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-rw-r--r--browser/app/profile/firefox.js94
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 94 deletions
diff --git a/browser/app/profile/firefox.js b/browser/app/profile/firefox.js
index fb85a9fb9..1182741bd 100644
--- a/browser/app/profile/firefox.js
+++ b/browser/app/profile/firefox.js
@@ -909,100 +909,6 @@ pref("dom.ipc.shims.enabledWarnings", false);
pref("browser.tabs.remote.autostart", false);
pref("browser.tabs.remote.desktopbehavior", true);
-#if defined(XP_WIN) && defined(MOZ_SANDBOX)
-// When this pref is true the Windows process sandbox will set up dummy
-// interceptions and log to the browser console when calls fail in the sandboxed
-// process and also if they are subsequently allowed by the broker process.
-// This will require a restart.
-pref("security.sandbox.windows.log", false);
-
-// Controls whether and how the Windows NPAPI plugin process is sandboxed.
-// To get a different setting for a particular plugin replace "default", with
-// the plugin's nice file name, see: nsPluginTag::GetNiceFileName.
-// On windows these levels are:
-// 0 - no sandbox
-// 1 - sandbox with USER_NON_ADMIN access token level
-// 2 - a more strict sandbox, which might cause functionality issues. This now
-// includes running at low integrity.
-// 3 - the strongest settings we seem to be able to use without breaking
-// everything, but will probably cause some functionality restrictions
-pref("dom.ipc.plugins.sandbox-level.default", 0);
-#if defined(_AMD64_)
-// The lines in PluginModuleParent.cpp should be changed in line with this.
-pref("dom.ipc.plugins.sandbox-level.flash", 2);
-#else
-pref("dom.ipc.plugins.sandbox-level.flash", 0);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX)
-// This controls the strength of the Windows content process sandbox for testing
-// purposes. This will require a restart.
-// On windows these levels are:
-// See - security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp
-// SetSecurityLevelForContentProcess() for what the different settings mean.
-#if defined(NIGHTLY_BUILD)
-pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 2);
-#else
-pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 1);
-#endif
-
-// This controls the depth of stack trace that is logged when Windows sandbox
-// logging is turned on. This is only currently available for the content
-// process because the only other sandbox (for GMP) has too strict a policy to
-// allow stack tracing. This does not require a restart to take effect.
-pref("security.sandbox.windows.log.stackTraceDepth", 0);
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(XP_MACOSX) && defined(MOZ_SANDBOX) && defined(MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX)
-// This pref is discussed in bug 1083344, the naming is inspired from its
-// Windows counterpart, but on Mac it's an integer which means:
-// 0 -> "no sandbox"
-// 1 -> "preliminary content sandboxing enabled: write access to
-// home directory is prevented"
-// 2 -> "preliminary content sandboxing enabled with profile protection:
-// write access to home directory is prevented, read and write access
-// to ~/Library and profile directories are prevented (excluding
-// $PROFILE/{extensions,weave})"
-// This setting is read when the content process is started. On Mac the content
-// process is killed when all windows are closed, so a change will take effect
-// when the 1st window is opened.
-#if defined(NIGHTLY_BUILD)
-pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 2);
-#else
-pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 1);
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(XP_LINUX) && defined(MOZ_SANDBOX) && defined(MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX)
-// This pref is introduced as part of bug 742434, the naming is inspired from
-// its Windows/Mac counterpart, but on Linux it's an integer which means:
-// 0 -> "no sandbox"
-// 1 -> "content sandbox using seccomp-bpf when available"
-// 2 -> "seccomp-bpf + file broker"
-// Content sandboxing on Linux is currently in the stage of
-// 'just getting it enabled', which includes a very permissive whitelist. We
-// enable seccomp-bpf on nightly to see if everything is running, or if we need
-// to whitelist more system calls.
-//
-// So the purpose of this setting is to allow nightly users to disable the
-// sandbox while we fix their problems. This way, they won't have to wait for
-// another nightly release which disables seccomp-bpf again.
-//
-// This setting may not be required anymore once we decide to permanently
-// enable the content sandbox.
-pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 2);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(XP_MACOSX) || defined(XP_WIN)
-#if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX) && defined(MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX)
-// ID (a UUID when set by gecko) that is used to form the name of a
-// sandbox-writable temporary directory to be used by content processes
-// when a temporary writable file is required in a level 1 sandbox.
-pref("security.sandbox.content.tempDirSuffix", "");
-#endif
-#endif
-
// This pref governs whether we attempt to work around problems caused by
// plugins using OS calls to manipulate the cursor while running out-of-
// process. These workarounds all involve intercepting (hooking) certain