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-rw-r--r--netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.cpp1682
1 files changed, 1682 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.cpp b/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a2275287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1682 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/* vim:set expandtab ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 cin: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+// HttpLog.h should generally be included first
+#include "HttpLog.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsHttpHandler.h"
+#include "nsIHttpAuthenticator.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "nsIAuthPrompt2.h"
+#include "nsIAuthPromptProvider.h"
+#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
+#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
+#include "nsEscape.h"
+#include "nsAuthInformationHolder.h"
+#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
+#include "nsIPrompt.h"
+#include "netCore.h"
+#include "nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsILoadContext.h"
+#include "nsIURL.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "nsIProxiedChannel.h"
+#include "nsIProxyInfo.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace net {
+
+#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL 0
+#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN 1
+#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL 2
+
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC 0
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE 1
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_CROSS_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE 2
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_XHR 3
+
+#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE 0
+#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE 1
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE 2
+#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE 3
+#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE 4
+#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE 5
+#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE 6
+#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE 7
+
+static void
+GetOriginAttributesSuffix(nsIChannel* aChan, nsACString &aSuffix)
+{
+ NeckoOriginAttributes oa;
+
+ // Deliberately ignoring the result and going with defaults
+ if (aChan) {
+ NS_GetOriginAttributes(aChan, oa);
+ }
+
+ oa.CreateSuffix(aSuffix);
+}
+
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::nsHttpChannelAuthProvider()
+ : mAuthChannel(nullptr)
+ , mPort(-1)
+ , mUsingSSL(false)
+ , mProxyUsingSSL(false)
+ , mIsPrivate(false)
+ , mProxyAuthContinuationState(nullptr)
+ , mAuthContinuationState(nullptr)
+ , mProxyAuth(false)
+ , mTriedProxyAuth(false)
+ , mTriedHostAuth(false)
+ , mSuppressDefensiveAuth(false)
+ , mCrossOrigin(false)
+ , mConnectionBased(false)
+ , mHttpHandler(gHttpHandler)
+{
+}
+
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::~nsHttpChannelAuthProvider()
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!mAuthChannel, "Disconnect wasn't called");
+}
+
+uint32_t nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::sAuthAllowPref =
+ SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL;
+
+void
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::InitializePrefs()
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+ mozilla::Preferences::AddUintVarCache(&sAuthAllowPref,
+ "network.auth.subresource-http-auth-allow",
+ SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Init(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel *channel)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(channel, "channel expected!");
+
+ mAuthChannel = channel;
+
+ nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(mURI));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ mAuthChannel->GetIsSSL(&mUsingSSL);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProxiedChannel> proxied(do_QueryInterface(channel));
+ if (proxied) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> pi;
+ rv = proxied->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(pi));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ if (pi) {
+ nsAutoCString proxyType;
+ rv = pi->GetType(proxyType);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ mProxyUsingSSL = proxyType.EqualsLiteral("https");
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = mURI->GetAsciiHost(mHost);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ // reject the URL if it doesn't specify a host
+ if (mHost.IsEmpty())
+ return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
+
+ rv = mURI->GetPort(&mPort);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> bareChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
+ mIsPrivate = NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(bareChannel);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication(uint32_t httpStatus,
+ bool SSLConnectFailed)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p code=%u SSLConnectFailed=%d]\n",
+ this, mAuthChannel, httpStatus, SSLConnectFailed));
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
+ nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+ if (proxyInfo) {
+ mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
+ if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString challenges;
+ mProxyAuth = (httpStatus == 407);
+
+ rv = PrepareForAuthentication(mProxyAuth);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ if (mProxyAuth) {
+ // only allow a proxy challenge if we have a proxy server configured.
+ // otherwise, we could inadvertently expose the user's proxy
+ // credentials to an origin server. We could attempt to proceed as
+ // if we had received a 401 from the server, but why risk flirting
+ // with trouble? IE similarly rejects 407s when a proxy server is
+ // not configured, so there's no reason not to do the same.
+ if (!UsingHttpProxy()) {
+ LOG(("rejecting 407 when proxy server not configured!\n"));
+ return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+ }
+ if (UsingSSL() && !SSLConnectFailed) {
+ // we need to verify that this challenge came from the proxy
+ // server itself, and not some server on the other side of the
+ // SSL tunnel.
+ LOG(("rejecting 407 from origin server!\n"));
+ return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+ }
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
+ }
+ else
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetWWWChallenges(challenges);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsAutoCString creds;
+ rv = GetCredentials(challenges.get(), mProxyAuth, creds);
+ if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS)
+ return rv;
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ LOG(("unable to authenticate\n"));
+ else {
+ // set the authentication credentials
+ if (mProxyAuth)
+ rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(creds);
+ else
+ rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(creds);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders(bool aDontUseCachedWWWCreds)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders? "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
+ nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+ if (proxyInfo) {
+ mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
+ if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t loadFlags;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ // this getter never fails
+ nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
+
+ // check if proxy credentials should be sent
+ const char *proxyHost = ProxyHost();
+ if (proxyHost && UsingHttpProxy()) {
+ SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization,
+ "http", proxyHost, ProxyPort(),
+ nullptr, // proxy has no path
+ mProxyIdent);
+ }
+
+ if (loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) {
+ LOG(("Skipping Authorization header for anonymous load\n"));
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (aDontUseCachedWWWCreds) {
+ LOG(("Authorization header already present:"
+ " skipping adding auth header from cache\n"));
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // check if server credentials should be sent
+ nsAutoCString path, scheme;
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(GetCurrentPath(path)) &&
+ NS_SUCCEEDED(mURI->GetScheme(scheme))) {
+ SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Authorization,
+ scheme.get(),
+ Host(),
+ Port(),
+ path.get(),
+ mIdent);
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth()
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth? "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
+
+ // we've been called because it has been determined that this channel is
+ // getting loaded without taking the userpass from the URL. if the URL
+ // contained a userpass, then (provided some other conditions are true),
+ // we'll give the user an opportunity to abort the channel as this might be
+ // an attempt to spoof a different site (see bug 232567).
+ if (!ConfirmAuth(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SuperfluousAuth"), true)) {
+ // calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
+ // transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
+ mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
+ return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Cancel(nsresult status)
+{
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
+
+ if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
+ mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
+ mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Disconnect(nsresult status)
+{
+ mAuthChannel = nullptr;
+
+ if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
+ mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
+ mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
+ }
+
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// buf contains "domain\user"
+static void
+ParseUserDomain(char16_t *buf,
+ const char16_t **user,
+ const char16_t **domain)
+{
+ char16_t *p = buf;
+ while (*p && *p != '\\') ++p;
+ if (!*p)
+ return;
+ *p = '\0';
+ *domain = buf;
+ *user = p + 1;
+}
+
+// helper function for setting identity from raw user:pass
+static void
+SetIdent(nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
+ uint32_t authFlags,
+ char16_t *userBuf,
+ char16_t *passBuf)
+{
+ const char16_t *user = userBuf;
+ const char16_t *domain = nullptr;
+
+ if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN)
+ ParseUserDomain(userBuf, &user, &domain);
+
+ ident.Set(domain, user, passBuf);
+}
+
+// helper function for getting an auth prompt from an interface requestor
+static void
+GetAuthPrompt(nsIInterfaceRequestor *ifreq, bool proxyAuth,
+ nsIAuthPrompt2 **result)
+{
+ if (!ifreq)
+ return;
+
+ uint32_t promptReason;
+ if (proxyAuth)
+ promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_PROXY;
+ else
+ promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_NORMAL;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPromptProvider> promptProvider = do_GetInterface(ifreq);
+ if (promptProvider)
+ promptProvider->GetAuthPrompt(promptReason,
+ NS_GET_IID(nsIAuthPrompt2),
+ reinterpret_cast<void**>(result));
+ else
+ NS_QueryAuthPrompt2(ifreq, result);
+}
+
+// generate credentials for the given challenge, and update the auth cache.
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GenCredsAndSetEntry(nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
+ bool proxyAuth,
+ const char *scheme,
+ const char *host,
+ int32_t port,
+ const char *directory,
+ const char *realm,
+ const char *challenge,
+ const nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> &sessionState,
+ char **result)
+{
+ nsresult rv;
+ nsISupports *ss = sessionState;
+
+ // set informations that depend on whether
+ // we're authenticating against a proxy
+ // or a webserver
+ nsISupports **continuationState;
+
+ if (proxyAuth) {
+ continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
+ } else {
+ continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
+ }
+
+ rv = auth->GenerateCredentialsAsync(mAuthChannel,
+ this,
+ challenge,
+ proxyAuth,
+ ident.Domain(),
+ ident.User(),
+ ident.Password(),
+ ss,
+ *continuationState,
+ getter_AddRefs(mGenerateCredentialsCancelable));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ // Calling generate credentials async, results will be dispatched to the
+ // main thread by calling OnCredsGenerated method
+ return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t generateFlags;
+ rv = auth->GenerateCredentials(mAuthChannel,
+ challenge,
+ proxyAuth,
+ ident.Domain(),
+ ident.User(),
+ ident.Password(),
+ &ss,
+ &*continuationState,
+ &generateFlags,
+ result);
+
+ sessionState.swap(ss);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ // don't log this in release build since it could contain sensitive info.
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ LOG(("generated creds: %s\n", *result));
+#endif
+
+ return UpdateCache(auth, scheme, host, port, directory, realm,
+ challenge, ident, *result, generateFlags, sessionState);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::UpdateCache(nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
+ const char *scheme,
+ const char *host,
+ int32_t port,
+ const char *directory,
+ const char *realm,
+ const char *challenge,
+ const nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident,
+ const char *creds,
+ uint32_t generateFlags,
+ nsISupports *sessionState)
+{
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ uint32_t authFlags;
+ rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ // find out if this authenticator allows reuse of credentials and/or
+ // challenge.
+ bool saveCreds =
+ 0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CREDENTIALS);
+ bool saveChallenge =
+ 0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CHALLENGE);
+
+ bool saveIdentity =
+ 0 == (generateFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::USING_INTERNAL_IDENTITY);
+
+ // this getter never fails
+ nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ nsAutoCString suffix;
+ GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
+
+
+ // create a cache entry. we do this even though we don't yet know that
+ // these credentials are valid b/c we need to avoid prompting the user
+ // more than once in case the credentials are valid.
+ //
+ // if the credentials are not reusable, then we don't bother sticking
+ // them in the auth cache.
+ rv = authCache->SetAuthEntry(scheme, host, port, directory, realm,
+ saveCreds ? creds : nullptr,
+ saveChallenge ? challenge : nullptr,
+ suffix,
+ saveIdentity ? &ident : nullptr,
+ sessionState);
+ return rv;
+
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication(bool proxyAuth)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ if (!proxyAuth) {
+ // reset the current proxy continuation state because our last
+ // authentication attempt was completed successfully.
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
+ LOG((" proxy continuation state has been reset"));
+ }
+
+ if (!UsingHttpProxy() || mProxyAuthType.IsEmpty())
+ return NS_OK;
+
+ // We need to remove any Proxy_Authorization header left over from a
+ // non-request based authentication handshake (e.g., for NTLM auth).
+
+ nsAutoCString contractId;
+ contractId.Assign(NS_HTTP_AUTHENTICATOR_CONTRACTID_PREFIX);
+ contractId.Append(mProxyAuthType);
+
+ nsresult rv;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> precedingAuth =
+ do_GetService(contractId.get(), &rv);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ uint32_t precedingAuthFlags;
+ rv = precedingAuth->GetAuthFlags(&precedingAuthFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ if (!(precedingAuthFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REQUEST_BASED)) {
+ nsAutoCString challenges;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ // delete the proxy authorization header because we weren't
+ // asked to authenticate
+ rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(EmptyCString());
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+ LOG((" cleared proxy authorization header"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentials(const char *challenges,
+ bool proxyAuth,
+ nsAFlatCString &creds)
+{
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
+ nsAutoCString challenge;
+
+ nsCString authType; // force heap allocation to enable string sharing since
+ // we'll be assigning this value into mAuthType.
+
+ // set informations that depend on whether we're authenticating against a
+ // proxy or a webserver
+ nsISupports **currentContinuationState;
+ nsCString *currentAuthType;
+
+ if (proxyAuth) {
+ currentContinuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
+ currentAuthType = &mProxyAuthType;
+ } else {
+ currentContinuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
+ currentAuthType = &mAuthType;
+ }
+
+ nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ bool gotCreds = false;
+
+ // figure out which challenge we can handle and which authenticator to use.
+ for (const char *eol = challenges - 1; eol; ) {
+ const char *p = eol + 1;
+
+ // get the challenge string (LF separated -- see nsHttpHeaderArray)
+ if ((eol = strchr(p, '\n')) != nullptr)
+ challenge.Assign(p, eol - p);
+ else
+ challenge.Assign(p);
+
+ rv = GetAuthenticator(challenge.get(), authType, getter_AddRefs(auth));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ //
+ // if we've already selected an auth type from a previous challenge
+ // received while processing this channel, then skip others until
+ // we find a challenge corresponding to the previously tried auth
+ // type.
+ //
+ if (!currentAuthType->IsEmpty() && authType != *currentAuthType)
+ continue;
+
+ //
+ // we allow the routines to run all the way through before we
+ // decide if they are valid.
+ //
+ // we don't worry about the auth cache being altered because that
+ // would have been the last step, and if the error is from updating
+ // the authcache it wasn't really altered anyway. -CTN
+ //
+ // at this point the code is really only useful for client side
+ // errors (it will not automatically fail over to do a different
+ // auth type if the server keeps rejecting what is being sent, even
+ // if a particular auth method only knows 1 thing, like a
+ // non-identity based authentication method)
+ //
+ rv = GetCredentialsForChallenge(challenge.get(), authType.get(),
+ proxyAuth, auth, creds);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ gotCreds = true;
+ *currentAuthType = authType;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ // authentication prompt has been invoked and result is
+ // expected asynchronously, save current challenge being
+ // processed and all remaining challenges to use later in
+ // OnAuthAvailable and now immediately return
+ mCurrentChallenge = challenge;
+ mRemainingChallenges = eol ? eol+1 : nullptr;
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ // reset the auth type and continuation state
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
+ currentAuthType->Truncate();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!gotCreds && !currentAuthType->IsEmpty()) {
+ // looks like we never found the auth type we were looking for.
+ // reset the auth type and continuation state, and try again.
+ currentAuthType->Truncate();
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
+
+ rv = GetCredentials(challenges, proxyAuth, creds);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthorizationMembers(bool proxyAuth,
+ nsCSubstring& scheme,
+ const char*& host,
+ int32_t& port,
+ nsCSubstring& path,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity*& ident,
+ nsISupports**& continuationState)
+{
+ if (proxyAuth) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT (UsingHttpProxy(),
+ "proxyAuth is true, but no HTTP proxy is configured!");
+
+ host = ProxyHost();
+ port = ProxyPort();
+ ident = &mProxyIdent;
+ scheme.AssignLiteral("http");
+
+ continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
+ }
+ else {
+ host = Host();
+ port = Port();
+ ident = &mIdent;
+
+ nsresult rv;
+ rv = GetCurrentPath(path);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ rv = mURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
+ }
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge(const char *challenge,
+ const char *authType,
+ bool proxyAuth,
+ nsIHttpAuthenticator *auth,
+ nsAFlatCString &creds)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p proxyAuth=%d challenges=%s]\n",
+ this, mAuthChannel, proxyAuth, challenge));
+
+ // this getter never fails
+ nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
+
+ uint32_t authFlags;
+ nsresult rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsAutoCString realm;
+ ParseRealm(challenge, realm);
+
+ // if no realm, then use the auth type as the realm. ToUpperCase so the
+ // ficticious realm stands out a bit more.
+ // XXX this will cause some single signon misses!
+ // XXX this was meant to be used with NTLM, which supplies no realm.
+ /*
+ if (realm.IsEmpty()) {
+ realm = authType;
+ ToUpperCase(realm);
+ }
+ */
+
+ // set informations that depend on whether
+ // we're authenticating against a proxy
+ // or a webserver
+ const char *host;
+ int32_t port;
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
+ nsAutoCString path, scheme;
+ bool identFromURI = false;
+ nsISupports **continuationState;
+
+ rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(proxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
+ path, ident, continuationState);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ uint32_t loadFlags;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ if (!proxyAuth) {
+ // if this is the first challenge, then try using the identity
+ // specified in the URL.
+ if (mIdent.IsEmpty()) {
+ GetIdentityFromURI(authFlags, mIdent);
+ identFromURI = !mIdent.IsEmpty();
+ }
+
+ if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !identFromURI) {
+ LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ // Let explicit URL credentials pass
+ // regardless of the LOAD_ANONYMOUS flag
+ }
+ else if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !UsingHttpProxy()) {
+ LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ nsAutoCString suffix;
+ GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
+
+ //
+ // if we already tried some credentials for this transaction, then
+ // we need to possibly clear them from the cache, unless the credentials
+ // in the cache have changed, in which case we'd want to give them a
+ // try instead.
+ //
+ nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
+ authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme.get(), host, port,
+ realm.get(), suffix, &entry);
+
+ // hold reference to the auth session state (in case we clear our
+ // reference to the entry).
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
+ if (entry)
+ sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
+
+ // remember if we already had the continuation state. it means we are in
+ // the middle of the authentication exchange and the connection must be
+ // kept sticky then (and only then).
+ bool authAtProgress = !!*continuationState;
+
+ // for digest auth, maybe our cached nonce value simply timed out...
+ bool identityInvalid;
+ nsISupports *sessionState = sessionStateGrip;
+ rv = auth->ChallengeReceived(mAuthChannel,
+ challenge,
+ proxyAuth,
+ &sessionState,
+ &*continuationState,
+ &identityInvalid);
+ sessionStateGrip.swap(sessionState);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ LOG((" identity invalid = %d\n", identityInvalid));
+
+ if (mConnectionBased && identityInvalid) {
+ // If the flag is set and identity is invalid, it means we received the first
+ // challange for a new negotiation round after negotiating a connection based
+ // auth failed (invalid password).
+ // The mConnectionBased flag is set later for the newly received challenge,
+ // so here it reflects the previous 401/7 response schema.
+ mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
+ }
+
+ mConnectionBased = !!(authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::CONNECTION_BASED);
+
+ // It's legal if the peer closes the connection after the first 401/7.
+ // Making the connection sticky will prevent its restart giving the user
+ // a 'network reset' error every time. Hence, we mark the connection
+ // as restartable.
+ mAuthChannel->ConnectionRestartable(mConnectionBased && !authAtProgress);
+
+ if (identityInvalid) {
+ if (entry) {
+ if (ident->Equals(entry->Identity())) {
+ if (!identFromURI) {
+ LOG((" clearing bad auth cache entry\n"));
+ // ok, we've already tried this user identity, so clear the
+ // corresponding entry from the auth cache.
+ authCache->ClearAuthEntry(scheme.get(), host,
+ port, realm.get(),
+ suffix);
+ entry = nullptr;
+ ident->Clear();
+ }
+ }
+ else if (!identFromURI ||
+ (nsCRT::strcmp(ident->User(),
+ entry->Identity().User()) == 0 &&
+ !(loadFlags &
+ (nsIChannel::LOAD_ANONYMOUS |
+ nsIChannel::LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS)))) {
+ LOG((" taking identity from auth cache\n"));
+ // the password from the auth cache is more likely to be
+ // correct than the one in the URL. at least, we know that it
+ // works with the given username. it is possible for a server
+ // to distinguish logons based on the supplied password alone,
+ // but that would be quite unusual... and i don't think we need
+ // to worry about such unorthodox cases.
+ ident->Set(entry->Identity());
+ identFromURI = false;
+ if (entry->Creds()[0] != '\0') {
+ LOG((" using cached credentials!\n"));
+ creds.Assign(entry->Creds());
+ return entry->AddPath(path.get());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (!identFromURI) {
+ // hmm... identity invalid, but no auth entry! the realm probably
+ // changed (see bug 201986).
+ ident->Clear();
+ }
+
+ if (!entry && ident->IsEmpty()) {
+ uint32_t level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_NONE;
+ if ((!proxyAuth && mUsingSSL) || (proxyAuth && mProxyUsingSSL))
+ level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_SECURE;
+ else if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_ENCRYPTED)
+ level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_PW_ENCRYPTED;
+
+ // Collect statistics on how frequently the various types of HTTP
+ // authentication are used over SSL and non-SSL connections.
+ if (gHttpHandler->IsTelemetryEnabled()) {
+ if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("basic").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
+ UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE);
+ } else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("digest").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
+ UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE);
+ } else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("ntlm").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
+ UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE);
+ } else if (NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("negotiate").LowerCaseEqualsASCII(authType)) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
+ UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Depending on the pref setting, the authentication dialog may be
+ // blocked for all sub-resources, blocked for cross-origin
+ // sub-resources, or always allowed for sub-resources.
+ // For more details look at the bug 647010.
+ // BlockPrompt will set mCrossOrigin parameter as well.
+ if (BlockPrompt()) {
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge: "
+ "Prompt is blocked [this=%p pref=%d]\n",
+ this, sAuthAllowPref));
+ return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+
+ // at this point we are forced to interact with the user to get
+ // their username and password for this domain.
+ rv = PromptForIdentity(level, proxyAuth, realm.get(),
+ authType, authFlags, *ident);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+ identFromURI = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (identFromURI) {
+ // Warn the user before automatically using the identity from the URL
+ // to automatically log them into a site (see bug 232567).
+ if (!ConfirmAuth(NS_LITERAL_STRING("AutomaticAuth"), false)) {
+ // calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
+ // transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
+ mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
+ // this return code alone is not equivalent to Cancel, since
+ // it only instructs our caller that authentication failed.
+ // without an explicit call to Cancel, our caller would just
+ // load the page that accompanies the HTTP auth challenge.
+ return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // get credentials for the given user:pass
+ //
+ // always store the credentials we're trying now so that they will be used
+ // on subsequent links. This will potentially remove good credentials from
+ // the cache. This is ok as we don't want to use cached credentials if the
+ // user specified something on the URI or in another manner. This is so
+ // that we don't transparently authenticate as someone they're not
+ // expecting to authenticate as.
+ //
+ nsXPIDLCString result;
+ rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, proxyAuth, scheme.get(), host, port,
+ path.get(), realm.get(), challenge, *ident,
+ sessionStateGrip, getter_Copies(result));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
+ creds = result;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+bool
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt()
+{
+ // Verify that it's ok to prompt for credentials here, per spec
+ // http://xhr.spec.whatwg.org/#the-send%28%29-method
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> chanInternal = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(chanInternal);
+
+ if (chanInternal->GetBlockAuthPrompt()) {
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt: Prompt is blocked "
+ "[this=%p channel=%p]\n", this, mAuthChannel));
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
+ chan->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
+
+ // We will treat loads w/o loadInfo as a top level document.
+ bool topDoc = true;
+ bool xhr = false;
+
+ if (loadInfo) {
+ if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+ topDoc = false;
+ }
+ if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+ nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
+ xhr = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!topDoc && !xhr) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> topURI;
+ chanInternal->GetTopWindowURI(getter_AddRefs(topURI));
+
+ if (!topURI) {
+ // If we do not have topURI try the loadingPrincipal.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrinc = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+ if (loadingPrinc) {
+ loadingPrinc->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(topURI));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!NS_SecurityCompareURIs(topURI, mURI, true)) {
+ mCrossOrigin = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (gHttpHandler->IsTelemetryEnabled()) {
+ if (topDoc) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS,
+ HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC);
+ } else if (xhr) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS,
+ HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_XHR);
+ } else if (!mCrossOrigin) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS,
+ HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE);
+ } else {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS,
+ HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_CROSS_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (sAuthAllowPref) {
+ case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL:
+ // Do not open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
+ // the sub-resources.
+ return !topDoc && !xhr;
+ case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN:
+ // Open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
+ // the sub-resources only if they are not cross-origin.
+ return !topDoc && !xhr && mCrossOrigin;
+ case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL:
+ // Allow the http-authentication dialog.
+ return false;
+ default:
+ // This is an invalid value.
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "A non valid value!");
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+inline void
+GetAuthType(const char *challenge, nsCString &authType)
+{
+ const char *p;
+
+ // get the challenge type
+ if ((p = strchr(challenge, ' ')) != nullptr)
+ authType.Assign(challenge, p - challenge);
+ else
+ authType.Assign(challenge);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator(const char *challenge,
+ nsCString &authType,
+ nsIHttpAuthenticator **auth)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
+ this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ GetAuthType(challenge, authType);
+
+ // normalize to lowercase
+ ToLowerCase(authType);
+
+ nsAutoCString contractid;
+ contractid.Assign(NS_HTTP_AUTHENTICATOR_CONTRACTID_PREFIX);
+ contractid.Append(authType);
+
+ return CallGetService(contractid.get(), auth);
+}
+
+void
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI(uint32_t authFlags,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
+ this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ nsAutoString userBuf;
+ nsAutoString passBuf;
+
+ // XXX i18n
+ nsAutoCString buf;
+ mURI->GetUsername(buf);
+ if (!buf.IsEmpty()) {
+ NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
+ CopyASCIItoUTF16(buf, userBuf);
+ mURI->GetPassword(buf);
+ if (!buf.IsEmpty()) {
+ NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
+ CopyASCIItoUTF16(buf, passBuf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!userBuf.IsEmpty()) {
+ SetIdent(ident, authFlags, (char16_t *) userBuf.get(),
+ (char16_t *) passBuf.get());
+ }
+}
+
+void
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ParseRealm(const char *challenge,
+ nsACString &realm)
+{
+ //
+ // From RFC2617 section 1.2, the realm value is defined as such:
+ //
+ // realm = "realm" "=" realm-value
+ // realm-value = quoted-string
+ //
+ // but, we'll accept anything after the the "=" up to the first space, or
+ // end-of-line, if the string is not quoted.
+ //
+
+ const char *p = PL_strcasestr(challenge, "realm=");
+ if (p) {
+ bool has_quote = false;
+ p += 6;
+ if (*p == '"') {
+ has_quote = true;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ const char *end;
+ if (has_quote) {
+ end = p;
+ while (*end) {
+ if (*end == '\\') {
+ // escaped character, store that one instead if not zero
+ if (!*++end)
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (*end == '\"')
+ // end of string
+ break;
+
+ realm.Append(*end);
+ ++end;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ // realm given without quotes
+ end = strchr(p, ' ');
+ if (end)
+ realm.Assign(p, end - p);
+ else
+ realm.Assign(p);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+class nsHTTPAuthInformation : public nsAuthInformationHolder {
+public:
+ nsHTTPAuthInformation(uint32_t aFlags, const nsString& aRealm,
+ const nsCString& aAuthType)
+ : nsAuthInformationHolder(aFlags, aRealm, aAuthType) {}
+
+ void SetToHttpAuthIdentity(uint32_t authFlags,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity);
+};
+
+void
+nsHTTPAuthInformation::SetToHttpAuthIdentity(uint32_t authFlags,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity)
+{
+ identity.Set(Domain().get(), User().get(), Password().get());
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity(uint32_t level,
+ bool proxyAuth,
+ const char *realm,
+ const char *authType,
+ uint32_t authFlags,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
+ this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPrompt2> authPrompt;
+ GetAuthPrompt(callbacks, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
+ if (!authPrompt && loadGroup) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> cbs;
+ loadGroup->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(cbs));
+ GetAuthPrompt(cbs, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
+ }
+ if (!authPrompt)
+ return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
+
+ // XXX i18n: need to support non-ASCII realm strings (see bug 41489)
+ NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 realmU(realm);
+
+ // prompt the user...
+ uint32_t promptFlags = 0;
+ if (proxyAuth)
+ {
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_PROXY;
+ if (mTriedProxyAuth)
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
+ mTriedProxyAuth = true;
+ }
+ else {
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_HOST;
+ if (mTriedHostAuth)
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
+ mTriedHostAuth = true;
+ }
+
+ if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN)
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::NEED_DOMAIN;
+
+ if (mCrossOrigin) {
+ promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::CROSS_ORIGIN_SUB_RESOURCE;
+ }
+
+ RefPtr<nsHTTPAuthInformation> holder =
+ new nsHTTPAuthInformation(promptFlags, realmU,
+ nsDependentCString(authType));
+ if (!holder)
+ return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel, &rv));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ rv =
+ authPrompt->AsyncPromptAuth(channel, this, nullptr, level, holder,
+ getter_AddRefs(mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable));
+
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ // indicate using this error code that authentication prompt
+ // result is expected asynchronously
+ rv = NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
+ }
+ else {
+ // Fall back to synchronous prompt
+ bool retval = false;
+ rv = authPrompt->PromptAuth(channel, level, holder, &retval);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ if (!retval)
+ rv = NS_ERROR_ABORT;
+ else
+ holder->SetToHttpAuthIdentity(authFlags, ident);
+ }
+
+ // remember that we successfully showed the user an auth dialog
+ if (!proxyAuth)
+ mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
+
+ if (mConnectionBased) {
+ // Connection can be reset by the server in the meantime user is entering
+ // the credentials. Result would be just a "Connection was reset" error.
+ // Hence, we drop the current regardless if the user would make it on time
+ // to provide credentials.
+ // It's OK to send the NTLM type 1 message (response to the plain "NTLM"
+ // challenge) on a new connection.
+ mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable(nsISupports *aContext,
+ nsIAuthInformation *aAuthInfo)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable [this=%p channel=%p]",
+ this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
+ if (!mAuthChannel)
+ return NS_OK;
+
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ const char *host;
+ int32_t port;
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
+ nsAutoCString path, scheme;
+ nsISupports **continuationState;
+ rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
+ path, ident, continuationState);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ OnAuthCancelled(aContext, false);
+
+ nsAutoCString realm;
+ ParseRealm(mCurrentChallenge.get(), realm);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ nsAutoCString suffix;
+ GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
+
+ nsHttpAuthCache *authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
+ nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
+ authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme.get(), host, port,
+ realm.get(), suffix,
+ &entry);
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
+ if (entry)
+ sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
+
+ nsAuthInformationHolder* holder =
+ static_cast<nsAuthInformationHolder*>(aAuthInfo);
+ ident->Set(holder->Domain().get(),
+ holder->User().get(),
+ holder->Password().get());
+
+ nsAutoCString unused;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
+ rv = GetAuthenticator(mCurrentChallenge.get(), unused,
+ getter_AddRefs(auth));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false, "GetAuthenticator failed");
+ OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ nsXPIDLCString creds;
+ rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, mProxyAuth,
+ scheme.get(), host, port, path.get(),
+ realm.get(), mCurrentChallenge.get(), *ident,
+ sessionStateGrip, getter_Copies(creds));
+
+ mCurrentChallenge.Truncate();
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled(nsISupports *aContext,
+ bool userCancel)
+{
+ LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled [this=%p channel=%p]",
+ this, mAuthChannel));
+
+ mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
+ if (!mAuthChannel)
+ return NS_OK;
+
+ // When user cancels or auth fails we want to close the connection for
+ // connection based schemes like NTLM. Some servers don't like re-negotiation
+ // on the same connection.
+ if (mConnectionBased) {
+ mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
+ mConnectionBased = false;
+ }
+
+ if (userCancel) {
+ if (!mRemainingChallenges.IsEmpty()) {
+ // there are still some challenges to process, do so
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ // Get rid of current continuationState to avoid reusing it in
+ // next challenges since it is no longer relevant.
+ if (mProxyAuth) {
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
+ } else {
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
+ }
+ nsAutoCString creds;
+ rv = GetCredentials(mRemainingChallenges.get(), mProxyAuth, creds);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ // GetCredentials loaded the credentials from the cache or
+ // some other way in a synchronous manner, process those
+ // credentials now
+ mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
+ return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
+ }
+ else if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ // GetCredentials successfully queued another authprompt for
+ // a challenge from the list, we are now waiting for the user
+ // to provide the credentials
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ // otherwise, we failed...
+ }
+
+ mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
+ }
+
+ mAuthChannel->OnAuthCancelled(userCancel);
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnCredsGenerated(const char *aGeneratedCreds,
+ uint32_t aFlags,
+ nsresult aResult,
+ nsISupports* aSessionState,
+ nsISupports* aContinuationState)
+{
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+ // When channel is closed, do not proceed
+ if (!mAuthChannel) {
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+
+ mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(aResult)) {
+ return OnAuthCancelled(nullptr, true);
+ }
+
+ // We want to update m(Proxy)AuthContinuationState in case it was changed by
+ // nsHttpNegotiateAuth::GenerateCredentials
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> contState(aContinuationState);
+ if (mProxyAuth) {
+ contState.swap(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
+ } else {
+ contState.swap(mAuthContinuationState);
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
+ nsAutoCString unused;
+ rv = GetAuthenticator(mCurrentChallenge.get(), unused, getter_AddRefs(auth));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ const char *host;
+ int32_t port;
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity *ident;
+ nsAutoCString directory, scheme;
+ nsISupports **unusedContinuationState;
+
+ // Get realm from challenge
+ nsAutoCString realm;
+ ParseRealm(mCurrentChallenge.get(), realm);
+
+ rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
+ directory, ident, unusedContinuationState);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ UpdateCache(auth, scheme.get(), host, port, directory.get(), realm.get(),
+ mCurrentChallenge.get(), *ident, aGeneratedCreds, aFlags, aSessionState);
+ mCurrentChallenge.Truncate();
+
+ ContinueOnAuthAvailable(nsDependentCString(aGeneratedCreds));
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ContinueOnAuthAvailable(const nsCSubstring& creds)
+{
+ nsresult rv;
+ if (mProxyAuth)
+ rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(creds);
+ else
+ rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(creds);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+ // drop our remaining list of challenges. We don't need them, because we
+ // have now authenticated against a challenge and will be sending that
+ // information to the server (or proxy). If it doesn't accept our
+ // authentication it'll respond with failure and resend the challenge list
+ mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
+
+ mAuthChannel->OnAuthAvailable();
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+bool
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ConfirmAuth(const nsString &bundleKey,
+ bool doYesNoPrompt)
+{
+ // skip prompting the user if
+ // 1) we've already prompted the user
+ // 2) we're not a toplevel channel
+ // 3) the userpass length is less than the "phishy" threshold
+
+ uint32_t loadFlags;
+ nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ if (mSuppressDefensiveAuth ||
+ !(loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI))
+ return true;
+
+ nsAutoCString userPass;
+ rv = mURI->GetUserPass(userPass);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) ||
+ (userPass.Length() < gHttpHandler->PhishyUserPassLength()))
+ return true;
+
+ // we try to confirm by prompting the user. if we cannot do so, then
+ // assume the user said ok. this is done to keep things working in
+ // embedded builds, where the string bundle might not be present, etc.
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
+ do_GetService(NS_STRINGBUNDLE_CONTRACTID);
+ if (!bundleService)
+ return true;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle;
+ bundleService->CreateBundle(NECKO_MSGS_URL, getter_AddRefs(bundle));
+ if (!bundle)
+ return true;
+
+ nsAutoCString host;
+ rv = mURI->GetHost(host);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ nsAutoCString user;
+ rv = mURI->GetUsername(user);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 ucsHost(host), ucsUser(user);
+ const char16_t *strs[2] = { ucsHost.get(), ucsUser.get() };
+
+ nsXPIDLString msg;
+ bundle->FormatStringFromName(bundleKey.get(), strs, 2, getter_Copies(msg));
+ if (!msg)
+ return true;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
+ rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
+ NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(callbacks, loadGroup, NS_GET_IID(nsIPrompt),
+ getter_AddRefs(prompt));
+ if (!prompt)
+ return true;
+
+ // do not prompt again
+ mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
+
+ bool confirmed;
+ if (doYesNoPrompt) {
+ int32_t choice;
+ bool checkState = false;
+ rv = prompt->ConfirmEx(nullptr, msg,
+ nsIPrompt::BUTTON_POS_1_DEFAULT +
+ nsIPrompt::STD_YES_NO_BUTTONS,
+ nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
+ &checkState, &choice);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+
+ confirmed = choice == 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ rv = prompt->Confirm(nullptr, msg, &confirmed);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return confirmed;
+}
+
+void
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::SetAuthorizationHeader(nsHttpAuthCache *authCache,
+ nsHttpAtom header,
+ const char *scheme,
+ const char *host,
+ int32_t port,
+ const char *path,
+ nsHttpAuthIdentity &ident)
+{
+ nsHttpAuthEntry *entry = nullptr;
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ // set informations that depend on whether
+ // we're authenticating against a proxy
+ // or a webserver
+ nsISupports **continuationState;
+
+ if (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization) {
+ continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
+ } else {
+ continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
+ }
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
+ nsAutoCString suffix;
+ GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
+
+ rv = authCache->GetAuthEntryForPath(scheme, host, port, path,
+ suffix, &entry);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ // if we are trying to add a header for origin server auth and if the
+ // URL contains an explicit username, then try the given username first.
+ // we only want to do this, however, if we know the URL requires auth
+ // based on the presence of an auth cache entry for this URL (which is
+ // true since we are here). but, if the username from the URL matches
+ // the username from the cache, then we should prefer the password
+ // stored in the cache since that is most likely to be valid.
+ if (header == nsHttp::Authorization && entry->Domain()[0] == '\0') {
+ GetIdentityFromURI(0, ident);
+ // if the usernames match, then clear the ident so we will pick
+ // up the one from the auth cache instead.
+ // when this is undesired, specify LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS load
+ // flag.
+ if (nsCRT::strcmp(ident.User(), entry->User()) == 0) {
+ uint32_t loadFlags;
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags)) &&
+ !(loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS)) {
+ ident.Clear();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ bool identFromURI;
+ if (ident.IsEmpty()) {
+ ident.Set(entry->Identity());
+ identFromURI = false;
+ }
+ else
+ identFromURI = true;
+
+ nsXPIDLCString temp;
+ const char *creds = entry->Creds();
+ const char *challenge = entry->Challenge();
+ // we can only send a preemptive Authorization header if we have either
+ // stored credentials or a stored challenge from which to derive
+ // credentials. if the identity is from the URI, then we cannot use
+ // the stored credentials.
+ if ((!creds[0] || identFromURI) && challenge[0]) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
+ nsAutoCString unused;
+ rv = GetAuthenticator(challenge, unused, getter_AddRefs(auth));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ bool proxyAuth = (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization);
+ rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, proxyAuth, scheme, host, port,
+ path, entry->Realm(), challenge, ident,
+ entry->mMetaData, getter_Copies(temp));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
+ creds = temp.get();
+
+ // make sure the continuation state is null since we do not
+ // support mixing preemptive and 'multirequest' authentication.
+ NS_IF_RELEASE(*continuationState);
+ }
+ }
+ if (creds[0]) {
+ LOG((" adding \"%s\" request header\n", header.get()));
+ if (header == nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization)
+ mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(nsDependentCString(creds));
+ else
+ mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(nsDependentCString(creds));
+
+ // suppress defensive auth prompting for this channel since we know
+ // that we already prompted at least once this session. we only do
+ // this for non-proxy auth since the URL's userpass is not used for
+ // proxy auth.
+ if (header == nsHttp::Authorization)
+ mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
+ }
+ else
+ ident.Clear(); // don't remember the identity
+ }
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCurrentPath(nsACString &path)
+{
+ nsresult rv;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(mURI);
+ if (url)
+ rv = url->GetDirectory(path);
+ else
+ rv = mURI->GetPath(path);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsHttpChannelAuthProvider, nsICancelable,
+ nsIHttpChannelAuthProvider, nsIAuthPromptCallback, nsIHttpAuthenticatorCallback)
+
+} // namespace net
+} // namespace mozilla