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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c1019
1 files changed, 1019 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9726d03c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1019 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file PK11Contexts which are used in multipart hashing,
+ * encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations.
+ */
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "nssilock.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 };
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Now Deal with Crypto Contexts
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * the monitors...
+ */
+void
+PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+ * the Context */
+ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+ /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+ PZ_Lock(cx->sessionLock);
+ } else {
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+ * the Context */
+ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+ /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+ PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock);
+ } else {
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free up a Cipher Context
+ */
+void
+PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession);
+ /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+ if (context->savedData != NULL)
+ PORT_Free(context->savedData);
+ if (context->key)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key);
+ if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE);
+ if (context->sessionLock)
+ PZ_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot);
+ if (freeit)
+ PORT_Free(context);
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary.
+ */
+static unsigned char *
+pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer,
+ unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+ if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+ /* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we
+ * have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the
+ * correct length
+ */
+ unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength;
+ buffer = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufLen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+void *
+pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+ return pk11_saveContextHelper(context,
+ (unsigned char *)space, savedLength);
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the current context
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long savedLength)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = (context->key) ? context->key->objectID : CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ PORT_Assert(space != NULL);
+ if (space == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context);
+
+/*
+ * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = context->key;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ CK_ULONG count = 0;
+ /* generate the IV for fortezza */
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK)
+ break;
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)
+ ->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
+ NULL, &count);
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ break;
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session, mech_info);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context.
+ */
+static PK11Context *
+pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey,
+ SECItem *param)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+ PK11Context *context;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
+ if (!slot || (!symKey && ((operation != CKA_DIGEST) ||
+ (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)))) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ context = (PK11Context *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context));
+ if (context == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt
+ * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA
+ * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be
+ * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to
+ * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it),
+ * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side
+ * of the connection.*/
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
+ if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) {
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+ context->operation = operation;
+ context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL;
+ context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+ context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &context->ownSession);
+ context->cx = symKey ? symKey->cx : NULL;
+ /* get our session */
+ context->savedData = NULL;
+
+ /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple
+ * begins on a single context */
+ context->type = type;
+ if (param) {
+ if (param->len > 0) {
+ context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param);
+ } else {
+ context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ context->param = NULL;
+ }
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ context->sessionLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockPK11cxt);
+ if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mech_info.mechanism = type;
+ mech_info.pParameter = param->data;
+ mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ rv = pk11_context_init(context, &mech_info);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ context->init = PR_TRUE;
+ return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different
+ * parts of libsec.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+__PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+ SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+ PK11Context *context = NULL;
+
+ /* first get a slot */
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+ }
+
+ /* now import the key */
+ symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param);
+
+loser:
+ if (symKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ }
+ if (slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+
+ return context;
+}
+
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+ SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+ return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation,
+ key, param, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using
+ * the same key in multiple session!
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *param)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *newKey;
+ PK11Context *context;
+
+ /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+ newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, type, operation);
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
+ } else {
+ symKey = newKey;
+ }
+
+ /* Context Adopts the symKey.... */
+ context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey,
+ param);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot.
+ * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg)
+{
+ /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PK11Context *context;
+ SECItem param;
+
+ type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg);
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */
+ param.data = NULL;
+ param.len = 0;
+ param.type = 0;
+
+ context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL, &param);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old)
+{
+ PK11Context *newcx;
+ PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned long len;
+
+ newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation,
+ old->key, old->param);
+ if (newcx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state
+ * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session,
+ * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */
+ if (old->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old);
+ data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL, &len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old);
+ needFree = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ data = old->savedData;
+ len = old->savedLength;
+ }
+
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different
+ * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we
+ * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the
+ * saveData pointer... */
+ if (newcx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx);
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL);
+ if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len);
+ newcx->savedLength = len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (needFree)
+ PORT_Free(data);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return newcx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA
+ * work.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int *len, int saveLength)
+{
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG length = saveLength;
+
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ if (data)
+ *len = length;
+ } else if ((unsigned)saveLength >= cx->savedLength) {
+ data = (unsigned char *)cx->savedData;
+ if (cx->savedData) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(save, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+ }
+ *len = cx->savedLength;
+ }
+ if (data != NULL) {
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PORT_ZFree(data, length);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+}
+
+/* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */
+unsigned char *
+PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx,
+ unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen,
+ unsigned int *stateLen)
+{
+ unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen;
+
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ *stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL) ? length : 0;
+ } else {
+ if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) {
+ stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(cx->savedLength);
+ if (!stateBuf) {
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ stateBuf = preAllocBuf;
+ }
+ if (cx->savedData) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+ }
+ *stateLen = cx->savedLength;
+ }
+ return stateBuf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for
+ * FORTEZZA .
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int len)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ pk11_Finalize(cx);
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx, save, len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL);
+ if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned)len)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData, save, len);
+ cx->savedLength = len;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is to get FIPS compliance until we can convert
+ * libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE
+ * if we can't get a PK11 Context.
+ */
+PRBool
+PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID)
+{
+ PK11Context *cx;
+
+ cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID);
+ if (cx == NULL)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * make sure the old context is clear first
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ pk11_Finalize(cx);
+
+ mech_info.mechanism = cx->type;
+ mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data;
+ mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len;
+ rv = pk11_context_init(cx, &mech_info);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ cx->init = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ PRInt32 len)
+{
+ PK11Context *context;
+ unsigned int max_length;
+ unsigned int out_length;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */
+ if (len < 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg);
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */
+ max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
+ PORT_Assert(max_length);
+ if (!max_length)
+ max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, out, &out_length, max_length);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a bulk encryption operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_ULONG length = maxout;
+ CK_ULONG offset = 0;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ unsigned char *saveOut = out;
+ unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and
+ * lose them on the first decrypt.
+ */
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ unsigned char random[8];
+ if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random));
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+
+ /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into
+ * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this
+ * call. */
+ allocOut = out = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(maxout);
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, random, sizeof(random), out, &length);
+
+ out += length;
+ maxout -= length;
+ offset = length;
+ } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) {
+ length = sizeof(random);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, sizeof(random), random, &length);
+ inlen -= length;
+ in += length;
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ length += offset;
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ *outlen = 0;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ *outlen = length;
+ }
+
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+ PORT_Assert(allocOut);
+ PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
+ PORT_Free(allocOut);
+ }
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a digest/signature operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char *in, unsigned inLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ if (inLen == 0) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (!in) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ /* also for MAC'ing */
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest a key if possible./
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+
+ if (!context || !key) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ if (context->slot != key->slot) {
+ newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, CKA_SIGN, key);
+ } else {
+ newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key);
+ }
+
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ if (key->data.data) {
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, key->data.data, key->data.len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session, newKey->objectID);
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ if (newKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize().
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ rv = pk11_Finalize(context);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by
+ * someone new.
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ CK_ULONG count = 0;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ unsigned char stackBuf[256];
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+finalize:
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, buffer, count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_Free(buffer);
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED) {
+ /* if there's no operation, it is finalized */
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* try to finalize the session with a buffer */
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) {
+ buffer = stackBuf;
+ } else {
+ buffer = PORT_Alloc(count);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ goto finalize;
+ }
+ if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_Free(buffer);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the final digested or signed data...
+ * this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data
+ * either out of an arena or out of the standard heap.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length)
+{
+ CK_ULONG len;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = length;
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, data, len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+
+ *outLen = (unsigned int)len;
+ context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}