) {
+ peer_supports_auth = 1;
+ } else {
+ peer_supports_auth = 0;
+ }
+ if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (peer_supports_asconf && !peer_supports_auth) {
+ SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+ "SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n");
+ return (-1);
+ } else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) &&
+ ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) {
+ return (-2);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
+{
+ uint16_t chunks_len = 0;
+ uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
+ uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+ sctp_key_t *new_key;
+ uint16_t keylen;
+
+ /* initialize hmac list from endpoint */
+ stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs);
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
+ hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo *
+ sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]);
+ }
+ /* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */
+ stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks =
+ sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks);
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
+ chunks_len++;
+ }
+ }
+ /* copy defaults from the endpoint */
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
+
+ /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
+ (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
+ &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
+
+ /* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */
+ /* key includes parameter headers */
+ keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len +
+ hmacs_len;
+ new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+ if (new_key != NULL) {
+ struct sctp_paramhdr *ph;
+ int plen;
+ /* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
+ ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key;
+ ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM);
+ plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len;
+ ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+ SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len);
+ keylen = plen;
+
+ /* append in the AUTH chunks */
+ /* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */
+ ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
+ ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST);
+ plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len;
+ ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+ keylen += sizeof(*ph);
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
+ new_key->key[keylen++] = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* append in the HMACs */
+ ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
+ ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST);
+ plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len;
+ ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+ keylen += sizeof(*ph);
+ (void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
+ new_key->key + keylen);
+ }
+ if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
+ sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
+ stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef SCTP_HMAC_TEST
+/*
+ * HMAC and key concatenation tests
+ */
+static void
+sctp_print_digest(uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen, const char *str)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s: 0x", str);
+ if (digest == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < digestlen; i++)
+ SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", digest[i]);
+}
+
+static int
+sctp_test_hmac(const char *str, uint16_t hmac_id, uint8_t *key,
+ uint32_t keylen, uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
+ uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
+{
+ uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s:", str);
+ sctp_hmac(hmac_id, key, keylen, text, textlen, computed_digest);
+ sctp_print_digest(digest, digestlen, "Expected digest");
+ sctp_print_digest(computed_digest, digestlen, "Computed digest");
+ if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
+ return (-1);
+ } else {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2202: HMAC-SHA1 test cases
+ */
+void
+sctp_test_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+ uint8_t *digest;
+ uint8_t key[128];
+ uint32_t keylen;
+ uint8_t text[128];
+ uint32_t textlen;
+ uint32_t digestlen = 20;
+ int failed = 0;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 1
+ * key = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+ * key_len = 20
+ * data = "Hi There"
+ * data_len = 8
+ * digest = 0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00
+ */
+ keylen = 20;
+ memset(key, 0x0b, keylen);
+ textlen = 8;
+ strcpy(text, "Hi There");
+ digest = "\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 1", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 2
+ * key = "Jefe"
+ * key_len = 4
+ * data = "what do ya want for nothing?"
+ * data_len = 28
+ * digest = 0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79
+ */
+ keylen = 4;
+ strcpy(key, "Jefe");
+ textlen = 28;
+ strcpy(text, "what do ya want for nothing?");
+ digest = "\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 2", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 3
+ * key = 0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
+ * key_len = 20
+ * data = 0xdd repeated 50 times
+ * data_len = 50
+ * digest = 0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3
+ */
+ keylen = 20;
+ memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+ textlen = 50;
+ memset(text, 0xdd, textlen);
+ digest = "\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 3", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 4
+ * key = 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
+ * key_len = 25
+ * data = 0xcd repeated 50 times
+ * data_len = 50
+ * digest = 0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da
+ */
+ keylen = 25;
+ memcpy(key, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", keylen);
+ textlen = 50;
+ memset(text, 0xcd, textlen);
+ digest = "\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 4", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 5
+ * key = 0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+ * key_len = 20
+ * data = "Test With Truncation"
+ * data_len = 20
+ * digest = 0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
+ * digest-96 = 0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
+ */
+ keylen = 20;
+ memset(key, 0x0c, keylen);
+ textlen = 20;
+ strcpy(text, "Test With Truncation");
+ digest = "\x4c\x1a\x03\x42\x4b\x55\xe0\x7f\xe7\xf2\x7b\xe1\xd5\x8b\xb9\x32\x4a\x9a\x5a\x04";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 5", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 6
+ * key = 0xaa repeated 80 times
+ * key_len = 80
+ * data = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
+ * data_len = 54
+ * digest = 0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
+ */
+ keylen = 80;
+ memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+ textlen = 54;
+ strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First");
+ digest = "\xaa\x4a\xe5\xe1\x52\x72\xd0\x0e\x95\x70\x56\x37\xce\x8a\x3b\x55\xed\x40\x21\x12";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 6", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /*-
+ * test_case = 7
+ * key = 0xaa repeated 80 times
+ * key_len = 80
+ * data = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
+ * data_len = 73
+ * digest = 0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
+ */
+ keylen = 80;
+ memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+ textlen = 73;
+ strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data");
+ digest = "\xe8\xe9\x9d\x0f\x45\x23\x7d\x78\x6d\x6b\xba\xa7\x96\x5c\x78\x08\xbb\xff\x1a\x91";
+ if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 7", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+ text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* done with all tests */
+ if (failed)
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: %d cases failed", failed);
+ else
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: all test cases passed");
+}
+
+/*
+ * test assoc key concatenation
+ */
+static int
+sctp_test_key_concatenation(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2,
+ sctp_key_t *expected_key)
+{
+ sctp_key_t *key;
+ int ret_val;
+
+ sctp_show_key(key1, "\nkey1");
+ sctp_show_key(key2, "\nkey2");
+ key = sctp_compute_hashkey(key1, key2, NULL);
+ sctp_show_key(expected_key, "\nExpected");
+ sctp_show_key(key, "\nComputed");
+ if (memcmp(key, expected_key, expected_key->keylen) != 0) {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
+ ret_val = -1;
+ } else {
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
+ ret_val = 0;
+ }
+ sctp_free_key(key1);
+ sctp_free_key(key2);
+ sctp_free_key(expected_key);
+ sctp_free_key(key);
+ return (ret_val);
+}
+
+
+void
+sctp_test_authkey(void)
+{
+ sctp_key_t *key1, *key2, *expected_key;
+ int failed = 0;
+
+ /* test case 1 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01", 4);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x02\x03\x04", 4);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x02\x03\x04", 8);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 2 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x02", 1);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02", 5);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 3 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x02", 4);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02", 5);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 4 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 5 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 6 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* test case 7 */
+ key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
+ key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
+ expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
+ if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+ failed++;
+
+ /* done with all tests */
+ if (failed)
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: %d cases failed", failed);
+ else
+ SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: all test cases passed");
+}
+
+
+#if defined(STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST)
+int
+main(void)
+{
+ sctp_test_hmac_sha1();
+ sctp_test_authkey();
+}
+
+#endif /* STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST */
+
+#endif /* SCTP_HMAC_TEST */