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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
download | UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.gz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.lz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.tar.xz UXP-5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8.zip |
Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp | 283 |
1 files changed, 283 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp b/security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53e83c39c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/certverifier/CTLogVerifier.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "CTLogVerifier.h" + +#include "CTSerialization.h" +#include "hasht.h" +#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/Assertions.h" +#include "pkix/pkixnss.h" +#include "pkixutil.h" + +namespace mozilla { namespace ct { + +using namespace mozilla::pkix; + +// A TrustDomain used to extract the SCT log signature parameters +// given its subjectPublicKeyInfo. +// Only RSASSA-PKCS1v15 with SHA-256 and ECDSA (using the NIST P-256 curve) +// with SHA-256 are allowed. +// RSA keys must be at least 2048 bits. +// See See RFC 6962, Section 2.1.4. +class SignatureParamsTrustDomain final : public TrustDomain +{ +public: + SignatureParamsTrustDomain() + : mSignatureAlgorithm(DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::Anonymous) + { + } + + Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input, + TrustLevel&) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result FindIssuer(Input, IssuerChecker&, Time) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, + const Input*, const Input*) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result DigestBuf(Input, DigestAlgorithm, uint8_t*, size_t) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm, EndEntityOrCA, + Time) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(EndEntityOrCA, NamedCurve curve) override + { + MOZ_ASSERT(mSignatureAlgorithm == + DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::Anonymous); + if (curve != NamedCurve::secp256r1) { + return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + } + mSignatureAlgorithm = DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA; + return Success; + } + + Result VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest&, Input) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(EndEntityOrCA, + unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) + override + { + MOZ_ASSERT(mSignatureAlgorithm == + DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::Anonymous); + // Require RSA keys of at least 2048 bits. See RFC 6962, Section 2.1.4. + if (modulusSizeInBits < 2048) { + return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE; + } + mSignatureAlgorithm = DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::RSA; + return Success; + } + + Result VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(const SignedDigest&, Input) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time, Time, EndEntityOrCA, + KeyPurposeId) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + Result NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time, bool&) override + { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + void NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension, Input) override + { + } + + DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm mSignatureAlgorithm; +}; + + +CTLogVerifier::CTLogVerifier() + : mSignatureAlgorithm(DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::Anonymous) +{ +} + +Result +CTLogVerifier::Init(Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) +{ + SignatureParamsTrustDomain trustDomain; + Result rv = CheckSubjectPublicKeyInfo(subjectPublicKeyInfo, trustDomain, + EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + mSignatureAlgorithm = trustDomain.mSignatureAlgorithm; + + rv = InputToBuffer(subjectPublicKeyInfo, mSubjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + if (!mKeyId.resizeUninitialized(SHA256_LENGTH)) { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + rv = DigestBufNSS(subjectPublicKeyInfo, DigestAlgorithm::sha256, + mKeyId.begin(), mKeyId.length()); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + return Success; +} + +Result +CTLogVerifier::Verify(const LogEntry& entry, + const SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct) +{ + if (mKeyId.empty() || sct.logId != mKeyId) { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + } + if (!SignatureParametersMatch(sct.signature)) { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + } + + Buffer serializedLogEntry; + Result rv = EncodeLogEntry(entry, serializedLogEntry); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + Input logEntryInput; + rv = BufferToInput(serializedLogEntry, logEntryInput); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + Input sctExtensionsInput; + rv = BufferToInput(sct.extensions, sctExtensionsInput); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + Buffer serializedData; + rv = EncodeV1SCTSignedData(sct.timestamp, logEntryInput, sctExtensionsInput, + serializedData); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + return VerifySignature(serializedData, sct.signature.signatureData); +} + +Result +CTLogVerifier::VerifySignedTreeHead(const SignedTreeHead& sth) +{ + if (!SignatureParametersMatch(sth.signature)) { + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + } + + Buffer serializedData; + Result rv = EncodeTreeHeadSignature(sth, serializedData); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + return VerifySignature(serializedData, sth.signature.signatureData); +} + +bool +CTLogVerifier::SignatureParametersMatch(const DigitallySigned& signature) +{ + return signature.SignatureParametersMatch( + DigitallySigned::HashAlgorithm::SHA256, mSignatureAlgorithm); +} + +Result +CTLogVerifier::VerifySignature(Input data, Input signature) +{ + uint8_t digest[SHA256_LENGTH]; + Result rv = DigestBufNSS(data, DigestAlgorithm::sha256, digest, + ArrayLength(digest)); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + SignedDigest signedDigest; + signedDigest.digestAlgorithm = DigestAlgorithm::sha256; + rv = signedDigest.digest.Init(digest, ArrayLength(digest)); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + rv = signedDigest.signature.Init(signature); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + Input spki; + rv = BufferToInput(mSubjectPublicKeyInfo, spki); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + + switch (mSignatureAlgorithm) { + case DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::RSA: + rv = VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, spki, nullptr); + break; + case DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA: + rv = VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, spki, nullptr); + break; + // We do not expect new values added to this enum any time soon, + // so just listing all the available ones seems to be the easiest way + // to suppress warning C4061 on MSVC (which expects all values of the + // enum to be explicitly handled). + case DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::Anonymous: + case DigitallySigned::SignatureAlgorithm::DSA: + default: + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("RSA/ECDSA expected"); + return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + } + if (rv != Success) { + if (IsFatalError(rv)) { + return rv; + } + // If the error is non-fatal, we assume the signature was invalid. + return Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE; + } + return Success; +} + +Result +CTLogVerifier::VerifySignature(const Buffer& data, const Buffer& signature) +{ + Input dataInput; + Result rv = BufferToInput(data, dataInput); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + Input signatureInput; + rv = BufferToInput(signature, signatureInput); + if (rv != Success) { + return rv; + } + return VerifySignature(dataInput, signatureInput); +} + +} } // namespace mozilla::ct |