Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 1191 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9aca5333
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1191 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
+#include "nsINode.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsIDocShell.h"
+#include "nsISecurityEventSink.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIRequest.h"
+#include "nsIDocument.h"
+#include "nsIContentViewer.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsISecureBrowserUI.h"
+#include "nsIDocumentLoader.h"
+#include "nsIWebNavigation.h"
+#include "nsLoadGroup.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
+#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/URIUtils.h"
+
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+
+enum nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType {
+  eBlocked = 0x00,
+  eUserOverride = 0x01
+};
+
+// Is mixed script blocking (fonts, plugin content, scripts, stylesheets,
+// iframes, websockets, XHR) enabled?
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sBlockMixedScript = false;
+
+// Is mixed display content blocking (images, audio, video, <a ping>) enabled?
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sBlockMixedDisplay = false;
+
+// Do we move HSTS before mixed-content
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sUseHSTS = false;
+// Do we send an HSTS priming request
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sSendHSTSPriming = false;
+// Default HSTS Priming failure timeout to 7 days, in seconds
+uint32_t nsMixedContentBlocker::sHSTSPrimingCacheTimeout = (60 * 24 * 7);
+
+// Fired at the document that attempted to load mixed content.  The UI could
+// handle this event, for example, by displaying an info bar that offers the
+// choice to reload the page with mixed content permitted.
+class nsMixedContentEvent : public Runnable
+{
+public:
+  nsMixedContentEvent(nsISupports *aContext, MixedContentTypes aType, bool aRootHasSecureConnection)
+    : mContext(aContext), mType(aType), mRootHasSecureConnection(aRootHasSecureConnection)
+  {}
+
+  NS_IMETHOD Run() override
+  {
+    NS_ASSERTION(mContext,
+                 "You can't call this runnable without a requesting context");
+
+    // To update the security UI in the tab with the blocked mixed content, call
+    // nsISecurityEventSink::OnSecurityChange.  You can get to the event sink by
+    // calling NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext on the context, and QI'ing to
+    // nsISecurityEventSink.
+
+
+    // Mixed content was allowed and is about to load; get the document and
+    // set the approriate flag to true if we are about to load Mixed Active
+    // Content.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(mContext);
+    if (!docShell) {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> sameTypeRoot;
+    docShell->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot));
+    NS_ASSERTION(sameTypeRoot, "No document shell root tree item from document shell tree item!");
+
+    // now get the document from sameTypeRoot
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> rootDoc = sameTypeRoot->GetDocument();
+    NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc, "No root document from document shell root tree item.");
+
+    // Get eventSink and the current security state from the docShell
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityEventSink> eventSink = do_QueryInterface(docShell);
+    NS_ASSERTION(eventSink, "No eventSink from docShell.");
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootShell = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot);
+    NS_ASSERTION(rootShell, "No root docshell from document shell root tree item.");
+    uint32_t state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISecureBrowserUI> securityUI;
+    rootShell->GetSecurityUI(getter_AddRefs(securityUI));
+    // If there is no securityUI, document doesn't have a security state to
+    // update.  But we still want to set the document flags, so we don't return
+    // early.
+    nsresult stateRV = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    if (securityUI) {
+      stateRV = securityUI->GetState(&state);
+    }
+
+    if (mType == eMixedScript) {
+       // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
+       if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
+         return NS_OK;
+       }
+       rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true);
+
+      // Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed active content
+      if (securityUI) {
+        // Bug 1182551 - before changing the security state to broken, check
+        // that the root is actually secure.
+        if (mRootHasSecureConnection) {
+          // reset state security flag
+          state = state >> 4 << 4;
+          // set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
+          state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+
+          // If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state.
+          if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
+            state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
+          }
+
+          eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext,
+                                      (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
+        } else {
+          // root not secure, mixed active content loaded in an https subframe
+          if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+            eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+    } else if (mType == eMixedDisplay) {
+      // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
+      if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true);
+
+      // Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed display content.
+      if (securityUI) {
+        // Bug 1182551 - before changing the security state to broken, check
+        // that the root is actually secure.
+        if (mRootHasSecureConnection) {
+          // reset state security flag
+          state = state >> 4 << 4;
+          // set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
+          state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+
+          // If mixed active content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state.
+          if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
+            state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
+          }
+
+          eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext,
+                                      (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
+        } else {
+          // root not secure, mixed display content loaded in an https subframe
+          if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+            eventSink->OnSecurityChange(mContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+private:
+  // The requesting context for the content load. Generally, a DOM node from
+  // the document that caused the load.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mContext;
+
+  // The type of mixed content detected, e.g. active or display
+  const MixedContentTypes mType;
+
+  // Indicates whether the top level load is https or not.
+  bool mRootHasSecureConnection;
+};
+
+
+nsMixedContentBlocker::nsMixedContentBlocker()
+{
+  // Cache the pref for mixed script blocking
+  Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockMixedScript,
+                               "security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+
+  // Cache the pref for mixed display blocking
+  Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sBlockMixedDisplay,
+                               "security.mixed_content.block_display_content");
+
+  // Cache the pref for HSTS
+  Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sUseHSTS,
+                               "security.mixed_content.use_hsts");
+
+  // Cache the pref for sending HSTS priming
+  Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sSendHSTSPriming,
+                               "security.mixed_content.send_hsts_priming");
+
+  // Cache the pref for HSTS priming failure cache time
+  Preferences::AddUintVarCache(&sHSTSPrimingCacheTimeout,
+                               "security.mixed_content.hsts_priming_cache_timeout");
+}
+
+nsMixedContentBlocker::~nsMixedContentBlocker()
+{
+}
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMixedContentBlocker, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink)
+
+static void
+LogMixedContentMessage(MixedContentTypes aClassification,
+                       nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                       nsIDocument* aRootDoc,
+                       nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType aMessageType)
+{
+  nsAutoCString messageCategory;
+  uint32_t severityFlag;
+  nsAutoCString messageLookupKey;
+
+  if (aMessageType == eBlocked) {
+    severityFlag = nsIScriptError::errorFlag;
+    messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Blocker");
+    if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedDisplayContent");
+    } else {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedActiveContent");
+    }
+  } else {
+    severityFlag = nsIScriptError::warningFlag;
+    messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Message");
+    if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedDisplayContent2");
+    } else {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedActiveContent2");
+    }
+  }
+
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 locationSpecUTF16(aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault());
+  const char16_t* strings[] = { locationSpecUTF16.get() };
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(severityFlag, messageCategory, aRootDoc,
+                                  nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                  messageLookupKey.get(), strings, ArrayLength(strings));
+}
+
+/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation
+ * This code is called when a request is redirected.
+ * We check the channel associated with the new uri is allowed to load
+ * in the current context
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
+                                              nsIChannel* aNewChannel,
+                                              uint32_t aFlags,
+                                              nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback)
+{
+  nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(aCallback);
+
+  if (!aOldChannel) {
+    NS_ERROR("No channel when evaluating mixed content!");
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // If we are in the parent process in e10s, we don't have access to the
+  // document node, and hence ShouldLoad will fail when we try to get
+  // the docShell.  If that's the case, ignore mixed content checks
+  // on redirects in the parent.  Let the child check for mixed content.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> is_ipc_channel;
+  NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aNewChannel, is_ipc_channel);
+  if (is_ipc_channel) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> oldUri;
+  rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(oldUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri;
+  rv = aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Get the loading Info from the old channel
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
+  rv = aOldChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (!loadInfo) {
+    // XXX: We want to have a loadInfo on all channels, but we don't yet.
+    // If an addon creates a channel, they may not set loadinfo. If that
+    // channel redirects from one page to another page, we would get caught
+    // in this code path. Hence, we have to return NS_OK. Once we have more
+    // confidence that all channels have loadinfo, we can change this to
+    // a failure. See bug 1077201.
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestingPrincipal = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+
+  // Since we are calling shouldLoad() directly on redirects, we don't go through the code
+  // in nsContentPolicyUtils::NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(). Hence, we have to
+  // duplicate parts of it here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestingLocation;
+  if (requestingPrincipal) {
+    // We check to see if the loadingPrincipal is systemPrincipal and return
+    // early if it is
+    if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(requestingPrincipal)) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+    // We set the requestingLocation from the RequestingPrincipal.
+    rv = requestingPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestingContext = loadInfo->LoadingNode();
+
+  int16_t decision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+  rv = ShouldLoad(contentPolicyType,
+                  newUri,
+                  requestingLocation,
+                  requestingContext,
+                  EmptyCString(),       // aMimeGuess
+                  nullptr,              // aExtra
+                  requestingPrincipal,
+                  &decision);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (nsMixedContentBlocker::sSendHSTSPriming) {
+    // The LoadInfo passed in is for the original channel, HSTS priming needs to
+    // be set on the new channel, if required. If the redirect changes
+    // http->https, or vice-versa, the need for priming may change.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> newLoadInfo;
+    rv = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(newLoadInfo));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    rv = nsMixedContentBlocker::MarkLoadInfoForPriming(newUri,
+                                                       requestingContext,
+                                                       newLoadInfo);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      decision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+      newLoadInfo->ClearHSTSPriming();
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If the channel is about to load mixed content, abort the channel
+  if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(decision)) {
+    autoCallback.DontCallback();
+    return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* This version of ShouldLoad() is non-static and called by the Content Policy
+ * API and AsyncOnChannelRedirect().  See nsIContentPolicy::ShouldLoad()
+ * for detailed description of the parameters.
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType,
+                                  nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                  nsIURI* aRequestingLocation,
+                                  nsISupports* aRequestingContext,
+                                  const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                  nsISupports* aExtra,
+                                  nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
+                                  int16_t* aDecision)
+{
+  // We pass in false as the first parameter to ShouldLoad(), because the
+  // callers of this method don't know whether the load went through cached
+  // image redirects.  This is handled by direct callers of the static
+  // ShouldLoad.
+  nsresult rv = ShouldLoad(false,   // aHadInsecureImageRedirect
+                           aContentType,
+                           aContentLocation,
+                           aRequestingLocation,
+                           aRequestingContext,
+                           aMimeGuess,
+                           aExtra,
+                           aRequestPrincipal,
+                           aDecision);
+  return rv;
+}
+
+/* Static version of ShouldLoad() that contains all the Mixed Content Blocker
+ * logic.  Called from non-static ShouldLoad().
+ */
+nsresult
+nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
+                                  uint32_t aContentType,
+                                  nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                  nsIURI* aRequestingLocation,
+                                  nsISupports* aRequestingContext,
+                                  const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                  nsISupports* aExtra,
+                                  nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
+                                  int16_t* aDecision)
+{
+  // Asserting that we are on the main thread here and hence do not have to lock
+  // and unlock sBlockMixedScript and sBlockMixedDisplay before reading/writing
+  // to them.
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+  bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentType);
+
+  // The content policy type that we receive may be an internal type for
+  // scripts.  Let's remember if we have seen a worker type, and reset it to the
+  // external type in all cases right now.
+  bool isWorkerType = aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER ||
+                      aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER ||
+                      aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER;
+  aContentType = nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType);
+
+  // Assume active (high risk) content and blocked by default
+  MixedContentTypes classification = eMixedScript;
+  // Make decision to block/reject by default
+  *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+
+  // Notes on non-obvious decisions:
+  //
+  // TYPE_DTD: A DTD can contain entity definitions that expand to scripts.
+  //
+  // TYPE_FONT: The TrueType hinting mechanism is basically a scripting
+  // language that gets interpreted by the operating system's font rasterizer.
+  // Mixed content web fonts are relatively uncommon, and we can can fall back
+  // to built-in fonts with minimal disruption in almost all cases.
+  //
+  // TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST could actually be either active content (e.g. a
+  // script that a plugin will execute) or display content (e.g. Flash video
+  // content).  Until we have a way to determine active vs passive content
+  // from plugin requests (bug 836352), we will treat this as passive content.
+  // This is to prevent false positives from causing users to become
+  // desensitized to the mixed content blocker.
+  //
+  // TYPE_CSP_REPORT: High-risk because they directly leak information about
+  // the content of the page, and because blocking them does not have any
+  // negative effect on the page loading.
+  //
+  // TYPE_PING: Ping requests are POSTS, not GETs like images and media.
+  // Also, PING requests have no bearing on the rendering or operation of
+  // the page when used as designed, so even though they are lower risk than
+  // scripts, blocking them is basically risk-free as far as compatibility is
+  // concerned.
+  //
+  // TYPE_STYLESHEET: XSLT stylesheets can insert scripts. CSS positioning
+  // and other advanced CSS features can possibly be exploited to cause
+  // spoofing attacks (e.g. make a "grant permission" button look like a
+  // "refuse permission" button).
+  //
+  // TYPE_BEACON: Beacon requests are similar to TYPE_PING, and are blocked by
+  // default.
+  //
+  // TYPE_WEBSOCKET: The Websockets API requires browsers to
+  // reject mixed-content websockets: "If secure is false but the origin of
+  // the entry script has a scheme component that is itself a secure protocol,
+  // e.g. HTTPS, then throw a SecurityError exception." We already block mixed
+  // content websockets within the websockets implementation, so we don't need
+  // to do any blocking here, nor do we need to provide a way to undo or
+  // override the blocking. Websockets without TLS are very flaky anyway in the
+  // face of many HTTP-aware proxies. Compared to passive content, there is
+  // additional risk that the script using WebSockets will disclose sensitive
+  // information from the HTTPS page and/or eval (directly or indirectly)
+  // received data.
+  //
+  // TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: XHR requires either same origin or CORS, so most
+  // mixed-content XHR will already be blocked by that check. This will also
+  // block HTTPS-to-HTTP XHR with CORS. The same security concerns mentioned
+  // above for WebSockets apply to XHR, and XHR should have the same security
+  // properties as WebSockets w.r.t. mixed content. XHR's handling of redirects
+  // amplifies these concerns.
+
+
+  static_assert(TYPE_DATAREQUEST == TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST,
+                "TYPE_DATAREQUEST is not a synonym for "
+                "TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST");
+
+  switch (aContentType) {
+    // The top-level document cannot be mixed content by definition
+    case TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    // Creating insecure websocket connections in a secure page is blocked already
+    // in the websocket constructor. We don't need to check the blocking here
+    // and we don't want to un-block
+    case TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+
+    // Static display content is considered moderate risk for mixed content so
+    // these will be blocked according to the mixed display preference
+    case TYPE_IMAGE:
+    case TYPE_MEDIA:
+    case TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+      classification = eMixedDisplay;
+      break;
+
+    // Active content (or content with a low value/risk-of-blocking ratio)
+    // that has been explicitly evaluated; listed here for documentation
+    // purposes and to avoid the assertion and warning for the default case.
+    case TYPE_BEACON:
+    case TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+    case TYPE_DTD:
+    case TYPE_FETCH:
+    case TYPE_FONT:
+    case TYPE_IMAGESET:
+    case TYPE_OBJECT:
+    case TYPE_SCRIPT:
+    case TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+    case TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+    case TYPE_PING:
+    case TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+    case TYPE_XBL:
+    case TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case TYPE_XSLT:
+    case TYPE_OTHER:
+      break;
+
+
+    // This content policy works as a whitelist.
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Mixed content of unknown type");
+  }
+
+  // Make sure to get the URI the load started with. No need to check
+  // outer schemes because all the wrapping pseudo protocols inherit the
+  // security properties of the actual network request represented
+  // by the innerMost URL.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerContentLocation = NS_GetInnermostURI(aContentLocation);
+  if (!innerContentLocation) {
+    NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from aContentLocation");
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+ /* Get the scheme of the sub-document resource to be requested. If it is
+  * a safe to load in an https context then mixed content doesn't apply.
+  *
+  * Check Protocol Flags to determine if scheme is safe to load:
+  * URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA - e.g.
+  *   "mailto"
+  * URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE - e.g.
+  *   "data",
+  *   "resource",
+  *   "moz-icon"
+  * URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT - e.g.
+  *   "javascript"
+  * URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT - e.g.
+  *   "https",
+  *   "moz-safe-about"
+  *
+  */
+  bool schemeLocal = false;
+  bool schemeNoReturnData = false;
+  bool schemeInherits = false;
+  bool schemeSecure = false;
+  if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(innerContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE , &schemeLocal))  ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(innerContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA, &schemeNoReturnData)) ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(innerContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT, &schemeInherits)) ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(innerContentLocation, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT, &schemeSecure))) {
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  // TYPE_IMAGE redirects are cached based on the original URI, not the final
+  // destination and hence cache hits for images may not have the correct
+  // innerContentLocation.  Check if the cached hit went through an http redirect,
+  // and if it did, we can't treat this as a secure subresource.
+  if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect &&
+      (schemeLocal || schemeNoReturnData || schemeInherits || schemeSecure)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+     return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Since there are cases where aRequestingLocation and aRequestPrincipal are
+  // definitely not the owning document, we try to ignore them by extracting the
+  // requestingLocation in the following order:
+  // 1) from the aRequestingContext, either extracting
+  //    a) the node's principal, or the
+  //    b) script object's principal.
+  // 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check
+  //    if its the system principal. If it is, allow the load.
+  // 3) Special case handling for:
+  //    a) speculative loads, where shouldLoad is called twice (bug 839235)
+  //       and the first speculative load does not include a context.
+  //       In this case we use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation.
+  //    b) TYPE_CSP_REPORT which does not provide a context. In this case we
+  //       use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation.
+  //    c) content scripts from addon code that do not provide aRequestingContext
+  //       or aRequestingLocation, but do provide aRequestPrincipal.
+  //       If aRequestPrincipal is an expanded principal, we allow the load.
+  // 4) If we still end up not having a requestingLocation, we reject the load.
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+  // 1a) Try to get the principal if aRequestingContext is a node.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext);
+  if (node) {
+    principal = node->NodePrincipal();
+  }
+
+  // 1b) Try using the window's script object principal if it's not a node.
+  if (!principal) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptObjectPrincipal> scriptObjPrin = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext);
+    if (scriptObjPrin) {
+      principal = scriptObjPrin->GetPrincipal();
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestingLocation;
+  if (principal) {
+    principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation));
+  }
+
+  // 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check if its a system principal.
+  if (principal && !requestingLocation) {
+    if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(principal)) {
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 3a,b) Special case handling for speculative loads and TYPE_CSP_REPORT. In
+  // such cases, aRequestingContext doesn't exist, so we use aRequestingLocation.
+  // Unfortunately we can not distinguish between speculative and normal loads here,
+  // otherwise we could special case this assignment.
+  if (!requestingLocation) {
+    requestingLocation = aRequestingLocation;
+  }
+
+  // 3c) Special case handling for content scripts from addons code, which only
+  // provide a aRequestPrincipal; aRequestingContext and aRequestingLocation are
+  // both null; if the aRequestPrincipal is an expandedPrincipal, we allow the load.
+  if (!principal && !requestingLocation && aRequestPrincipal) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded = do_QueryInterface(aRequestPrincipal);
+    if (expanded) {
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 4) Giving up. We still don't have a requesting location, therefore we can't tell
+  //    if this is a mixed content load. Deny to be safe.
+  if (!requestingLocation) {
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content
+  // restrictions do not apply.
+  bool parentIsHttps;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerRequestingLocation = NS_GetInnermostURI(requestingLocation);
+  if (!innerRequestingLocation) {
+    NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from requestingLocation");
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = innerRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("https", &parentIsHttps);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    NS_ERROR("requestingLocation->SchemeIs failed");
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  if (!parentIsHttps) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(docShell, NS_OK);
+
+  // Disallow mixed content loads for workers, shared workers and service
+  // workers.
+  if (isWorkerType) {
+    // For workers, we can assume that we're mixed content at this point, since
+    // the parent is https, and the protocol associated with innerContentLocation
+    // doesn't map to the secure URI flags checked above.  Assert this for
+    // sanity's sake
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    bool isHttpsScheme = false;
+    rv = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpsScheme);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    MOZ_ASSERT(!isHttpsScheme);
+#endif
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // The page might have set the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. In such
+  // a case allow the http: load to succeed with the promise that the channel will
+  // get upgraded to https before fetching any data from the netwerk.
+  // Please see: nsHttpChannel::Connect()
+  //
+  // Please note that the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests' only applies to
+  // http: and ws: (for websockets). Websockets are not subject to mixed content
+  // blocking since insecure websockets are not allowed within secure pages. Hence,
+  // we only have to check against http: here. Skip mixed content blocking if the
+  // subresource load uses http: and the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests'
+  // is present on the page.
+  bool isHttpScheme = false;
+  rv = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http", &isHttpScheme);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsIDocument* document = docShell->GetDocument();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(document, "Expected a document");
+  if (isHttpScheme && document->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(isPreload)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // The page might have set the CSP directive 'block-all-mixed-content' which
+  // should block not only active mixed content loads but in fact all mixed content
+  // loads, see https://www.w3.org/TR/mixed-content/#strict-checking
+  // Block all non secure loads in case the CSP directive is present. Please note
+  // that at this point we already know, based on |schemeSecure| that the load is
+  // not secure, so we can bail out early at this point.
+  if (document->GetBlockAllMixedContent(isPreload)) {
+    // log a message to the console before returning.
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportSpec(spec);
+
+    const char16_t* params[] = { reportSpec.get()};
+    CSP_LogLocalizedStr(u"blockAllMixedContent",
+                        params, ArrayLength(params),
+                        EmptyString(), // aSourceFile
+                        EmptyString(), // aScriptSample
+                        0, // aLineNumber
+                        0, // aColumnNumber
+                        nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "CSP",
+                        document->InnerWindowID());
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Determine if the rootDoc is https and if the user decided to allow Mixed Content
+  bool rootHasSecureConnection = false;
+  bool allowMixedContent = false;
+  bool isRootDocShell = false;
+  rv = docShell->GetAllowMixedContentAndConnectionData(&rootHasSecureConnection, &allowMixedContent, &isRootDocShell);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Get the sameTypeRoot tree item from the docshell
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> sameTypeRoot;
+  docShell->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot));
+  NS_ASSERTION(sameTypeRoot, "No root tree item from docshell!");
+
+  // When navigating an iframe, the iframe may be https
+  // but its parents may not be.  Check the parents to see if any of them are https.
+  // If none of the parents are https, allow the load.
+  if (aContentType == TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT && !rootHasSecureConnection) {
+
+    bool httpsParentExists = false;
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> parentTreeItem;
+    parentTreeItem = docShell;
+
+    while(!httpsParentExists && parentTreeItem) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIWebNavigation> parentAsNav(do_QueryInterface(parentTreeItem));
+      NS_ASSERTION(parentAsNav, "No web navigation object from parent's docshell tree item");
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> parentURI;
+
+      parentAsNav->GetCurrentURI(getter_AddRefs(parentURI));
+      if (!parentURI) {
+        // if getting the URI fails, assume there is a https parent and break.
+        httpsParentExists = true;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerParentURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(parentURI);
+      if (!innerParentURI) {
+        NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from parentURI");
+        *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+
+      if (NS_FAILED(innerParentURI->SchemeIs("https", &httpsParentExists))) {
+        // if getting the scheme fails, assume there is a https parent and break.
+        httpsParentExists = true;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // When the parent and the root are the same, we have traversed all the way up
+      // the same type docshell tree.  Break out of the while loop.
+      if(sameTypeRoot == parentTreeItem) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // update the parent to the grandparent.
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> newParentTreeItem;
+      parentTreeItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(newParentTreeItem));
+      parentTreeItem = newParentTreeItem;
+    } // end while loop.
+
+    if (!httpsParentExists) {
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Get the root document from the sameTypeRoot
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> rootDoc = sameTypeRoot->GetDocument();
+  NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc, "No root document from document shell root tree item.");
+
+  // Get eventSink and the current security state from the docShell
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityEventSink> eventSink = do_QueryInterface(docShell);
+  NS_ASSERTION(eventSink, "No eventSink from docShell.");
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootShell = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot);
+  NS_ASSERTION(rootShell, "No root docshell from document shell root tree item.");
+  uint32_t state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISecureBrowserUI> securityUI;
+  rootShell->GetSecurityUI(getter_AddRefs(securityUI));
+  // If there is no securityUI, document doesn't have a security state.
+  // Allow load and return early.
+  if (!securityUI) {
+    *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  nsresult stateRV = securityUI->GetState(&state);
+
+  bool doHSTSPriming = false;
+  if (isHttpScheme) {
+    bool hsts = false;
+    bool cached = false;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss =
+      do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, aContentLocation,
+        0, &cached, &hsts);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (hsts && sUseHSTS) {
+      // assume we will be upgraded later
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // Send a priming request if the result is not already cached and priming
+    // requests are allowed
+    if (!cached && sSendHSTSPriming) {
+      // add this URI as a priming location
+      doHSTSPriming = true;
+      document->AddHSTSPrimingLocation(innerContentLocation,
+          HSTSPrimingState::eHSTS_PRIMING_ALLOW);
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // At this point we know that the request is mixed content, and the only
+  // question is whether we block it.  Record telemetry at this point as to
+  // whether HSTS would have fixed things by making the content location
+  // into an HTTPS URL.
+  //
+  // Note that we count this for redirects as well as primary requests. This
+  // will cause some degree of double-counting, especially when mixed content
+  // is not blocked (e.g., for images).  For more detail, see:
+  //   https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1198572#c19
+  //
+  // We do not count requests aHadInsecureImageRedirect=true, since these are
+  // just an artifact of the image caching system.
+  bool active = (classification == eMixedScript);
+  if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect) {
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(innerContentLocation, active, doHSTSPriming);
+    } else {
+      // Ask the parent process to do the same call
+      mozilla::dom::ContentChild* cc = mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton();
+      if (cc) {
+        mozilla::ipc::URIParams uri;
+        SerializeURI(innerContentLocation, uri);
+        cc->SendAccumulateMixedContentHSTS(uri, active, doHSTSPriming);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // set hasMixedContentObjectSubrequest on this object if necessary
+  if (aContentType == TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST) {
+    rootDoc->SetHasMixedContentObjectSubrequest(true);
+  }
+
+  // If the content is display content, and the pref says display content should be blocked, block it.
+  if (sBlockMixedDisplay && classification == eMixedDisplay) {
+    if (allowMixedContent) {
+      LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride);
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      // See if mixed display content has already loaded on the page or if the state needs to be updated here.
+      // If mixed display hasn't loaded previously, then we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
+      if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true);
+
+      if (rootHasSecureConnection) {
+        // reset state security flag
+        state = state >> 4 << 4;
+        // set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
+        state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+
+        // If mixed active content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state.
+        if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
+          state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
+        }
+
+        eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext,
+                                    (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
+      } else {
+        // User has overriden the pref and the root is not https;
+        // mixed display content was allowed on an https subframe.
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+          eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
+        }
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (doHSTSPriming) {
+        document->AddHSTSPrimingLocation(innerContentLocation,
+            HSTSPrimingState::eHSTS_PRIMING_BLOCK);
+        *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      } else {
+        *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
+      }
+      LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eBlocked);
+      if (!rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked() && NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+        rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked(true);
+        eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
+      }
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+
+  } else if (sBlockMixedScript && classification == eMixedScript) {
+    // If the content is active content, and the pref says active content should be blocked, block it
+    // unless the user has choosen to override the pref
+    if (allowMixedContent) {
+      LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride);
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      // See if the state will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
+      if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true);
+
+      if (rootHasSecureConnection) {
+        // reset state security flag
+        state = state >> 4 << 4;
+        // set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
+        state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+
+        // If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in the state.
+        if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
+          state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
+        }
+
+        eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext,
+                                    (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
+
+        return NS_OK;
+      } else {
+        // User has already overriden the pref and the root is not https;
+        // mixed active content was allowed on an https subframe.
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+          eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
+        }
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+    } else {
+      //User has not overriden the pref by Disabling protection. Reject the request and update the security state.
+      if (doHSTSPriming) {
+        document->AddHSTSPrimingLocation(innerContentLocation,
+            HSTSPrimingState::eHSTS_PRIMING_BLOCK);
+        *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      } else {
+        *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
+      }
+      LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eBlocked);
+      // See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
+      if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked(true);
+
+      // The user has not overriden the pref, so make sure they still have an option by calling eventSink
+      // which will invoke the doorhanger
+      if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
+         eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequestingContext, (state | nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
+      }
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // The content is not blocked by the mixed content prefs.
+
+    // Log a message that we are loading mixed content.
+    LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc, eUserOverride);
+
+    // Fire the event from a script runner as it is unsafe to run script
+    // from within ShouldLoad
+    nsContentUtils::AddScriptRunner(
+      new nsMixedContentEvent(aRequestingContext, classification, rootHasSecureConnection));
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType,
+                                     nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                     nsIURI* aRequestingLocation,
+                                     nsISupports* aRequestingContext,
+                                     const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                     nsISupports* aExtra,
+                                     nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
+                                     int16_t* aDecision)
+{
+  aContentType = nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType);
+
+  if (!aContentLocation) {
+    // aContentLocation may be null when a plugin is loading without an associated URI resource
+    if (aContentType == TYPE_OBJECT) {
+       *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+       return NS_OK;
+    } else {
+       *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+       return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ShouldLoad(aContentType, aContentLocation, aRequestingLocation,
+                    aRequestingContext, aMimeGuess, aExtra, aRequestPrincipal,
+                    aDecision);
+}
+
+enum MixedContentHSTSState {
+  MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS   = 0,
+  MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS = 1,
+  MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS    = 2,
+  MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS  = 3
+};
+
+// Similar to the existing mixed-content HSTS, except MCB_HSTS_*_NO_HSTS is
+// broken into two distinct states, indicating whether we plan to send a priming
+// request or not. If we decided not go send a priming request, it could be
+// because it is a type we do not support, or because we cached a previous
+// negative response.
+enum MixedContentHSTSPrimingState {
+  eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS  = 0,
+  eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS   = 1,
+  eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_PRIMING = 2,
+  eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_DO_PRIMING = 3,
+  eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_PRIMING  = 4,
+  eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_DO_PRIMING  = 5
+};
+
+// Record information on when HSTS would have made mixed content not mixed
+// content (regardless of whether it was actually blocked)
+void
+nsMixedContentBlocker::AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(nsIURI* aURI, bool aActive, bool aHasHSTSPriming)
+{
+  // This method must only be called in the parent, because
+  // nsSiteSecurityService is only available in the parent
+  if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  bool hsts;
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss = do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, aURI, 0, nullptr, &hsts);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // states: would upgrade, would prime, hsts info cached
+  // active, passive
+  //
+  if (!aActive) {
+    if (!hsts) {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS);
+      if (aHasHSTSPriming) {
+        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                              eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_DO_PRIMING);
+      } else {
+        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                              eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_PRIMING);
+      }
+    }
+    else {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                            eMCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!hsts) {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS);
+      if (aHasHSTSPriming) {
+        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                              eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_DO_PRIMING);
+      } else {
+        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                              eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_PRIMING);
+      }
+    }
+    else {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS_PRIMING,
+                            eMCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+//static
+nsresult
+nsMixedContentBlocker::MarkLoadInfoForPriming(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                              nsISupports* aRequestingContext,
+                                              nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+{
+  nsresult rv;
+  bool sendPriming = false;
+  bool mixedContentWouldBlock = false;
+  rv = GetHSTSPrimingFromRequestingContext(aURI,
+                                           aRequestingContext,
+                                           &sendPriming,
+                                           &mixedContentWouldBlock);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (sendPriming) {
+    aLoadInfo->SetHSTSPriming(mixedContentWouldBlock);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+//static
+nsresult
+nsMixedContentBlocker::GetHSTSPrimingFromRequestingContext(nsIURI* aURI,
+    nsISupports* aRequestingContext,
+    bool* aSendPrimingRequest,
+    bool* aMixedContentWouldBlock)
+{
+  *aSendPrimingRequest = false;
+  *aMixedContentWouldBlock = false;
+  // If we marked for priming, we used the innermost URI, so get that
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
+  if (!innerURI) {
+    NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from aContentLocation");
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  bool isHttp = false;
+  innerURI->SchemeIs("http", &isHttp);
+  if (!isHttp) {
+    // there is nothign to do
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // If the DocShell was marked for HSTS priming, propagate that to the LoadInfo
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext);
+  if (!docShell) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> document = docShell->GetDocument();
+  if (!document) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  HSTSPrimingState status = document->GetHSTSPrimingStateForLocation(innerURI);
+  if (status != HSTSPrimingState::eNO_HSTS_PRIMING) {
+    *aSendPrimingRequest = (status != HSTSPrimingState::eNO_HSTS_PRIMING);
+    *aMixedContentWouldBlock = (status == HSTSPrimingState::eHSTS_PRIMING_BLOCK);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}