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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
download | UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.lz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.xz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.zip |
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp | 484 |
1 files changed, 484 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp b/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..23378f56a --- /dev/null +++ b/services/crypto/component/nsSyncJPAKE.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsSyncJPAKE.h" + +#include "base64.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "mozilla/ModuleUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/Move.h" +#include "nsDebug.h" +#include "nsError.h" +#include "nsString.h" +#include "nscore.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "secmodt.h" +#include "secport.h" + +using mozilla::fallible; + +static bool +hex_from_2char(const unsigned char *c2, unsigned char *byteval) +{ + int i; + unsigned char offset; + *byteval = 0; + for (i=0; i<2; i++) { + if (c2[i] >= '0' && c2[i] <= '9') { + offset = c2[i] - '0'; + *byteval |= offset << 4*(1-i); + } else if (c2[i] >= 'a' && c2[i] <= 'f') { + offset = c2[i] - 'a'; + *byteval |= (offset + 10) << 4*(1-i); + } else if (c2[i] >= 'A' && c2[i] <= 'F') { + offset = c2[i] - 'A'; + *byteval |= (offset + 10) << 4*(1-i); + } else { + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +static bool +fromHex(const char * str, unsigned char * p, size_t sLen) +{ + size_t i; + if (sLen & 1) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i < sLen / 2; ++i) { + if (!hex_from_2char((const unsigned char *) str + (2*i), + (unsigned char *) p + i)) { + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +static nsresult +fromHexString(const nsACString & str, unsigned char * p, size_t pMaxLen) +{ + char * strData = (char *) str.Data(); + unsigned len = str.Length(); + NS_ENSURE_ARG(len / 2 <= pMaxLen); + if (!fromHex(strData, p, len)) { + return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; + } + return NS_OK; +} + +static bool +toHexString(const unsigned char * str, unsigned len, nsACString & out) +{ + static const char digits[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + if (!out.SetCapacity(2 * len, fallible)) + return false; + out.SetLength(0); + for (unsigned i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + out.Append(digits[str[i] >> 4]); + out.Append(digits[str[i] & 0x0f]); + } + return true; +} + +static nsresult +mapErrno() +{ + int err = PORT_GetError(); + switch (err) { + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + default: return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; + } +} + +#define NUM_ELEM(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof (x)[0]) + +static const char p[] = + "90066455B5CFC38F9CAA4A48B4281F292C260FEEF01FD61037E56258A7795A1C" + "7AD46076982CE6BB956936C6AB4DCFE05E6784586940CA544B9B2140E1EB523F" + "009D20A7E7880E4E5BFA690F1B9004A27811CD9904AF70420EEFD6EA11EF7DA1" + "29F58835FF56B89FAA637BC9AC2EFAAB903402229F491D8D3485261CD068699B" + "6BA58A1DDBBEF6DB51E8FE34E8A78E542D7BA351C21EA8D8F1D29F5D5D159394" + "87E27F4416B0CA632C59EFD1B1EB66511A5A0FBF615B766C5862D0BD8A3FE7A0" + "E0DA0FB2FE1FCB19E8F9996A8EA0FCCDE538175238FC8B0EE6F29AF7F642773E" + "BE8CD5402415A01451A840476B2FCEB0E388D30D4B376C37FE401C2A2C2F941D" + "AD179C540C1C8CE030D460C4D983BE9AB0B20F69144C1AE13F9383EA1C08504F" + "B0BF321503EFE43488310DD8DC77EC5B8349B8BFE97C2C560EA878DE87C11E3D" + "597F1FEA742D73EEC7F37BE43949EF1A0D15C3F3E3FC0A8335617055AC91328E" + "C22B50FC15B941D3D1624CD88BC25F3E941FDDC6200689581BFEC416B4B2CB73"; +static const char q[] = + "CFA0478A54717B08CE64805B76E5B14249A77A4838469DF7F7DC987EFCCFB11D"; +static const char g[] = + "5E5CBA992E0A680D885EB903AEA78E4A45A469103D448EDE3B7ACCC54D521E37" + "F84A4BDD5B06B0970CC2D2BBB715F7B82846F9A0C393914C792E6A923E2117AB" + "805276A975AADB5261D91673EA9AAFFEECBFA6183DFCB5D3B7332AA19275AFA1" + "F8EC0B60FB6F66CC23AE4870791D5982AAD1AA9485FD8F4A60126FEB2CF05DB8" + "A7F0F09B3397F3937F2E90B9E5B9C9B6EFEF642BC48351C46FB171B9BFA9EF17" + "A961CE96C7E7A7CC3D3D03DFAD1078BA21DA425198F07D2481622BCE45969D9C" + "4D6063D72AB7A0F08B2F49A7CC6AF335E08C4720E31476B67299E231F8BD90B3" + "9AC3AE3BE0C6B6CACEF8289A2E2873D58E51E029CAFBD55E6841489AB66B5B4B" + "9BA6E2F784660896AFF387D92844CCB8B69475496DE19DA2E58259B090489AC8" + "E62363CDF82CFD8EF2A427ABCD65750B506F56DDE3B988567A88126B914D7828" + "E2B63A6D7ED0747EC59E0E0A23CE7D8A74C1D2C2A7AFB6A29799620F00E11C33" + "787F7DED3B30E1A22D09F1FBDA1ABBBFBF25CAE05A13F812E34563F99410E73B"; + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Round1(const nsACString & aSignerID, + nsACString & aGX1, + nsACString & aGV1, + nsACString & aR1, + nsACString & aGX2, + nsACString & aGV2, + nsACString & aR2) +{ + nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker; + if (isAlreadyShutDown()) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKENotStarted); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(key == nullptr); + + static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanisms[] = { + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256, + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256, + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256 + }; + + UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanisms, + NUM_ELEM(mechanisms), + nullptr)); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(slot != nullptr); + + CK_BYTE pBuf[(NUM_ELEM(p) - 1) / 2]; + CK_BYTE qBuf[(NUM_ELEM(q) - 1) / 2]; + CK_BYTE gBuf[(NUM_ELEM(g) - 1) / 2]; + + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1; + NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(p, pBuf, (NUM_ELEM(p) - 1))); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(q, qBuf, (NUM_ELEM(q) - 1))); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(fromHex(g, gBuf, (NUM_ELEM(g) - 1))); + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = { + { CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID, (CK_BYTE *) aSignerID.Data(), + aSignerID.Length() }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType }, + { CKA_PRIME, pBuf, sizeof pBuf }, + { CKA_SUBPRIME, qBuf, sizeof qBuf }, + { CKA_BASE, gBuf, sizeof gBuf } + }; + + CK_BYTE gx1Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_BYTE gv1Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_BYTE r1Buf [NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_BYTE gx2Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_BYTE gv2Buf[NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_BYTE r2Buf [NUM_ELEM(p) / 2]; + CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params rp = { + { gx1Buf, sizeof gx1Buf, gv1Buf, sizeof gv1Buf, r1Buf, sizeof r1Buf }, + { gx2Buf, sizeof gx2Buf, gv2Buf, sizeof gv2Buf, r2Buf, sizeof r2Buf } + }; + SECItem paramsItem; + paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp; + paramsItem.len = sizeof rp; + key = UniquePK11SymKey( + PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(slot.get(), CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256, + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256, ¶msItem, + keyTemplate, NUM_ELEM(keyTemplate), nullptr)); + nsresult rv = key != nullptr + ? NS_OK + : mapErrno(); + if (rv == NS_OK) { + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(toHexString(rp.gx1.pGX, rp.gx1.ulGXLen, aGX1) && + toHexString(rp.gx1.pGV, rp.gx1.ulGVLen, aGV1) && + toHexString(rp.gx1.pR, rp.gx1.ulRLen, aR1) && + toHexString(rp.gx2.pGX, rp.gx2.ulGXLen, aGX2) && + toHexString(rp.gx2.pGV, rp.gx2.ulGVLen, aGV2) && + toHexString(rp.gx2.pR, rp.gx2.ulRLen, aR2), + NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); + round = JPAKEBeforeRound2; + } + return rv; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Round2(const nsACString & aPeerID, + const nsACString & aPIN, + const nsACString & aGX3, + const nsACString & aGV3, + const nsACString & aR3, + const nsACString & aGX4, + const nsACString & aGV4, + const nsACString & aR4, + nsACString & aA, + nsACString & aGVA, + nsACString & aRA) +{ + nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker; + if (isAlreadyShutDown()) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKEBeforeRound2); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(key != nullptr); + NS_ENSURE_ARG(!aPeerID.IsEmpty()); + + /* PIN cannot be equal to zero when converted to a bignum. NSS 3.12.9 J-PAKE + assumes that the caller has already done this check. Future versions of + NSS J-PAKE will do this check internally. See Bug 609068 Comment 4 */ + bool foundNonZero = false; + for (size_t i = 0; i < aPIN.Length(); ++i) { + if (aPIN[i] != 0) { + foundNonZero = true; + break; + } + } + NS_ENSURE_ARG(foundNonZero); + + CK_BYTE gx3Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gv3Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], r3Buf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2]; + CK_BYTE gx4Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gv4Buf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], r4Buf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2]; + CK_BYTE gxABuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gvABuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], rABuf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2]; + nsresult rv = fromHexString(aGX3, gx3Buf, sizeof gx3Buf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGV3, gv3Buf, sizeof gv3Buf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aR3, r3Buf, sizeof r3Buf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGX4, gx4Buf, sizeof gx4Buf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGV4, gv4Buf, sizeof gv4Buf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aR4, r4Buf, sizeof r4Buf); + if (rv != NS_OK) + return rv; + + CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params rp; + rp.pSharedKey = (CK_BYTE *) aPIN.Data(); + rp.ulSharedKeyLen = aPIN.Length(); + rp.gx3.pGX = gx3Buf; rp.gx3.ulGXLen = aGX3.Length() / 2; + rp.gx3.pGV = gv3Buf; rp.gx3.ulGVLen = aGV3.Length() / 2; + rp.gx3.pR = r3Buf; rp.gx3.ulRLen = aR3 .Length() / 2; + rp.gx4.pGX = gx4Buf; rp.gx4.ulGXLen = aGX4.Length() / 2; + rp.gx4.pGV = gv4Buf; rp.gx4.ulGVLen = aGV4.Length() / 2; + rp.gx4.pR = r4Buf; rp.gx4.ulRLen = aR4 .Length() / 2; + rp.A.pGX = gxABuf; rp.A .ulGXLen = sizeof gxABuf; + rp.A.pGV = gvABuf; rp.A .ulGVLen = sizeof gxABuf; + rp.A.pR = rABuf; rp.A .ulRLen = sizeof gxABuf; + + // Bug 629090: NSS 3.12.9 J-PAKE fails to check that gx^4 != 1, so check here. + bool gx4Good = false; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < rp.gx4.ulGXLen; ++i) { + if (rp.gx4.pGX[i] > 1 || (rp.gx4.pGX[i] != 0 && i < rp.gx4.ulGXLen - 1)) { + gx4Good = true; + break; + } + } + NS_ENSURE_ARG(gx4Good); + + SECItem paramsItem; + paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp; + paramsItem.len = sizeof rp; + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = { + { CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID, (CK_BYTE *) aPeerID.Data(), aPeerID.Length(), }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType } + }; + UniquePK11SymKey newKey(PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(key.get(), + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256, + ¶msItem, + CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, + keyTemplate, + NUM_ELEM(keyTemplate), + false)); + if (newKey != nullptr) { + if (toHexString(rp.A.pGX, rp.A.ulGXLen, aA) && + toHexString(rp.A.pGV, rp.A.ulGVLen, aGVA) && + toHexString(rp.A.pR, rp.A.ulRLen, aRA)) { + round = JPAKEAfterRound2; + key = Move(newKey); + return NS_OK; + } else { + rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + } else { + rv = mapErrno(); + } + + return rv; +} + +static nsresult +setBase64(const unsigned char * data, unsigned len, nsACString & out) +{ + nsresult rv = NS_OK; + const char * base64 = BTOA_DataToAscii(data, len); + + if (base64 != nullptr) { + size_t len = PORT_Strlen(base64); + if (out.SetCapacity(len, fallible)) { + out.SetLength(0); + out.Append(base64, len); + } else { + rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + PORT_Free((void*) base64); + } else { + rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + return rv; +} + +static nsresult +base64KeyValue(PK11SymKey * key, nsACString & keyString) +{ + nsresult rv = NS_OK; + if (PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key) == SECSuccess) { + const SECItem * value = PK11_GetKeyData(key); + rv = value != nullptr && value->data != nullptr && value->len > 0 + ? setBase64(value->data, value->len, keyString) + : NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; + } else { + rv = mapErrno(); + } + return rv; +} + +static nsresult +extractBase64KeyValue(UniquePK11SymKey & keyBlock, CK_ULONG bitPosition, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE destMech, int keySize, + nsACString & keyString) +{ + SECItem paramsItem; + paramsItem.data = (CK_BYTE *) &bitPosition; + paramsItem.len = sizeof bitPosition; + PK11SymKey * key = PK11_Derive(keyBlock.get(), CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, + ¶msItem, destMech, + CKA_SIGN, keySize); + if (key == nullptr) + return mapErrno(); + nsresult rv = base64KeyValue(key, keyString); + PK11_FreeSymKey(key); + return rv; +} + + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsSyncJPAKE::Final(const nsACString & aB, + const nsACString & aGVB, + const nsACString & aRB, + const nsACString & aHKDFInfo, + nsACString & aAES256Key, + nsACString & aHMAC256Key) +{ + nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker; + if (isAlreadyShutDown()) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + static const unsigned AES256_KEY_SIZE = 256 / 8; + static const unsigned HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE = 256 / 8; + CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS aesBitPosition = 0; + CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS hmacBitPosition = aesBitPosition + (AES256_KEY_SIZE * 8); + + NS_ENSURE_STATE(round == JPAKEAfterRound2); + NS_ENSURE_STATE(key != nullptr); + + CK_BYTE gxBBuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], gvBBuf[NUM_ELEM(p)/2], rBBuf [NUM_ELEM(p)/2]; + nsresult rv = fromHexString(aB, gxBBuf, sizeof gxBBuf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aGVB, gvBBuf, sizeof gvBBuf); + if (rv == NS_OK) rv = fromHexString(aRB, rBBuf, sizeof rBBuf); + if (rv != NS_OK) + return rv; + + CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams rp; + rp.B.pGX = gxBBuf; rp.B.ulGXLen = aB .Length() / 2; + rp.B.pGV = gvBBuf; rp.B.ulGVLen = aGVB.Length() / 2; + rp.B.pR = rBBuf; rp.B.ulRLen = aRB .Length() / 2; + SECItem paramsItem; + paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &rp; + paramsItem.len = sizeof rp; + UniquePK11SymKey keyMaterial(PK11_Derive(key.get(), CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256, + ¶msItem, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, + CKA_DERIVE, 0)); + UniquePK11SymKey keyBlock; + + if (keyMaterial == nullptr) + rv = mapErrno(); + + if (rv == NS_OK) { + CK_NSS_HKDFParams hkdfParams; + hkdfParams.bExtract = CK_TRUE; + hkdfParams.pSalt = nullptr; + hkdfParams.ulSaltLen = 0; + hkdfParams.bExpand = CK_TRUE; + hkdfParams.pInfo = (CK_BYTE *) aHKDFInfo.Data(); + hkdfParams.ulInfoLen = aHKDFInfo.Length(); + paramsItem.data = (unsigned char *) &hkdfParams; + paramsItem.len = sizeof hkdfParams; + keyBlock = UniquePK11SymKey( + PK11_Derive(keyMaterial.get(), CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, ¶msItem, + CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY, CKA_DERIVE, + AES256_KEY_SIZE + HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE)); + if (keyBlock == nullptr) + rv = mapErrno(); + } + + if (rv == NS_OK) { + rv = extractBase64KeyValue(keyBlock, aesBitPosition, CKM_AES_CBC, + AES256_KEY_SIZE, aAES256Key); + } + if (rv == NS_OK) { + rv = extractBase64KeyValue(keyBlock, hmacBitPosition, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, + HMAC_SHA256_KEY_SIZE, aHMAC256Key); + } + + if (rv == NS_OK) { + SECStatus srv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(keyMaterial.get()); + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(srv == SECSuccess, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); + SECItem * keyMaterialBytes = PK11_GetKeyData(keyMaterial.get()); + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(keyMaterialBytes != nullptr, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); + } + + return rv; +} + +NS_GENERIC_FACTORY_CONSTRUCTOR(nsSyncJPAKE) +NS_DEFINE_NAMED_CID(NS_SYNCJPAKE_CID); + +nsSyncJPAKE::nsSyncJPAKE() : round(JPAKENotStarted), key(nullptr) { } + +nsSyncJPAKE::~nsSyncJPAKE() +{ + nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker; + if (isAlreadyShutDown()) { + return; + } + destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference(); + shutdown(ShutdownCalledFrom::Object); +} + +void +nsSyncJPAKE::virtualDestroyNSSReference() +{ + destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference(); +} + +void +nsSyncJPAKE::destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference() +{ + key = nullptr; +} + +static const mozilla::Module::CIDEntry kServicesCryptoCIDs[] = { + { &kNS_SYNCJPAKE_CID, false, nullptr, nsSyncJPAKEConstructor }, + { nullptr } +}; + +static const mozilla::Module::ContractIDEntry kServicesCryptoContracts[] = { + { NS_SYNCJPAKE_CONTRACTID, &kNS_SYNCJPAKE_CID }, + { nullptr } +}; + +static const mozilla::Module kServicesCryptoModule = { + mozilla::Module::kVersion, + kServicesCryptoCIDs, + kServicesCryptoContracts +}; + +NSMODULE_DEFN(nsServicesCryptoModule) = &kServicesCryptoModule; |