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+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsISupports.idl"
+
+%{C++
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+%}
+
+interface nsIURI;
+interface nsIChannel;
+interface nsILoadInfo;
+
+/**
+ * nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags
+ *
+ * Protocols that wish to return different flags depending on the URI should
+ * implement this interface.
+ */
+[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(65a8e823-0591-4fc0-a56a-03265e0a4ce8)]
+interface nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags : nsISupports
+{
+ /*
+ * Returns protocol flags for the given URI, which may be different from the
+ * flags for another URI of the same scheme.
+ */
+ unsigned long getFlagsForURI(in nsIURI aURI);
+};
+
+/**
+ * nsIProtocolHandler
+ */
+[scriptable, uuid(a87210e6-7c8c-41f7-864d-df809015193e)]
+interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
+{
+ /**
+ * The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
+ */
+ readonly attribute ACString scheme;
+
+ /**
+ * The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses.
+ * If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:")
+ * then -1 will be returned.
+ */
+ readonly attribute long defaultPort;
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below).
+ */
+ readonly attribute unsigned long protocolFlags;
+
+%{C++
+ // Helper method to get the protocol flags in the right way.
+ nsresult DoGetProtocolFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t* aFlags)
+ {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags> dh = do_QueryInterface(this);
+ return dh ? dh->GetFlagsForURI(aURI, aFlags) : GetProtocolFlags(aFlags);
+ }
+%}
+
+ /**
+ * Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol,
+ * where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string. The caller may
+ * provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that
+ * the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary)
+ * before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI
+ * string. (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time,
+ * so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin
+ * server.)
+ *
+ * @param aSpec - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending
+ * on the protocol implementation, unicode character
+ * sequences may or may not be %xx escaped.
+ * @param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI
+ * string originated. this corresponds to the
+ * charset that should be used when communicating
+ * this URI to an origin server, for example. if
+ * null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e.,
+ * no charset transformation from aSpec).
+ * @param aBaseURI - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI.
+ * otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative
+ * to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol.
+ * If the protocol has no concept of relative
+ * URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored.
+ */
+ nsIURI newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec,
+ [optional] in string aOriginCharset,
+ [optional] in nsIURI aBaseURI);
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler and
+ * sets the loadInfo for the constructed channel.
+ */
+ nsIChannel newChannel2(in nsIURI aURI, in nsILoadInfo aLoadinfo);
+
+ /**
+ * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler.
+ */
+ nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI);
+
+ /**
+ * Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports.
+ *
+ * This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port
+ * that is blacklisted. For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail
+ * Transfer) is banned. When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things"
+ * port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the
+ * protocol handler wants to override the ban.
+ */
+ boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme);
+
+
+ /**************************************************************************
+ * Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the
+ * others are deviations):
+ *
+ * NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand.
+ */
+
+ /**
+ * standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative
+ * URIs (http, ftp, ...)
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_STD = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0);
+
+ /**
+ * no authority component (file, ...)
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1);
+
+ /**
+ * This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http)
+ * (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.). If the protocol supports transparent
+ * proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler.
+ *
+ * If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support
+ * nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP
+ * flag (see below).
+ *
+ * @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
+ */
+ const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2);
+
+ /**
+ * This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http,
+ * ftp, etc.). nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this
+ * protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead. This flag is
+ * ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
+ */
+ const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3);
+
+ /**
+ * The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so
+ * documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context
+ * from the document that loads them.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
+
+ /**
+ * "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh,
+ * certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application
+ * decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT
+ * the target) URI has this protocol flag. Note that the decision as to
+ * what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller
+ * of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. See documentation for that
+ * method for more information.
+ *
+ * A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that
+ * shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects
+ * to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5);
+
+ /**
+ * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * | ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS. |
+ * | |
+ * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ *
+ * These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this
+ * protocol. Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the
+ * innermost URI matter. See nsINestedURI.
+ *
+ * If none of these five flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it
+ * had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol
+ * handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier. In this case, there may
+ * be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure"
+ * assumption is being made. At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0,
+ * most likely), these warnings will become errors.
+ */
+
+ /**
+ * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone. For example, any
+ * website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol.
+ * Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6);
+
+ /**
+ * The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web)
+ * content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code
+ * which has the system principal). Various internal protocols should set
+ * this flag.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7);
+
+ /**
+ * The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the
+ * application's user interface. There are cases when such resources may
+ * be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is
+ * less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than
+ * URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. See the documentation for
+ * nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8);
+
+ /**
+ * Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be
+ * allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem.
+ * It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such
+ * access. Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this
+ * flag.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9);
+
+ /**
+ * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a
+ * principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and
+ * websites that are same origin as this uri.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<10);
+
+ /**
+ * Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable
+ * on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore
+ * do not return any data that we can use.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11);
+
+ /**
+ * URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources. This could
+ * be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE),
+ * or something else that would not hit the network.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12);
+
+ /**
+ * URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13);
+
+ /**
+ * Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make
+ * it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<14);
+
+ /**
+ * This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related
+ * protocols.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1<<15);
+
+ /**
+ * URIs for this protocol require the webapps permission on the principal
+ * when opening URIs for a different domain. See bug#773886
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM = (1<<16);
+
+ /**
+ * Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle
+ * Open() and reads on the resulting stream.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<17);
+
+ /**
+ * URI is secure to load in an https page and should not be blocked
+ * by nsMixedContentBlocker
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT = (1<<18);
+
+ /**
+ * This URI may be fetched and the contents are visible to anyone. This is
+ * semantically equivalent to the resource being served with all-access CORS
+ * headers.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_FETCHABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1 << 19);
+
+ /**
+ * If this flag is set, then the origin for this protocol is the full URI
+ * spec, not just the scheme + host + port.
+ */
+ const unsigned long ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC = (1 << 20);
+
+ /**
+ * If this flag is set, the URI does not always allow content using the same
+ * protocol to link to it.
+ */
+ const unsigned long URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE = (1 << 21);
+};
+
+%{C++
+/**
+ * Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix:
+ */
+#define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name="
+/**
+ * For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http"
+ */
+
+#define IS_ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC_DEFINED 1
+%}