diff options
64 files changed, 1149 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js b/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js index 3d5d40e4c..830c20998 100644 --- a/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js +++ b/application/palemoon/base/content/nsContextMenu.js @@ -909,7 +909,8 @@ nsContextMenu.prototype = { Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DISALLOW_SCRIPT); let doc = this.target.ownerDocument; openUILink(viewURL, e, { disallowInheritPrincipal: true, - referrerURI: doc.documentURIObject }); + referrerURI: doc.documentURIObject, + forceAllowDataURI: true }); } }, diff --git a/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js b/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js index b1e78d6a9..86cc5cea5 100644 --- a/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js +++ b/application/palemoon/base/content/utilityOverlay.js @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ function openUILinkIn(url, where, aAllowThirdPartyFixup, aPostData, aReferrerURI openLinkIn(url, where, params); } +/* eslint-disable complexity */ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { if (!where || !url) return; @@ -215,6 +216,7 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { var aCharset = params.charset; var aReferrerURI = params.referrerURI; var aRelatedToCurrent = params.relatedToCurrent; + var aForceAllowDataURI = params.forceAllowDataURI; var aInBackground = params.inBackground; var aDisallowInheritPrincipal = params.disallowInheritPrincipal; var aInitiatingDoc = params.initiatingDoc; @@ -315,6 +317,9 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { } if (aDisallowInheritPrincipal) flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_DISALLOW_INHERIT_OWNER; + if (aForceAllowDataURI) { + flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI; + } w.gBrowser.loadURIWithFlags(url, flags, aReferrerURI, null, aPostData); break; case "tabshifted": diff --git a/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js b/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js index 8eb9b034f..ddf695202 100644 --- a/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js +++ b/browser/base/content/nsContextMenu.js @@ -1158,7 +1158,8 @@ nsContextMenu.prototype = { this.browser.contentPrincipal, Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DISALLOW_SCRIPT); openUILink(this.mediaURL, e, { disallowInheritPrincipal: true, - referrerURI: referrerURI }); + referrerURI: referrerURI, + forceAllowDataURI: true }); } }, diff --git a/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js b/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js index 0b703b6f8..6ceaf773e 100644 --- a/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js +++ b/browser/base/content/utilityOverlay.js @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ function openUILinkIn(url, where, aAllowThirdPartyFixup, aPostData, aReferrerURI openLinkIn(url, where, params); } +/* eslint-disable complexity */ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { if (!where || !url) return; @@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { params.referrerPolicy : Ci.nsIHttpChannel.REFERRER_POLICY_DEFAULT); var aRelatedToCurrent = params.relatedToCurrent; var aAllowMixedContent = params.allowMixedContent; + var aForceAllowDataURI = params.forceAllowDataURI; var aInBackground = params.inBackground; var aDisallowInheritPrincipal = params.disallowInheritPrincipal; var aInitiatingDoc = params.initiatingDoc; @@ -378,6 +380,9 @@ function openLinkIn(url, where, params) { if (aIndicateErrorPageLoad) { flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_ERROR_LOAD_CHANGES_RV; } + if (aForceAllowDataURI) { + flags |= Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI; + } let {URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT} = Ci.nsIProtocolHandler; if (aForceAboutBlankViewerInCurrent && diff --git a/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp b/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp index 891a29bd8..f8b867160 100644 --- a/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp +++ b/caps/nsNullPrincipalURI.cpp @@ -168,6 +168,32 @@ nsNullPrincipalURI::SetPath(const nsACString &aPath) } NS_IMETHODIMP +nsNullPrincipalURI::GetFilePath(nsACString &aFilePath) +{ + aFilePath.Truncate(); + return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsNullPrincipalURI::SetFilePath(const nsACString &aFilePath) +{ + return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsNullPrincipalURI::GetQuery(nsACString &aQuery) +{ + aQuery.Truncate(); + return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsNullPrincipalURI::SetQuery(const nsACString &aQuery) +{ + return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsNullPrincipalURI::GetRef(nsACString &_ref) { _ref.Truncate(); diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp index 93ce3cb26..ee6a4dd62 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp +++ b/docshell/base/nsDSURIContentListener.cpp @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "nsIHttpChannel.h" #include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.h" #include "nsError.h" +#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h" #include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h" #include "nsIConsoleService.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" @@ -93,6 +94,14 @@ nsDSURIContentListener::DoContent(const nsACString& aContentType, if (aOpenedChannel) { aOpenedChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags); + + // block top-level data URI navigations if triggered by the web + if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(aOpenedChannel)) { + // logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI + aRequest->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI); + *aAbortProcess = true; + return NS_OK; + } } if (loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_RETARGETED_DOCUMENT_URI) { diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp index 58c182cbb..bd2a8a433 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp +++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.cpp @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "nsArray.h" #include "nsArrayUtils.h" +#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h" #include "nsICaptivePortalService.h" #include "nsIDOMStorage.h" #include "nsIContentViewer.h" @@ -138,6 +139,7 @@ #include "nsISiteSecurityService.h" #include "nsStructuredCloneContainer.h" #include "nsIStructuredCloneContainer.h" +#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h" #ifdef MOZ_PLACES #include "nsIFaviconService.h" #include "mozIPlacesPendingOperation.h" @@ -1272,6 +1274,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsCOMPtr<nsISHEntry> shEntry; nsXPIDLString target; nsAutoString srcdoc; + bool forceAllowDataURI = false; nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> sourceDocShell; nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> baseURI; @@ -1307,6 +1310,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI, aLoadInfo->GetSrcdocData(srcdoc); aLoadInfo->GetSourceDocShell(getter_AddRefs(sourceDocShell)); aLoadInfo->GetBaseURI(getter_AddRefs(baseURI)); + aLoadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI(&forceAllowDataURI); } #if defined(DEBUG) @@ -1560,6 +1564,10 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURI(nsIURI* aURI, flags |= INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_IS_SRCDOC; } + if (forceAllowDataURI) { + flags |= INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI; + } + return InternalLoad(aURI, originalURI, loadReplace, @@ -4821,6 +4829,9 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURIWithOptions(const char16_t* aURI, } nsAutoPopupStatePusher statePusher(popupState); + bool forceAllowDataURI = + aLoadFlags & LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI; + // Don't pass certain flags that aren't needed and end up confusing // ConvertLoadTypeToDocShellLoadInfo. We do need to ensure that they are // passed to LoadURI though, since it uses them. @@ -4850,6 +4861,7 @@ nsDocShell::LoadURIWithOptions(const char16_t* aURI, loadInfo->SetReferrerPolicy(aReferrerPolicy); loadInfo->SetHeadersStream(aHeaderStream); loadInfo->SetBaseURI(aBaseURI); + loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(forceAllowDataURI); if (fixupInfo) { nsAutoString searchProvider, keyword; @@ -9884,49 +9896,49 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI, contentType = nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT; } - // If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new window, - // perform a content policy check before creating the window. - if (!targetDocShell) { - nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement; + // If there's no targetDocShell, that means we are about to create a new + // window (or aWindowTarget is empty). Perform a content policy check before + // creating the window. Please note for all other docshell loads + // content policy checks are performed within the contentSecurityManager + // when the channel is about to be openend. + if (!targetDocShell && !aWindowTarget.IsEmpty()) { + MOZ_ASSERT(contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "opening a new window requires type to be TYPE_DOCUMENT"); + nsISupports* requestingContext = nullptr; - if (contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) { - if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) { - // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that - // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome - // process). So we just pass mScriptGlobal. - requestingContext = ToSupports(mScriptGlobal); - } else { - // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various - // sorts. - // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null. - requestingElement = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal(); - requestingContext = requestingElement; - } + if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) { + // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that + // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome + // process). So we just pass mScriptGlobal. + requestingContext = ToSupports(mScriptGlobal); } else { - requestingElement = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal(); + // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various + // sorts. + // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null. + nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement = + mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal(); requestingContext = requestingElement; - -#ifdef DEBUG - if (requestingElement) { - // Get the docshell type for requestingElement. - nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> requestingDoc = requestingElement->OwnerDoc(); - nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> elementDocShell = requestingDoc->GetDocShell(); - - // requestingElement docshell type = current docshell type. - MOZ_ASSERT(mItemType == elementDocShell->ItemType(), - "subframes should have the same docshell type as their parent"); - } -#endif } + // Since Content Policy checks are performed within docShell as well as + // the ContentSecurityManager we need a reliable way to let certain + // nsIContentPolicy consumers ignore duplicate calls. Let's use the 'extra' + // argument to pass a specific identifier. + nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsString> extraStr = + do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_STRING_CONTRACTID, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(msg, "conPolCheckFromDocShell"); + rv = extraStr->SetData(msg); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(contentType, aURI, aTriggeringPrincipal, requestingContext, EmptyCString(), // mime guess - nullptr, // extra + extraStr, // extra &shouldLoad); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) { @@ -10082,6 +10094,7 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI, // principal to inherit is: it should be aTriggeringPrincipal. loadInfo->SetPrincipalIsExplicit(true); loadInfo->SetLoadType(ConvertLoadTypeToDocShellLoadInfo(LOAD_LINK)); + loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI); rv = win->Open(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec), aWindowTarget, // window name @@ -10232,8 +10245,11 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI, } } + bool loadFromExternal = false; + // Before going any further vet loads initiated by external programs. if (aLoadType == LOAD_NORMAL_EXTERNAL) { + loadFromExternal = true; // Disallow external chrome: loads targetted at content windows bool isChrome = false; if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome)) && isChrome) { @@ -10724,7 +10740,9 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI* aURI, nsINetworkPredictor::PREDICT_LOAD, this, nullptr); nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req; - rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, aReferrer, + rv = DoURILoad(aURI, aOriginalURI, aLoadReplace, loadFromExternal, + (aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI), + aReferrer, !(aFlags & INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_DONT_SEND_REFERRER), aReferrerPolicy, aTriggeringPrincipal, principalToInherit, aTypeHint, @@ -10804,6 +10822,8 @@ nsresult nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, bool aLoadReplace, + bool aLoadFromExternal, + bool aForceAllowDataURI, nsIURI* aReferrerURI, bool aSendReferrer, uint32_t aReferrerPolicy, @@ -10880,17 +10900,40 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI, nsCOMPtr<nsINode> loadingNode; nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> loadingWindow; nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal; + nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> topLevelLoadingContext; if (aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) { loadingNode = nullptr; loadingPrincipal = nullptr; loadingWindow = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter(); + if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) { + // In e10s the child process doesn't have access to the element that + // contains the browsing context (because that element is in the chrome + // process). + nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = GetTabChild(); + topLevelLoadingContext = ToSupports(tabChild); + } else { + // This is for loading non-e10s tabs and toplevel windows of various + // sorts. + // For the toplevel window cases, requestingElement will be null. + nsCOMPtr<Element> requestingElement = + loadingWindow->GetFrameElementInternal(); + topLevelLoadingContext = requestingElement; + } } else { loadingWindow = nullptr; loadingNode = mScriptGlobal->AsOuter()->GetFrameElementInternal(); if (loadingNode) { // If we have a loading node, then use that as our loadingPrincipal. loadingPrincipal = loadingNode->NodePrincipal(); +#ifdef DEBUG + // Get the docshell type for requestingElement. + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> requestingDoc = loadingNode->OwnerDoc(); + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> elementDocShell = requestingDoc->GetDocShell(); + // requestingElement docshell type = current docshell type. + MOZ_ASSERT(mItemType == elementDocShell->ItemType(), + "subframes should have the same docshell type as their parent"); +#endif } else { // If this isn't a top-level load and mScriptGlobal's frame element is // null, then the element got removed from the DOM while we were trying @@ -10940,7 +10983,7 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI, nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = (aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) ? - new LoadInfo(loadingWindow, aTriggeringPrincipal, + new LoadInfo(loadingWindow, aTriggeringPrincipal, topLevelLoadingContext, securityFlags) : new LoadInfo(loadingPrincipal, aTriggeringPrincipal, loadingNode, securityFlags, aContentPolicyType); @@ -10948,6 +10991,8 @@ nsDocShell::DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI, if (aPrincipalToInherit) { loadInfo->SetPrincipalToInherit(aPrincipalToInherit); } + loadInfo->SetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(aLoadFromExternal); + loadInfo->SetForceAllowDataURI(aForceAllowDataURI); // We have to do this in case our OriginAttributes are different from the // OriginAttributes of the parent document. Or in case there isn't a diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h index 3ca9e0b34..63a4e3358 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h +++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShell.h @@ -369,6 +369,8 @@ protected: nsresult DoURILoad(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, bool aLoadReplace, + bool aLoadFromExternal, + bool aForceAllowDataURI, nsIURI* aReferrer, bool aSendReferrer, uint32_t aReferrerPolicy, diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp index 7d0034b04..b00e8e360 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp +++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.cpp @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ nsDocShellLoadInfo::nsDocShellLoadInfo() : mLoadReplace(false) , mInheritPrincipal(false) , mPrincipalIsExplicit(false) + , mForceAllowDataURI(false) , mSendReferrer(true) , mReferrerPolicy(mozilla::net::RP_Default) , mLoadType(nsIDocShellLoadInfo::loadNormal) @@ -127,6 +128,20 @@ nsDocShellLoadInfo::SetPrincipalIsExplicit(bool aPrincipalIsExplicit) } NS_IMETHODIMP +nsDocShellLoadInfo::GetForceAllowDataURI(bool* aForceAllowDataURI) +{ + *aForceAllowDataURI = mForceAllowDataURI; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsDocShellLoadInfo::SetForceAllowDataURI(bool aForceAllowDataURI) +{ + mForceAllowDataURI = aForceAllowDataURI; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsDocShellLoadInfo::GetLoadType(nsDocShellInfoLoadType* aLoadType) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aLoadType); diff --git a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h index b7eaed832..f3ddcca1e 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h +++ b/docshell/base/nsDocShellLoadInfo.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ protected: bool mLoadReplace; bool mInheritPrincipal; bool mPrincipalIsExplicit; + bool mForceAllowDataURI; bool mSendReferrer; nsDocShellInfoReferrerPolicy mReferrerPolicy; nsDocShellInfoLoadType mLoadType; diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl b/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl index 8261c45dc..e34e6adfd 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl +++ b/docshell/base/nsIDocShell.idl @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem const long INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_NO_OPENER = 0x100; + // Whether a top-level data URI navigation is allowed for that load + const long INTERNAL_LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI = 0x200; + // NB: 0x80 is available. /** diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl b/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl index 113c0a4c1..8804f63a3 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl +++ b/docshell/base/nsIDocShellLoadInfo.idl @@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ interface nsIDocShellLoadInfo : nsISupports */ attribute boolean principalIsExplicit; + /** + * If this attribute is true, then a top-level navigation + * to a data URI will be allowed. + */ + attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI; + /* these are load type enums... */ const long loadNormal = 0; // Normal Load const long loadNormalReplace = 1; // Normal Load but replaces current history slot diff --git a/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl b/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl index 042b1c547..241d0731c 100644 --- a/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl +++ b/docshell/base/nsIWebNavigation.idl @@ -206,6 +206,12 @@ interface nsIWebNavigation : nsISupports const unsigned long LOAD_FLAGS_FIXUP_SCHEME_TYPOS = 0x200000; /** + * Allows a top-level data: navigation to occur. E.g. view-image + * is an explicit user action which should be allowed. + */ + const unsigned long LOAD_FLAGS_FORCE_ALLOW_DATA_URI = 0x400000; + + /** * Loads a given URI. This will give priority to loading the requested URI * in the object implementing this interface. If it can't be loaded here * however, the URI dispatcher will go through its normal process of content diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html b/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c51e574e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +<html> +<body> +This window should never be openend! +</body> +</html> diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini b/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini index 0c35cf352..764e400a8 100644 --- a/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini +++ b/docshell/test/navigation/mochitest.ini @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ support-files = file_bug1300461_redirect.html file_bug1300461_redirect.html^headers^ file_bug1300461_back.html + file_contentpolicy_block_window.html [test_bug13871.html] [test_bug270414.html] @@ -62,3 +63,4 @@ skip-if = toolkit == 'android' #RANDOM [test_triggeringprincipal_window_open.html] [test_triggeringprincipal_parent_iframe_window_open.html] [test_triggeringprincipal_iframe_iframe_window_open.html] +[test_contentpolicy_block_window.html] diff --git a/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html b/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..651be825c --- /dev/null +++ b/docshell/test/navigation/test_contentpolicy_block_window.html @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<!-- +https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329288 +--> +<head> + <title>Test for Bug 1329288</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329288">Mozilla Bug 1329288</a> + + +<!-- have a testlink which we can use for the test to open a new window --> +<a href="http://test1.example.org/tests/docshell/test/navigation/file_contentpolicy_block_window.html" + target="_blank" + id="testlink">This is a link</a> + +<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript"> +/* + * Description of the test: + * The test tries to open a new window and makes sure that a registered contentPolicy + * gets called with the right (a non null) 'context' for the TYPE_DOCUMENT load. + */ + +const Cc = SpecialPowers.Cc; +const Ci = SpecialPowers.Ci; + +var categoryManager = Cc["@mozilla.org/categorymanager;1"].getService(Ci.nsICategoryManager); +var componentManager = SpecialPowers.wrap(SpecialPowers.Components).manager + .QueryInterface(Ci.nsIComponentRegistrar); + +// Content policy / factory implementation for the test +var policyID = SpecialPowers.wrap(SpecialPowers.Components).ID("{b80e19d0-878f-d41b-2654-194714a4115c}"); +var policyName = "@mozilla.org/testpolicy;1"; +var policy = { + // nsISupports implementation + QueryInterface: function(iid) { + iid = SpecialPowers.wrap(iid); + if (iid.equals(Ci.nsISupports) || + iid.equals(Ci.nsIFactory) || + iid.equals(Ci.nsIContentPolicy)) + return this; + throw SpecialPowers.Cr.NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE; + }, + + // nsIFactory implementation + createInstance: function(outer, iid) { + return this.QueryInterface(iid); + }, + + // nsIContentPolicy implementation + shouldLoad: function(contentType, contentLocation, requestOrigin, context, mimeTypeGuess, extra) { + + if (SpecialPowers.wrap(contentLocation).spec !== document.getElementById("testlink").href) { + // not the URI we are looking for, allow the load + return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; + } + + is(contentType, Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "needs to be type document load"); + ok(context, "context is not allowed to be null"); + ok(context.name.endsWith("test_contentpolicy_block_window.html"), + "context should be the current window"); + + // remove the policy and finish test. + categoryManager.deleteCategoryEntry("content-policy", policyName, false); + + setTimeout(function() { + // Component must be unregistered delayed, otherwise other content + // policy will not be removed from the category correctly + componentManager.unregisterFactory(policyID, policy); + }, 0); + + SimpleTest.finish(); + return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST; + }, + + shouldProcess: function(contentType, contentLocation, requestOrigin, context, mimeTypeGuess, extra) { + return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; + } +} + +policy = SpecialPowers.wrapCallbackObject(policy); +componentManager.registerFactory(policyID, "Test content policy", policyName, policy); +categoryManager.addCategoryEntry("content-policy", policyName, policyName, false, true); + +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); + +// now everything is set up, let's start the test +document.getElementById("testlink").click() + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/base/Location.cpp b/dom/base/Location.cpp index e3b614931..b6b95aaa6 100644 --- a/dom/base/Location.cpp +++ b/dom/base/Location.cpp @@ -577,19 +577,17 @@ Location::GetPathname(nsAString& aPathname) aPathname.Truncate(); nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; - nsresult result = NS_OK; + nsresult result = GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + if (NS_FAILED(result) || !uri) { + return result; + } - result = GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + nsAutoCString file; - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(uri)); - if (url) { - nsAutoCString file; + result = uri->GetFilePath(file); - result = url->GetFilePath(file); - - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(result)) { - AppendUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname); - } + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(result)) { + AppendUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname); } return result; @@ -604,8 +602,7 @@ Location::SetPathname(const nsAString& aPathname) return rv; } - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(uri)); - if (url && NS_SUCCEEDED(url->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)))) { + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)))) { return SetURI(uri); } diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp index 337debcea..5511b9086 100644 --- a/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp +++ b/dom/base/nsContentPolicy.cpp @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "nsIDOMElement.h" #include "nsIDOMNode.h" #include "nsIDOMWindow.h" +#include "nsITabChild.h" #include "nsIContent.h" #include "nsILoadContext.h" #include "nsCOMArray.h" @@ -89,8 +90,9 @@ nsContentPolicy::CheckPolicy(CPMethod policyMethod, { nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMNode> node(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext)); nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> window(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext)); - NS_ASSERTION(!requestingContext || node || window, - "Context should be a DOM node or a DOM window!"); + nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild(do_QueryInterface(requestingContext)); + NS_ASSERTION(!requestingContext || node || window || tabChild, + "Context should be a DOM node, DOM window or a tabChild!"); } #endif diff --git a/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties b/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties index 8b66cc265..c0b80996c 100644 --- a/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties +++ b/dom/locales/en-US/chrome/security/security.properties @@ -81,3 +81,6 @@ MimeTypeMismatch=The resource from “%1$S” was blocked due to MIME type misma XCTOHeaderValueMissing=X-Content-Type-Options header warning: value was “%1$S”; did you mean to send “nosniff”? BlockScriptWithWrongMimeType=Script from “%1$S” was blocked because of a disallowed MIME type. + +# LOCALIZATION NOTE: Do not translate "data: URI". +BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation=Navigation to toplevel data: URI not allowed (Blocked loading of: “%1$S”) diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp index a7517f65e..979bd915f 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp @@ -171,9 +171,10 @@ nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, } } - // aExtra is only non-null if the channel got redirected. - bool wasRedirected = (aExtra != nullptr); + // aExtra holds the original URI of the channel if the + // channel got redirected (until we fix Bug 1332422). nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI = do_QueryInterface(aExtra); + bool wasRedirected = originalURI; bool permitted = permitsInternal(dir, aContentLocation, diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index c4e1ed8e1..0cc4933fe 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ #include "nsContentSecurityManager.h" +#include "nsEscape.h" #include "nsIChannel.h" #include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h" #include "nsIStreamListener.h" #include "nsILoadInfo.h" +#include "nsIOService.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h" #include "nsIStreamListener.h" @@ -10,11 +12,86 @@ #include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Element.h" +#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h" NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager, nsIContentSecurityManager, nsIChannelEventSink) +/* static */ bool +nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel) +{ + // Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI. + // In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a + // data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a codeBasePrincipal, or + // a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into + // the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal; + // we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming + // from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load + // using a codeBasePrincipal, but we want to block those loads. + if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) { + return true; + } + nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo(); + if (!loadInfo) { + return true; + } + if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) { + return true; + } + if (loadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI()) { + // if the loadinfo explicitly allows the data URI navigation, let's allow it now + return true; + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + bool isDataURI = + (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI); + if (!isDataURI) { + return true; + } + // Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs + nsAutoCString filePath; + uri->GetFilePath(filePath); + if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) && + !StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/svg+xml"))) { + return true; + } + // Whitelist data: PDFs and JSON + if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/pdf")) || + StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"))) { + return true; + } + // Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make + // sure the RedirectChain is empty. + if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() && + nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) && + loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) { + return true; + } + nsAutoCString dataSpec; + uri->GetSpec(dataSpec); + if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) { + dataSpec.Truncate(50); + dataSpec.AppendLiteral("..."); + } + nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad()); + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc; + if (tabChild) { + doc = static_cast<mozilla::dom::TabChild*>(tabChild.get())->GetDocument(); + } + NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec)); + const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() }; + nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag, + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"), + doc, + nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, + "BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation", + params, ArrayLength(params)); + return false; +} + static nsresult ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) { @@ -176,7 +253,7 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType(); nsCString mimeTypeGuess; - nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr; + nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestingContext = nullptr; #ifdef DEBUG // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads @@ -250,10 +327,13 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: { // alias nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DATAREQUEST: requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, - "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document"); - +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, + "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document"); + } +#endif // We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case // an addon creates a request with that type. if (internalContentPolicyType == @@ -274,18 +354,26 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: { mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString(); requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE, - "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element"); +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE, + "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element"); + } +#endif break; } case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: { mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString(); requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, - "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document"); +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, + "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document"); + } +#endif break; } @@ -303,9 +391,13 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString(); } requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE, - "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element"); +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE, + "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element"); + } +#endif break; } @@ -332,18 +424,26 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: { mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/xml"); requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, - "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document"); +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, + "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document"); + } +#endif break; } case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: { mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString(); requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); - MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext || - requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, - "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document"); +#ifdef DEBUG + { + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(requestingContext); + MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE, + "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document"); + } +#endif break; } diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h index 912c0e89f..bab847743 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ public: static nsresult doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener); + static bool AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel); + private: static nsresult CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel); diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b00baa95d --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +[DEFAULT] +[browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js] +support-files = + file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs + file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html +[browser_test_data_download.js] +support-files = + file_data_download.html +[browser_test_data_text_csv.js] +support-files = + file_data_text_csv.html +[browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js] +support-files = + file_view_image_data_navigation.html diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1ee8d5844 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +"use strict"; + +const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com") +const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_download.html"; + +function addWindowListener(aURL, aCallback) { + Services.wm.addListener({ + onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) { + info("window opened, waiting for focus"); + Services.wm.removeListener(this); + var domwindow = aXULWindow.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIInterfaceRequestor) + .getInterface(Ci.nsIDOMWindow); + waitForFocus(function() { + is(domwindow.document.location.href, aURL, "should have seen the right window open"); + aCallback(domwindow); + }, domwindow); + }, + onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) { }, + onWindowTitleChange(aXULWindow, aNewTitle) { } + }); +} + +function test() { + waitForExplicitFinish(); + Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true); + registerCleanupFunction(function() { + Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations"); + }); + addWindowListener("chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xul", function(win) { + is(win.document.getElementById("location").value, "data-foo.html", + "file name of download should match"); + win.close(); + finish(); + }); + gBrowser.loadURI(kTestURI); +} diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c45e40cc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +"use strict"; + +const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com") +const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_text_csv.html"; + +function addWindowListener(aURL, aCallback) { + Services.wm.addListener({ + onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) { + info("window opened, waiting for focus"); + Services.wm.removeListener(this); + var domwindow = aXULWindow.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIInterfaceRequestor) + .getInterface(Ci.nsIDOMWindow); + waitForFocus(function() { + is(domwindow.document.location.href, aURL, "should have seen the right window open"); + aCallback(domwindow); + }, domwindow); + }, + onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) { }, + onWindowTitleChange(aXULWindow, aNewTitle) { } + }); +} + +function test() { + waitForExplicitFinish(); + Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true); + registerCleanupFunction(function() { + Services.prefs.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations"); + }); + addWindowListener("chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xul", function(win) { + is(win.document.getElementById("location").value, "text/csv;foo,bar,foobar", + "file name of download should match"); + win.close(); + finish(); + }); + gBrowser.loadURI(kTestURI); +} diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a13a6350e --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* eslint-disable mozilla/no-arbitrary-setTimeout */ + +"use strict"; + +const kDataBody = "toplevel navigation to data: URI allowed"; +const kDataURI = "data:text/html,<body>" + kDataBody + "</body>"; +const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + .replace("chrome://mochitests/content", "http://example.com") +const kRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs"; +const kMetaRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html"; + +add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri() { + await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]], + }); + await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(kDataURI, async function(browser) { + await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {kDataBody}, async function({kDataBody}) { // eslint-disable-line + is(content.document.body.innerHTML, kDataBody, + "data: URI navigation from system should be allowed"); + }); + }); +}); + +add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_redirect() { + await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]], + }); + let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kRedirectURI); + registerCleanupFunction(async function() { + await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab); + }); + // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked + await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500)); + await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() { + is(content.document.body.innerHTML, "", + "data: URI navigation after server redirect should be blocked"); + }); +}); + +add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_meta_redirect() { + await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]], + }); + let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kMetaRedirectURI); + registerCleanupFunction(async function() { + await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab); + }); + // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked + await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500)); + await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() { + is(content.document.body.innerHTML, "", + "data: URI navigation after meta redirect should be blocked"); + }); +}); diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22de35894 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +"use strict"; + +const TEST_PAGE = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + "file_view_image_data_navigation.html"; + +add_task(async function test_principal_right_click_open_link_in_new_tab() { + await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + "set": [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]], + }); + + await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_PAGE, async function(browser) { + let loadPromise = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, true); + + // simulate right-click->view-image + BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(document, "popupshown", false, event => { + // These are operations that must be executed synchronously with the event. + document.getElementById("context-viewimage").doCommand(); + event.target.hidePopup(); + return true; + }); + BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter("#testimage", + { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 }, + gBrowser.selectedBrowser); + await loadPromise; + + await ContentTask.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, {}, async function() { + ok(content.document.location.toString().startsWith("data:image/svg+xml;"), + "data:image/svg navigation allowed through right-click view-image") + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5fbfdfdef --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Toplevel data navigation</title> +</head> +<body> +test1: clicking data: URI tries to navigate window<br/> +<a id="testlink" href="data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>">click me</a> +<script> + document.getElementById('testlink').click(); +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e0308e1ae --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Toplevel data navigation</title> +</head> +<body> +test2: data: URI in iframe tries to window.open(data:, _blank);<br/> +<iframe id="testFrame" src=""></iframe> +<script> + let DATA_URI = `data:text/html,<body><script> + var win = window.open("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>", "_blank"); + setTimeout(function () { + var result = win.document.body.innerHTML === "" ? "blocked" : "navigated"; + parent.postMessage(result, "*"); + win.close(); + }, 1000); + <\/script></body>`; + + window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage); + function receiveMessage(event) { + window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage); + // propagate the information back to the caller + window.opener.postMessage(event.data, "*"); + } + document.getElementById('testFrame').src = DATA_URI; +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..34aeddab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Toplevel data navigation</title> +</head> +<body> +test3: performing data: URI navigation through win.loc.href<br/> +<script> + window.location.href = "data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>"; +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64e294cab --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug: +// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect + +var DATA_URI = + "<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>"; + +function handleRequest(request, response) +{ + // avoid confusing cache behaviors + response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false); + + response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found"); + response.setHeader("Location", "data:text/html," + escape(DATA_URI), false); +} diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4cc92fe8f --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <title>Test download attribute for data: URI</title> +</head> +<body> + <a href="data:text/html,<body>data download</body>" download="data-foo.html" id="testlink">download data</a> + <script> + // click the link to have the downoad panel appear + let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink"); + testlink.click(); + </script> + </body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a9ac369d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <title>Test open data:text/csv</title> +</head> +<body> + <a href="data:text/csv;foo,bar,foobar" id="testlink">test text/csv</a> + <script> + // click the link to have the downoad panel appear + let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink"); + testlink.click(); + </script> + </body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f4f5deb52 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +<html>
+<body>
+<head>
+ <meta http-equiv="refresh"
+ content="0; url='data:text/html,<body>toplevel meta redirect to data: URI should be blocked</body>'">
+</head>
+<body>
+Meta Redirect to data: URI
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..501b833e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug: +// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect + +var DATA_URI = + "data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>"; + +function handleRequest(request, response) +{ + // avoid confusing cache behaviors + response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false); + + response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found"); + response.setHeader("Location", DATA_URI, false); +} diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a3f9acfb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Bug 1407891: Test navigation for right-click view-image on "></img> + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini index 70c0c9fb6..f3bcca072 100644 --- a/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini +++ b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini @@ -3,7 +3,19 @@ support-files = file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs file_nosniff_testserver.sjs file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs + file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html + file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html + file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html + file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs [test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html] [test_nosniff.html] [test_block_script_wrong_mime.html] +[test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html] +skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # intermittent failure +[test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html] +skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # intermittent failure +[test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html] +skip-if = toolkit == 'android' +[test_allow_opening_data_json.html] +skip-if = toolkit == 'android' diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1530a24e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Bug 1403814: Allow toplevel data URI navigation data:application/json</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript"> + +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); + +function test_toplevel_data_json() { + const DATA_JSON = "data:application/json,{'my_json_key':'my_json_value'}"; + + let win = window.open(DATA_JSON); + let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win); + + // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the JSON has loaded or not using some + // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that + // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure. + var jsonLoaded = setInterval(function() { + if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/json")) { + clearInterval(jsonLoaded); + ok(true, "navigating to data:application/json allowed"); + wrappedWin.close(); + SimpleTest.finish(); + } + }, 200); +} + +SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]] +}, test_toplevel_data_json); + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b51fe57b --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Bug 1398692: Allow toplevel navigation to a data:application/pdf</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript"> + +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); + +function test_toplevel_data_pdf() { + // The PDF contains one page and it is a 3/72" square, the minimum allowed by the spec + const DATA_PDF = + "data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjANCjEgMCBvYmo8PC9UeXBlL0NhdGFsb2cvUGFnZXMgMiAwIFI+PmVuZG9iaiAyIDAgb2JqPDwvVHlwZS9QYWdlcy9LaWRzWzMgMCBSXS9Db3VudCAxPj5lbmRvYmogMyAwIG9iajw8L1R5cGUvUGFnZS9NZWRpYUJveFswIDAgMyAzXT4+ZW5kb2JqDQp4cmVmDQowIDQNCjAwMDAwMDAwMDAgNjU1MzUgZg0KMDAwMDAwMDAxMCAwMDAwMCBuDQowMDAwMDAwMDUzIDAwMDAwIG4NCjAwMDAwMDAxMDIgMDAwMDAgbg0KdHJhaWxlcjw8L1NpemUgNC9Sb290IDEgMCBSPj4NCnN0YXJ0eHJlZg0KMTQ5DQolRU9G"; + + let win = window.open(DATA_PDF); + let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win); + + // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the PDF has loaded or not using some + // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that + // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure. + var pdfLoaded = setInterval(function() { + if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/pdf")) { + clearInterval(pdfLoaded); + ok(true, "navigating to data:application/pdf allowed"); + wrappedWin.close(); + SimpleTest.finish(); + } + }, 200); +} + +SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ + set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]] +}, test_toplevel_data_pdf); + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7f8dfc748 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Bug 1396798: Do not block toplevel data: navigation to image (except svgs)</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript"> +SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true); +SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => { + SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations"); +}); + +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); +SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that top level data:image loading is blocked/allowed"); + +function test_toplevel_data_image() { + const DATA_PNG = + ""; + let win1 = window.open(DATA_PNG); + let wrappedWin1 = SpecialPowers.wrap(win1); + setTimeout(function () { + let images = wrappedWin1.document.getElementsByTagName('img'); + is(images.length, 1, "Loading data:image/png should be allowed"); + is(images[0].src, DATA_PNG, "Sanity: img src matches"); + wrappedWin1.close(); + test_toplevel_data_image_svg(); + }, 1000); +} + +function test_toplevel_data_image_svg() { + const DATA_SVG = + ""; + let win2 = window.open(DATA_SVG); + // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the window was closed using some event, + // hence we are constantly polling till we see that win == null. + // Test times out on failure. + var win2Closed = setInterval(function() { + if (win2 == null || win2.closed) { + clearInterval(win2Closed); + ok(true, "Loading data:image/svg+xml should be blocked"); + SimpleTest.finish(); + } + }, 200); +} +// fire up the tests +test_toplevel_data_image(); + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cef232b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> +<head> + <meta charset="utf-8"> + <title>Bug 1331351 - Block top level window data: URI navigations</title> + <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !--> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript"> +SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true); +SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => { + SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations"); +}); + +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); +SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that top level data: URI navgiation is blocked"); + +function test1() { + // simple data: URI click navigation should be prevented + let TEST_FILE = "file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html"; + let win1 = window.open(TEST_FILE); + setTimeout(function () { + ok(SpecialPowers.wrap(win1).document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test1:") !== -1, + "toplevel data: URI navigation through click() should be blocked"); + win1.close(); + test2(); + }, 1000); +} + +function test2() { + // data: URI in iframe which opens data: URI in _blank should be blocked + let win2 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html"); + window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage); + function receiveMessage(event) { + window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage); + is(event.data, "blocked", + "data: URI navigation using _blank from data: URI should be blocked"); + win2.close(); + test3(); + } +} + +function test3() { + // navigating to a data: URI using window.location.href should be blocked + let win3 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html"); + setTimeout(function () { + ok(win3.document.body.innerHTML.indexOf("test3:") !== -1, + "data: URI navigation through win.loc.href should be blocked"); + win3.close(); + test4(); + }, 1000); +} + +function test4() { + // navigating to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked + let win4 = window.open("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>"); + setTimeout(function () { + // Please note that the data: URI will be displayed in the URL-Bar but not + // loaded, hence we rather rely on document.body than document.location + is(win4.document.body.innerHTML, "", + "navigating to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked"); + test5(); + }, 1000); +} + +function test5() { + // navigating to a URI which redirects to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked + let win5 = window.open("file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs"); + setTimeout(function () { + // Please note that the data: URI will be displayed in the URL-Bar but not + // loaded, hence we rather rely on document.body than document.location + is(SpecialPowers.wrap(win5).document.body.innerHTML, "", + "navigating to URI which redirects to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked"); + win5.close(); + SimpleTest.finish(); + }, 1000); +} + +// fire up the tests +test1(); + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html index 7b1ab72dc..3ef243824 100644 --- a/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html +++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ var policy = { "content policy type should TYPESUBDOCUMENT"); categoryManager.deleteCategoryEntry("content-policy", POLICYNAME, false); SimpleTest.finish(); + return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST; } return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; }, diff --git a/dom/security/test/moz.build b/dom/security/test/moz.build index ddb4e9b89..946959dee 100644 --- a/dom/security/test/moz.build +++ b/dom/security/test/moz.build @@ -27,5 +27,6 @@ MOCHITEST_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [ BROWSER_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [ 'contentverifier/browser.ini', 'csp/browser.ini', + 'general/browser.ini', 'hsts/browser.ini', ] diff --git a/dom/url/URL.cpp b/dom/url/URL.cpp index 1f15e1151..c8724c359 100644 --- a/dom/url/URL.cpp +++ b/dom/url/URL.cpp @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include "nsEscape.h" #include "nsHostObjectProtocolHandler.h" #include "nsIIOService.h" -#include "nsIURIWithQuery.h" #include "nsIURL.h" #include "nsNetCID.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" @@ -525,21 +524,10 @@ URLMainThread::GetPathname(nsAString& aPathname, ErrorResult& aRv) const // Do not throw! Not having a valid URI or URL should result in an empty // string. - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI)); - if (url) { - nsAutoCString file; - nsresult rv = url->GetFilePath(file); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { - CopyUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname); - } - - return; - } - - nsAutoCString path; - nsresult rv = mURI->GetPath(path); + nsAutoCString file; + nsresult rv = mURI->GetFilePath(file); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { - CopyUTF8toUTF16(path, aPathname); + CopyUTF8toUTF16(file, aPathname); } } @@ -548,11 +536,7 @@ URLMainThread::SetPathname(const nsAString& aPathname, ErrorResult& aRv) { // Do not throw! - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI)); - if (url) { - url->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)); - return; - } + mURI->SetFilePath(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPathname)); } void @@ -566,13 +550,9 @@ URLMainThread::GetSearch(nsAString& aSearch, ErrorResult& aRv) const nsAutoCString search; nsresult rv; - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> url(do_QueryInterface(mURI)); - if (url) { - rv = url->GetQuery(search); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !search.IsEmpty()) { - CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("?") + search, aSearch); - } - return; + rv = mURI->GetQuery(search); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !search.IsEmpty()) { + CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("?") + search, aSearch); } } @@ -603,11 +583,7 @@ URLMainThread::SetSearchInternal(const nsAString& aSearch, ErrorResult& aRv) { // Ignore failures to be compatible with NS4. - nsCOMPtr<nsIURIWithQuery> uriWithQuery(do_QueryInterface(mURI)); - if (uriWithQuery) { - uriWithQuery->SetQuery(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aSearch)); - return; - } + mURI->SetQuery(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aSearch)); } } // anonymous namespace diff --git a/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp b/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp index 2c2788c8f..632a733fe 100644 --- a/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp +++ b/image/decoders/icon/nsIconURI.cpp @@ -372,6 +372,32 @@ nsMozIconURI::SetPath(const nsACString& aPath) } NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMozIconURI::GetFilePath(nsACString& aFilePath) +{ + aFilePath.Truncate(); + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMozIconURI::SetFilePath(const nsACString& aFilePath) +{ + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMozIconURI::GetQuery(nsACString& aQuery) +{ + aQuery.Truncate(); + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMozIconURI::SetQuery(const nsACString& aQuery) +{ + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsMozIconURI::GetRef(nsACString& aRef) { aRef.Truncate(); diff --git a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp index b335f5c23..e115fa74c 100644 --- a/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp +++ b/ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ LoadInfoToLoadInfoArgs(nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo, aLoadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(), aLoadInfo->GetVerifySignedContent(), aLoadInfo->GetEnforceSRI(), + aLoadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI(), aLoadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped(), aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(), aLoadInfo->GetOuterWindowID(), @@ -294,6 +295,7 @@ LoadInfoToLoadInfoArgs(nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo, aLoadInfo->CorsUnsafeHeaders(), aLoadInfo->GetForcePreflight(), aLoadInfo->GetIsPreflight(), + aLoadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(), aLoadInfo->GetForceHSTSPriming(), aLoadInfo->GetMixedContentWouldBlock()); @@ -356,6 +358,7 @@ LoadInfoArgsToLoadInfo(const OptionalLoadInfoArgs& aOptionalLoadInfoArgs, loadInfoArgs.upgradeInsecureRequests(), loadInfoArgs.verifySignedContent(), loadInfoArgs.enforceSRI(), + loadInfoArgs.forceAllowDataURI(), loadInfoArgs.forceInheritPrincipalDropped(), loadInfoArgs.innerWindowID(), loadInfoArgs.outerWindowID(), @@ -370,6 +373,7 @@ LoadInfoArgsToLoadInfo(const OptionalLoadInfoArgs& aOptionalLoadInfoArgs, loadInfoArgs.corsUnsafeHeaders(), loadInfoArgs.forcePreflight(), loadInfoArgs.isPreflight(), + loadInfoArgs.loadTriggeredFromExternal(), loadInfoArgs.forceHSTSPriming(), loadInfoArgs.mixedContentWouldBlock() ); diff --git a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp index e46e51467..d1e4b5a59 100644 --- a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp +++ b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsJARURI) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN(nsJARURI) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_AMBIGUOUS(nsISupports, nsIJARURI) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURI) - NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURIWithQuery) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIJARURI) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISerializable) diff --git a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h index 31271e4ac..d2608a5c6 100644 --- a/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h +++ b/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.h @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ class nsJARURI final : public nsIJARURI, public: NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS NS_DECL_NSIURI - NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY NS_DECL_NSIURL NS_DECL_NSIJARURI NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE diff --git a/modules/libpref/init/all.js b/modules/libpref/init/all.js index 182de4a11..ccc59269b 100644 --- a/modules/libpref/init/all.js +++ b/modules/libpref/init/all.js @@ -5564,6 +5564,12 @@ pref("security.mixed_content.use_hsts", true); // Approximately 1 week default cache for HSTS priming failures pref ("security.mixed_content.hsts_priming_cache_timeout", 10080); +// TODO: Bug 1380959: Block toplevel data: URI navigations +// If true, all toplevel data: URI navigations will be blocked. +// Please note that manually entering a data: URI in the +// URL-Bar will not be blocked when flipping this pref. +pref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", false); + // Disable Storage api in release builds. #ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD pref("dom.storageManager.enabled", true); diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp index 42fdea4a1..ede825b8f 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp +++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h" #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" +#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ToJSValue.h" #include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h" #include "nsFrameLoader.h" @@ -47,12 +48,14 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, aTriggeringPrincipal : mLoadingPrincipal.get()) , mPrincipalToInherit(nullptr) , mLoadingContext(do_GetWeakReference(aLoadingContext)) + , mContextForTopLevelLoad(nullptr) , mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags) , mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType) , mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic) , mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false) , mVerifySignedContent(false) , mEnforceSRI(false) + , mForceAllowDataURI(false) , mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false) , mInnerWindowID(0) , mOuterWindowID(0) @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, , mIsThirdPartyContext(false) , mForcePreflight(false) , mIsPreflight(false) + , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(false) , mForceHSTSPriming(false) , mMixedContentWouldBlock(false) { @@ -215,16 +219,19 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, */ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow, nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal, + nsISupports* aContextForTopLevelLoad, nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags) : mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr) , mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal) , mPrincipalToInherit(nullptr) + , mContextForTopLevelLoad(do_GetWeakReference(aContextForTopLevelLoad)) , mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags) , mInternalContentPolicyType(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) , mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic) , mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false) , mVerifySignedContent(false) , mEnforceSRI(false) + , mForceAllowDataURI(false) , mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(false) , mInnerWindowID(0) , mOuterWindowID(0) @@ -235,6 +242,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow, , mIsThirdPartyContext(false) // NB: TYPE_DOCUMENT implies not third-party. , mForcePreflight(false) , mIsPreflight(false) + , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(false) , mForceHSTSPriming(false) , mMixedContentWouldBlock(false) { @@ -276,12 +284,14 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs) , mTriggeringPrincipal(rhs.mTriggeringPrincipal) , mPrincipalToInherit(rhs.mPrincipalToInherit) , mLoadingContext(rhs.mLoadingContext) + , mContextForTopLevelLoad(rhs.mContextForTopLevelLoad) , mSecurityFlags(rhs.mSecurityFlags) , mInternalContentPolicyType(rhs.mInternalContentPolicyType) , mTainting(rhs.mTainting) , mUpgradeInsecureRequests(rhs.mUpgradeInsecureRequests) , mVerifySignedContent(rhs.mVerifySignedContent) , mEnforceSRI(rhs.mEnforceSRI) + , mForceAllowDataURI(rhs.mForceAllowDataURI) , mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(rhs.mForceInheritPrincipalDropped) , mInnerWindowID(rhs.mInnerWindowID) , mOuterWindowID(rhs.mOuterWindowID) @@ -297,6 +307,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs) , mCorsUnsafeHeaders(rhs.mCorsUnsafeHeaders) , mForcePreflight(rhs.mForcePreflight) , mIsPreflight(rhs.mIsPreflight) + , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(rhs.mLoadTriggeredFromExternal) , mForceHSTSPriming(rhs.mForceHSTSPriming) , mMixedContentWouldBlock(rhs.mMixedContentWouldBlock) { @@ -311,6 +322,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests, bool aVerifySignedContent, bool aEnforceSRI, + bool aForceAllowDataURI, bool aForceInheritPrincipalDropped, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, uint64_t aOuterWindowID, @@ -325,6 +337,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, const nsTArray<nsCString>& aCorsUnsafeHeaders, bool aForcePreflight, bool aIsPreflight, + bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal, bool aForceHSTSPriming, bool aMixedContentWouldBlock) : mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingPrincipal) @@ -336,6 +349,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, , mUpgradeInsecureRequests(aUpgradeInsecureRequests) , mVerifySignedContent(aVerifySignedContent) , mEnforceSRI(aEnforceSRI) + , mForceAllowDataURI(aForceAllowDataURI) , mForceInheritPrincipalDropped(aForceInheritPrincipalDropped) , mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID) , mOuterWindowID(aOuterWindowID) @@ -348,6 +362,7 @@ LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, , mCorsUnsafeHeaders(aCorsUnsafeHeaders) , mForcePreflight(aForcePreflight) , mIsPreflight(aIsPreflight) + , mLoadTriggeredFromExternal(aLoadTriggeredFromExternal) , mForceHSTSPriming (aForceHSTSPriming) , mMixedContentWouldBlock(aMixedContentWouldBlock) { @@ -477,6 +492,17 @@ LoadInfo::LoadingNode() return node; } +nsISupports* +LoadInfo::ContextForTopLevelLoad() +{ + // Most likely you want to query LoadingNode() instead of + // ContextForTopLevelLoad() if this assertion fires. + MOZ_ASSERT(mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "should only query this context for top level document loads"); + nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> context = do_QueryReferent(mContextForTopLevelLoad); + return context; +} + NS_IMETHODIMP LoadInfo::GetSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags* aResult) { @@ -648,6 +674,23 @@ LoadInfo::GetEnforceSRI(bool* aResult) } NS_IMETHODIMP +LoadInfo::SetForceAllowDataURI(bool aForceAllowDataURI) +{ + MOZ_ASSERT(!mForceAllowDataURI || + mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "can only allow data URI navigation for TYPE_DOCUMENT"); + mForceAllowDataURI = aForceAllowDataURI; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +LoadInfo::GetForceAllowDataURI(bool* aForceAllowDataURI) +{ + *aForceAllowDataURI = mForceAllowDataURI; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP LoadInfo::GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped(bool* aResult) { *aResult = mForceInheritPrincipalDropped; @@ -873,6 +916,23 @@ LoadInfo::GetIsPreflight(bool* aIsPreflight) } NS_IMETHODIMP +LoadInfo::SetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal) +{ + MOZ_ASSERT(!aLoadTriggeredFromExternal || + mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT, + "can only set load triggered from external for TYPE_DOCUMENT"); + mLoadTriggeredFromExternal = aLoadTriggeredFromExternal; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +LoadInfo::GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal(bool* aLoadTriggeredFromExternal) +{ + *aLoadTriggeredFromExternal = mLoadTriggeredFromExternal; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP LoadInfo::GetForceHSTSPriming(bool* aForceHSTSPriming) { *aForceHSTSPriming = mForceHSTSPriming; diff --git a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h index 3e1b92ff4..0ae6061b3 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h +++ b/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.h @@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ public: nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags, nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType); - // Constructor used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads which have no reasonable - // loadingNode or loadingPrincipal + // Constructor used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads which have a different + // loadingContext than other loads. This ContextForTopLevelLoad is + // only used for content policy checks. LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow, nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal, + nsISupports* aContextForTopLevelLoad, nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags); // create an exact copy of the loadinfo @@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ private: bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests, bool aVerifySignedContent, bool aEnforceSRI, + bool aForceAllowDataURI, bool aForceInheritPrincipalDropped, uint64_t aInnerWindowID, uint64_t aOuterWindowID, @@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ private: const nsTArray<nsCString>& aUnsafeHeaders, bool aForcePreflight, bool aIsPreflight, + bool aLoadTriggeredFromExternal, bool aForceHSTSPriming, bool aMixedContentWouldBlock); LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs); @@ -132,12 +136,14 @@ private: nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mTriggeringPrincipal; nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mPrincipalToInherit; nsWeakPtr mLoadingContext; + nsWeakPtr mContextForTopLevelLoad; nsSecurityFlags mSecurityFlags; nsContentPolicyType mInternalContentPolicyType; LoadTainting mTainting; bool mUpgradeInsecureRequests; bool mVerifySignedContent; bool mEnforceSRI; + bool mForceAllowDataURI; bool mForceInheritPrincipalDropped; uint64_t mInnerWindowID; uint64_t mOuterWindowID; @@ -152,6 +158,7 @@ private: nsTArray<nsCString> mCorsUnsafeHeaders; bool mForcePreflight; bool mIsPreflight; + bool mLoadTriggeredFromExternal; bool mForceHSTSPriming : 1; bool mMixedContentWouldBlock : 1; diff --git a/netwerk/base/moz.build b/netwerk/base/moz.build index 3b731db10..5de1eea81 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/moz.build +++ b/netwerk/base/moz.build @@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ XPIDL_SOURCES += [ 'nsIURIClassifier.idl', 'nsIURIWithBlobImpl.idl', 'nsIURIWithPrincipal.idl', - 'nsIURIWithQuery.idl', 'nsIURL.idl', 'nsIURLParser.idl', 'nsPILoadGroupInternal.idl', diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl index 78433c8b8..4ec29b972 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl +++ b/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl @@ -324,6 +324,16 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports nsINode binaryLoadingNode(); /** + * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext for toplevel loads. + * Most likely you want to query the ownerDocument or LoadingNode + * and not this context only available for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads. + * Please note that except for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, this + * ContextForTopLevelLoad will always return null. + */ + [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(ContextForTopLevelLoad)] + nsISupports binaryContextForTopLevelLoad(); + + /** * The securityFlags of that channel. */ readonly attribute nsSecurityFlags securityFlags; @@ -470,6 +480,11 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports [infallible] attribute boolean enforceSRI; /** + * If true, toplevel data: URI navigation is allowed + */ + [infallible] attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI; + + /** * The SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL flag may be dropped when a load info * object is created. Specifically, it will be dropped if the SEC_SANDBOXED * flag is also present. This flag is set if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was @@ -575,6 +590,13 @@ interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports [infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone; /** + * Returns true if the load was triggered from an external application + * (e.g. Thunderbird). Please note that this flag will only ever be true + * if the load is of TYPE_DOCUMENT. + */ + [infallible] attribute boolean loadTriggeredFromExternal; + + /** * Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the principal of the * channel [before the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo, * so that at every point this array lets us reason about all the diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp index 0da79c18a..8b7f31f99 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp +++ b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp @@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ uint32_t nsIOService::gDefaultSegmentCount = 24; bool nsIOService::sTelemetryEnabled = false; +bool nsIOService::sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations = false; + //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// nsIOService::nsIOService() @@ -251,6 +253,8 @@ nsIOService::Init() NS_WARNING("failed to get observer service"); Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sTelemetryEnabled, "toolkit.telemetry.enabled", false); + Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations, + "security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", false); Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&mOfflineMirrorsConnectivity, OFFLINE_MIRRORS_CONNECTIVITY, true); gIOService = this; @@ -1876,5 +1880,11 @@ nsIOService::SpeculativeAnonymousConnect2(nsIURI *aURI, return SpeculativeConnectInternal(aURI, aPrincipal, aCallbacks, true); } +/*static*/ bool +nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations() +{ + return sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations; +} + } // namespace net } // namespace mozilla diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h index 7ac23b791..e592c4d1c 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h +++ b/netwerk/base/nsIOService.h @@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ public: bool IsLinkUp(); + static bool BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations(); + // Used to trigger a recheck of the captive portal status nsresult RecheckCaptivePortal(); private: @@ -176,6 +178,8 @@ private: static bool sTelemetryEnabled; + static bool sBlockToplevelDataUriNavigations; + // These timestamps are needed for collecting telemetry on PR_Connect, // PR_ConnectContinue and PR_Close blocking time. If we spend very long // time in any of these functions we want to know if and what network diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl index 2384c5fd9..ef163813a 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl +++ b/netwerk/base/nsIURI.idl @@ -10,18 +10,18 @@ * provides accessors to set and query the most basic components of an URI. * Subclasses, including nsIURL, impose greater structure on the URI. * - * This interface follows Tim Berners-Lee's URI spec (RFC2396) [1], where the + * This interface follows Tim Berners-Lee's URI spec (RFC3986) [1], where the * basic URI components are defined as such: * <pre> - * ftp://username:password@hostname:portnumber/pathname#ref - * \ / \ / \ / \ /\ \ / - * - --------------- ------ -------- | - - * | | | | | | - * | | | | | Ref - * | | | Port \ / - * | | Host / -------- - * | UserPass / | - * Scheme / Path + * ftp://username:password@hostname:portnumber/pathname?query#ref + * \ / \ / \ / \ /\ / \ / \ / + * - --------------- ------ -------- ------- --- - + * | | | | | | | + * | | | | FilePath Query Ref + * | | | Port \ / + * | | Host / ------------ + * | UserPass / | + * Scheme / Path * \ / * -------------------------------- * | @@ -30,13 +30,9 @@ * The definition of the URI components has been extended to allow for * internationalized domain names [2] and the more generic IRI structure [3]. * - * Note also that the RFC defines #-separated fragment identifiers as being - * "not part of the URI". Despite this, we bundle them as part of the URI, for - * convenience. - * - * [1] http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt - * [2] http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idn-idna-06.txt - * [3] http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-masinter-url-i18n-08.txt + * [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986 + * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890 + * [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3987 */ %{C++ @@ -116,7 +112,7 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports /** * The Scheme is the protocol to which this URI refers. The scheme is - * restricted to the US-ASCII charset per RFC2396. Setting this is + * restricted to the US-ASCII charset per RFC3986. Setting this is * highly discouraged outside of a protocol handler implementation, since * that will generally lead to incorrect results. */ @@ -174,6 +170,9 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports * empty, depending on the protocol). * * Some characters may be escaped. + * + * This attribute contains query and ref parts for historical reasons. + * Use the 'filePath' attribute if you do not want those parts included. */ attribute AUTF8String path; @@ -281,10 +280,31 @@ interface nsIURI : nsISupports /** * returns a string for the current URI with the ref element cleared. */ - readonly attribute AUTF8String specIgnoringRef; + readonly attribute AUTF8String specIgnoringRef; /** * Returns if there is a reference portion (the part after the "#") of the URI. */ - readonly attribute boolean hasRef; + readonly attribute boolean hasRef; + + /************************************************************************ + * Additional attributes added for .query support: + */ + + /** + * Returns a path including the directory and file portions of a + * URL. For example, the filePath of "http://host/foo/bar.html#baz" + * is "/foo/bar.html". + * + * Some characters may be escaped. + */ + attribute AUTF8String filePath; + + /** + * Returns the query portion (the part after the "?") of the URL. + * If there isn't one, an empty string is returned. + * + * Some characters may be escaped. + */ + attribute AUTF8String query; }; diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl deleted file mode 100644 index 749b2773d..000000000 --- a/netwerk/base/nsIURIWithQuery.idl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this - * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ - -#include "nsIURI.idl" - -/** - * nsIURIWithQuery is implemented by URIs which have a query parameter. - * This is useful for the URL API. - */ -[scriptable, uuid(367510ee-8556-435a-8f99-b5fd357e08cc)] -interface nsIURIWithQuery : nsIURI -{ - /** - * Returns a path including the directory and file portions of a - * URL. For example, the filePath of "http://host/foo/bar.html#baz" - * is "/foo/bar.html". - * - * Some characters may be escaped. - */ - attribute AUTF8String filePath; - - /** - * Returns the query portion (the part after the "?") of the URL. - * If there isn't one, an empty string is returned. - * - * Some characters may be escaped. - */ - attribute AUTF8String query; -}; diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl index aeaa3f694..9ff6c3dcd 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl +++ b/netwerk/base/nsIURL.idl @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ -#include "nsIURIWithQuery.idl" +#include "nsIURI.idl" /** * The nsIURL interface provides convenience methods that further @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ * filePath */ [scriptable, uuid(86adcd89-0b70-47a2-b0fe-5bb2c5f37e31)] -interface nsIURL : nsIURIWithQuery +interface nsIURL : nsIURI { /************************************************************************* * The URL path is broken down into the following principal components: @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ interface nsIURL : nsIURIWithQuery * attribute AUTF8String filePath; * attribute AUTF8String query; * - * These are inherited from nsIURIWithQuery. + * These are inherited from nsIURI. */ /************************************************************************* diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp index ae5c51a1e..dbc0dc817 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp +++ b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.cpp @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ nsSimpleURI::~nsSimpleURI() NS_IMPL_ADDREF(nsSimpleURI) NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsSimpleURI) NS_INTERFACE_TABLE_HEAD(nsSimpleURI) -NS_INTERFACE_TABLE(nsSimpleURI, nsIURI, nsIURIWithQuery, nsISerializable, +NS_INTERFACE_TABLE(nsSimpleURI, nsIURI, nsISerializable, nsIClassInfo, nsIMutable, nsIIPCSerializableURI) NS_INTERFACE_TABLE_TO_MAP_SEGUE if (aIID.Equals(kThisSimpleURIImplementationCID)) @@ -784,10 +784,6 @@ nsSimpleURI::SizeOfIncludingThis(MallocSizeOf aMallocSizeOf) const { return aMallocSizeOf(this) + SizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); } -//---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// nsSimpleURI::nsIURIWithQuery -//---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - NS_IMETHODIMP nsSimpleURI::GetFilePath(nsACString& aFilePath) { diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h index 29bc9b313..842136ed6 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h +++ b/netwerk/base/nsSimpleURI.h @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ #include "mozilla/MemoryReporting.h" #include "nsIURI.h" -#include "nsIURIWithQuery.h" #include "nsISerializable.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "nsIClassInfo.h" @@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ namespace net { } class nsSimpleURI - : public nsIURIWithQuery + : public nsIURI , public nsISerializable , public nsIClassInfo , public nsIMutable @@ -41,7 +40,6 @@ protected: public: NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS NS_DECL_NSIURI - NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE NS_DECL_NSICLASSINFO NS_DECL_NSIMUTABLE diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp index 0cdd2a7b5..e2a290e4d 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp +++ b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.cpp @@ -1182,7 +1182,6 @@ NS_IMPL_RELEASE(nsStandardURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN(nsStandardURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_AMBIGUOUS(nsISupports, nsIStandardURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURI) - NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURIWithQuery) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY_CONDITIONAL(nsIFileURL, mSupportsFileURL) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsIStandardURL) diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h index 90f7f7db2..0ca345572 100644 --- a/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h +++ b/netwerk/base/nsStandardURL.h @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ protected: public: NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS NS_DECL_NSIURI - NS_DECL_NSIURIWITHQUERY NS_DECL_NSIURL NS_DECL_NSIFILEURL NS_DECL_NSISTANDARDURL diff --git a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh index 9365397d1..4f4dcf6a9 100644 --- a/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh +++ b/netwerk/ipc/NeckoChannelParams.ipdlh @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct LoadInfoArgs bool upgradeInsecureRequests; bool verifySignedContent; bool enforceSRI; + bool forceAllowDataURI; bool forceInheritPrincipalDropped; uint64_t innerWindowID; uint64_t outerWindowID; @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ struct LoadInfoArgs nsCString[] corsUnsafeHeaders; bool forcePreflight; bool isPreflight; + bool loadTriggeredFromExternal; bool forceHSTSPriming; bool mixedContentWouldBlock; }; diff --git a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js index 219675e5b..f044a1cd4 100644 --- a/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js +++ b/toolkit/modules/addons/WebRequestContent.js @@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ var ContentPolicy = { shouldLoad(policyType, contentLocation, requestOrigin, node, mimeTypeGuess, extra, requestPrincipal) { + + // Loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT perform a ConPol check + // within docshell as well as within the ContentSecurityManager. To avoid + // duplicate evaluations we ignore ConPol checks performed within docShell. + if (extra instanceof Ci.nsISupportsString) { + if (extra.data === "conPolCheckFromDocShell") { + return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; + } + } + if (requestPrincipal && Services.scriptSecurityManager.isSystemPrincipal(requestPrincipal)) { return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; |