Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

14 files changed, 2124 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp b/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d64bfcb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1560 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsNSSCertificateDB.h"
+
+#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
+#include "CryptoTask.h"
+#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
+#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsDataSignatureVerifier.h"
+#include "nsHashKeys.h"
+#include "nsIDirectoryEnumerator.h"
+#include "nsIFile.h"
+#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
+#include "nsIInputStream.h"
+#include "nsIStringEnumerator.h"
+#include "nsIZipReader.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsTHashtable.h"
+#include "nssb64.h"
+#include "pkix/pkix.h"
+#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "plstr.h"
+#include "secmime.h"
+
+
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::psm;
+
+extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
+
+namespace {
+
+// Reads a maximum of 1MB from a stream into the supplied buffer.
+// The reason for the 1MB limit is because this function is used to read
+// signature-related files and we want to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of
+// an entry can be hundreds of times larger than the compressed version,
+// especially if someone has specifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to
+// consume massive amounts of disk space.
+//
+// @param stream  The input stream to read from.
+// @param buf     The buffer that we read the stream into, which must have
+//                already been allocated.
+nsresult
+ReadStream(const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream>& stream, /*out*/ SECItem& buf)
+{
+  // The size returned by Available() might be inaccurate so we need
+  // to check that Available() matches up with the actual length of
+  // the file.
+  uint64_t length;
+  nsresult rv = stream->Available(&length);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Cap the maximum accepted size of signature-related files at 1MB (which is
+  // still crazily huge) to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of an entry can be
+  // hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, especially if
+  // someone has speifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to consume
+  // massive amounts of disk space.
+  static const uint32_t MAX_LENGTH = 1024 * 1024;
+  if (length > MAX_LENGTH) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG;
+  }
+
+  // With bug 164695 in mind we +1 to leave room for null-terminating
+  // the buffer.
+  SECITEM_AllocItem(buf, static_cast<uint32_t>(length + 1));
+
+  // buf.len == length + 1. We attempt to read length + 1 bytes
+  // instead of length, so that we can check whether the metadata for
+  // the entry is incorrect.
+  uint32_t bytesRead;
+  rv = stream->Read(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(buf.data), buf.len,
+                    &bytesRead);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  if (bytesRead != length) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED;
+  }
+
+  buf.data[buf.len - 1] = 0; // null-terminate
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Finds exactly one (signature metadata) JAR entry that matches the given
+// search pattern, and then load it. Fails if there are no matches or if
+// there is more than one match. If bugDigest is not null then on success
+// bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digeset of the entry.
+nsresult
+FindAndLoadOneEntry(nsIZipReader * zip,
+                    const nsACString & searchPattern,
+                    /*out*/ nsACString & filename,
+                    /*out*/ SECItem & buf,
+                    /*optional, out*/ Digest * bufDigest)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> files;
+  nsresult rv = zip->FindEntries(searchPattern, getter_AddRefs(files));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  bool more;
+  rv = files->HasMore(&more);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (!more) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  rv = files->GetNext(filename);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Check if there is more than one match, if so then error!
+  rv = files->HasMore(&more);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (more) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
+  rv = zip->GetInputStream(filename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = ReadStream(stream, buf);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  if (bufDigest) {
+    rv = bufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, buf.data, buf.len - 1);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Verify the digest of an entry. We avoid loading the entire entry into memory
+// at once, which would require memory in proportion to the size of the largest
+// entry. Instead, we require only a small, fixed amount of memory.
+//
+// @param stream  an input stream from a JAR entry or file depending on whether
+//                it is from a signed archive or unpacked into a directory
+// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
+//                           contents against, from the manifest
+// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O, which must have
+//            already been allocated. The size of this buffer is the unit
+//            size of our I/O.
+nsresult
+VerifyStreamContentDigest(nsIInputStream* stream,
+                          const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
+{
+  MOZ_ASSERT(buf.len > 0);
+  if (digestFromManifest.len != SHA1_LENGTH)
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  uint64_t len64;
+  rv = stream->Available(&len64);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (len64 > UINT32_MAX) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
+  }
+
+  UniquePK11Context digestContext(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1));
+  if (!digestContext) {
+    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError());
+  }
+
+  rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(digestContext.get()));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  uint64_t totalBytesRead = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    uint32_t bytesRead;
+    rv = stream->Read(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(buf.data), buf.len,
+                      &bytesRead);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (bytesRead == 0) {
+      break; // EOF
+    }
+
+    totalBytesRead += bytesRead;
+    if (totalBytesRead >= UINT32_MAX) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
+    }
+
+    rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(digestContext.get(), buf.data, bytesRead));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  if (totalBytesRead != len64) {
+    // The metadata we used for Available() doesn't match the actual size of
+    // the entry.
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Verify that the digests match.
+  Digest digest;
+  rv = digest.End(SEC_OID_SHA1, digestContext);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&digestFromManifest, &digest.get()) != SECEqual) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MODIFIED_ENTRY;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+VerifyEntryContentDigest(nsIZipReader* zip, const nsACString& aFilename,
+                         const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
+  nsresult rv = zip->GetInputStream(aFilename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
+}
+
+// @oaram aDir       directory containing the unpacked signed archive
+// @param aFilename  path of the target file relative to aDir
+// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
+//                           contents against, from the manifest
+// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O
+nsresult
+VerifyFileContentDigest(nsIFile* aDir, const nsAString& aFilename,
+                        const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
+{
+  // Find the file corresponding to the manifest path
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
+  nsresult rv = aDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(file));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We don't know how to handle JARs with signed directory entries.
+  // It's technically possible in the manifest but makes no sense on disk.
+  // Inside an archive we just ignore them, but here we have to treat it
+  // as an error because the signed bytes never got unpacked.
+  int32_t pos = 0;
+  int32_t slash;
+  int32_t namelen = aFilename.Length();
+  if (namelen == 0 || aFilename[namelen - 1] == '/') {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Append path segments one by one
+  do {
+    slash = aFilename.FindChar('/', pos);
+    int32_t segend = (slash == kNotFound) ? namelen : slash;
+    rv = file->Append(Substring(aFilename, pos, (segend - pos)));
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+    }
+    pos = slash + 1;
+  }  while (pos < namelen && slash != kNotFound);
+
+  bool exists;
+  rv = file->Exists(&exists);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  bool isDir;
+  rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isDir) {
+    // We only support signed files, not directory entries
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Open an input stream for that file and verify it.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
+  rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), file, -1, -1,
+                                  nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !stream) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
+}
+
+// On input, nextLineStart is the start of the current line. On output,
+// nextLineStart is the start of the next line.
+nsresult
+ReadLine(/*in/out*/ const char* & nextLineStart, /*out*/ nsCString & line,
+         bool allowContinuations = true)
+{
+  line.Truncate();
+  size_t previousLength = 0;
+  size_t currentLength = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    const char* eol = PL_strpbrk(nextLineStart, "\r\n");
+
+    if (!eol) { // Reached end of file before newline
+      eol = nextLineStart + strlen(nextLineStart);
+    }
+
+    previousLength = currentLength;
+    line.Append(nextLineStart, eol - nextLineStart);
+    currentLength = line.Length();
+
+    // The spec says "No line may be longer than 72 bytes (not characters)"
+    // in its UTF8-encoded form.
+    static const size_t lineLimit = 72;
+    if (currentLength - previousLength > lineLimit) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    // The spec says: "Implementations should support 65535-byte
+    // (not character) header values..."
+    if (currentLength > 65535) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    if (*eol == '\r') {
+      ++eol;
+    }
+    if (*eol == '\n') {
+      ++eol;
+    }
+
+    nextLineStart = eol;
+
+    if (*eol != ' ') {
+      // not a continuation
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // continuation
+    if (!allowContinuations) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    ++nextLineStart; // skip space and keep appending
+  }
+}
+
+// The header strings are defined in the JAR specification.
+#define JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/(M|m)(ANIFEST|anifest).(MF|mf)$"
+#define JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(SF|sf)$"
+#define JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(RSA|rsa)$"
+#define JAR_META_DIR "META-INF"
+#define JAR_MF_HEADER "Manifest-Version: 1.0"
+#define JAR_SF_HEADER "Signature-Version: 1.0"
+
+nsresult
+ParseAttribute(const nsAutoCString & curLine,
+               /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrName,
+               /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrValue)
+{
+  // Find the colon that separates the name from the value.
+  int32_t colonPos = curLine.FindChar(':');
+  if (colonPos == kNotFound) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // set attrName to the name, skipping spaces between the name and colon
+  int32_t nameEnd = colonPos;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (nameEnd == 0) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; // colon with no name
+    }
+    if (curLine[nameEnd - 1] != ' ')
+      break;
+    --nameEnd;
+  }
+  curLine.Left(attrName, nameEnd);
+
+  // Set attrValue to the value, skipping spaces between the colon and the
+  // value. The value may be empty.
+  int32_t valueStart = colonPos + 1;
+  int32_t curLineLength = curLine.Length();
+  while (valueStart != curLineLength && curLine[valueStart] == ' ') {
+    ++valueStart;
+  }
+  curLine.Right(attrValue, curLineLength - valueStart);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Parses the version line of the MF or SF header.
+nsresult
+CheckManifestVersion(const char* & nextLineStart,
+                     const nsACString & expectedHeader)
+{
+  // The JAR spec says: "Manifest-Version and Signature-Version must be first,
+  // and in exactly that case (so that they can be recognized easily as magic
+  // strings)."
+  nsAutoCString curLine;
+  nsresult rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine, false);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  if (!curLine.Equals(expectedHeader)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Parses a signature file (SF) as defined in the JDK 8 JAR Specification.
+//
+// The SF file *must* contain exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute in
+// the main section. All other sections are ignored. This means that this will
+// NOT parse old-style signature files that have separate digests per entry.
+// The JDK8 x-Digest-Manifest variant is better because:
+//
+//   (1) It allows us to follow the principle that we should minimize the
+//       processing of data that we do before we verify its signature. In
+//       particular, with the x-Digest-Manifest style, we can verify the digest
+//       of MANIFEST.MF before we parse it, which prevents malicious JARs
+//       exploiting our MANIFEST.MF parser.
+//   (2) It is more time-efficient and space-efficient to have one
+//       x-Digest-Manifest instead of multiple x-Digest values.
+//
+// In order to get benefit (1), we do NOT implement the fallback to the older
+// mechanism as the spec requires/suggests. Also, for simplity's sake, we only
+// support exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute, and no other
+// algorithms.
+//
+// filebuf must be null-terminated. On output, mfDigest will contain the
+// decoded value of SHA1-Digest-Manifest.
+nsresult
+ParseSF(const char* filebuf, /*out*/ SECItem & mfDigest)
+{
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
+  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_HEADER));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+    return rv;
+
+  // Find SHA1-Digest-Manifest
+  for (;;) {
+    nsAutoCString curLine;
+    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
+      // End of main section (blank line or end-of-file), and no
+      // SHA1-Digest-Manifest found.
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString attrName;
+    nsAutoCString attrValue;
+    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest-manifest")) {
+      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&mfDigest, attrValue.get()));
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+
+      // There could be multiple SHA1-Digest-Manifest attributes, which
+      // would be an error, but it's better to just skip any erroneous
+      // duplicate entries rather than trying to detect them, because:
+      //
+      //   (1) It's simpler, and simpler generally means more secure
+      //   (2) An attacker can't make us accept a JAR we would otherwise
+      //       reject just by adding additional SHA1-Digest-Manifest
+      //       attributes.
+      break;
+    }
+
+    // ignore unrecognized attributes
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Parses MANIFEST.MF. The filenames of all entries will be returned in
+// mfItems. buf must be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing
+// I/O.
+nsresult
+ParseMF(const char* filebuf, nsIZipReader * zip,
+        /*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> & mfItems,
+        ScopedAutoSECItem & buf)
+{
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
+
+  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
+  {
+    nsAutoCString line;
+    do {
+      rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+    } while (line.Length() > 0);
+
+    // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
+    if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString curItemName;
+  ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    nsAutoCString curLine;
+    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
+      // end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
+
+      if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
+        // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
+        // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      if (digest.len == 0) {
+        // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
+        // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      if (mfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
+        // Duplicate entry
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      // Verify that the entry's content digest matches the digest from this
+      // MF section.
+      rv = VerifyEntryContentDigest(zip, curItemName, digest, buf);
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+        return rv;
+
+      mfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
+
+      if (*nextLineStart == '\0') // end-of-file
+        break;
+
+      // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
+      // item yet.
+      curItemName.Truncate();
+      digest.reset();
+
+      continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString attrName;
+    nsAutoCString attrValue;
+    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Lines to look for:
+
+    // (1) Digest:
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest"))
+    {
+      if (digest.len > 0) // multiple SHA1 digests in section
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+
+      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name"))
+    {
+      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) // multiple names in section
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+
+      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0))
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+
+      curItemName = attrValue;
+
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
+      // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
+      // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
+      // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    // unrecognized attributes must be ignored
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+struct VerifyCertificateContext {
+  AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot;
+  UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain;
+};
+
+nsresult
+VerifyCertificate(CERTCertificate* signerCert, void* voidContext, void* pinArg)
+{
+  // TODO: null pinArg is tolerated.
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert) || NS_WARN_IF(!voidContext)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+  const VerifyCertificateContext& context =
+    *static_cast<const VerifyCertificateContext*>(voidContext);
+
+  AppTrustDomain trustDomain(context.builtChain, pinArg);
+  if (trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(context.trustedRoot) != SECSuccess) {
+    return MapSECStatus(SECFailure);
+  }
+  Input certDER;
+  mozilla::pkix::Result rv = certDER.Init(signerCert->derCert.data,
+                                          signerCert->derCert.len);
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
+  }
+
+  rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(),
+                      EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
+                      KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
+                      KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
+                      CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
+                      nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/);
+  if (rv == mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
+    // For code-signing you normally need trusted 3rd-party timestamps to
+    // handle expiration properly. The signer could always mess with their
+    // system clock so you can't trust the certificate was un-expired when
+    // the signing took place. The choice is either to ignore expiration
+    // or to enforce expiration at time of use. The latter leads to the
+    // user-hostile result that perfectly good code stops working.
+    //
+    // Our package format doesn't support timestamps (nor do we have a
+    // trusted 3rd party timestamper), but since we sign all of our apps and
+    // add-ons ourselves we can trust ourselves not to mess with the clock
+    // on the signing systems. We also have a revocation mechanism if we
+    // need it. It's OK to ignore cert expiration under these conditions.
+    //
+    // This is an invalid approach if
+    //  * we issue certs to let others sign their own packages
+    //  * mozilla::pkix returns "expired" when there are "worse" problems
+    //    with the certificate or chain.
+    // (see bug 1267318)
+    rv = Success;
+  }
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+VerifySignature(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot, const SECItem& buffer,
+                const SECItem& detachedDigest,
+                /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain)
+{
+  // Currently, this function is only called within the CalculateResult() method
+  // of CryptoTasks. As such, NSS should not be shut down at this point and the
+  // CryptoTask implementation should already hold a nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock.
+  // We acquire a nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock here solely to prove we did to
+  // VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate().
+  nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
+  VerifyCertificateContext context = { trustedRoot, builtChain };
+  // XXX: missing pinArg
+  return VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate(buffer, detachedDigest,
+                                                        VerifyCertificate,
+                                                        &context, nullptr,
+                                                        locker);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+OpenSignedAppFile(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
+                  /*out, optional */ nsIZipReader** aZipReader,
+                  /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
+
+  if (aZipReader) {
+    *aZipReader = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> zip = do_CreateInstance(kZipReaderCID, &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = zip->Open(aJarFile);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Signature (RSA) file
+  nsAutoCString sigFilename;
+  ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
+  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, nsLiteralCString(JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING),
+                           sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+
+  // Signature (SF) file
+  nsAutoCString sfFilename;
+  ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
+  Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
+  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING),
+                           sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
+  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
+  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
+                       builtChain);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
+  rv = ParseSF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Manifest (MF) file
+  nsAutoCString mfFilename;
+  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
+  Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
+  rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING),
+                           mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
+  // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
+  // memory.
+  ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
+
+  nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> items;
+
+  rv = ParseMF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(manifestBuffer.data), zip,
+               items, buf);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Verify every entry in the file.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> entries;
+  rv = zip->FindEntries(EmptyCString(), getter_AddRefs(entries));
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !entries) {
+    rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    bool hasMore;
+    rv = entries->HasMore(&hasMore);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (!hasMore) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString entryFilename;
+    rv = entries->GetNext(entryFilename);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Verifying digests for %s",
+           entryFilename.get()));
+
+    // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
+    // signature.
+    //
+    // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
+    // multiple signatures, because the metadata for the other signatures
+    // is not signed either.
+    if (entryFilename == mfFilename ||
+        entryFilename == sfFilename ||
+        entryFilename == sigFilename) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (entryFilename.Length() == 0) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    // Entries with names that end in "/" are directory entries, which are not
+    // signed.
+    //
+    // XXX: As long as we don't unpack the JAR into the filesystem, the "/"
+    // entries are harmless. But, it is not clear what the security
+    // implications of directory entries are if/when we were to unpackage the
+    // JAR into the filesystem.
+    if (entryFilename[entryFilename.Length() - 1] == '/') {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    nsCStringHashKey * item = items.GetEntry(entryFilename);
+    if (!item) {
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
+    }
+
+    // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
+    items.RemoveEntry(item);
+  }
+
+  // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
+  // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
+  // manifest but missing from the archive?
+  if (items.Count() != 0) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  // Return the reader to the caller if they want it
+  if (aZipReader) {
+    zip.forget(aZipReader);
+  }
+
+  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
+  // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
+    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
+        !signerCertNode->cert) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
+      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
+    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+VerifySignedManifest(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
+                     nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
+                     nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
+                     /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aManifestStream);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSignatureStream);
+
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Load signature file in buffer
+  ScopedAutoSECItem signatureBuffer;
+  nsresult rv = ReadStream(aSignatureStream, signatureBuffer);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  signatureBuffer.type = siBuffer;
+
+  // Load manifest file in buffer
+  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
+  rv = ReadStream(aManifestStream, manifestBuffer);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Calculate SHA1 digest of the manifest buffer
+  Digest manifestCalculatedDigest;
+  rv = manifestCalculatedDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
+                                          manifestBuffer.data,
+                                          manifestBuffer.len - 1); // buffer is null terminated
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Get base64 encoded string from manifest buffer digest
+  UniquePORTString
+    base64EncDigest(NSSBase64_EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0,
+                      const_cast<SECItem*>(&manifestCalculatedDigest.get())));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!base64EncDigest)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  // Calculate SHA1 digest of the base64 encoded string
+  Digest doubleDigest;
+  rv = doubleDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
+                              BitwiseCast<uint8_t*, char*>(base64EncDigest.get()),
+                              strlen(base64EncDigest.get()));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Verify the manifest signature (signed digest of the base64 encoded string)
+  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
+  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, signatureBuffer,
+                       doubleDigest.get(), builtChain);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
+    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
+        !signerCertNode->cert) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
+      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+class OpenSignedAppFileTask final : public CryptoTask
+{
+public:
+  OpenSignedAppFileTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
+                        nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
+    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
+    , mJarFile(aJarFile)
+    , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback>(aCallback))
+  {
+  }
+
+private:
+  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
+  {
+    return OpenSignedAppFile(mTrustedRoot, mJarFile,
+                             getter_AddRefs(mZipReader),
+                             getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
+  }
+
+  // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
+  // needs to be released
+  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
+
+  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
+  {
+    (void) mCallback->OpenSignedAppFileFinished(rv, mZipReader, mSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
+  const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mJarFile;
+  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback> mCallback;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> mZipReader; // out
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
+};
+
+class VerifySignedmanifestTask final : public CryptoTask
+{
+public:
+  VerifySignedmanifestTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
+                           nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
+                           nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
+                           nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
+    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
+    , mManifestStream(aManifestStream)
+    , mSignatureStream(aSignatureStream)
+    , mCallback(
+      new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback>(aCallback))
+  {
+  }
+
+private:
+  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
+  {
+    return VerifySignedManifest(mTrustedRoot, mManifestStream,
+                                mSignatureStream, getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
+  }
+
+  // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
+  // needs to be released
+  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
+
+  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
+  {
+    (void) mCallback->VerifySignedManifestFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
+  const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mManifestStream;
+  const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mSignatureStream;
+  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback> mCallback;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
+};
+
+} // unnamed namespace
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNSSCertificateDB::OpenSignedAppFileAsync(
+  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
+  nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
+  RefPtr<OpenSignedAppFileTask> task(new OpenSignedAppFileTask(aTrustedRoot,
+                                                               aJarFile,
+                                                               aCallback));
+  return task->Dispatch("SignedJAR");
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedManifestAsync(
+  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
+  nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aManifestStream);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSignatureStream);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
+
+  RefPtr<VerifySignedmanifestTask> task(
+    new VerifySignedmanifestTask(aTrustedRoot, aManifestStream,
+                                 aSignatureStream, aCallback));
+  return task->Dispatch("SignedManifest");
+}
+
+
+//
+// Signature verification for archives unpacked into a file structure
+//
+
+// Finds the "*.rsa" signature file in the META-INF directory and returns
+// the name. It is an error if there are none or more than one .rsa file
+nsresult
+FindSignatureFilename(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
+                      /*out*/ nsAString& aFilename)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
+  nsresult rv = aMetaDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+
+  bool found = false;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
+  rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
+
+  while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && file) {
+    nsAutoString leafname;
+    rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+      if (StringEndsWith(leafname, NS_LITERAL_STRING(".rsa"))) {
+        if (!found) {
+          found = true;
+          aFilename = leafname;
+        } else {
+          // second signature file is an error
+          rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!found) {
+    rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+
+  files->Close();
+  return rv;
+}
+
+// Loads the signature metadata file that matches the given filename in
+// the passed-in Meta-inf directory. If bufDigest is not null then on
+// success bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digest of the entry.
+nsresult
+LoadOneMetafile(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
+                const nsAString& aFilename,
+                /*out*/ SECItem& aBuf,
+                /*optional, out*/ Digest* aBufDigest)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metafile;
+  nsresult rv = aMetaDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metafile));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = metafile->Append(aFilename);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  bool exists;
+  rv = metafile->Exists(&exists);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
+    // we can call a missing .rsa file "unsigned" but FindSignatureFilename()
+    // already found one: missing other metadata files means a broken signature.
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
+  rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), metafile);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = ReadStream(stream, aBuf);
+  stream->Close();
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (aBufDigest) {
+    rv = aBufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, aBuf.data, aBuf.len - 1);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Parses MANIFEST.MF and verifies the contents of the unpacked files
+// listed in the manifest.
+// The filenames of all entries will be returned in aMfItems. aBuf must
+// be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing I/O.
+nsresult
+ParseMFUnpacked(const char* aFilebuf, nsIFile* aDir,
+                /*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aMfItems,
+                ScopedAutoSECItem& aBuf)
+{
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  const char* nextLineStart = aFilebuf;
+
+  rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
+  {
+    nsAutoCString line;
+    do {
+      rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+    } while (line.Length() > 0);
+
+    // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
+    if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString curItemName;
+  ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    nsAutoCString curLine;
+    rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
+      // end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
+
+      if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
+        // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
+        // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      if (digest.len == 0) {
+        // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
+        // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      if (aMfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
+        // Duplicate entry
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      // Verify that the file's content digest matches the digest from this
+      // MF section.
+      rv = VerifyFileContentDigest(aDir, curItemName, digest, aBuf);
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+
+      aMfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
+
+      if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
+        // end-of-file
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
+      // item yet.
+      curItemName.Truncate();
+      digest.reset();
+
+      continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString attrName;
+    nsAutoCString attrValue;
+    rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Lines to look for:
+
+    // (1) Digest:
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest")) {
+      if (digest.len > 0) {
+        // multiple SHA1 digests in section
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
+      if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name")) {
+      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) {
+        // multiple names in section
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0)) {
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+      }
+
+      curItemName = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(attrValue);
+
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
+    if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
+      // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
+      // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
+      // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
+      return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    // unrecognized attributes must be ignored
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// recursively check a directory tree for files not in the list of
+// verified files we found in the manifest. For each file we find
+// Check it against the files found in the manifest. If the file wasn't
+// in the manifest then it's unsigned and we can stop looking. Otherwise
+// remove it from the collection so we can check leftovers later.
+//
+// @param aDir   Directory to check
+// @param aPath  Relative path to that directory (to check against aItems)
+// @param aItems All the files found
+// @param *Filename  signature files that won't be in the manifest
+nsresult
+CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(nsIFile* aDir,
+                         const nsString& aPath,
+                         /* in/out */ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aItems,
+                         const nsAString& sigFilename,
+                         const nsAString& sfFilename,
+                         const nsAString& mfFilename)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
+  nsresult rv = aDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  bool inMeta = StringBeginsWith(aPath, NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
+
+  while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
+    rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !file) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoString leafname;
+    rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoString curName(aPath + leafname);
+
+    bool isDir;
+    rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // if it's a directory we need to recurse
+    if (isDir) {
+      curName.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("/"));
+      rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(file, curName, aItems,
+                                    sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
+    } else {
+      // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
+      // signature.
+      //
+      // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
+      // multiple signatures because the metadata for the other signatures
+      // is not signed either.
+      if (inMeta && ( leafname == sigFilename ||
+                      leafname == sfFilename ||
+                      leafname == mfFilename )) {
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      // make sure the current file was found in the manifest
+      nsStringHashKey* item = aItems.GetEntry(curName);
+      if (!item) {
+        return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
+      }
+
+      // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
+      aItems.RemoveEntry(item);
+    }
+  }
+  files->Close();
+  return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature of a directory structure as if it were a
+ * signed JAR file (used for unpacked JARs)
+ */
+nsresult
+VerifySignedDirectory(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
+                      nsIFile* aDirectory,
+                      /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aDirectory);
+
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    *aSignerCert = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Make sure there's a META-INF directory
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metaDir;
+  nsresult rv = aDirectory->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metaDir));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  rv = metaDir->Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  bool exists;
+  rv = metaDir->Exists(&exists);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+  bool isDirectory;
+  rv = metaDir->IsDirectory(&isDirectory);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !isDirectory) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+
+  // Find and load the Signature (RSA) file
+
+  nsAutoString sigFilename;
+  rv = FindSignatureFilename(metaDir, sigFilename);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
+  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
+  }
+
+  // Load the signature (SF) file and verify the signature.
+  // The .sf and .rsa files must have the same name apart from the extension.
+
+  nsAutoString sfFilename(Substring(sigFilename, 0, sigFilename.Length() - 3)
+                          + NS_LITERAL_STRING("sf"));
+
+  ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
+  Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
+  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
+  UniqueCERTCertList builtChain;
+  rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
+                       builtChain);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Get the expected manifest hash from the signed .sf file
+
+  ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
+  rv = ParseSF(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Load manifest (MF) file and verify signature
+
+  nsAutoString mfFilename(NS_LITERAL_STRING("manifest.mf"));
+  ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
+  Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
+  rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  // Parse manifest and verify signed hash of all listed files
+
+  // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
+  // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
+  // memory.
+  ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
+
+  nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey> items;
+  rv = ParseMFUnpacked(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(manifestBuffer.data),
+                       aDirectory, items, buf);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)){
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We've checked that everything listed in the manifest exists and is signed
+  // correctly. Now check on disk for extra (unsigned) files.
+  // Deletes found entries from items as it goes.
+  rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(aDirectory, EmptyString(), items,
+                                sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
+  // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
+  // manifest but missing from the directory tree? (There shouldn't be given
+  // ParseMFUnpacked() checking them all, but it's a cheap sanity check.)
+  if (items.Count() != 0) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
+  }
+
+  // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
+  // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
+  if (aSignerCert) {
+    CERTCertListNode* signerCertNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
+    if (!signerCertNode || CERT_LIST_END(signerCertNode, builtChain) ||
+        !signerCertNode->cert) {
+      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
+      nsNSSCertificate::Create(signerCertNode->cert);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
+    signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+class VerifySignedDirectoryTask final : public CryptoTask
+{
+public:
+  VerifySignedDirectoryTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
+                            nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
+    : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
+    , mDirectory(aUnpackedJar)
+    , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback>(aCallback))
+  {
+  }
+
+private:
+  virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
+  {
+    return VerifySignedDirectory(mTrustedRoot,
+                                 mDirectory,
+                                 getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
+  }
+
+  // This class doesn't directly hold NSS resources so there's nothing that
+  // needs to be released
+  virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
+
+  virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
+  {
+    (void) mCallback->VerifySignedDirectoryFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
+  }
+
+  const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
+  const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mDirectory;
+  nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback> mCallback;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
+};
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedDirectoryAsync(
+  AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
+  nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aUnpackedJar);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
+  RefPtr<VerifySignedDirectoryTask> task(new VerifySignedDirectoryTask(aTrustedRoot,
+                                                                       aUnpackedJar,
+                                                                       aCallback));
+  return task->Dispatch("UnpackedJar");
+}
diff --git a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9131a701b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
+#include "MainThreadUtils.h"
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsIFile.h"
+#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
+#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+// Generated in Makefile.in
+#include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
+#include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
+#include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
+#include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
+#include "marketplace-stage.inc"
+#include "xpcshell.inc"
+// Trusted Hosted Apps Certificates
+#include "manifest-signing-root.inc"
+#include "manifest-signing-test-root.inc"
+// Add-on signing Certificates
+#include "addons-public.inc"
+#include "addons-stage.inc"
+// Privileged Package Certificates
+#include "privileged-package-root.inc"
+
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+
+extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
+
+static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
+static char kDevImportedDER[] =
+  "network.http.signed-packages.developer-root";
+
+namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
+
+StaticMutex AppTrustDomain::sMutex;
+UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERData;
+unsigned int AppTrustDomain::sDevImportedDERLen = 0;
+
+AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(UniqueCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg)
+  : mCertChain(certChain)
+  , mPinArg(pinArg)
+  , mMinRSABits(DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS)
+{
+}
+
+SECStatus
+AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
+{
+  SECItem trustedDER;
+
+  // Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
+  // CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
+
+  switch (trustedRoot)
+  {
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceStageRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceStageRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceStageRoot);
+      // The staging root was generated with a 1024-bit key.
+      mMinRSABits = 1024u;
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsPublicRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsPublicRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsPublicRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsStageRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(addonsStageRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(addonsStageRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::PrivilegedPackageRoot:
+      trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(privilegedPackageRoot);
+      trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(privilegedPackageRoot);
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::DeveloperImportedRoot: {
+      StaticMutexAutoLock lock(sMutex);
+      if (!sDevImportedDERData) {
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file(do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/file/local;1"));
+        if (!file) {
+          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
+          return SECFailure;
+        }
+        nsresult rv = file->InitWithNativePath(
+            Preferences::GetCString(kDevImportedDER));
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
+          return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;
+        NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(inputStream), file, -1, -1,
+                                   nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
+        if (!inputStream) {
+          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
+          return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        uint64_t length;
+        rv = inputStream->Available(&length);
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
+          return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        auto data = MakeUnique<char[]>(length);
+        rv = inputStream->Read(data.get(), length, &sDevImportedDERLen);
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO, 0);
+          return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        MOZ_ASSERT(length == sDevImportedDERLen);
+        sDevImportedDERData.reset(
+          BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, char*>(data.release()));
+      }
+
+      trustedDER.data = sDevImportedDERData.get();
+      trustedDER.len = sDevImportedDERLen;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
+      return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  mTrustedRoot.reset(CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+                                             &trustedDER, nullptr, false, true));
+  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker,
+                           Time)
+
+{
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
+  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(bug 1035418): If/when mozilla::pkix relaxes the restriction that
+  // FindIssuer must only pass certificates with a matching subject name to
+  // checker.Check, we can stop using CERT_CreateSubjectCertList and instead
+  // use logic like this:
+  //
+  // 1. First, try the trusted trust anchor.
+  // 2. Secondly, iterate through the certificates that were stored in the CMS
+  //    message, passing each one to checker.Check.
+  SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem =
+    UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
+  UniqueCERTCertList
+    candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+                                          &encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
+                                          false));
+  if (candidates) {
+    for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
+         !CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
+      Input certDER;
+      Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        continue; // probably too big
+      }
+
+      bool keepGoing;
+      rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/,
+                         keepGoing);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+      if (!keepGoing) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                             const CertPolicyId& policy,
+                             Input candidateCertDER,
+                     /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
+{
+  MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
+  if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  if (!mTrustedRoot) {
+    return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+
+  // Handle active distrust of the certificate.
+
+  // XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
+  // information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
+  // expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
+  SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem =
+    UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
+  UniqueCERTCertificate candidateCert(
+    CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
+                            nullptr, false, true));
+  if (!candidateCert) {
+    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
+  }
+
+  CERTCertTrust trust;
+  if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
+    uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
+
+    // For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
+    // because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
+    // CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
+    // relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
+    // distrusted.
+    uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
+                              ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
+                              : CERTDB_TRUSTED;
+    if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
+            == CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
+      trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
+      return Success;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
+  if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
+    trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item,
+                          DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
+                          /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
+                          size_t digestBufLen)
+{
+  return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration,
+                                /*optional*/ const Input*,
+                                /*optional*/ const Input*)
+{
+  // We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
+  // certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time)
+{
+  SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain,
+                                                            mCertChain);
+  if (srv != SECSuccess) {
+    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm,
+                                              EndEntityOrCA,
+                                              Time)
+{
+  // TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
+  EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
+{
+  if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
+    return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+                                           Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
+{
+  // TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
+  return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+                                       mPinArg);
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
+                                            NamedCurve curve)
+{
+  switch (curve) {
+    case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
+      return Success;
+  }
+
+  return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+                                        Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
+{
+  return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+                                    mPinArg);
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time /*notBefore*/, Time /*notAfter*/,
+                                          EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
+                                          KeyPurposeId /*keyPurpose*/)
+{
+  return Success;
+}
+
+Result
+AppTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(Time /*notBefore*/,
+                                                /*out*/ bool& matches)
+{
+  matches = false;
+  return Success;
+}
+
+void
+AppTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension /*extension*/,
+                                       Input /*extensionData*/)
+{
+}
+
+} } // namespace mozilla::psm
diff --git a/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d435ed971
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/AppTrustDomain.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef AppTrustDomain_h
+#define AppTrustDomain_h
+
+#include "pkix/pkixtypes.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticMutex.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "nsDebug.h"
+#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
+#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
+
+namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
+
+class AppTrustDomain final : public mozilla::pkix::TrustDomain
+{
+public:
+  typedef mozilla::pkix::Result Result;
+
+  AppTrustDomain(UniqueCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg);
+
+  SECStatus SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot);
+
+  virtual Result GetCertTrust(mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                              const mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& policy,
+                              mozilla::pkix::Input candidateCertDER,
+                              /*out*/ mozilla::pkix::TrustLevel& trustLevel)
+                              override;
+  virtual Result FindIssuer(mozilla::pkix::Input encodedIssuerName,
+                            IssuerChecker& checker,
+                            mozilla::pkix::Time time) override;
+  virtual Result CheckRevocation(mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                 const mozilla::pkix::CertID& certID,
+                                 mozilla::pkix::Time time,
+                                 mozilla::pkix::Duration validityDuration,
+                    /*optional*/ const mozilla::pkix::Input* stapledOCSPresponse,
+                    /*optional*/ const mozilla::pkix::Input* aiaExtension) override;
+  virtual Result IsChainValid(const mozilla::pkix::DERArray& certChain,
+                              mozilla::pkix::Time time) override;
+  virtual Result CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(
+                   mozilla::pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
+                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore) override;
+  virtual Result CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
+                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                   unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) override;
+  virtual Result VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
+                   const mozilla::pkix::SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+                   mozilla::pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override;
+  virtual Result CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
+                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                   mozilla::pkix::NamedCurve curve) override;
+  virtual Result VerifyECDSASignedDigest(
+                   const mozilla::pkix::SignedDigest& signedDigest,
+                   mozilla::pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override;
+  virtual Result CheckValidityIsAcceptable(
+                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore, mozilla::pkix::Time notAfter,
+                   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                   mozilla::pkix::KeyPurposeId keyPurpose) override;
+  virtual Result NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(
+                   mozilla::pkix::Time notBefore,
+                   /*out*/ bool& matches) override;
+  virtual void NoteAuxiliaryExtension(
+                   mozilla::pkix::AuxiliaryExtension extension,
+                   mozilla::pkix::Input extensionData) override;
+  virtual Result DigestBuf(mozilla::pkix::Input item,
+                           mozilla::pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
+                           /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
+                           size_t digestBufLen) override;
+
+private:
+  /*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& mCertChain;
+  void* mPinArg; // non-owning!
+  UniqueCERTCertificate mTrustedRoot;
+  unsigned int mMinRSABits;
+
+  static StaticMutex sMutex;
+  static UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> sDevImportedDERData;
+  static unsigned int sDevImportedDERLen;
+};
+
+} } // namespace mozilla::psm
+
+#endif // AppTrustDomain_h
diff --git a/security/apps/addons-public.crt b/security/apps/addons-public.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6ab711b99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/addons-public.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/addons-stage.crt b/security/apps/addons-stage.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..73e48cadf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/addons-stage.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py b/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ffe25cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/gen_cert_header.py
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+import binascii
+
+def _file_byte_generator(filename):
+  with open(filename, "rb") as f:
+    contents = f.read()
+
+    # Treat empty files the same as a file containing a lone 0;
+    # a single-element array will fail cert verifcation just as an
+    # empty array would.
+    if not contents:
+      return ['\0']
+
+    return contents
+
+def _create_header(array_name, cert_bytes):
+  hexified = ["0x" + binascii.hexlify(byte) for byte in cert_bytes]
+  substs = { 'array_name': array_name, 'bytes': ', '.join(hexified) }
+  return "const uint8_t %(array_name)s[] = {\n%(bytes)s\n};\n" % substs
+
+# Create functions named the same as the data arrays that we're going to
+# write to the headers, so we don't have to duplicate the names like so:
+#
+#   def arrayName(header, cert_filename):
+#     header.write(_create_header("arrayName", cert_filename))
+array_names = [
+  'marketplaceProdPublicRoot',
+  'marketplaceProdReviewersRoot',
+  'marketplaceDevPublicRoot',
+  'marketplaceDevReviewersRoot',
+  'marketplaceStageRoot',
+  'trustedAppPublicRoot',
+  'trustedAppTestRoot',
+  'xpcshellRoot',
+  'addonsPublicRoot',
+  'addonsStageRoot',
+  'privilegedPackageRoot',
+]
+
+for n in array_names:
+  # Make sure the lambda captures the right string.
+  globals()[n] = lambda header, cert_filename, name=n: header.write(_create_header(name, _file_byte_generator(cert_filename)))
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..490b8682b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-public.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5b8bde933
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85c2fed92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-public.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53be8c81e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt b/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84504f357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/marketplace-stage.crt
diff --git a/security/apps/moz.build b/security/apps/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c26ce11ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+    'AppSignatureVerification.cpp',
+    'AppTrustDomain.cpp',
+]
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul'
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    '/security/certverifier',
+    '/security/manager/ssl',
+    '/security/pkix/include',
+]
+
+DEFINES['NSS_ENABLE_ECC'] = 'True'
+for var in ('DLL_PREFIX', 'DLL_SUFFIX'):
+    DEFINES[var] = '"%s"' % CONFIG[var]
+
+test_ssl_path = '/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit'
+
+headers_arrays_certs = [
+    ('marketplace-prod-public.inc', 'marketplaceProdPublicRoot', 'marketplace-prod-public.crt'),
+    ('marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc', 'marketplaceProdReviewersRoot', 'marketplace-prod-reviewers.crt'),
+    ('marketplace-dev-public.inc', 'marketplaceDevPublicRoot', 'marketplace-dev-public.crt'),
+    ('marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc', 'marketplaceDevReviewersRoot', 'marketplace-dev-reviewers.crt'),
+    ('marketplace-stage.inc', 'marketplaceStageRoot', 'marketplace-stage.crt'),
+    ('manifest-signing-root.inc', 'trustedAppPublicRoot', 'trusted-app-public.der'),
+    ('manifest-signing-test-root.inc', 'trustedAppTestRoot', test_ssl_path + '/test_signed_manifest/trusted_ca1.der'),
+    ('xpcshell.inc', 'xpcshellRoot', test_ssl_path + '/test_signed_apps/trusted_ca1.der'),
+    ('addons-public.inc', 'addonsPublicRoot', 'addons-public.crt'),
+    ('addons-stage.inc', 'addonsStageRoot', 'addons-stage.crt'),
+    ('privileged-package-root.inc', 'privilegedPackageRoot', 'privileged-package-root.der'),
+]
+
+for header, array_name, cert in headers_arrays_certs:
+    GENERATED_FILES += [header]
+    h = GENERATED_FILES[header]
+    h.script = 'gen_cert_header.py:' + array_name
+    h.inputs = [cert]
diff --git a/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der b/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f77af582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/privileged-package-root.der
diff --git a/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der b/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e69de29bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apps/trusted-app-public.der