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authorwolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com>2018-04-25 21:33:33 +0200
committerwolfbeast <mcwerewolf@gmail.com>2018-04-25 21:33:33 +0200
commitfba28f19754f62b5227650143d5441fc86d4c7d7 (patch)
tree26629d73f83543ff92a060fd7b310bb748b13173 /security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
parentb4154e043bfc0d2f301d88304efc896989d650bf (diff)
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Revert "Update NSS to 3.35-RTM"
This reverts commit f1a0f0a56fdd0fc39f255174ce08c06b91c66c94.
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c457
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 457 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
deleted file mode 100644
index aba0f62ab..000000000
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,457 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-/*
- * DTLS 1.3 Protocol
- */
-
-#include "ssl.h"
-#include "sslimpl.h"
-#include "sslproto.h"
-
-/* DTLS 1.3 Record map for ACK processing.
- * This represents a single fragment, so a record which includes
- * multiple fragments will have one entry for each fragment on the
- * sender. We use the same structure on the receiver for convenience
- * but the only value we actually use is |record|.
- */
-typedef struct DTLSHandshakeRecordEntryStr {
- PRCList link;
- PRUint16 messageSeq; /* The handshake message sequence number. */
- PRUint32 offset; /* The offset into the handshake message. */
- PRUint32 length; /* The length of the fragment. */
- sslSequenceNumber record; /* The record (includes epoch). */
- PRBool acked; /* Has this packet been acked. */
-} DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry;
-
-/* Combine the epoch and sequence number into a single value. */
-static inline sslSequenceNumber
-dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum)
-{
- PORT_Assert(seqNum <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX);
- return ((sslSequenceNumber)epoch << 48) | seqNum;
-}
-
-SECStatus
-dtls13_RememberFragment(sslSocket *ss,
- PRCList *list,
- PRUint32 sequence,
- PRUint32 offset,
- PRUint32 length,
- DTLSEpoch epoch,
- sslSequenceNumber record)
-{
- DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry;
-
- PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
- /* We should never send an empty fragment with offset > 0. */
- PORT_Assert(length || !offset);
-
- if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) {
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: %s remembering %s record=%llx msg=%d offset=%d",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
- SSL_ROLE(ss),
- list == &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake ? "sent" : "received",
- dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(epoch, record), sequence, offset));
-
- entry = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry));
- if (!entry) {
- return SECFailure;
- }
-
- entry->messageSeq = sequence;
- entry->offset = offset;
- entry->length = length;
- entry->record = dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(epoch, record);
- entry->acked = PR_FALSE;
-
- PR_APPEND_LINK(&entry->link, list);
-
- return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-SECStatus
-dtls13_SendAck(sslSocket *ss)
-{
- sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
- PRCList *cursor;
- PRInt32 sent;
-
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Sending ACK",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-
- for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake);
- cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake;
- cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
- DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor;
-
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ACK for record=%llx",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, entry->record));
- rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, entry->record, 8);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- goto loser;
- }
- }
-
- ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
- sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_ack,
- buf.buf, buf.len, 0);
- ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
- if (sent != buf.len) {
- rv = SECFailure;
- if (sent != -1) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
- }
- }
-
-loser:
- sslBuffer_Clear(&buf);
- return rv;
-}
-
-void
-dtls13_SendAckCb(sslSocket *ss)
-{
- if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
- return;
- }
- (void)dtls13_SendAck(ss);
-}
-
-/* Zero length messages are very simple to check. */
-static PRBool
-dtls_IsEmptyMessageAcknowledged(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 msgSeq, PRUint32 offset)
-{
- PRCList *cursor;
-
- for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake);
- cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake;
- cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
- DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor;
- if (!entry->acked || msgSeq != entry->messageSeq) {
- continue;
- }
- /* Empty fragments are always offset 0. */
- if (entry->length == 0) {
- PORT_Assert(!entry->offset);
- return PR_TRUE;
- }
- }
- return PR_FALSE;
-}
-
-/* Take a range starting at |*start| and that start forwards based on the
- * contents of the acknowedgement in |entry|. Only move if the acknowledged
- * range overlaps |*start|. Return PR_TRUE if it moves. */
-static PRBool
-dtls_MoveUnackedStartForward(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry, PRUint32 *start)
-{
- /* This entry starts too late. */
- if (*start < entry->offset) {
- return PR_FALSE;
- }
- /* This entry ends too early. */
- if (*start >= entry->offset + entry->length) {
- return PR_FALSE;
- }
- *start = entry->offset + entry->length;
- return PR_TRUE;
-}
-
-/* Take a range ending at |*end| and move that end backwards based on the
- * contents of the acknowedgement in |entry|. Only move if the acknowledged
- * range overlaps |*end|. Return PR_TRUE if it moves. */
-static PRBool
-dtls_MoveUnackedEndBackward(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry, PRUint32 *end)
-{
- /* This entry ends too early. */
- if (*end > entry->offset + entry->length) {
- return PR_FALSE;
- }
- /* This entry starts too late. */
- if (*end <= entry->offset) {
- return PR_FALSE;
- }
- *end = entry->offset;
- return PR_TRUE;
-}
-
-/* Get the next contiguous range of unacknowledged bytes from the handshake
- * message identified by |msgSeq|. The search starts at the offset in |offset|.
- * |len| contains the full length of the message.
- *
- * Returns PR_TRUE if there is an unacknowledged range. In this case, values at
- * |start| and |end| are modified to contain the range.
- *
- * Returns PR_FALSE if the message is entirely acknowledged from |offset|
- * onwards.
- */
-PRBool
-dtls_NextUnackedRange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 msgSeq, PRUint32 offset,
- PRUint32 len, PRUint32 *startOut, PRUint32 *endOut)
-{
- PRCList *cur_p;
- PRBool done = PR_FALSE;
- DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry;
- PRUint32 start;
- PRUint32 end;
-
- PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
-
- *startOut = offset;
- *endOut = len;
- if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) {
- return PR_TRUE;
- }
-
- /* The message is empty. Use a simple search. */
- if (!len) {
- PORT_Assert(!offset);
- return !dtls_IsEmptyMessageAcknowledged(ss, msgSeq, offset);
- }
-
- /* This iterates multiple times over the acknowledgments and only terminates
- * when an entire iteration happens without start or end moving. If that
- * happens without start and end crossing each other, then there is a range
- * of unacknowledged data. If they meet, then the message is fully
- * acknowledged. */
- start = offset;
- end = len;
- while (!done) {
- done = PR_TRUE;
- for (cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake);
- cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake;
- cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) {
- entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cur_p;
- if (!entry->acked || msgSeq != entry->messageSeq) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (dtls_MoveUnackedStartForward(entry, &start) ||
- dtls_MoveUnackedEndBackward(entry, &end)) {
- if (start >= end) {
- /* The message is all acknowledged. */
- return PR_FALSE;
- }
- /* Start over again and keep going until we don't move either
- * start or end. */
- done = PR_FALSE;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- PORT_Assert(start < end);
-
- *startOut = start;
- *endOut = end;
- return PR_TRUE;
-}
-
-SECStatus
-dtls13_SetupAcks(sslSocket *ss)
-{
- if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight) {
- dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer);
-
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake && ss->sec.isServer) {
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_HandleHandshake, sending ACK",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- return dtls13_SendAck(ss);
- }
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- /* We need to send an ACK. */
- if (!ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer->cb) {
- /* We're not armed, so arm. */
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_HandleHandshake, arming ack timer",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- return dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer,
- DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS / 4,
- dtls13_SendAckCb);
- }
- /* The ack timer is already armed, so just return. */
- return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-/*
- * Special case processing for out-of-epoch records.
- * This can only handle ACKs for now and everything else generates
- * an error. In future, may also handle KeyUpdate.
- *
- * The error checking here is as follows:
- *
- * - If it's not encrypted, out of epoch stuff is just discarded.
- * - If it's encrypted, out of epoch stuff causes an error.
- */
-SECStatus
-dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
- SSL3ContentType rType,
- sslBuffer *databuf)
-{
- SECStatus rv;
- sslBuffer buf = *databuf;
-
- databuf->len = 0; /* Discard data whatever happens. */
- PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
- PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
- /* Can't happen, but double check. */
- if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
- tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
- return SECFailure;
- }
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS13[%d]: handle out of epoch record: type=%d", SSL_GETPID(),
- ss->fd, rType));
-
- if (rType == content_ack) {
- ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
- rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, &buf);
- ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
- PORT_Assert(databuf->len == 0);
- return rv;
- }
-
- switch (spec->epoch) {
- case TrafficKeyClearText:
- /* Drop. */
- return SECSuccess;
-
- case TrafficKeyHandshake:
- /* Drop out of order handshake messages, but if we are the
- * server, we might have processed the client's Finished and
- * moved on to application data keys, but the client has
- * retransmitted Finished (e.g., because our ACK got lost.)
- * We just retransmit the previous Finished to let the client
- * complete. */
- if (rType == content_handshake) {
- if ((ss->sec.isServer) &&
- (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) {
- PORT_Assert(dtls_TimerActive(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.hdTimer));
- return dtls13_SendAck(ss);
- }
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- /* This isn't a handshake record, so shouldn't be encrypted
- * under the handshake key. */
- break;
-
- default:
- /* Any other epoch is forbidden. */
- break;
- }
-
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: unexpected out of epoch record type %d", SSL_GETPID(),
- ss->fd, rType));
-
- (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
- PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
- return SECFailure;
-}
-
-SECStatus
-dtls13_HandleAck(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *databuf)
-{
- PRUint8 *b = databuf->buf;
- PRUint32 l = databuf->len;
- SECStatus rv;
-
- /* Ensure we don't loop. */
- databuf->len = 0;
-
- PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
- if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) {
- tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE, illegal_parameter);
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Handling ACK", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- while (l > 0) {
- PRUint64 seq;
- PRCList *cursor;
-
- rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &seq, 8, &b, &l);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- return SECFailure;
- }
-
- for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake);
- cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake;
- cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
- DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor;
-
- if (entry->record == seq) {
- SSL_TRC(10, (
- "%d: SSL3[%d]: Marking record=%llx message %d offset %d length=%d as ACKed",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
- seq, entry->messageSeq, entry->offset, entry->length));
- entry->acked = PR_TRUE;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Try to flush. */
- rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- return SECFailure;
- }
-
- /* Reset the retransmit timer. */
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->cb) {
- (void)dtls_RestartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer);
- }
-
- /* If there are no more messages to send, cleanup. */
- if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight)) {
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: No more unacked handshake messages",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-
- dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer);
- ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake, NULL);
- /* If the handshake is finished, and we're the client then
- * also clean up the handshake read cipher spec. Any ACKs
- * we receive will be with the application data cipher spec.
- * The server needs to keep the handshake cipher spec around
- * for the holddown period to process retransmitted Finisheds.
- */
- if (!ss->sec.isServer && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) {
- ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, CipherSpecRead,
- TrafficKeyHandshake);
- }
- }
- return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-/* Clean up the read timer for the handshake cipher suites on the
- * server.
- *
- * In DTLS 1.3, the client speaks last (Finished), and will retransmit
- * until the server ACKs that message (using application data cipher
- * suites). I.e.,
- *
- * - The client uses the retransmit timer and retransmits using the
- * saved write handshake cipher suite.
- * - The server keeps the saved read handshake cipher suite around
- * for the holddown period in case it needs to read the Finished.
- *
- * After the holddown period, the server assumes the client is happy
- * and discards the handshake read cipher suite.
- */
-void
-dtls13_HolddownTimerCb(sslSocket *ss)
-{
- SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: holddown timer fired",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, CipherSpecRead, TrafficKeyHandshake);
- ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake, NULL);
-}