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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp')
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp785
1 files changed, 785 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4529f877
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsKeygenHandler.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,785 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*-
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "nsIContent.h"
+#include "nsIDOMHTMLSelectElement.h"
+#include "nsIGenKeypairInfoDlg.h"
+#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
+#include "nsITokenDialogs.h"
+#include "nsKeygenHandler.h"
+#include "nsKeygenHandlerContent.h"
+#include "nsKeygenThread.h"
+#include "nsNSSComponent.h" // for PIPNSS string bundle calls.
+#include "nsNSSHelper.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
+#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
+#include "nspr.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secdert.h"
+
+//These defines are taken from the PKCS#11 spec
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
+
+DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
+ { DER_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, nullptr, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
+ { DER_OBJECT_ID,
+ offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), },
+ { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
+ offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), },
+ { 0, }
+};
+
+DERTemplate CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate[] = {
+ { DER_SEQUENCE,
+ 0, nullptr, sizeof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo) },
+ { DER_INLINE,
+ offsetof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo,algorithm),
+ SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, },
+ { DER_BIT_STRING,
+ offsetof(CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo,subjectPublicKey), },
+ { 0, }
+};
+
+DERTemplate CERTPublicKeyAndChallengeTemplate[] =
+{
+ { DER_SEQUENCE, 0, nullptr, sizeof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge) },
+ { DER_ANY, offsetof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge,spki), },
+ { DER_IA5_STRING, offsetof(CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge,challenge), },
+ { 0, }
+};
+
+typedef struct curveNameTagPairStr {
+ const char *curveName;
+ SECOidTag curveOidTag;
+} CurveNameTagPair;
+
+static CurveNameTagPair nameTagPair[] =
+{
+ { "prime192v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
+ { "prime192v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2 },
+ { "prime192v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3 },
+ { "prime239v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1 },
+ { "prime239v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2 },
+ { "prime239v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3 },
+ { "prime256v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
+
+ { "secp112r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1},
+ { "secp112r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2},
+ { "secp128r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1},
+ { "secp128r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2},
+ { "secp160k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1},
+ { "secp160r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1},
+ { "secp160r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2},
+ { "secp192k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1},
+ { "secp192r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
+ { "nistp192", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1 },
+ { "secp224k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1},
+ { "secp224r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1},
+ { "nistp224", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1},
+ { "secp256k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1},
+ { "secp256r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
+ { "nistp256", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1 },
+ { "secp384r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1},
+ { "nistp384", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1},
+ { "secp521r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1},
+ { "nistp521", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1},
+
+ { "c2pnb163v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1 },
+ { "c2pnb163v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2 },
+ { "c2pnb163v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3 },
+ { "c2pnb176v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1 },
+ { "c2tnb191v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1 },
+ { "c2tnb191v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2 },
+ { "c2tnb191v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3 },
+ { "c2onb191v4", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V4 },
+ { "c2onb191v5", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V5 },
+ { "c2pnb208w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1 },
+ { "c2tnb239v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1 },
+ { "c2tnb239v2", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2 },
+ { "c2tnb239v3", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3 },
+ { "c2onb239v4", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V4 },
+ { "c2onb239v5", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V5 },
+ { "c2pnb272w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1 },
+ { "c2pnb304w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1 },
+ { "c2tnb359v1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1 },
+ { "c2pnb368w1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1 },
+ { "c2tnb431r1", SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1 },
+
+ { "sect113r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1},
+ { "sect113r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2},
+ { "sect131r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1},
+ { "sect131r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2},
+ { "sect163k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1},
+ { "nistk163", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1},
+ { "sect163r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1},
+ { "sect163r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2},
+ { "nistb163", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2},
+ { "sect193r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1},
+ { "sect193r2", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2},
+ { "sect233k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1},
+ { "nistk233", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1},
+ { "sect233r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1},
+ { "nistb233", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1},
+ { "sect239k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1},
+ { "sect283k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1},
+ { "nistk283", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1},
+ { "sect283r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1},
+ { "nistb283", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1},
+ { "sect409k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1},
+ { "nistk409", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1},
+ { "sect409r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1},
+ { "nistb409", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1},
+ { "sect571k1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1},
+ { "nistk571", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1},
+ { "sect571r1", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1},
+ { "nistb571", SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1},
+
+};
+
+mozilla::UniqueSECItem
+DecodeECParams(const char* curve)
+{
+ SECOidData *oidData = nullptr;
+ SECOidTag curveOidTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; /* default */
+ int i, numCurves;
+
+ if (curve && *curve) {
+ numCurves = sizeof(nameTagPair)/sizeof(CurveNameTagPair);
+ for (i = 0; ((i < numCurves) && (curveOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN));
+ i++) {
+ if (PL_strcmp(curve, nameTagPair[i].curveName) == 0)
+ curveOidTag = nameTagPair[i].curveOidTag;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Return nullptr if curve name is not recognized */
+ if ((curveOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ||
+ (oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(curveOidTag)) == nullptr) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ mozilla::UniqueSECItem ecparams(SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr,
+ 2 + oidData->oid.len));
+ if (!ecparams) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ecparams->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID)
+ * representing the named curve. The actual OID is in
+ * oidData->oid.data so we simply prepend 0x06 and OID length
+ */
+ ecparams->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID;
+ ecparams->data[1] = oidData->oid.len;
+ memcpy(ecparams->data + 2, oidData->oid.data, oidData->oid.len);
+
+ return ecparams;
+}
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsKeygenFormProcessor, nsIFormProcessor)
+
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::nsKeygenFormProcessor()
+{
+ m_ctx = new PipUIContext();
+}
+
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::~nsKeygenFormProcessor()
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ shutdown(ShutdownCalledFrom::Object);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::Create(nsISupports* aOuter, const nsIID& aIID, void* *aResult)
+{
+ if (GeckoProcessType_Content == XRE_GetProcessType()) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> contentProcessor = new nsKeygenFormProcessorContent();
+ return contentProcessor->QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
+ }
+
+ nsresult rv;
+ NS_ENSURE_NO_AGGREGATION(aOuter);
+ nsKeygenFormProcessor* formProc = new nsKeygenFormProcessor();
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> stabilize = formProc;
+ rv = formProc->Init();
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ rv = formProc->QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::Init()
+{
+ static NS_DEFINE_CID(kNSSComponentCID, NS_NSSCOMPONENT_CID);
+
+ nsresult rv;
+
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> nssComponent;
+ nssComponent = do_GetService(kNSSComponentCID, &rv);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ // Init possible key size choices.
+ nssComponent->GetPIPNSSBundleString("HighGrade", mSECKeySizeChoiceList[0].name);
+ mSECKeySizeChoiceList[0].size = 2048;
+
+ nssComponent->GetPIPNSSBundleString("MediumGrade", mSECKeySizeChoiceList[1].name);
+ mSECKeySizeChoiceList[1].size = 1024;
+
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetSlot(uint32_t aMechanism, PK11SlotInfo** aSlot)
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return GetSlotWithMechanism(aMechanism, m_ctx, aSlot, locker);
+}
+
+uint32_t MapGenMechToAlgoMech(uint32_t mechanism)
+{
+ uint32_t searchMech;
+
+ /* We are interested in slots based on the ability to perform
+ a given algorithm, not on their ability to generate keys usable
+ by that algorithm. Therefore, map keygen-specific mechanism tags
+ to tags for the corresponding crypto algorithm. */
+ switch(mechanism)
+ {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ searchMech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ break;
+ case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+ searchMech = CKM_RC4;
+ break;
+ case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ searchMech = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE; /* ### mwelch is this right? */
+ break;
+ case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+ /* What do we do about DES keygen? Right now, we're just using
+ DES_KEY_GEN to look for tokens, because otherwise we'll have
+ to search the token list three times. */
+ case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ /* The default should also work for EC key pair generation. */
+ default:
+ searchMech = mechanism;
+ break;
+ }
+ return searchMech;
+}
+
+
+nsresult
+GetSlotWithMechanism(uint32_t aMechanism, nsIInterfaceRequestor* m_ctx,
+ PK11SlotInfo** aSlot, nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock& /*proofOfLock*/)
+{
+ PK11SlotList * slotList = nullptr;
+ char16_t** tokenNameList = nullptr;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsITokenDialogs> dialogs;
+ char16_t *unicodeTokenChosen;
+ PK11SlotListElement *slotElement, *tmpSlot;
+ uint32_t numSlots = 0, i = 0;
+ bool canceled;
+ nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+
+ *aSlot = nullptr;
+
+ // Get the slot
+ slotList = PK11_GetAllTokens(MapGenMechToAlgoMech(aMechanism),
+ true, true, m_ctx);
+ if (!slotList || !slotList->head) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!slotList->head->next) {
+ /* only one slot available, just return it */
+ *aSlot = slotList->head->slot;
+ } else {
+ // Gerenate a list of slots and ask the user to choose //
+ tmpSlot = slotList->head;
+ while (tmpSlot) {
+ numSlots++;
+ tmpSlot = tmpSlot->next;
+ }
+
+ // Allocate the slot name buffer //
+ tokenNameList = static_cast<char16_t**>(moz_xmalloc(sizeof(char16_t *) * numSlots));
+ if (!tokenNameList) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ i = 0;
+ slotElement = PK11_GetFirstSafe(slotList);
+ while (slotElement) {
+ tokenNameList[i] = UTF8ToNewUnicode(nsDependentCString(PK11_GetTokenName(slotElement->slot)));
+ slotElement = PK11_GetNextSafe(slotList, slotElement, false);
+ if (tokenNameList[i])
+ i++;
+ else {
+ // OOM. adjust numSlots so we don't free unallocated memory.
+ numSlots = i;
+ PK11_FreeSlotListElement(slotList, slotElement);
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Throw up the token list dialog and get back the token.
+ rv = getNSSDialogs(getter_AddRefs(dialogs), NS_GET_IID(nsITokenDialogs),
+ NS_TOKENDIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!tokenNameList || !*tokenNameList) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ } else {
+ rv = dialogs->ChooseToken(m_ctx, (const char16_t**)tokenNameList,
+ numSlots, &unicodeTokenChosen, &canceled);
+ }
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) goto loser;
+
+ if (canceled) { rv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; goto loser; }
+
+ // Get the slot //
+ slotElement = PK11_GetFirstSafe(slotList);
+ nsAutoString tokenStr(unicodeTokenChosen);
+ while (slotElement) {
+ if (tokenStr.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(slotElement->slot)))) {
+ *aSlot = slotElement->slot;
+ PK11_FreeSlotListElement(slotList, slotElement);
+ break;
+ }
+ slotElement = PK11_GetNextSafe(slotList, slotElement, false);
+ }
+ if(!(*aSlot)) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Get a reference to the slot //
+ PK11_ReferenceSlot(*aSlot);
+loser:
+ if (slotList) {
+ PK11_FreeSlotList(slotList);
+ }
+ if (tokenNameList) {
+ NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(numSlots, tokenNameList);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+
+void
+GatherKeygenTelemetry(uint32_t keyGenMechanism, int keysize, char* curve)
+{
+ if (keyGenMechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
+ if (keysize > 8196 || keysize < 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nsCString telemetryValue("rsa");
+ telemetryValue.AppendPrintf("%d", keysize);
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, telemetryValue);
+ } else if (keyGenMechanism == CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
+ nsCString secp384r1 = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("secp384r1");
+ nsCString secp256r1 = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("secp256r1");
+
+ mozilla::UniqueSECItem decoded = DecodeECParams(curve);
+ if (!decoded) {
+ switch (keysize) {
+ case 2048:
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp384r1);
+ break;
+ case 1024:
+ case 512:
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp256r1);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (secp384r1.EqualsIgnoreCase(curve, secp384r1.Length())) {
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp384r1);
+ } else if (secp256r1.EqualsIgnoreCase(curve, secp256r1.Length())) {
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, secp256r1);
+ } else {
+ mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+ mozilla::Telemetry::KEYGEN_GENERATED_KEY_TYPE, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("other_ec"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ MOZ_CRASH("Unknown keygen algorithm");
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::GetPublicKey(const nsAString& aValue,
+ const nsAString& aChallenge,
+ const nsAFlatString& aKeyType,
+ nsAString& aOutPublicKey,
+ const nsAString& aKeyParams)
+{
+ nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+ if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+ UniquePORTString keystring;
+ char *keyparamsString = nullptr;
+ uint32_t keyGenMechanism;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = nullptr;
+ PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
+ mozilla::UniqueSECItem ecParams;
+ SECOidTag algTag;
+ int keysize = 0;
+ void *params = nullptr; // Non-owning.
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privateKey = nullptr;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *publicKey = nullptr;
+ CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spkInfo = nullptr;
+ SECStatus srv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem spkiItem;
+ SECItem pkacItem;
+ SECItem signedItem;
+ CERTPublicKeyAndChallenge pkac;
+ pkac.challenge.data = nullptr;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIGeneratingKeypairInfoDialogs> dialogs;
+ nsKeygenThread *KeygenRunnable = 0;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIKeygenThread> runnable;
+
+ // permanent and sensitive flags for keygen
+ PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE;
+
+ UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
+ if (!arena) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ // Get the key size //
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_key_size_choices; ++i) {
+ if (aValue.Equals(mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].name)) {
+ keysize = mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].size;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!keysize) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ // Set the keygen mechanism
+ if (aKeyType.IsEmpty() || aKeyType.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("rsa")) {
+ keyGenMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
+ } else if (aKeyType.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("ec")) {
+ keyparamsString = ToNewCString(aKeyParams);
+ if (!keyparamsString) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ keyGenMechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
+ /* ecParams are initialized later */
+ } else {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ // Get the slot
+ rv = GetSlot(keyGenMechanism, &slot);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ switch (keyGenMechanism) {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = keysize;
+ rsaParams.pe = DEFAULT_RSA_KEYGEN_PE;
+ algTag = DEFAULT_RSA_KEYGEN_ALG;
+ params = &rsaParams;
+ break;
+ case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ /* XXX We ought to rethink how the KEYGEN tag is
+ * displayed. The pulldown selections presented
+ * to the user must depend on the keytype.
+ * The displayed selection could be picked
+ * from the keyparams attribute (this is currently called
+ * the pqg attribute).
+ * For now, we pick ecparams from the keyparams field
+ * if it specifies a valid supported curve, or else
+ * we pick one of secp384r1, secp256r1 or secp192r1
+ * respectively depending on the user's selection
+ * (High, Medium, Low).
+ * (RSA uses RSA-2048, RSA-1024 and RSA-512 for historical
+ * reasons, while ECC choices represent a stronger mapping)
+ * NOTE: The user's selection
+ * is silently ignored when a valid curve is presented
+ * in keyparams.
+ */
+ ecParams = DecodeECParams(keyparamsString);
+ if (!ecParams) {
+ /* The keyparams attribute did not specify a valid
+ * curve name so use a curve based on the keysize.
+ * NOTE: Here keysize is used only as an indication of
+ * High/Medium/Low strength; elliptic curve
+ * cryptography uses smaller keys than RSA to provide
+ * equivalent security.
+ */
+ switch (keysize) {
+ case 2048:
+ ecParams = DecodeECParams("secp384r1");
+ break;
+ case 1024:
+ case 512:
+ ecParams = DecodeECParams("secp256r1");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ MOZ_ASSERT(ecParams);
+ params = ecParams.get();
+ /* XXX The signature algorithm ought to choose the hashing
+ * algorithm based on key size once ECDSA variations based
+ * on SHA256 SHA384 and SHA512 are standardized.
+ */
+ algTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure token is initialized. */
+ rv = setPassword(slot, m_ctx, locker);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+ goto loser;
+
+ srv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, true, m_ctx);
+ if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = getNSSDialogs(getter_AddRefs(dialogs),
+ NS_GET_IID(nsIGeneratingKeypairInfoDialogs),
+ NS_GENERATINGKEYPAIRINFODIALOGS_CONTRACTID);
+
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ KeygenRunnable = new nsKeygenThread();
+ NS_IF_ADDREF(KeygenRunnable);
+ }
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !KeygenRunnable) {
+ rv = NS_OK;
+ privateKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(slot, keyGenMechanism, params,
+ &publicKey, attrFlags, m_ctx);
+ } else {
+ KeygenRunnable->SetParams( slot, attrFlags, nullptr, 0,
+ keyGenMechanism, params, m_ctx );
+
+ runnable = do_QueryInterface(KeygenRunnable);
+ if (runnable) {
+ rv = dialogs->DisplayGeneratingKeypairInfo(m_ctx, runnable);
+ // We call join on the thread so we can be sure that no
+ // simultaneous access to the passed parameters will happen.
+ KeygenRunnable->Join();
+
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *used_slot = nullptr;
+ rv = KeygenRunnable->ConsumeResult(&used_slot, &privateKey, &publicKey);
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && used_slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(used_slot);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !privateKey) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ // just in case we'll need to authenticate to the db -jp //
+ privateKey->wincx = m_ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a subject public key info from the public key.
+ */
+ spkInfo = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(publicKey);
+ if ( !spkInfo ) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now DER encode the whole subjectPublicKeyInfo.
+ */
+ srv = DER_Encode(arena.get(), &spkiItem, CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate,
+ spkInfo);
+ if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * set up the PublicKeyAndChallenge data structure, then DER encode it
+ */
+ pkac.spki = spkiItem;
+ pkac.challenge.len = aChallenge.Length();
+ pkac.challenge.data = (unsigned char *)ToNewCString(aChallenge);
+ if (!pkac.challenge.data) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ srv = DER_Encode(arena.get(), &pkacItem, CERTPublicKeyAndChallengeTemplate,
+ &pkac);
+ if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now sign the DER encoded PublicKeyAndChallenge
+ */
+ srv = SEC_DerSignData(arena.get(), &signedItem, pkacItem.data, pkacItem.len,
+ privateKey, algTag);
+ if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the signed public key and challenge into base64/ascii.
+ */
+ keystring = UniquePORTString(
+ BTOA_DataToAscii(signedItem.data, signedItem.len));
+ if (!keystring) {
+ rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ CopyASCIItoUTF16(keystring.get(), aOutPublicKey);
+
+ rv = NS_OK;
+
+ GatherKeygenTelemetry(keyGenMechanism, keysize, keyparamsString);
+loser:
+ if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+ if ( privateKey ) {
+ PK11_DestroyTokenObject(privateKey->pkcs11Slot,privateKey->pkcs11ID);
+ }
+ if ( publicKey ) {
+ PK11_DestroyTokenObject(publicKey->pkcs11Slot,publicKey->pkcs11ID);
+ }
+ }
+ if ( spkInfo ) {
+ SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spkInfo);
+ }
+ if ( publicKey ) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publicKey);
+ }
+ if ( privateKey ) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privateKey);
+ }
+ if (slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ if (KeygenRunnable) {
+ NS_RELEASE(KeygenRunnable);
+ }
+ if (keyparamsString) {
+ free(keyparamsString);
+ }
+ if (pkac.challenge.data) {
+ free(pkac.challenge.data);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+// static
+void
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::ExtractParams(nsIDOMHTMLElement* aElement,
+ nsAString& challengeValue,
+ nsAString& keyTypeValue,
+ nsAString& keyParamsValue)
+{
+ aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("keytype"), keyTypeValue);
+ if (keyTypeValue.IsEmpty()) {
+ // If this field is not present, we default to rsa.
+ keyTypeValue.AssignLiteral("rsa");
+ }
+
+ aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("pqg"),
+ keyParamsValue);
+ /* XXX We can still support the pqg attribute in the keygen
+ * tag for backward compatibility while introducing a more
+ * general attribute named keyparams.
+ */
+ if (keyParamsValue.IsEmpty()) {
+ aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("keyparams"),
+ keyParamsValue);
+ }
+
+ aElement->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("challenge"), challengeValue);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProcessValue(nsIDOMHTMLElement* aElement,
+ const nsAString& aName,
+ nsAString& aValue)
+{
+ nsAutoString challengeValue;
+ nsAutoString keyTypeValue;
+ nsAutoString keyParamsValue;
+ ExtractParams(aElement, challengeValue, keyTypeValue, keyParamsValue);
+
+ return GetPublicKey(aValue, challengeValue, keyTypeValue,
+ aValue, keyParamsValue);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProcessValueIPC(const nsAString& aOldValue,
+ const nsAString& aChallenge,
+ const nsAString& aKeyType,
+ const nsAString& aKeyParams,
+ nsAString& newValue)
+{
+ return GetPublicKey(aOldValue, aChallenge, PromiseFlatString(aKeyType),
+ newValue, aKeyParams);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsKeygenFormProcessor::ProvideContent(const nsAString& aFormType,
+ nsTArray<nsString>& aContent,
+ nsAString& aAttribute)
+{
+ if (Compare(aFormType, NS_LITERAL_STRING("SELECT"),
+ nsCaseInsensitiveStringComparator()) == 0) {
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < number_of_key_size_choices; ++i) {
+ aContent.AppendElement(mSECKeySizeChoiceList[i].name);
+ }
+ aAttribute.AssignLiteral("-mozilla-keygen");
+ }
+ return NS_OK;
+}
+