Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 254 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c5eaf021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/* Copyright(c) 2013, Intel Corp. */
+
+/* Wrapper functions for Intel optimized implementation of AES-GCM */
+
+#ifdef USE_HW_AES
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "blapii.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
+#include "gcm.h"
+#include "ctr.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "prtypes.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "intel-gcm.h"
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#include <emmintrin.h>
+#include <tmmintrin.h>
+
+struct intel_AES_GCMContextStr {
+    unsigned char Htbl[16 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char X0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char CTR[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    AESContext *aes_context;
+    unsigned long tagBits;
+    unsigned long Alen;
+    unsigned long Mlen;
+};
+
+intel_AES_GCMContext *
+intel_AES_GCM_CreateContext(void *context,
+                            freeblCipherFunc cipher,
+                            const unsigned char *params,
+                            unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm = NULL;
+    AESContext *aes = (AESContext *)context;
+    const CK_GCM_PARAMS *gcmParams = (const CK_GCM_PARAMS *)params;
+    unsigned char buff[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* aux buffer */
+
+    unsigned long IV_whole_len = gcmParams->ulIvLen & (~0xful);
+    unsigned int IV_remainder_len = gcmParams->ulIvLen & 0xful;
+    unsigned long AAD_whole_len = gcmParams->ulAADLen & (~0xful);
+    unsigned int AAD_remainder_len = gcmParams->ulAADLen & 0xful;
+
+    __m128i BSWAP_MASK = _mm_setr_epi8(15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);
+    __m128i ONE = _mm_set_epi32(0, 0, 0, 1);
+    unsigned int j;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (blocksize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    gcm = PORT_ZNew(intel_AES_GCMContext);
+
+    if (gcm == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* initialize context fields */
+    gcm->aes_context = aes;
+    gcm->tagBits = gcmParams->ulTagBits;
+    gcm->Alen = 0;
+    gcm->Mlen = 0;
+
+    /* first prepare H and its derivatives for ghash */
+    intel_aes_gcmINIT(gcm->Htbl, (unsigned char *)aes->expandedKey, aes->Nr);
+
+    /* Initial TAG value is zero */
+    _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->T, _mm_setzero_si128());
+    _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->X0, _mm_setzero_si128());
+
+    /* Init the counter */
+    if (gcmParams->ulIvLen == 12) {
+        _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR,
+                         _mm_setr_epi32(((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[0],
+                                        ((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[1],
+                                        ((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[2],
+                                        0x01000000));
+    } else {
+        /* If IV size is not 96 bits, then the initial counter value is GHASH
+         * of the IV */
+        intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, gcmParams->pIv, IV_whole_len, gcm->T);
+
+        /* Partial block */
+        if (IV_remainder_len) {
+            PORT_Memset(buff, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            PORT_Memcpy(buff, gcmParams->pIv + IV_whole_len, IV_remainder_len);
+            intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, buff, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->T);
+        }
+
+        intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+            gcm->Htbl,
+            gcm->T,
+            gcmParams->ulIvLen,
+            0,
+            gcm->X0,
+            gcm->CTR);
+
+        /* TAG should be zero again */
+        _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->T, _mm_setzero_si128());
+    }
+
+    /* Encrypt the initial counter, will be used to encrypt the GHASH value,
+     * in the end */
+    rv = (*cipher)(context, gcm->X0, &j, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->CTR,
+                   AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Promote the counter by 1 */
+    _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR, _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_add_epi32(ONE, _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR), BSWAP_MASK)), BSWAP_MASK));
+
+    /* Now hash AAD - it would actually make sense to seperate the context
+     * creation from the AAD, because that would allow to reuse the H, which
+     * only changes when the AES key changes, and not every package, like the
+     * IV and AAD */
+    intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, gcmParams->pAAD, AAD_whole_len, gcm->T);
+    if (AAD_remainder_len) {
+        PORT_Memset(buff, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        PORT_Memcpy(buff, gcmParams->pAAD + AAD_whole_len, AAD_remainder_len);
+        intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, buff, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->T);
+    }
+    gcm->Alen += gcmParams->ulAADLen;
+    return gcm;
+
+loser:
+    PORT_Free(gcm);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    if (freeit) {
+        PORT_Free(gcm);
+    }
+}
+
+SECStatus
+intel_AES_GCM_EncryptUpdate(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm,
+                            unsigned char *outbuf,
+                            unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+                            const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+                            unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    unsigned int tagBytes;
+    unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned int j;
+
+    tagBytes = (gcm->tagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+    if (UINT_MAX - inlen < tagBytes) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (maxout < inlen + tagBytes) {
+        *outlen = inlen + tagBytes;
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    intel_aes_gcmENC(
+        inbuf,
+        outbuf,
+        gcm,
+        inlen);
+
+    gcm->Mlen += inlen;
+
+    intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+        gcm->Htbl,
+        gcm->T,
+        gcm->Mlen,
+        gcm->Alen,
+        gcm->X0,
+        T);
+
+    *outlen = inlen + tagBytes;
+
+    for (j = 0; j < tagBytes; j++) {
+        outbuf[inlen + j] = T[j];
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+intel_AES_GCM_DecryptUpdate(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm,
+                            unsigned char *outbuf,
+                            unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+                            const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+                            unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    unsigned int tagBytes;
+    unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char *intag;
+
+    tagBytes = (gcm->tagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+    /* get the authentication block */
+    if (inlen < tagBytes) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    inlen -= tagBytes;
+    intag = inbuf + inlen;
+
+    if (maxout < inlen) {
+        *outlen = inlen;
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    intel_aes_gcmDEC(
+        inbuf,
+        outbuf,
+        gcm,
+        inlen);
+
+    gcm->Mlen += inlen;
+    intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+        gcm->Htbl,
+        gcm->T,
+        gcm->Mlen,
+        gcm->Alen,
+        gcm->X0,
+        T);
+
+    if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(T, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
+        memset(outbuf, 0, inlen);
+        *outlen = 0;
+        /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    *outlen = inlen;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#endif