Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 501 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ebb812222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11N_H_
+#define _PKCS11N_H_
+
+/*
+ * pkcs11n.h
+ *
+ * This file contains the NSS-specific type definitions for Cryptoki
+ * (PKCS#11).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS
+ *
+ * Cryptoki reserves the high half of all the number spaces for
+ * vendor-defined use.  I'd like to keep all of our NSS-
+ * specific values together, but not in the oh-so-obvious
+ * 0x80000001, 0x80000002, etc. area.  So I've picked an offset,
+ * and constructed values for the beginnings of our spaces.
+ *
+ * Note that some "historical" Netscape values don't fall within
+ * this range.
+ */
+#define NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS 0x4E534350 /* NSCP */
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined object classes
+ *
+ */
+#define CKO_NSS (CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+#define CKO_NSS_CRL (CKO_NSS + 1)
+#define CKO_NSS_SMIME (CKO_NSS + 2)
+#define CKO_NSS_TRUST (CKO_NSS + 3)
+#define CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST (CKO_NSS + 4)
+#define CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT (CKO_NSS + 5)
+#define CKO_NSS_DELSLOT (CKO_NSS + 6)
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined key types
+ *
+ */
+#define CKK_NSS (CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+#define CKK_NSS_PKCS8 (CKK_NSS + 1)
+
+#define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1 (CKK_NSS + 2)
+#define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2 (CKK_NSS + 3)
+
+#define CKK_NSS_CHACHA20 (CKK_NSS + 4)
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined certificate types
+ *
+ */
+#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
+#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
+#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined object attributes
+ *
+ */
+#define CKA_NSS (CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+#define CKA_NSS_URL (CKA_NSS + 1)
+#define CKA_NSS_EMAIL (CKA_NSS + 2)
+#define CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO (CKA_NSS + 3)
+#define CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP (CKA_NSS + 4)
+#define CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT (CKA_NSS + 5)
+#define CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK (CKA_NSS + 6)
+#define CKA_NSS_EXPIRES (CKA_NSS + 7)
+#define CKA_NSS_KRL (CKA_NSS + 8)
+
+#define CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER (CKA_NSS + 20)
+#define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED (CKA_NSS + 21)
+#define CKA_NSS_PQG_H (CKA_NSS + 22)
+#define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS (CKA_NSS + 23)
+#define CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC (CKA_NSS + 24)
+#define CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS (CKA_NSS + 25)
+
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID (CKA_NSS + 26)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID (CKA_NSS + 27)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX1 (CKA_NSS + 28)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX2 (CKA_NSS + 29)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX3 (CKA_NSS + 30)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX4 (CKA_NSS + 31)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2 (CKA_NSS + 32)
+#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2S (CKA_NSS + 33)
+
+/*
+ * Trust attributes:
+ *
+ * If trust goes standard, these probably will too.  So I'll
+ * put them all in one place.
+ */
+
+#define CKA_TRUST (CKA_NSS + 0x2000)
+
+/* "Usage" key information */
+#define CKA_TRUST_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (CKA_TRUST + 1)
+#define CKA_TRUST_NON_REPUDIATION (CKA_TRUST + 2)
+#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 3)
+#define CKA_TRUST_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 4)
+#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_AGREEMENT (CKA_TRUST + 5)
+#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_CERT_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 6)
+#define CKA_TRUST_CRL_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 7)
+
+/* "Purpose" trust information */
+#define CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 8)
+#define CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 9)
+#define CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING (CKA_TRUST + 10)
+#define CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION (CKA_TRUST + 11)
+#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_END_SYSTEM (CKA_TRUST + 12)
+#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_TUNNEL (CKA_TRUST + 13)
+#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_USER (CKA_TRUST + 14)
+#define CKA_TRUST_TIME_STAMPING (CKA_TRUST + 15)
+#define CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED (CKA_TRUST + 16)
+
+#define CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 100)
+#define CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 101)
+
+/* NSS trust stuff */
+
+/* HISTORICAL: define used to pass in the database key for DSA private keys */
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_DB 0xD5A0DB00L
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_TRUST 0x80000001L
+
+/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
+#define CKM_FAKE_RANDOM 0x80000efeUL
+#define CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM 0xffffffffUL
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined crypto mechanisms
+ *
+ */
+#define CKM_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+#define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP (CKM_NSS + 1)
+#define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (CKM_NSS + 2)
+
+/* HKDF key derivation mechanisms. See CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
+#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 3)
+#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 4)
+#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 5)
+#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 6)
+
+/* J-PAKE round 1 key generation mechanisms.
+ *
+ * Required template attributes: CKA_PRIME, CKA_SUBPRIME, CKA_BASE,
+ *                               CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID
+ * Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1
+ * Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
+ * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params
+ *
+ */
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 7)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 8)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 9)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 10)
+
+/* J-PAKE round 2 key derivation mechanisms.
+ *
+ * Required template attributes: CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID
+ * Input key type:  CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1
+ * Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2
+ * Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
+ * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params
+ */
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 11)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 12)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 13)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 14)
+
+/* J-PAKE final key material derivation mechanisms
+ *
+ * Input key type:  CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2
+ * Output key type: CKK_GENERIC_SECRET
+ * Output key class: CKO_SECRET_KEY
+ * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams
+ *
+ * You must apply a KDF (e.g. CKM_NSS_HKDF_*) to resultant keying material
+ * to get a key with uniformly distributed bits.
+ */
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 15)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 16)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 17)
+#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 18)
+
+/* Constant-time MAC mechanisms:
+ *
+ * These operations verify a padded, MAC-then-encrypt block of data in
+ * constant-time. Because of the order of operations, the padding bytes are not
+ * protected by the MAC. However, disclosing the value of the padding bytes
+ * gives an attacker the ability to decrypt ciphertexts. Such disclosure can be
+ * as subtle as taking slightly less time to perform the MAC when the padding
+ * is one byte longer. See https://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+ *
+ * CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an HMAC authentication.
+ * CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an authentication with SSLv3 MAC.
+ *
+ * Parameter type: CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS
+ */
+#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19)
+#define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20)
+
+/* TLS 1.2 mechanisms */
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 21)
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 22)
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 23)
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 24)
+
+/* TLS extended master secret derivation */
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 25)
+#define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (CKM_NSS + 26)
+
+#define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 27)
+#define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (CKM_NSS + 28)
+
+/*
+ * HISTORICAL:
+ * Do not attempt to use these. They are only used by NETSCAPE's internal
+ * PKCS #11 interface. Most of these are place holders for other mechanism
+ * and will change in the future.
+ */
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC 0x80000002UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC 0x80000003UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000004UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000005UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4 0x80000006UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4 0x80000007UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC 0x80000008UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x80000009UL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000aUL
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000bUL
+
+#define CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL 0x80000373UL
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue {
+    CK_BYTE *pGX;
+    CK_ULONG ulGXLen;
+    CK_BYTE *pGV;
+    CK_ULONG ulGVLen;
+    CK_BYTE *pR;
+    CK_ULONG ulRLen;
+} CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue;
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params {
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx1; /* out */
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx2; /* out */
+} CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params;
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params {
+    CK_BYTE *pSharedKey;         /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulSharedKeyLen;     /* in */
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx3; /* in */
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx4; /* in */
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue A;   /* out */
+} CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params;
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams {
+    CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue B; /* in */
+} CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams;
+
+/* macAlg: the MAC algorithm to use. This determines the hash function used in
+ *     the HMAC/SSLv3 MAC calculations.
+ * ulBodyTotalLen: the total length of the data, including padding bytes and
+ *     padding length.
+ * pHeader: points to a block of data that contains additional data to
+ *     authenticate. For TLS this includes the sequence number etc. For SSLv3,
+ *     this also includes the initial padding bytes.
+ *
+ * NOTE: the softoken's implementation of CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME and
+ * CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME requires that the sum of ulBodyTotalLen
+ * and ulHeaderLen be much smaller than 2^32 / 8 bytes because it uses an
+ * unsigned int variable to represent the length in bits. This should not
+ * be a problem because the SSL/TLS protocol limits the size of an SSL
+ * record to something considerably less than 2^32 bytes.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS {
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg; /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen;  /* in */
+    CK_BYTE *pHeader;         /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen;     /* in */
+} CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS {
+    CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce;
+    CK_ULONG ulNonceLen;
+    CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
+    CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
+    CK_ULONG ulTagLen;
+} CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS;
+
+/*
+ * NSS-defined return values
+ *
+ */
+#define CKR_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+#define CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 1)
+#define CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 2)
+
+/* Mandatory parameter for the CKM_NSS_HKDF_* key deriviation mechanisms.
+   See RFC 5869.
+
+    bExtract: If set, HKDF-Extract will be applied to the input key. If
+              the optional salt is given, it is used; otherwise, the salt is
+              set to a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC output.
+              If bExpand is not set, then the key template given to
+              C_DeriveKey must indicate an output key size less than or equal
+              to the output size of the HMAC.
+
+    bExpand:  If set, HKDF-Expand will be applied to the input key (if
+              bExtract is not set) or to the result of HKDF-Extract (if
+              bExtract is set). Any info given in the optional pInfo field will
+              be included in the calculation.
+
+    The size of the output key must be specified in the template passed to
+    C_DeriveKey.
+*/
+typedef struct CK_NSS_HKDFParams {
+    CK_BBOOL bExtract;
+    CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
+    CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
+    CK_BBOOL bExpand;
+    CK_BYTE_PTR pInfo;
+    CK_ULONG ulInfoLen;
+} CK_NSS_HKDFParams;
+
+/*
+ * Parameter for the TLS extended master secret key derivation mechanisms:
+ *
+ *  * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
+ *  * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
+ *
+ * For the TLS 1.2 PRF, the prfHashMechanism parameter determines the hash
+ * function used. For earlier versions of the PRF, set the prfHashMechanism
+ * value to CKM_TLS_PRF.
+ *
+ * The session hash input is expected to be the output of the same hash
+ * function as the PRF uses (as required by draft-ietf-tls-session-hash).  So
+ * the ulSessionHashLen member must be equal the output length of the hash
+ * function specified by the prfHashMechanism member (or, for pre-TLS 1.2 PRF,
+ * the length of concatenated MD5 and SHA-1 digests).
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
+    CK_BYTE_PTR pSessionHash;
+    CK_ULONG ulSessionHashLen;
+    CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
+} CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+/*
+ * Trust info
+ *
+ * This isn't part of the Cryptoki standard (yet), so I'm putting
+ * all the definitions here.  Some of this would move to nssckt.h
+ * if trust info were made part of the standard.  In view of this
+ * possibility, I'm putting my (NSS) values in the NSS
+ * vendor space, like everything else.
+ */
+
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_TRUST;
+
+/* The following trust types are defined: */
+#define CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+#define CKT_NSS (CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
+
+/* If trust goes standard, these'll probably drop out of vendor space. */
+#define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 1)
+#define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 2)
+#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST (CKT_NSS + 3)
+#define CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 10)
+#define CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN (CKT_NSS + 5) /* default */
+
+/*
+ * These may well remain NSS-specific; I'm only using them
+ * to cache resolution data.
+ */
+#define CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 11)
+
+/*
+ * old definitions. They still exist, but the plain meaning of the
+ * labels have never been accurate to what was really implemented.
+ * The new labels correctly reflect what the values effectively mean.
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3)
+/* make GCC warn when we use these #defines */
+/*
+ *  This is really painful because GCC doesn't allow us to mark random
+ *  #defines as deprecated. We can only mark the following:
+ *      functions, variables, and types.
+ *  const variables will create extra storage for everyone including this
+ *       header file, so it's undesirable.
+ *  functions could be inlined to prevent storage creation, but will fail
+ *       when constant values are expected (like switch statements).
+ *  enum types do not seem to pay attention to the deprecated attribute.
+ *
+ *  That leaves typedefs. We declare new types that we then deprecate, then
+ *  cast the resulting value to the deprecated type in the #define, thus
+ *  producting the warning when the #define is used.
+ */
+#if (__GNUC__ == 4) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ < 5)
+/* The mac doesn't like the friendlier deprecate messages. I'm assuming this
+ * is a gcc version issue rather than mac or ppc specific */
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated));
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__((deprecated));
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated));
+#else
+/* when possible, get a full deprecation warning. This works on gcc 4.5
+ * it may work on earlier versions of gcc */
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST")));
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED")));
+typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY really functions as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN")));
+#endif
+#define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED ((__CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED)CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST)
+#define CKT_NSS_VALID ((__CKT_NSS_VALID)CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED)
+/* keep the old value for compatibility reasons*/
+#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY ((__CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY)(CKT_NSS + 4))
+#else
+#ifdef _WIN32
+/* This magic gets the windows compiler to give us a deprecation
+ * warning */
+#pragma deprecated(CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED, CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY, CKT_NSS_VALID)
+#endif
+/* CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST */
+#define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
+/* CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED */
+#define CKT_NSS_VALID CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
+/* CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY was always treated as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN */
+#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY (CKT_NSS + 4) /*really means trust unknown*/
+#endif
+
+/* don't leave old programs in a lurch just yet, give them the old NETSCAPE
+ * synonym */
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_CRL CKO_NSS_CRL
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_SMIME CKO_NSS_SMIME
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST CKO_NSS_TRUST
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_NEWSLOT CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT
+#define CKO_NETSCAPE_DELSLOT CKO_NSS_DELSLOT
+#define CKK_NETSCAPE_PKCS8 CKK_NSS_PKCS8
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_URL CKA_NSS_URL
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_EMAIL CKA_NSS_EMAIL
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_INFO CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_TIMESTAMP CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PKCS8_SALT CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PASSWORD_CHECK CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_EXPIRES CKA_NSS_EXPIRES
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_KRL CKA_NSS_KRL
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H CKA_NSS_PQG_H
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS
+#define CKA_NETSCAPE_MODULE_SPEC CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP
+#define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD
+#define CKR_NETSCAPE_CERTDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED
+#define CKR_NETSCAPE_KEYDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED
+
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED CKT_NSS_TRUSTED
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_MUST_VERIFY CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUST_UNKNOWN CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID
+#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR
+
+/*
+ * These are not really PKCS #11 values specifically. They are the 'loadable'
+ * module spec NSS uses. The are available for others to use as well, but not
+ * part of the formal PKCS #11 spec.
+ *
+ * The function 'FIND' returns an array of PKCS #11 initialization strings
+ * The function 'ADD' takes a PKCS #11 initialization string and stores it.
+ * The function 'DEL' takes a 'name= library=' value and deletes the associated
+ *  string.
+ * The function 'RELEASE' frees the array returned by 'FIND'
+ */
+#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_FIND 0
+#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_ADD 1
+#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_DEL 2
+#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_RELEASE 3
+typedef char **(PR_CALLBACK *SECMODModuleDBFunc)(unsigned long function,
+                                                 char *parameters, void *moduleSpec);
+
+/* softoken slot ID's */
+#define SFTK_MIN_USER_SLOT_ID 4
+#define SFTK_MAX_USER_SLOT_ID 100
+#define SFTK_MIN_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 101
+#define SFTK_MAX_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 127
+
+#endif /* _PKCS11N_H_ */