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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
download | UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.lz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.xz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.zip |
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c | 1009 |
1 files changed, 1009 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9f2f4d621 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,1009 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* ECC code moved here from ssl3con.c */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "prinit.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x, id, v, l) \ + (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue = (v); \ + (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#endif + +SECStatus +ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(PLArenaPool *arena, const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + SECKEYECParams *params) +{ + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + + if (!params) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ecGroup || ecGroup->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh || + (oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ecGroup->oidTag)) == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, params, (2 + oidData->oid.len)) == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing the named curve. The actual OID is in + * oidData->oid.data so we simply prepend 0x06 and OID length + */ + params->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID; + params->data[1] = oidData->oid.len; + memcpy(params->data + 2, oidData->oid.data, oidData->oid.len); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECItem oid = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + PRUint32 policyFlags = 0; + unsigned int i; + const SECKEYECParams *params; + + if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; + } + + params = &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams; + + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing a named curve. Here, we strip away everything + * before the actual OID and use the OID to look up a named curve. + */ + if (params->data[0] != SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID) + return NULL; + oid.len = params->len - 2; + oid.data = params->data + 2; + if ((oidData = SECOID_FindOID(&oid)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(oidData->offset, &policyFlags) == + SECSuccess) && + !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ssl_named_groups[i].oidTag == oidData->offset) { + return &ssl_named_groups[i]; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, + SECItem ec_params, SECItem server_ecpoint, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + PRUint8 *hashBuf; + PRUint8 *pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen; + /* + * We only support named curves (the appropriate checks are made before this + * method is called) so ec_params takes up only two bytes. ECPoint needs to + * fit in 256 bytes because the spec says the length must fit in one byte. + */ + PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 256]; + + bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + ec_params.len + 1 + server_ecpoint.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + pBuf += ec_params.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += 1; + memcpy(pBuf, server_ecpoint.data, server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += server_ecpoint.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + if (hashBuf != buf) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + /* Generate ephemeral EC keypair */ + if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + groupDef = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(svrPubKey); + if (!groupDef) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + goto loser; + } + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "ECDH public value:", + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (pms) + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (keyPair) + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This function returns the size of the key_exchange field in + * the KeyShareEntry structure, i.e.: + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; */ +unsigned int +tls13_SizeOfECDHEKeyShareKEX(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + PORT_Assert(pubKey->keyType == ecKey); + return pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; +} + +/* This function encodes the key_exchange field in + * the KeyShareEntry structure. */ +SECStatus +tls13_EncodeECDHEKeyShareKEX(const sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(pubKey->keyType == ecKey); + + return ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); +} + +/* +** Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange() +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + clntPubKey.keyType = ecKey; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = + serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = + serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data; + clntPubKey.u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.ec.publicValue, + 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* we have to catch the case when the client's public key has length 0. */ + if (!clntPubKey.u.ec.publicValue.len) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, + CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + /* last gasp. */ + errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(&clntPubKey); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* +** Take an encoded key share and make a public key out of it. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ecPoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!length) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Fail if the ec point uses compressed representation */ + if (b[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED && + ecGroup->name != ssl_grp_ec_curve25519) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM); + return SECFailure; + } + + peerKey->keyType = ecKey; + /* Set up the encoded params */ + rv = ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(peerKey->arena, ecGroup, + &peerKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + peerKey->u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined; + + /* copy publicValue in peerKey */ + ecPoint.data = b; + ecPoint.len = length; + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.ec.publicValue, &ecPoint); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_GetECGroupWithStrength(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int requiredECCbits) +{ + int i; + + PORT_Assert(ss); + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (group && group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && + group->bits >= requiredECCbits) { + return group; + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the "weakest link". Get the strength of the signature and symmetric + * keys and choose a curve based on the weakest of those two. */ +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_GetECGroupForServerSocket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert; + unsigned int certKeySize; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *bulkCipher; + unsigned int requiredECCbits; + + PORT_Assert(cert); + if (!cert || !cert->serverKeyPair || !cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return NULL; + } + + if (cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) { + certKeySize = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + certKeySize = + SSL_RSASTRENGTH_TO_ECSTRENGTH(certKeySize); + } else if (cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef = cert->certType.namedCurve; + + /* We won't select a certificate unless the named curve has been + * negotiated (or supported_curves was absent), double check that. */ + PORT_Assert(groupDef->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh); + PORT_Assert(ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, groupDef)); + if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, groupDef)) { + return NULL; + } + certKeySize = groupDef->bits; + } else { + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; + } + bulkCipher = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + requiredECCbits = bulkCipher->key_size * BPB * 2; + PORT_Assert(requiredECCbits || + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_null); + if (requiredECCbits > certKeySize) { + requiredECCbits = certKeySize; + } + + return ssl_GetECGroupWithStrength(ss, requiredECCbits); +} + +/* Create an ECDHE key pair for a given curve */ +SECStatus +ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(const sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; + SECKEYECParams ecParams = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + if (ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(NULL, ecGroup, &ecParams) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + privKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(&ecParams, &pubKey, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ecParams, PR_FALSE); + + if (!privKey || !pubKey || + !(pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(ecGroup, privKey, pubKey))) { + if (privKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + } + if (pubKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + } + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + + *keyPair = pair; + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: SSL[%d]: Create ECDH ephemeral key %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss ? ss->fd : NULL, ecGroup->name)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Public Key", pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len)); +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 50) { + SECItem d = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, privKey, + CKA_VALUE, &d); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Private Key", d.data, d.len)); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&d, PR_FALSE); + } else { + SSL_TRC(50, ("Error extracting private key")); + } + } +#endif + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + PRBool isTLS; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + SECItem ec_params = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem ec_point = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup; + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + ec_params.len = sizeof paramBuf; + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Fail if the curve is not a named curve */ + if (ec_params.data[0] != ec_type_named) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + ecGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(ec_params.data[1] << 8 | ec_params.data[2]); + if (!ecGroup || ecGroup->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ec_point, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Fail if the provided point has length 0. */ + if (!ec_point.len) { + /* desc and errCode are initialized already */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Fail if the ec point is not uncompressed for any curve that's not 25519. */ + if (ecGroup->name != ssl_grp_ec_curve25519 && + ec_point.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, + ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC params", ec_params.data, ec_params.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC point", ec_point.data, ec_point.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(hashAlg, ec_params, ec_point, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + peerKey->arena = arena; + + /* create public key from point data */ + rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(ss, peerKey, ec_point.data, ec_point.len, + ecGroup); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* error code is set */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + PRBool isTLS12; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SECItem ec_params = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + /* Generate ephemeral ECDH key pair and send the public key */ + ecGroup = ssl_GetECGroupForServerSocket(ss); + if (!ecGroup) { + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + if (ss->opt.reuseServerECDHEKey) { + rv = ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKey(ss, ecGroup); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } else { + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, ecGroup, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } + + PORT_Assert(keyPair); + if (!keyPair) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ec_params.len = sizeof(paramBuf); + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + PORT_Assert(keyPair->group); + PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh); + ec_params.data[0] = ec_type_named; + ec_params.data[1] = keyPair->group->name >> 8; + ec_params.data[2] = keyPair->group->name & 0xff; + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(hashAlg, ec_params, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue, + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, + ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + + length = ec_params.len + + 1 + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len + + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0) + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* List of all ECC cipher suites */ +static const ssl3CipherSuite ssl_all_ec_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ssl_dhe_suites[] = { + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + 0 +}; + +/* Order(N^2). Yuk. */ +static PRBool +ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuite *list) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuite *suite; + + for (suite = list; *suite; ++suite) { + PRBool enabled = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefGet(ss, *suite, &enabled); + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */ + if (rv == SECSuccess && enabled) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Ask: is ANY ECC cipher suite enabled on this socket? */ +PRBool +ssl_IsECCEnabled(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + + /* make sure we can do ECC */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!slot) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + /* make sure an ECC cipher is enabled */ + return ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(ss, ssl_all_ec_suites); +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsDHEEnabled(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(ss, ssl_dhe_suites); +} + +/* Send our Supported Groups extension. */ +PRInt32 +ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + PRInt32 extension_length; + unsigned char enabledGroups[64]; + unsigned int enabledGroupsLen = 0; + unsigned int i; + PRBool ec; + PRBool ff = PR_FALSE; + + if (!ss) + return 0; + + /* We only send FF supported groups if we require DH named groups + * or if TLS 1.3 is a possibility. */ + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ec = ssl_IsECCEnabled(ss); + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + ff = ssl_IsDHEEnabled(ss); + } + if (!ec && !ff) + return 0; + } else { + ec = ff = PR_TRUE; + } + + PORT_Assert(sizeof(enabledGroups) > SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT * 2); + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (!group) { + continue; + } + if (group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && !ec) { + continue; + } + if (group->keaType == ssl_kea_dh && !ff) { + continue; + } + + if (append) { + (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(group->name, 2, &enabledGroups[enabledGroupsLen]); + } + enabledGroupsLen += 2; + } + + if (enabledGroupsLen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + extension_length = + 2 /* extension type */ + + 2 /* extension length */ + + 2 /* enabled groups length */ + + enabledGroupsLen; + + if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) { + return 0; + } + + if (append) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enabledGroups, + enabledGroupsLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_supported_groups_xtn; + } + } + return extension_length; +} + +/* Send our "canned" (precompiled) Supported Point Formats extension, + * which says that we only support uncompressed points. + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn( + const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + PRBool append, + PRUint32 maxBytes) +{ + static const PRUint8 ecPtFmt[6] = { + 0, 11, /* Extension type */ + 0, 2, /* octets that follow */ + 1, /* octets that follow */ + 0 /* uncompressed type only */ + }; + + /* No point in doing this unless we have a socket that supports ECC. + * Similarly, no point if we are going to do TLS 1.3 only or we have already + * picked TLS 1.3 (server) given that it doesn't use point formats. */ + if (!ss || !ssl_IsECCEnabled(ss) || + ss->vrange.min >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) + return 0; + if (append && maxBytes >= (sizeof ecPtFmt)) { + SECStatus rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, ecPtFmt, (sizeof ecPtFmt)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return -1; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn; + } + } + return sizeof(ecPtFmt); +} |