Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 1292 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..412adb403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
+#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
+#include "OCSPRequestor.h"
+#include "OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.h"
+#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/PodOperations.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "pkix/Result.h"
+#include "pkix/pkix.h"
+#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+#include "prmem.h"
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+#include "CNNICHashWhitelist.inc"
+#include "StartComAndWoSignData.inc"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+
+extern LazyLogModule gCertVerifierLog;
+
+static const uint64_t ServerFailureDelaySeconds = 5 * 60;
+
+namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
+
+const char BUILTIN_ROOTS_MODULE_DEFAULT_NAME[] = "Builtin Roots Module";
+
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType,
+                                           OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
+                                           OCSPCache& ocspCache,
+             /*optional but shouldn't be*/ void* pinArg,
+                                           CertVerifier::OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig,
+                                           uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
+                                           CertVerifier::PinningMode pinningMode,
+                                           unsigned int minRSABits,
+                                           ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode,
+                                           CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
+                                           NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
+                                           const NeckoOriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                                           UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
+                              /*optional*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
+                              /*optional*/ const char* hostname)
+  : mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType)
+  , mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching)
+  , mOCSPCache(ocspCache)
+  , mPinArg(pinArg)
+  , mOCSPGetConfig(ocspGETConfig)
+  , mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays)
+  , mPinningMode(pinningMode)
+  , mMinRSABits(minRSABits)
+  , mValidityCheckingMode(validityCheckingMode)
+  , mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode)
+  , mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy)
+  , mOriginAttributes(originAttributes)
+  , mBuiltChain(builtChain)
+  , mPinningTelemetryInfo(pinningTelemetryInfo)
+  , mHostname(hostname)
+  , mCertBlocklist(do_GetService(NS_CERTBLOCKLIST_CONTRACTID))
+  , mOCSPStaplingStatus(CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED)
+  , mSCTListFromCertificate()
+  , mSCTListFromOCSPStapling()
+{
+}
+
+// If useRoots is true, we only use root certificates in the candidate list.
+// If useRoots is false, we only use non-root certificates in the list.
+static Result
+FindIssuerInner(const UniqueCERTCertList& candidates, bool useRoots,
+                Input encodedIssuerName, TrustDomain::IssuerChecker& checker,
+                /*out*/ bool& keepGoing)
+{
+  keepGoing = true;
+  for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
+       !CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
+    bool candidateIsRoot = !!n->cert->isRoot;
+    if (candidateIsRoot != useRoots) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    Input certDER;
+    Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      continue; // probably too big
+    }
+
+    const SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = {
+      siBuffer,
+      const_cast<unsigned char*>(encodedIssuerName.UnsafeGetData()),
+      encodedIssuerName.GetLength()
+    };
+    ScopedAutoSECItem nameConstraints;
+    SECStatus srv = CERT_GetImposedNameConstraints(&encodedIssuerNameItem,
+                                                   &nameConstraints);
+    if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+      if (PR_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) {
+        return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+      }
+
+      // If no imposed name constraints were found, continue without them
+      rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr, keepGoing);
+    } else {
+      // Otherwise apply the constraints
+      Input nameConstraintsInput;
+      if (nameConstraintsInput.Init(nameConstraints.data, nameConstraints.len)
+            != Success) {
+        return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+      }
+      rv = checker.Check(certDER, &nameConstraintsInput, keepGoing);
+    }
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    if (!keepGoing) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName,
+                                 IssuerChecker& checker, Time)
+{
+  // TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
+  // "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
+  SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
+  UniqueCERTCertList
+    candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+                                          &encodedIssuerNameItem, 0,
+                                          false));
+  if (candidates) {
+    // First, try all the root certs; then try all the non-root certs.
+    bool keepGoing;
+    Result rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, true, encodedIssuerName, checker,
+                                keepGoing);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    if (keepGoing) {
+      rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, false, encodedIssuerName, checker,
+                           keepGoing);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                   const CertPolicyId& policy,
+                                   Input candidateCertDER,
+                                   /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
+{
+  // XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
+  // information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
+  // expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion. The use of
+  // CERT_NewTempCertificate to get a CERTCertificate shouldn't be a
+  // performance problem because NSS will just find the existing
+  // CERTCertificate in its in-memory cache and return it.
+  SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
+  UniqueCERTCertificate candidateCert(
+    CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
+                            nullptr, false, true));
+  if (!candidateCert) {
+    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
+  }
+
+  // Check the certificate against the OneCRL cert blocklist
+  if (!mCertBlocklist) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // The certificate blocklist currently only applies to TLS server
+  // certificates.
+  if (mCertDBTrustType == trustSSL) {
+    bool isCertRevoked;
+    nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsCertRevoked(
+                      candidateCert->derIssuer.data,
+                      candidateCert->derIssuer.len,
+                      candidateCert->serialNumber.data,
+                      candidateCert->serialNumber.len,
+                      candidateCert->derSubject.data,
+                      candidateCert->derSubject.len,
+                      candidateCert->derPublicKey.data,
+                      candidateCert->derPublicKey.len,
+                      &isCertRevoked);
+    if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    if (isCertRevoked) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: certificate is in blocklist"));
+      return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
+  // SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
+  // is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
+  // CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
+  // "We have a trust record."
+  CERTCertTrust trust;
+  if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
+    uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
+
+    // For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
+    // because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
+    // CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
+    // relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
+    // distrusted.
+    uint32_t relevantTrustBit =
+      endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
+                                               : CERTDB_TRUSTED;
+    if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit|CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
+            == CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
+      trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
+      return Success;
+    }
+
+    // For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
+    // needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
+    // Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
+    if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
+      if (policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
+        trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
+        return Success;
+      }
+      if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert, policy)) {
+        trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
+        return Success;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item, DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
+                                /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf, size_t digestBufLen)
+{
+  return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
+}
+
+static PRIntervalTime
+OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching)
+{
+  switch (ocspFetching) {
+    case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail:
+      return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
+    case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV:
+    case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail:
+      return PR_SecondsToInterval(10);
+    // The rest of these are error cases. Assert in debug builds, but return
+    // the default value corresponding to 2 seconds in release builds.
+    case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP:
+    case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV:
+      PR_NOT_REACHED("we should never see this OCSPFetching type here");
+      break;
+  }
+
+  PR_NOT_REACHED("we're not handling every OCSPFetching type");
+  return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
+}
+
+// Copied and modified from CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation and
+// CERT_GetGeneralNameByType. Returns a non-Result::Success result on error,
+// Success with url == nullptr when an OCSP URI was not found, and Success with
+// url != nullptr when an OCSP URI was found. The output url will be owned
+// by the arena.
+static Result
+GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(const UniquePLArenaPool& arena,
+                                   Input aiaExtension,
+                                   /*out*/ char const*& url)
+{
+  MOZ_ASSERT(arena.get());
+  if (!arena.get()) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+
+  url = nullptr;
+  SECItem aiaExtensionSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(aiaExtension);
+  CERTAuthInfoAccess** aia =
+    CERT_DecodeAuthInfoAccessExtension(arena.get(), &aiaExtensionSECItem);
+  if (!aia) {
+    return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; aia[i]; ++i) {
+    if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&aia[i]->method) == SEC_OID_PKIX_OCSP) {
+      // NSS chooses the **last** OCSP URL; we choose the **first**
+      CERTGeneralName* current = aia[i]->location;
+      if (!current) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      do {
+        if (current->type == certURI) {
+          const SECItem& location = current->name.other;
+          // (location.len + 1) must be small enough to fit into a uint32_t,
+          // but we limit it to a smaller bound to reduce OOM risk.
+          if (location.len > 1024 || memchr(location.data, 0, location.len)) {
+            // Reject embedded nulls. (NSS doesn't do this)
+            return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
+          }
+          // Copy the non-null-terminated SECItem into a null-terminated string.
+          char* nullTerminatedURL(
+            static_cast<char*>(PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena.get(), location.len + 1)));
+          if (!nullTerminatedURL) {
+            return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+          }
+          memcpy(nullTerminatedURL, location.data, location.len);
+          nullTerminatedURL[location.len] = 0;
+          url = nullTerminatedURL;
+          return Success;
+        }
+        current = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(current);
+      } while (current != aia[i]->location);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                      const CertID& certID, Time time,
+                                      Duration validityDuration,
+                         /*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
+                         /*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension)
+{
+  // Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
+  // GetCertTrust.
+
+  // TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
+  // that that fact is documented in mozillapkix.
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+         ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
+
+  // Bug 991815: The BR allow OCSP for intermediates to be up to one year old.
+  // Since this affects EV there is no reason why DV should be more strict
+  // so all intermediatates are allowed to have OCSP responses up to one year
+  // old.
+  uint16_t maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 10;
+  if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
+    maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 365;
+  }
+
+  // If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
+  // determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
+  // exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
+  // are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
+  // We keep track of the result of verifying the stapled response but don't
+  // immediately return failure if the response has expired.
+  //
+  // We only set the OCSP stapling status if we're validating the end-entity
+  // certificate. Non-end-entity certificates would always be
+  // OCSP_STAPLING_NONE unless/until we implement multi-stapling.
+  Result stapledOCSPResponseResult = Success;
+  if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
+    PR_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity);
+    bool expired;
+    stapledOCSPResponseResult =
+      VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
+                                             maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
+                                             *stapledOCSPResponse,
+                                             ResponseWasStapled, expired);
+    if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Success) {
+      // stapled OCSP response present and good
+      mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_GOOD;
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: good"));
+      return Success;
+    }
+    if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE ||
+        expired) {
+      // stapled OCSP response present but expired
+      mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_EXPIRED;
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: expired stapled OCSP response"));
+    } else {
+      // stapled OCSP response present but invalid for some reason
+      mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_INVALID;
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: failure"));
+      return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
+    }
+  } else if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
+    // no stapled OCSP response
+    mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NONE;
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no stapled OCSP response"));
+  }
+
+  Result cachedResponseResult = Success;
+  Time cachedResponseValidThrough(Time::uninitialized);
+  bool cachedResponsePresent = mOCSPCache.Get(certID, mOriginAttributes,
+                                              cachedResponseResult,
+                                              cachedResponseValidThrough);
+  if (cachedResponsePresent) {
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough >= time) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: good"));
+      return Success;
+    }
+    // If we have a cached revoked response, use it.
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: revoked"));
+      return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+    // The cached response may indicate an unknown certificate or it may be
+    // expired. Don't return with either of these statuses yet - we may be
+    // able to fetch a more recent one.
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: error %d",
+           cachedResponseResult));
+    // When a good cached response has expired, it is more convenient
+    // to convert that to an error code and just deal with
+    // cachedResponseResult from here on out.
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
+      cachedResponseResult = Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
+    }
+    // We may have a cached indication of server failure. Ignore it if
+    // it has expired.
+    if (cachedResponseResult != Success &&
+        cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
+        cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE &&
+        cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
+      cachedResponseResult = Success;
+      cachedResponsePresent = false;
+    }
+  } else {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no cached OCSP response"));
+  }
+  // At this point, if and only if cachedErrorResult is Success, there was no
+  // cached response.
+  PR_ASSERT((!cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult == Success) ||
+            (cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult != Success));
+
+  // If we have a fresh OneCRL Blocklist we can skip OCSP for CA certs
+  bool blocklistIsFresh;
+  nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsBlocklistFresh(&blocklistIsFresh);
+  if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for expired responses. But,
+  // if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous whether
+  // security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really never want
+  // you to ever fetch OCSP."
+
+  Duration shortLifetime(mCertShortLifetimeInDays * Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
+
+  if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) ||
+      (validityDuration < shortLifetime) ||
+      (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA &&
+       (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
+        mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail ||
+        blocklistIsFresh))) {
+    // We're not going to be doing any fetching, so if there was a cached
+    // "unknown" response, say so.
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
+    }
+    // If we're doing hard-fail, we want to know if we have a cached response
+    // that has expired.
+    if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail &&
+        cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
+    }
+
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
+    if (cachedResponseResult != Success) {
+      return cachedResponseResult;
+    }
+    return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
+  }
+
+  UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
+  if (!arena) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  Result rv;
+  const char* url = nullptr; // owned by the arena
+
+  if (aiaExtension) {
+    rv = GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(arena, *aiaExtension, url);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!url) {
+    if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV ||
+        cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
+    }
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
+      return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
+    }
+    if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
+      return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
+    }
+
+    // Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
+    // assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
+    // interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
+    // certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  // Only request a response if we didn't have a cached indication of failure
+  // (don't keep requesting responses from a failing server).
+  Input response;
+  bool attemptedRequest;
+  if (cachedResponseResult == Success ||
+      cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
+      cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
+    uint8_t ocspRequest[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+    size_t ocspRequestLength;
+    rv = CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(*this, certID, ocspRequest,
+                                  ocspRequestLength);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    SECItem ocspRequestItem = {
+      siBuffer,
+      ocspRequest,
+      static_cast<unsigned int>(ocspRequestLength)
+    };
+    // Owned by arena
+    SECItem* responseSECItem = nullptr;
+    Result tempRV =
+      DoOCSPRequest(arena, url, mOriginAttributes, &ocspRequestItem,
+                    OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(mOCSPFetching),
+                    mOCSPGetConfig == CertVerifier::ocspGetEnabled,
+                    responseSECItem);
+    MOZ_ASSERT((tempRV != Success) || responseSECItem);
+    if (tempRV != Success) {
+      rv = tempRV;
+    } else if (response.Init(responseSECItem->data, responseSECItem->len)
+                 != Success) {
+      rv = Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE; // too big
+    }
+    attemptedRequest = true;
+  } else {
+    rv = cachedResponseResult;
+    attemptedRequest = false;
+  }
+
+  if (response.GetLength() == 0) {
+    Result error = rv;
+    if (attemptedRequest) {
+      Time timeout(time);
+      if (timeout.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
+        return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
+      }
+      rv = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, mOriginAttributes, error, time, timeout);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+    }
+    if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
+              "OCSP request failure"));
+      return error;
+    }
+    if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from cached "
+              "response after OCSP request failure"));
+      return cachedResponseResult;
+    }
+    if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
+      MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+             ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired "
+              "stapled response after OCSP request failure"));
+      return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
+    }
+
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
+            "OCSP request failure"));
+    return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
+  }
+
+  // If the response from the network has expired but indicates a revoked
+  // or unknown certificate, PR_GetError() will return the appropriate error.
+  // We actually ignore expired here.
+  bool expired;
+  rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
+                                              maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
+                                              response, ResponseIsFromNetwork,
+                                              expired);
+  if (rv == Success || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+      ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
+      rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired stapled "
+            "response after OCSP request verification failure"));
+    return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+         ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
+
+  return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
+  const CertID& certID, Time time, uint16_t maxLifetimeInDays,
+  Input encodedResponse, EncodedResponseSource responseSource,
+  /*out*/ bool& expired)
+{
+  Time thisUpdate(Time::uninitialized);
+  Time validThrough(Time::uninitialized);
+
+  // We use a try and fallback approach which first mandates good signature
+  // digest algorithms, then falls back to SHA-1 if this fails. If a delegated
+  // OCSP response signing certificate was issued with a SHA-1 signature,
+  // verification initially fails. We cache the failure and then re-use that
+  // result even when doing fallback (i.e. when weak signature digest algorithms
+  // should succeed). To address this we use an OCSPVerificationTrustDomain
+  // here, rather than using *this, to ensure verification succeeds for all
+  // allowed signature digest algorithms.
+  OCSPVerificationTrustDomain trustDomain(*this);
+  Result rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(trustDomain, certID, time,
+                                        maxLifetimeInDays, encodedResponse,
+                                        expired, &thisUpdate, &validThrough);
+  // If a response was stapled and expired, we don't want to cache it. Return
+  // early to simplify the logic here.
+  if (responseSource == ResponseWasStapled && expired) {
+    PR_ASSERT(rv != Success);
+    return rv;
+  }
+  // validThrough is only trustworthy if the response successfully verifies
+  // or it indicates a revoked or unknown certificate.
+  // If this isn't the case, store an indication of failure (to prevent
+  // repeatedly requesting a response from a failing server).
+  if (rv != Success && rv != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
+      rv != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
+    validThrough = time;
+    if (validThrough.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
+    }
+  }
+  if (responseSource == ResponseIsFromNetwork ||
+      rv == Success ||
+      rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE ||
+      rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+           ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: caching OCSP response"));
+    Result putRV = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, mOriginAttributes, rv, thisUpdate,
+                                  validThrough);
+    if (putRV != Success) {
+      return putRV;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return rv;
+}
+
+static const uint8_t CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
+  "\x30\x32\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x0E\x30"
+  "\x0C\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x13\x05\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x31\x13\x30\x11\x06"
+  "\x03\x55\x04\x03\x13\x0A\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x20\x52\x4F\x4F\x54";
+
+static const uint8_t CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
+  "\x30\x81\x8A\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x32"
+  "\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x0C\x29\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74"
+  "\x65\x72\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F"
+  "\x72\x6D\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x31\x47\x30\x45"
+  "\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0C\x3E\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74\x65\x72"
+  "\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F\x72\x6D"
+  "\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x20\x45\x56\x20\x43\x65"
+  "\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x73\x20\x52\x6F\x6F\x74";
+
+class WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator
+{
+public:
+  explicit WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator(const uint8_t* aTarget,
+                                                      size_t aTargetLength)
+    : mTarget(aTarget)
+  {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aTargetLength == CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN,
+               "Hashes should be of the same length.");
+  }
+
+  int operator()(const WhitelistedCNNICHash val) const {
+    return memcmp(mTarget, val.hash, CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN);
+  }
+
+private:
+  const uint8_t* mTarget;
+};
+
+static bool
+CertIsStartComOrWoSign(const CERTCertificate* cert)
+{
+  for (const DataAndLength& dn : StartComAndWoSignDNs) {
+    if (cert->derSubject.len == dn.len &&
+        PodEqual(cert->derSubject.data, dn.data, dn.len)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// If a certificate in the given chain appears to have been issued by one of
+// seven roots operated by StartCom and WoSign that are not trusted to issue new
+// certificates, verify that the end-entity has a notBefore date before 21
+// October 2016. If the value of notBefore is after this time, the chain is not
+// valid.
+// (NB: While there are seven distinct roots being checked for, two of them
+// share distinguished names, resulting in six distinct distinguished names to
+// actually look for.)
+static Result
+CheckForStartComOrWoSign(const UniqueCERTCertList& certChain)
+{
+  if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certChain)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  const CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certChain);
+  if (!endEntityNode || !endEntityNode->cert) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  PRTime notBefore;
+  PRTime notAfter;
+  if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityNode->cert, &notBefore, &notAfter)
+        != SECSuccess) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  // PRTime is microseconds since the epoch, whereas JS time is milliseconds.
+  // (new Date("2016-10-21T00:00:00Z")).getTime() * 1000
+  static const PRTime OCTOBER_21_2016 = 1477008000000000;
+  if (notBefore <= OCTOBER_21_2016) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  for (const CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certChain);
+       !CERT_LIST_END(node, certChain); node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+    if (!node || !node->cert) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    if (CertIsStartComOrWoSign(node->cert)) {
+      return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray, Time time)
+{
+  MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+         ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: IsChainValid"));
+
+  UniqueCERTCertList certList;
+  SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certArray,
+                                                            certList);
+  if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
+  }
+  if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  Result rv = CheckForStartComOrWoSign(certList);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // If the certificate appears to have been issued by a CNNIC root, only allow
+  // it if it is on the whitelist.
+  CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
+  if (!rootNode) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  CERTCertificate* root = rootNode->cert;
+  if (!root) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  if ((root->derSubject.len == sizeof(CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA) - 1 &&
+       memcmp(root->derSubject.data, CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA,
+              root->derSubject.len) == 0) ||
+      (root->derSubject.len == sizeof(CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA) - 1 &&
+       memcmp(root->derSubject.data, CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA,
+              root->derSubject.len) == 0)) {
+    CERTCertListNode* certNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+    if (!certNode) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    CERTCertificate* cert = certNode->cert;
+    if (!cert) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    Digest digest;
+    nsresult nsrv = digest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, cert->derCert.data,
+                                     cert->derCert.len);
+    if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    const uint8_t* certHash(
+      BitwiseCast<uint8_t*, unsigned char*>(digest.get().data));
+    size_t certHashLen = digest.get().len;
+    size_t unused;
+    if (!mozilla::BinarySearchIf(WhitelistedCNNICHashes, 0,
+                                 ArrayLength(WhitelistedCNNICHashes),
+                                 WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator(
+                                   certHash, certHashLen),
+                                 &unused)) {
+      return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
+  rv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(root, isBuiltInRoot);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  bool skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode =
+    (!isBuiltInRoot && mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningAllowUserCAMITM);
+  // If mHostname isn't set, we're not verifying in the context of a TLS
+  // handshake, so don't verify HPKP in those cases.
+  if (mHostname && (mPinningMode != CertVerifier::pinningDisabled) &&
+      !skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode) {
+    bool enforceTestMode =
+      (mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningEnforceTestMode);
+    bool chainHasValidPins;
+    nsresult nsrv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(
+      certList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, chainHasValidPins,
+      mPinningTelemetryInfo);
+    if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
+      return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+    if (!chainHasValidPins) {
+      return Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  mBuiltChain = Move(certList);
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm aAlg,
+                                                    EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                                    Time notBefore)
+{
+  // (new Date("2016-01-01T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
+  static const Time JANUARY_FIRST_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1451606400);
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm"));
+  if (aAlg == DigestAlgorithm::sha1) {
+    switch (mSHA1Mode) {
+      case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
+        MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
+        return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
+      case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
+        if (JANUARY_FIRST_2016 <= notBefore) {
+          MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Post-2015 SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
+          return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
+        }
+        break;
+      case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Allowed:
+      // Enforcing that the resulting chain uses an imported root is only
+      // possible at a higher level. This is done in CertVerifier::VerifyCert.
+      case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
+      default:
+        break;
+      // MSVC warns unless we explicitly handle this now-unused option.
+      case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden:
+        MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unexpected SHA1Mode type");
+        return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
+  EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
+{
+  if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
+    return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
+  const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+  Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
+{
+  return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+                                       mPinArg);
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
+  EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, NamedCurve curve)
+{
+  switch (curve) {
+    case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
+      return Success;
+  }
+
+  return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+                                              Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
+{
+  return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+                                    mPinArg);
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time notBefore, Time notAfter,
+                                                EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                                KeyPurposeId keyPurpose)
+{
+  if (endEntityOrCA != EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+  if (keyPurpose == KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning) {
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  Duration DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP((2 * 365 + 3 * 31 + 7) *
+                                        Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
+  Duration maxValidityDuration(UINT64_MAX);
+  Duration validityDuration(notBefore, notAfter);
+
+  switch (mValidityCheckingMode) {
+    case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff:
+      return Success;
+    case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV:
+      // The EV Guidelines say the maximum is 27 months, but we use a slightly
+      // higher limit here to (hopefully) minimize compatibility breakage.
+      maxValidityDuration = DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP;
+      break;
+    default:
+      PR_NOT_REACHED("We're not handling every ValidityCheckingMode type");
+  }
+
+  if (validityDuration > maxValidityDuration) {
+    return Result::ERROR_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG;
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time notBefore,
+                                                      /*out*/ bool& matches)
+{
+  // (new Date("2015-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
+  static const Time AUGUST_23_2015 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1440288000);
+  // (new Date("2016-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
+  static const Time AUGUST_23_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1471910400);
+
+  switch (mNetscapeStepUpPolicy) {
+    case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::AlwaysMatch:
+      matches = true;
+      return Success;
+    case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::MatchBefore23August2016:
+      matches = notBefore < AUGUST_23_2016;
+      return Success;
+    case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::MatchBefore23August2015:
+      matches = notBefore < AUGUST_23_2015;
+      return Success;
+    case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch:
+      matches = false;
+      return Success;
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled NetscapeStepUpPolicy type");
+  }
+  return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+}
+
+void
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::ResetAccumulatedState()
+{
+  mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
+  mSCTListFromOCSPStapling = nullptr;
+  mSCTListFromCertificate = nullptr;
+}
+
+static Input
+SECItemToInput(const UniqueSECItem& item)
+{
+  Input result;
+  if (item) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(item->type == siBuffer);
+    Result rv = result.Init(item->data, item->len);
+    // As used here, |item| originally comes from an Input,
+    // so there should be no issues converting it back.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == Success);
+    Unused << rv; // suppresses warnings in release builds
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+Input
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetSCTListFromCertificate() const
+{
+  return SECItemToInput(mSCTListFromCertificate);
+}
+
+Input
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetSCTListFromOCSPStapling() const
+{
+  return SECItemToInput(mSCTListFromOCSPStapling);
+}
+
+void
+NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension extension,
+                                             Input extensionData)
+{
+  UniqueSECItem* out = nullptr;
+  switch (extension) {
+    case AuxiliaryExtension::EmbeddedSCTList:
+      out = &mSCTListFromCertificate;
+      break;
+    case AuxiliaryExtension::SCTListFromOCSPResponse:
+      out = &mSCTListFromOCSPStapling;
+      break;
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled AuxiliaryExtension");
+  }
+  if (out) {
+    SECItem extensionDataItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(extensionData);
+    out->reset(SECITEM_DupItem(&extensionDataItem));
+  }
+}
+
+SECStatus
+InitializeNSS(const char* dir, bool readOnly, bool loadPKCS11Modules)
+{
+  // The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
+  // module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
+  // later.  It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
+  // Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
+  // "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
+  uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
+  if (readOnly) {
+    flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
+  }
+  if (!loadPKCS11Modules) {
+    flags |= NSS_INIT_NOMODDB;
+  }
+  return ::NSS_Initialize(dir, "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
+}
+
+void
+DisableMD5()
+{
+  NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_MD5,
+    0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
+  NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
+    0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
+  NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC,
+    0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+LoadLoadableRoots(/*optional*/ const char* dir, const char* modNameUTF8)
+{
+  PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
+
+  if (!modNameUTF8) {
+    PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<char, void(&)(char*)>
+    fullLibraryPath(PR_GetLibraryName(dir, "nssckbi"), PR_FreeLibraryName);
+  if (!fullLibraryPath) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  // Escape the \ and " characters.
+  nsAutoCString escapedFullLibraryPath(fullLibraryPath.get());
+  escapedFullLibraryPath.ReplaceSubstring("\\", "\\\\");
+  escapedFullLibraryPath.ReplaceSubstring("\"", "\\\"");
+  if (escapedFullLibraryPath.IsEmpty()) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  // If a module exists with the same name, delete it.
+  int modType;
+  SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8, &modType);
+
+  nsAutoCString pkcs11ModuleSpec;
+  pkcs11ModuleSpec.AppendPrintf("name=\"%s\" library=\"%s\"", modNameUTF8,
+                                escapedFullLibraryPath.get());
+  if (pkcs11ModuleSpec.IsEmpty()) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  UniqueSECMODModule rootsModule(
+    SECMOD_LoadUserModule(const_cast<char*>(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get()), nullptr,
+                          false));
+  if (!rootsModule) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
+    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8)
+{
+  PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
+  UniqueSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
+
+  if (rootsModule) {
+    SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
+  }
+}
+
+nsresult
+DefaultServerNicknameForCert(const CERTCertificate* cert,
+                     /*out*/ nsCString& nickname)
+{
+  MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(cert);
+
+  UniquePORTString baseName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject));
+  if (!baseName) {
+    baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject));
+  }
+  if (!baseName) {
+    baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject));
+  }
+  if (!baseName) {
+    baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject));
+  }
+  if (!baseName) {
+    baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject));
+  }
+  if (!baseName) {
+    baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject));
+  }
+  if (!baseName) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // This function is only used in contexts where a failure to find a suitable
+  // nickname does not block the overall task from succeeding.
+  // As such, we use an arbitrary limit to prevent this nickname searching
+  // process from taking forever.
+  static const uint32_t ARBITRARY_LIMIT = 500;
+  for (uint32_t count = 1; count < ARBITRARY_LIMIT; count++) {
+    nickname = baseName.get();
+    if (count != 1) {
+      nickname.AppendPrintf(" #%u", count);
+    }
+    if (nickname.IsEmpty()) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    bool conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname.get(), &cert->derSubject,
+                                             cert->dbhandle);
+    if (!conflict) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Given a list of certificates representing a verified certificate path from an
+ * end-entity certificate to a trust anchor, imports the intermediate
+ * certificates into the permanent certificate database. This is an attempt to
+ * cope with misconfigured servers that don't include the appropriate
+ * intermediate certificates in the TLS handshake.
+ *
+ * @param certList the verified certificate list
+ */
+void
+SaveIntermediateCerts(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
+{
+  if (!certList) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
+  if (!slot) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  bool isEndEntity = true;
+  for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+        !CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
+        node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+    if (isEndEntity) {
+      // Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
+      isEndEntity = false;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (node->cert->slot) {
+      // This cert was found on a token; no need to remember it in the permanent
+      // database.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (node->cert->isperm) {
+      // We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // No need to save the trust anchor - it's either already a permanent
+    // certificate or it's the Microsoft Family Safety root or an enterprise
+    // root temporarily imported via the child mode or enterprise root features.
+    // We don't want to import these because they're intended to be temporary
+    // (and because importing them happens to reset their trust settings, which
+    // breaks these features).
+    if (node == CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString nickname;
+    nsresult rv = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert, nickname);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // As mentioned in the documentation of this function, we're importing only
+    // to cope with misconfigured servers. As such, we ignore the return value
+    // below, since it doesn't really matter if the import fails.
+    Unused << PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+                              nickname.get(), false);
+  }
+}
+
+} } // namespace mozilla::psm