diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp | 1616 |
1 files changed, 1616 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..63b4aae2c --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,1616 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsAttrValue.h" +#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" +#include "nsCSPUtils.h" +#include "nsDebug.h" +#include "nsIConsoleService.h" +#include "nsICryptoHash.h" +#include "nsIScriptError.h" +#include "nsIServiceManager.h" +#include "nsIStringBundle.h" +#include "nsIURL.h" +#include "nsReadableUtils.h" +#include "nsSandboxFlags.h" + +#define DEFAULT_PORT -1 + +static mozilla::LogModule* +GetCspUtilsLog() +{ + static mozilla::LazyLogModule gCspUtilsPRLog("CSPUtils"); + return gCspUtilsPRLog; +} + +#define CSPUTILSLOG(args) MOZ_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args) +#define CSPUTILSLOGENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug) + +void +CSP_PercentDecodeStr(const nsAString& aEncStr, nsAString& outDecStr) +{ + outDecStr.Truncate(); + + // helper function that should not be visible outside this methods scope + struct local { + static inline char16_t convertHexDig(char16_t aHexDig) { + if (isNumberToken(aHexDig)) { + return aHexDig - '0'; + } + if (aHexDig >= 'A' && aHexDig <= 'F') { + return aHexDig - 'A' + 10; + } + // must be a lower case character + // (aHexDig >= 'a' && aHexDig <= 'f') + return aHexDig - 'a' + 10; + } + }; + + const char16_t *cur, *end, *hexDig1, *hexDig2; + cur = aEncStr.BeginReading(); + end = aEncStr.EndReading(); + + while (cur != end) { + // if it's not a percent sign then there is + // nothing to do for that character + if (*cur != PERCENT_SIGN) { + outDecStr.Append(*cur); + cur++; + continue; + } + + // get the two hexDigs following the '%'-sign + hexDig1 = cur + 1; + hexDig2 = cur + 2; + + // if there are no hexdigs after the '%' then + // there is nothing to do for us. + if (hexDig1 == end || hexDig2 == end || + !isValidHexDig(*hexDig1) || + !isValidHexDig(*hexDig2)) { + outDecStr.Append(PERCENT_SIGN); + cur++; + continue; + } + + // decode "% hexDig1 hexDig2" into a character. + char16_t decChar = (local::convertHexDig(*hexDig1) << 4) + + local::convertHexDig(*hexDig2); + outDecStr.Append(decChar); + + // increment 'cur' to after the second hexDig + cur = ++hexDig2; + } +} + +void +CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName, + const char16_t** aParams, + uint32_t aLength, + char16_t** outResult) +{ + nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> keyStringBundle; + nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService = + mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService(); + + NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!"); + stringBundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties", + getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle)); + + NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!"); + + if (!keyStringBundle) { + return; + } + keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, aLength, outResult); +} + +void +CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg) +{ + nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1")); + + if (!console) { + return; + } + nsString msg = PromiseFlatString(aMsg); + console->LogStringMessage(msg.get()); +} + +void +CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, + const nsAString& aSourceName, + const nsAString& aSourceLine, + uint32_t aLineNumber, + uint32_t aColumnNumber, + uint32_t aFlags, + const char *aCategory, + uint64_t aInnerWindowID) +{ + nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID)); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID)); + + if (!console || !error) { + return; + } + + // Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message + nsString cspMsg; + cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("Content Security Policy: ")); + cspMsg.Append(aMessage); + + // Currently 'aSourceLine' is not logged to the console, because similar + // information is already included within the source link of the message. + // For inline violations however, the line and column number are 0 and + // information contained within 'aSourceLine' can be really useful for devs. + // E.g. 'aSourceLine' might be: 'onclick attribute on DIV element'. + // In such cases we append 'aSourceLine' directly to the error message. + if (!aSourceLine.IsEmpty()) { + cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(" Source: ")); + cspMsg.Append(aSourceLine); + cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(".")); + } + + nsresult rv; + if (aInnerWindowID > 0) { + nsCString catStr; + catStr.AssignASCII(aCategory); + rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName, + aSourceLine, aLineNumber, + aColumnNumber, aFlags, + catStr, aInnerWindowID); + } + else { + rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName, + aSourceLine, aLineNumber, + aColumnNumber, aFlags, + aCategory); + } + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return; + } + console->LogMessage(error); +} + +/** + * Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call. + */ +void +CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName, + const char16_t** aParams, + uint32_t aLength, + const nsAString& aSourceName, + const nsAString& aSourceLine, + uint32_t aLineNumber, + uint32_t aColumnNumber, + uint32_t aFlags, + const char* aCategory, + uint64_t aInnerWindowID) +{ + nsXPIDLString logMsg; + CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aLength, getter_Copies(logMsg)); + CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, + aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags, + aCategory, aInnerWindowID); +} + +/* ===== Helpers ============================ */ +CSPDirective +CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType) +{ + switch (aType) { + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + // BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139 + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; + + // csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case + // of a redirect. + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: + // CSP can not block csp reports + case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE; + + // Fall through to error for all other directives + default: + MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective"); + } + return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE; +} + +nsCSPHostSrc* +CSP_CreateHostSrcFromURI(nsIURI* aURI) +{ + // Create the host first + nsCString host; + aURI->GetHost(host); + nsCSPHostSrc *hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host)); + + // Add the scheme. + nsCString scheme; + aURI->GetScheme(scheme); + hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme)); + + int32_t port; + aURI->GetPort(&port); + // Only add port if it's not default port. + if (port > 0) { + nsAutoString portStr; + portStr.AppendInt(port); + hostsrc->setPort(portStr); + } + return hostsrc; +} + +bool +CSP_IsValidDirective(const nsAString& aDir) +{ + uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0])); + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numDirs; i++) { + if (aDir.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} +bool +CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir) +{ + return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir)); +} + +bool +CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey) +{ + return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKey)); +} + +bool +CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey) +{ + nsString lowerKey = PromiseFlatString(aKey); + ToLowerCase(lowerKey); + + static_assert(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE == + (sizeof(CSPStrKeywords) / sizeof(CSPStrKeywords[0])), + "CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE does not match length of CSPStrKeywords"); + + nsAutoString keyword; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) { + // skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing ' + keyword.AssignASCII(CSPStrKeywords[i] + 1); + keyword.Trim("'", false, true); + if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +/* + * Checks whether the current directive permits a specific + * scheme. This function is called from nsCSPSchemeSrc() and + * also nsCSPHostSrc. + * @param aEnforcementScheme + * The scheme that this directive allows + * @param aUri + * The uri of the subresource load. + * @param aReportOnly + * Whether the enforced policy is report only or not. + * @param aUpgradeInsecure + * Whether the policy makes use of the directive + * 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. + */ + +bool +permitsScheme(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme, + nsIURI* aUri, + bool aReportOnly, + bool aUpgradeInsecure) +{ + nsAutoCString scheme; + nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // no scheme to enforce, let's allow the load (e.g. script-src *) + if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) { + return true; + } + + // if the scheme matches, all good - allow the load + if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) { + return true; + } + + // allow scheme-less sources where the protected resource is http + // and the load is https, see: + // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression + if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("http") && + scheme.EqualsASCII("https")) { + return true; + } + + // Allow the load when enforcing upgrade-insecure-requests with the + // promise the request gets upgraded from http to https and ws to wss. + // See nsHttpChannel::Connect() and also WebSocket.cpp. Please note, + // the report only policies should not allow the load and report + // the error back to the page. + return ((aUpgradeInsecure && !aReportOnly) && + ((scheme.EqualsASCII("http") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) || + (scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("wss")))); +} + +/* + * A helper function for appending a CSP header to an existing CSP + * policy. + * + * @param aCsp the CSP policy + * @param aHeaderValue the header + * @param aReportOnly is this a report-only header? + */ + +nsresult +CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp, + const nsAString& aHeaderValue, + bool aReportOnly) +{ + NS_ENSURE_ARG(aCsp); + + // Need to tokenize the header value since multiple headers could be + // concatenated into one comma-separated list of policies. + // See RFC2616 section 4.2 (last paragraph) + nsresult rv = NS_OK; + nsCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(aHeaderValue, ','); + while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) { + const nsSubstring& policy = tokenizer.nextToken(); + rv = aCsp->AppendPolicy(policy, aReportOnly, false); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + { + CSPUTILSLOG(("CSP refined with policy: \"%s\"", + NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get())); + } + } + return NS_OK; +} + +/* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */ + +nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc() + : mInvalidated(false) +{ +} + +nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc() +{ +} + +// ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore: +// nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class +// implementation which will never allow the load. +bool +nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + return false; +} + +// ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore: +// nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back +// to this base class implementation which will never allow the load. +bool +nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", + aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), + NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); + return false; +} + +/* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */ + +nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme) + : mScheme(aScheme) +{ + ToLowerCase(mScheme); +} + +nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + MOZ_ASSERT((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string"); + if (mInvalidated) { + return false; + } + return permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure); +} + +bool +nsCSPSchemeSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return aVisitor->visitSchemeSrc(*this); +} + +void +nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.Append(mScheme); + outStr.AppendASCII(":"); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */ + +nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost) + : mHost(aHost) +{ + ToLowerCase(mHost); +} + +nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc() +{ +} + +/* + * Checks whether the current directive permits a specific port. + * @param aEnforcementScheme + * The scheme that this directive allows + * (used to query the default port for that scheme) + * @param aEnforcementPort + * The port that this directive allows + * @param aResourceURI + * The uri of the subresource load + */ +bool +permitsPort(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme, + const nsAString& aEnforcementPort, + nsIURI* aResourceURI) +{ + // If enforcement port is the wildcard, don't block the load. + if (aEnforcementPort.EqualsASCII("*")) { + return true; + } + + int32_t resourcePort; + nsresult rv = aResourceURI->GetPort(&resourcePort); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // Avoid unnecessary string creation/manipulation and don't block the + // load if the resource to be loaded uses the default port for that + // scheme and there is no port to be enforced. + // Note, this optimization relies on scheme checks within permitsScheme(). + if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT && aEnforcementPort.IsEmpty()) { + return true; + } + + // By now we know at that either the resourcePort does not use the default + // port or there is a port restriction to be enforced. A port value of -1 + // corresponds to the protocol's default port (eg. -1 implies port 80 for + // http URIs), in such a case we have to query the default port of the + // resource to be loaded. + if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT) { + nsAutoCString resourceScheme; + rv = aResourceURI->GetScheme(resourceScheme); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + resourcePort = NS_GetDefaultPort(resourceScheme.get()); + } + + // If there is a port to be enforced and the ports match, then + // don't block the load. + nsString resourcePortStr; + resourcePortStr.AppendInt(resourcePort); + if (aEnforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) { + return true; + } + + // If there is no port to be enforced, query the default port for the load. + nsString enforcementPort(aEnforcementPort); + if (enforcementPort.IsEmpty()) { + // For scheme less sources, our parser always generates a scheme + // which is the scheme of the protected resource. + MOZ_ASSERT(!aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty(), + "need a scheme to query default port"); + int32_t defaultEnforcementPort = + NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aEnforcementScheme).get()); + enforcementPort.Truncate(); + enforcementPort.AppendInt(defaultEnforcementPort); + } + + // If default ports match, don't block the load + if (enforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) { + return true; + } + + // Additional port matching where the regular URL matching algorithm + // treats insecure ports as matching their secure variants. + // default port for http is :80 + // default port for https is :443 + if (enforcementPort.EqualsLiteral("80") && + resourcePortStr.EqualsLiteral("443")) { + return true; + } + + // ports do not match, block the load. + return false; +} + +bool +nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + + if (mInvalidated) { + return false; + } + + // we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see: + // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression + + // 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches. + if (!permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure)) { + return false; + } + + // The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing + // just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource. + NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string"); + + // 2) host matching: Enforce a single * + if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) { + // The single ASTERISK character (*) does not match a URI's scheme of a type + // designating a globally unique identifier (such as blob:, data:, or filesystem:) + // At the moment firefox does not support filesystem; but for future compatibility + // we support it in CSP according to the spec, see: 4.2.2 Matching Source Expressions + // Note, that whitelisting any of these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(). + bool isBlobScheme = + (NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("blob", &isBlobScheme)) && isBlobScheme); + bool isDataScheme = + (NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataScheme)) && isDataScheme); + bool isFileScheme = + (NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("filesystem", &isFileScheme)) && isFileScheme); + + if (isBlobScheme || isDataScheme || isFileScheme) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + + // Before we can check if the host matches, we have to + // extract the host part from aUri. + nsAutoCString uriHost; + nsresult rv = aUri->GetHost(uriHost); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + nsString decodedUriHost; + CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), decodedUriHost); + + // 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard. + if (mHost.First() == '*') { + NS_ASSERTION(mHost[1] == '.', "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'"); + + // Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before checking + // if the remaining characters match + nsString wildCardHost = mHost; + wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1); + if (!StringEndsWith(decodedUriHost, wildCardHost)) { + return false; + } + } + // 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match. + else if (!mHost.Equals(decodedUriHost)) { + return false; + } + + // Port matching: Check if the ports match. + if (!permitsPort(mScheme, mPort, aUri)) { + return false; + } + + // 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce + // path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see: + // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects + if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) { + // converting aUri into nsIURL so we can strip query and ref + // example.com/test#foo -> example.com/test + // example.com/test?val=foo -> example.com/test + nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(aUri); + if (!url) { + NS_ASSERTION(false, "can't QI into nsIURI"); + return false; + } + nsAutoCString uriPath; + rv = url->GetFilePath(uriPath); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + nsString decodedUriPath; + CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), decodedUriPath); + + // check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so + // we just have to check loading resource is within + // the allowed path. + if (mPath.Last() == '/') { + if (!StringBeginsWith(decodedUriPath, mPath)) { + return false; + } + } + // otherwise mPath whitelists a specific file, and we have to + // check if the loading resource matches that whitelisted file. + else { + if (!mPath.Equals(decodedUriPath)) { + return false; + } + } + } + + // At the end: scheme, host, port and path match -> allow the load. + return true; +} + +bool +nsCSPHostSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return aVisitor->visitHostSrc(*this); +} + +void +nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + // If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return. + if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") && + mScheme.IsEmpty() && + mPort.IsEmpty()) { + outStr.Append(mHost); + return; + } + + // append scheme + outStr.Append(mScheme); + + // append host + outStr.AppendASCII("://"); + outStr.Append(mHost); + + // append port + if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) { + outStr.AppendASCII(":"); + outStr.Append(mPort); + } + + // append path + outStr.Append(mPath); +} + +void +nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme) +{ + mScheme = aScheme; + ToLowerCase(mScheme); +} + +void +nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort) +{ + mPort = aPort; +} + +void +nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath) +{ + mPath.Append(aPath); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */ + +nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) + : mKeyword(aKeyword) +{ + NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF), + "'self' should have been replaced in the parser"); +} + +nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPKeywordSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + // no need to check for invalidated, this will always return false unless + // it is an nsCSPKeywordSrc for 'strict-dynamic', which should allow non + // parser created scripts. + return ((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated); +} + +bool +nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, aHashOrNonce: %s, mInvalidated: %s", + CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), + CSP_EnumToKeyword(mKeyword), + NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get(), + mInvalidated ? "yes" : "false")); + + if (mInvalidated) { + // only 'self' and 'unsafe-inline' are keywords that can be ignored. Please note that + // the parser already translates 'self' into a uri (see assertion in constructor). + MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, + "should only invalidate unsafe-inline"); + return false; + } + // either the keyword allows the load or the policy contains 'strict-dynamic', in which + // case we have to make sure the script is not parser created before allowing the load. + return ((mKeyword == aKeyword) || + ((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated)); +} + +bool +nsCSPKeywordSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return aVisitor->visitKeywordSrc(*this); +} + +void +nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(mKeyword)); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */ + +nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce) + : mNonce(aNonce) +{ +} + +nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), + NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get())); + } + + // nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic + return mNonce.Equals(aNonce); +} + +bool +nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", + CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); + + if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) { + return false; + } + // nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic + return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce); +} + +bool +nsCSPNonceSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return aVisitor->visitNonceSrc(*this); +} + +void +nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(CSP_NONCE)); + outStr.Append(mNonce); + outStr.AppendASCII("'"); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */ + +nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash) + : mAlgorithm(aAlgo) + , mHash(aHash) +{ + // Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the same. + ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm); +} + +nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", + CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); + + if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) { + return false; + } + + // hashes can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic + + // Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8 + NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce); + + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher; + hasher = do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/security/hash;1", &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + rv = hasher->InitWithString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t *)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length()); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + nsAutoCString hash; + rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // The NSS Base64 encoder automatically adds linebreaks "\r\n" every 64 + // characters. We need to remove these so we can properly validate longer + // (SHA-512) base64-encoded hashes + hash.StripChars("\r\n"); + return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash); +} + +bool +nsCSPHashSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return aVisitor->visitHashSrc(*this); +} + +void +nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII("'"); + outStr.Append(mAlgorithm); + outStr.AppendASCII("-"); + outStr.Append(mHash); + outStr.AppendASCII("'"); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */ + +nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI *aURI) + :mReportURI(aURI) +{ +} + +nsCSPReportURI::~nsCSPReportURI() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPReportURI::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return false; +} + +void +nsCSPReportURI::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + nsAutoCString spec; + nsresult rv = mReportURI->GetSpec(spec); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return; + } + outStr.AppendASCII(spec.get()); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPSandboxFlags ===================== */ + +nsCSPSandboxFlags::nsCSPSandboxFlags(const nsAString& aFlags) + : mFlags(aFlags) +{ + ToLowerCase(mFlags); +} + +nsCSPSandboxFlags::~nsCSPSandboxFlags() +{ +} + +bool +nsCSPSandboxFlags::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + return false; +} + +void +nsCSPSandboxFlags::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.Append(mFlags); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPDirective ====================== */ + +nsCSPDirective::nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) +{ + mDirective = aDirective; +} + +nsCSPDirective::~nsCSPDirective() +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + delete mSrcs[i]; + } +} + +bool +nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected, + bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::permits, aUri: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + if (mSrcs[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure, aParserCreated)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +bool +nsCSPDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", + CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + if (mSrcs[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +void +nsCSPDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + // Append directive name + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective)); + outStr.AppendASCII(" "); + + // Append srcs + uint32_t length = mSrcs.Length(); + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { + mSrcs[i]->toString(outStr); + if (i != (length - 1)) { + outStr.AppendASCII(" "); + } + } +} + +void +nsCSPDirective::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const +{ + mozilla::dom::Sequence<nsString> srcs; + nsString src; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + src.Truncate(); + mSrcs[i]->toString(src); + srcs.AppendElement(src, mozilla::fallible); + } + + switch(mDirective) { + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mDefault_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mDefault_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mScript_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mScript_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mObject_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mObject_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mStyle_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mStyle_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mImg_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mImg_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mMedia_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mMedia_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mFrame_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mFrame_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mFont_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mFont_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mConnect_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mConnect_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mReport_uri.Construct(); + outCSP.mReport_uri.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Construct(); + outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mManifest_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mManifest_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + // not supporting REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mBase_uri.Construct(); + outCSP.mBase_uri.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mForm_action.Construct(); + outCSP.mForm_action.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT: + outCSP.mBlock_all_mixed_content.Construct(); + // does not have any srcs + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mUpgrade_insecure_requests.Construct(); + // does not have any srcs + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mChild_src.Construct(); + outCSP.mChild_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE: + outCSP.mSandbox.Construct(); + outCSP.mSandbox.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs); + return; + + // REFERRER_DIRECTIVE and REQUIRE_SRI_FOR are handled in nsCSPPolicy::toDomCSPStruct() + + default: + NS_ASSERTION(false, "cannot find directive to convert CSP to JSON"); + } +} + + +bool +nsCSPDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const +{ + // make sure we do not check for the default src before any other sources + if (isDefaultDirective()) { + return false; + } + return mDirective == CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType); +} + +void +nsCSPDirective::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString> &outReportURIs) const +{ + NS_ASSERTION((mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE), "not a report-uri directive"); + + // append uris + nsString tmpReportURI; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + tmpReportURI.Truncate(); + mSrcs[i]->toString(tmpReportURI); + outReportURIs.AppendElement(tmpReportURI); + } +} + +bool +nsCSPDirective::visitSrcs(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) { + if (!mSrcs[i]->visit(aVisitor)) { + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +bool nsCSPDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const +{ + return (mDirective == aDirective); +} + +/* =============== nsCSPChildSrcDirective ============= */ + +nsCSPChildSrcDirective::nsCSPChildSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) + : nsCSPDirective(aDirective) + , mHandleFrameSrc(false) +{ +} + +nsCSPChildSrcDirective::~nsCSPChildSrcDirective() +{ +} + +void nsCSPChildSrcDirective::setHandleFrameSrc() +{ + mHandleFrameSrc = true; +} + +bool nsCSPChildSrcDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const +{ + if (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) { + return mHandleFrameSrc; + } + + return (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER + || aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER + || aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER + ); +} + +bool nsCSPChildSrcDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const +{ + if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE) { + return mHandleFrameSrc; + } + + return (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE); +} + +/* =============== nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective ============= */ + +nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) +: nsCSPDirective(aDirective) +{ +} + +nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::~nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective() +{ +} + +void +nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString( + nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)); +} + +/* =============== nsUpgradeInsecureDirective ============= */ + +nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::nsUpgradeInsecureDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) +: nsCSPDirective(aDirective) +{ +} + +nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::~nsUpgradeInsecureDirective() +{ +} + +void +nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString( + nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)); +} + +/* ===== nsRequireSRIForDirective ========================= */ + +nsRequireSRIForDirective::nsRequireSRIForDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) +: nsCSPDirective(aDirective) +{ +} + +nsRequireSRIForDirective::~nsRequireSRIForDirective() +{ +} + +void +nsRequireSRIForDirective::toString(nsAString &outStr) const +{ + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString( + nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REQUIRE_SRI_FOR)); + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTypes.Length(); i++) { + if (mTypes[i] == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) { + outStr.AppendASCII(" script"); + } + else if (mTypes[i] == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) { + outStr.AppendASCII(" style"); + } + } +} + +bool +nsRequireSRIForDirective::hasType(nsContentPolicyType aType) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTypes.Length(); i++) { + if (mTypes[i] == aType) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +bool +nsRequireSRIForDirective::restrictsContentType(const nsContentPolicyType aType) const +{ + return this->hasType(aType); +} + +bool +nsRequireSRIForDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + // can only disallow CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR. + return (aKeyword != CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR); +} + +/* ===== nsCSPPolicy ========================= */ + +nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy() + : mUpgradeInsecDir(nullptr) + , mReportOnly(false) +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy")); +} + +nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy() +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy")); + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + delete mDirectives[i]; + } +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir, + nsIURI* aUri, + bool aSpecific) const +{ + nsString outp; + return this->permits(aDir, aUri, EmptyString(), false, aSpecific, false, outp); +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir, + nsIURI* aUri, + const nsAString& aNonce, + bool aWasRedirected, + bool aSpecific, + bool aParserCreated, + nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const +{ + if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) { + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, aSpecific: %s", + aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), aDir, + aSpecific ? "true" : "false")); + } + + NS_ASSERTION(aUri, "permits needs an uri to perform the check!"); + outViolatedDirective.Truncate(); + + nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; + + // Try to find a relevant directive + // These directive arrays are short (1-5 elements), not worth using a hashtable. + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { + if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly, + mUpgradeInsecDir, aParserCreated)) { + mDirectives[i]->toString(outViolatedDirective); + return false; + } + return true; + } + if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { + defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; + } + } + + // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive. + // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping. + if (!aSpecific && defaultDir) { + if (!defaultDir->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly, + mUpgradeInsecDir, aParserCreated)) { + defaultDir->toString(outViolatedDirective); + return false; + } + return true; + } + + // Nothing restricts this, so we're allowing the load + // See bug 764937 + return true; +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, + enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, + const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, + bool aParserCreated) const +{ + CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s", + CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get())); + + nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; + + // Try to find a matching directive + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) { + if (mDirectives[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated)) { + return true; + } + return false; + } + if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { + defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; + } + } + + // {nonce,hash}-source should not consult default-src: + // * return false if default-src is specified + // * but allow the load if default-src is *not* specified (Bug 1198422) + if (aKeyword == CSP_NONCE || aKeyword == CSP_HASH) { + if (!defaultDir) { + return true; + } + return false; + } + + // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive. + // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping. + if (defaultDir) { + return defaultDir->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated); + } + + // Allowing the load; see Bug 885433 + // a) inline scripts (also unsafe eval) should only be blocked + // if there is a [script-src] or [default-src] + // b) inline styles should only be blocked + // if there is a [style-src] or [default-src] + return true; +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, + enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) const +{ + return allows(aContentType, aKeyword, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""), false); +} + +void +nsCSPPolicy::toString(nsAString& outStr) const +{ + uint32_t length = mDirectives.Length(); + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) { + + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) { + outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)); + outStr.AppendASCII(" "); + outStr.Append(mReferrerPolicy); + } else { + mDirectives[i]->toString(outStr); + } + if (i != (length - 1)) { + outStr.AppendASCII("; "); + } + } +} + +void +nsCSPPolicy::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const +{ + outCSP.mReport_only = mReportOnly; + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); ++i) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) { + mozilla::dom::Sequence<nsString> srcs; + srcs.AppendElement(mReferrerPolicy, mozilla::fallible); + outCSP.mReferrer.Construct(); + outCSP.mReferrer.Value() = srcs; + } else { + mDirectives[i]->toDomCSPStruct(outCSP); + } + } +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +/* + * Use this function only after ::allows() returned 'false'. Most and + * foremost it's used to get the violated directive before sending reports. + * The parameter outDirective is the equivalent of 'outViolatedDirective' + * for the ::permits() function family. + */ +void +nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveStringForContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, + nsAString& outDirective) const +{ + nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) { + mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective); + return; + } + if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) { + defaultDir = mDirectives[i]; + } + } + // if we haven't found a matching directive yet, + // the contentType must be restricted by the default directive + if (defaultDir) { + defaultDir->toString(outDirective); + return; + } + NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not query directive string for contentType!"); + outDirective.AppendASCII("couldNotQueryViolatedDirective"); +} + +void +nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir, nsAString& outDirective) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { + mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective); + return; + } + } +} + +/* + * Helper function that returns the underlying bit representation of sandbox + * flags. The function returns SANDBOXED_NONE if there are no sandbox + * directives. + */ +uint32_t +nsCSPPolicy::getSandboxFlags() const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE)) { + nsAutoString flags; + mDirectives[i]->toString(flags); + + if (flags.IsEmpty()) { + return SANDBOX_ALL_FLAGS; + } + + nsAttrValue attr; + attr.ParseAtomArray(flags); + + return nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(&attr); + } + } + + return SANDBOXED_NONE; +} + +void +nsCSPPolicy::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) { + mDirectives[i]->getReportURIs(outReportURIs); + return; + } + } +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::visitDirectiveSrcs(CSPDirective aDir, nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) { + return mDirectives[i]->visitSrcs(aVisitor); + } + } + return false; +} + +bool +nsCSPPolicy::requireSRIForType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) { + if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REQUIRE_SRI_FOR)) { + return static_cast<nsRequireSRIForDirective*>(mDirectives[i])->hasType(aContentType); + } + } + return false; +} |