Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0

1 files changed, 1759 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp b/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a219dcaed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1759 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
+
+#include "xpcpublic.h"
+#include "XPCWrapper.h"
+#include "nsIAppsService.h"
+#include "nsIInputStreamChannel.h"
+#include "nsILoadContext.h"
+#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
+#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsIScriptContext.h"
+#include "nsIURL.h"
+#include "nsINestedURI.h"
+#include "nspr.h"
+#include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "nsSystemPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
+#include "DomainPolicy.h"
+#include "nsXPIDLString.h"
+#include "nsCRT.h"
+#include "nsCRTGlue.h"
+#include "nsDocShell.h"
+#include "nsError.h"
+#include "nsDOMCID.h"
+#include "nsTextFormatter.h"
+#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
+#include "nsIProperties.h"
+#include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
+#include "nsIFile.h"
+#include "nsIFileURL.h"
+#include "nsIZipReader.h"
+#include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h"
+#include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
+#include "nsIDocShell.h"
+#include "nsIPrompt.h"
+#include "nsIWindowWatcher.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
+#include "nsIObserverService.h"
+#include "nsIContent.h"
+#include "nsDOMJSUtils.h"
+#include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
+#include "nsIClassInfo.h"
+#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsIChromeRegistry.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
+#include "mozIApplication.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
+#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsJSUtils.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsXPCOMStrings.h"
+
+// This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
+#define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+nsIIOService    *nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr;
+nsIStringBundle *nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrBundle = nullptr;
+JSContext       *nsScriptSecurityManager::sContext   = nullptr;
+bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
+
+///////////////////////////
+// Convenience Functions //
+///////////////////////////
+
+class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter {
+public:
+    nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
+        ++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
+    }
+    ~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() {
+        --sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
+    }
+    static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
+};
+uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
+
+static
+nsresult
+GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin)
+{
+  if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) {
+      // Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that
+      // might be happening on a different principal from the first call.  But
+      // after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something
+      // we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here.
+      return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+
+  nsAutoCString hostPort;
+
+  nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+    nsAutoCString scheme;
+    rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    aOrigin = scheme + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("://") + hostPort;
+  }
+  else {
+    // Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just
+    // get the full spec.
+    rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static
+nsresult
+GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                         nsACString& aOrigin)
+{
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (!uri) {
+    aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  }
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+
+  return GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin);
+}
+
+inline void SetPendingExceptionASCII(JSContext *cx, const char *aMsg)
+{
+    JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "%s", aMsg);
+}
+
+inline void SetPendingException(JSContext *cx, const char16_t *aMsg)
+{
+    NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 msg(aMsg);
+    JS_ReportErrorUTF8(cx, "%s", msg.get());
+}
+
+// Helper class to get stuff from the ClassInfo and not waste extra time with
+// virtual method calls for things it has already gotten
+class ClassInfoData
+{
+public:
+    ClassInfoData(nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo, const char *aName)
+        : mClassInfo(aClassInfo),
+          mName(const_cast<char *>(aName)),
+          mDidGetFlags(false),
+          mMustFreeName(false)
+    {
+    }
+
+    ~ClassInfoData()
+    {
+        if (mMustFreeName)
+            free(mName);
+    }
+
+    uint32_t GetFlags()
+    {
+        if (!mDidGetFlags) {
+            if (mClassInfo) {
+                nsresult rv = mClassInfo->GetFlags(&mFlags);
+                if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+                    mFlags = 0;
+                }
+            } else {
+                mFlags = 0;
+            }
+
+            mDidGetFlags = true;
+        }
+
+        return mFlags;
+    }
+
+    bool IsDOMClass()
+    {
+        return !!(GetFlags() & nsIClassInfo::DOM_OBJECT);
+    }
+
+    const char* GetName()
+    {
+        if (!mName) {
+            if (mClassInfo) {
+                mClassInfo->GetClassDescription(&mName);
+            }
+
+            if (mName) {
+                mMustFreeName = true;
+            } else {
+                mName = const_cast<char *>("UnnamedClass");
+            }
+        }
+
+        return mName;
+    }
+
+private:
+    nsIClassInfo *mClassInfo; // WEAK
+    uint32_t mFlags;
+    char *mName;
+    bool mDidGetFlags;
+    bool mMustFreeName;
+};
+
+/* static */
+bool
+nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
+                                             nsIURI* aTargetURI)
+{
+    return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI, sStrictFileOriginPolicy);
+}
+
+// SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because NS_SecurityHashURI
+// is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs.  See nsNetUtil.h.
+uint32_t
+nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI)
+{
+    return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI);
+}
+
+uint16_t
+nsScriptSecurityManager::AppStatusForPrincipal(nsIPrincipal *aPrin)
+{
+    uint32_t appId = aPrin->GetAppId();
+
+    // After bug 1238160, the principal no longer knows how to answer "is this a
+    // browser element", which is really what this code path wants. Currently,
+    // desktop is the only platform where we intend to disable isolation on a
+    // browser frame, so non-desktop should be able to assume that
+    // inIsolatedMozBrowser is true for all mozbrowser frames.  Additionally,
+    // apps are no longer used on desktop, so appId is always NO_APP_ID.  We use
+    // a release assertion in nsFrameLoader::OwnerIsIsolatedMozBrowserFrame so
+    // that platforms with apps can assume inIsolatedMozBrowser is true for all
+    // mozbrowser frames.
+    bool inIsolatedMozBrowser = aPrin->GetIsInIsolatedMozBrowserElement();
+
+    NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(
+      appId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
+      "Asking for app status on a principal with an unknown app id");
+
+    // Installed apps have a valid app id (not NO_APP_ID or UNKNOWN_APP_ID)
+    // and they are not inside a mozbrowser.
+    if (appId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID ||
+        appId == nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID ||
+        inIsolatedMozBrowser)
+    {
+        return nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED;
+    }
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIAppsService> appsService = do_GetService(APPS_SERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(appsService, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+
+    nsCOMPtr<mozIApplication> app;
+    appsService->GetAppByLocalId(appId, getter_AddRefs(app));
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(app, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+
+    uint16_t status = nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_INSTALLED;
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(app->GetAppStatus(&status),
+                      nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+
+    nsString appOrigin;
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(app->GetOrigin(appOrigin),
+                      nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> appURI;
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(appURI), appOrigin),
+                      nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+
+    // The app could contain a cross-origin iframe - make sure that the content
+    // is actually same-origin with the app.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(inIsolatedMozBrowser == false, "Checked this above");
+    nsAutoCString suffix;
+    PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(attrs.PopulateFromOrigin(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(appOrigin), suffix),
+                   nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+    attrs.mAppId = appId;
+    attrs.mInIsolatedMozBrowser = false;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> appPrin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(appURI, attrs);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(appPrin, nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED);
+    return aPrin->Equals(appPrin) ? status
+                                  : nsIPrincipal::APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GetChannelResultPrincipal will return the principal that the resource
+ * returned by this channel will use.  For example, if the resource is in
+ * a sandbox, it will return the nullprincipal.  If the resource is forced
+ * to inherit principal, it will return the principal of its parent.  If
+ * the load doesn't require sandboxing or inheriting, it will return the same
+ * principal as GetChannelURIPrincipal. Namely the principal of the URI
+ * that is being loaded.
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                                   nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
+                                   /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                                                 nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
+                                   /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                                   nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal,
+                                                   bool aIgnoreSandboxing)
+{
+    NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
+    // Check whether we have an nsILoadInfo that says what we should do.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
+    if (loadInfo && loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit = loadInfo->PrincipalToInherit();
+      if (!principalToInherit) {
+        principalToInherit = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+      }
+      principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> owner;
+    aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner));
+    if (owner) {
+        CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal);
+        if (*aPrincipal) {
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (loadInfo) {
+        if (!aIgnoreSandboxing && loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed()) {
+            RefPtr<nsNullPrincipal> prin;
+            if (loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) {
+              prin =
+                nsNullPrincipal::CreateWithInheritedAttributes(loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal());
+            } else {
+              NeckoOriginAttributes nAttrs;
+              loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes(&nAttrs);
+              PrincipalOriginAttributes pAttrs;
+              pAttrs.InheritFromNecko(nAttrs);
+              prin = nsNullPrincipal::Create(pAttrs);
+            }
+            prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+
+            // if the new NullPrincipal (above) loads an iframe[srcdoc], we
+            // need to inherit an existing CSP to avoid bypasses (bug 1073952).
+            // We continue inheriting for nested frames with e.g., data: URLs.
+            if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+              nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+              aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+              nsAutoCString URISpec;
+              uri->GetSpec(URISpec);
+              bool isData = (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("data", &isData)) && isData);
+              if (URISpec.EqualsLiteral("about:srcdoc") || isData) {
+                nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit = loadInfo->PrincipalToInherit();
+                if (!principalToInherit) {
+                  principalToInherit = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+                }
+                nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> originalCSP;
+                principalToInherit->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(originalCSP));
+                if (originalCSP) {
+                  // if the principalToInherit had a CSP,
+                  // add it to the newly created NullPrincipal
+                  // (unless it already has one)
+                  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> nullPrincipalCSP;
+                  (*aPrincipal)->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(nullPrincipalCSP));
+                  if (nullPrincipalCSP) {
+                    MOZ_ASSERT(nullPrincipalCSP == originalCSP,
+                              "There should be no other CSP here.");
+                    // CSPs are equal, no need to set it again.
+                    return NS_OK;
+                  } else {
+                    nsresult rv = (*aPrincipal)->SetCsp(originalCSP);
+                    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+                  }
+                }
+              }
+            }
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+
+        bool forceInherit = loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipal();
+        if (aIgnoreSandboxing && !forceInherit) {
+          // Check if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was dropped because of
+          // sandboxing:
+          if (loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed() &&
+              loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped()) {
+            forceInherit = true;
+          }
+        }
+        if (forceInherit) {
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit = loadInfo->PrincipalToInherit();
+            if (!principalToInherit) {
+              principalToInherit = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+            }
+            principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+
+        nsSecurityFlags securityFlags = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+        // The data: inheritance flags should only apply to the initial load,
+        // not to loads that it might have redirected to.
+        if (loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty() &&
+            (securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
+             securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
+             securityFlags == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS)) {
+
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+            nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+            NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); 
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit = loadInfo->PrincipalToInherit();
+            if (!principalToInherit) {
+              principalToInherit = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+            }
+            bool inheritForAboutBlank = loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits();
+
+            if (nsContentUtils::ChannelShouldInheritPrincipal(principalToInherit,
+                                                              uri,
+                                                              inheritForAboutBlank,
+                                                              false)) {
+                principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
+                return NS_OK;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal);
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(PrincipalOriginAttributes& aAttrs, nsIURI* aURI)
+{
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-extension") && GetAddonPolicyService()) {
+    rv = GetAddonPolicyService()->ExtensionURIToAddonId(aURI, aAttrs.mAddonId);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* The principal of the URI that this channel is loading. This is never
+ * affected by things like sandboxed loads, or loads where we forcefully
+ * inherit the principal.  Think of this as the principal of the server
+ * which this channel is loading from.  Most callers should use
+ * GetChannelResultPrincipal instead of GetChannelURIPrincipal.  Only
+ * call GetChannelURIPrincipal if you are sure that you want the
+ * principal that matches the uri, even in cases when the load is
+ * sandboxed or when the load could be a blob or data uri (i.e even when
+ * you encounter loads that may or may not be sandboxed and loads
+ * that may or may not inherit)."
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelURIPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                                nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+    NS_PRECONDITION(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
+
+    // Get the principal from the URI.  Make sure this does the same thing
+    // as nsDocument::Reset and XULDocument::StartDocumentLoad.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo;
+    aChannel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo));
+
+    // Inherit the origin attributes from loadInfo.
+    // If this is a top-level document load, the origin attributes of the
+    // loadInfo will be set from nsDocShell::DoURILoad.
+    // For subresource loading, the origin attributes of the loadInfo is from
+    // its loadingPrincipal.
+    PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+
+    // For addons loadInfo might be null.
+    if (loadInfo) {
+      attrs.InheritFromNecko(loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes());
+    }
+    rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, uri);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(uri, attrs);
+    prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+    return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::IsSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                                           bool* aIsSystem)
+{
+    *aIsSystem = (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal);
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////
+// nsScriptSecurityManager //
+/////////////////////////////
+
+////////////////////////////////////
+// Methods implementing ISupports //
+////////////////////////////////////
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager,
+                  nsIScriptSecurityManager,
+                  nsIObserver)
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
+
+bool
+nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(JSContext *cx)
+{
+    MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
+    nsresult rv = subjectPrincipal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
+    NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "CSP: Failed to get CSP from principal.");
+
+    // don't do anything unless there's a CSP
+    if (!csp)
+        return true;
+
+    bool evalOK = true;
+    bool reportViolation = false;
+    rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
+
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv))
+    {
+        NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
+        return true; // fail open to not break sites.
+    }
+
+    if (reportViolation) {
+        nsAutoString fileName;
+        unsigned lineNum = 0;
+        NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(scriptSample, "call to eval() or related function blocked by CSP");
+
+        JS::AutoFilename scriptFilename;
+        if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &scriptFilename, &lineNum)) {
+            if (const char *file = scriptFilename.get()) {
+                CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName);
+            }
+        } else {
+            MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_IsExceptionPending(cx));
+        }
+        csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
+                                 fileName,
+                                 scriptSample,
+                                 lineNum,
+                                 EmptyString(),
+                                 EmptyString());
+    }
+
+    return evalOK;
+}
+
+// static
+bool
+nsScriptSecurityManager::JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals *first,
+                                             JSPrincipals *second)
+{
+    return nsJSPrincipals::get(first)->Subsumes(nsJSPrincipals::get(second));
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
+                                            nsIURI* aTargetURI,
+                                            bool reportError)
+{
+    if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI))
+    {
+         if (reportError) {
+            ReportError(nullptr, NS_LITERAL_STRING("CheckSameOriginError"),
+                     aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
+         }
+         return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/*static*/ uint32_t
+nsScriptSecurityManager::HashPrincipalByOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal)
+{
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+    if (!uri)
+        aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+    return SecurityHashURI(uri);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext *cx, nsIURI *aURI)
+{
+    // Get principal of currently executing script.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
+    nsIPrincipal* principal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
+    nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(principal, aURI,
+                                            nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD);
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+        // OK to load
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // See if we're attempting to load a file: URI. If so, let a
+    // UniversalXPConnect capability trump the above check.
+    bool isFile = false;
+    bool isRes = false;
+    if (NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("file", &isFile)) ||
+        NS_FAILED(aURI->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes)))
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    if (isFile || isRes)
+    {
+        if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome())
+            return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // Report error.
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec)))
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+    nsAutoCString msg("Access to '");
+    msg.Append(spec);
+    msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied");
+    SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, msg.get());
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to
+ * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain
+ * nsIProtocolHandler flags set.
+ * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
+ */
+static nsresult
+DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
+{
+    NS_PRECONDITION(aURI, "Must have URI!");
+
+    bool uriHasFlags;
+    nsresult rv =
+        NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (uriHasFlags) {
+        return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+    }
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static bool
+EqualOrSubdomain(nsIURI* aProbeArg, nsIURI* aBase)
+{
+    // Make a clone of the incoming URI, because we're going to mutate it.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> probe;
+    nsresult rv = aProbeArg->Clone(getter_AddRefs(probe));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService = do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(tldService, false);
+    while (true) {
+        if (nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(probe, aBase)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        nsAutoCString host, newHost;
+        rv = probe->GetHost(host);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+        rv = tldService->GetNextSubDomain(host, newHost);
+        if (rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+        rv = probe->SetHost(newHost);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+    }
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                                                   nsIURI *aTargetURI,
+                                                   uint32_t aFlags)
+{
+    NS_PRECONDITION(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal");
+    // If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should
+    // fail, because they may need a security check that we don't
+    // provide.
+    NS_ENSURE_FALSE(aFlags & ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
+                               nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME |
+                               nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT |
+                               nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL |
+                               nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS),
+                    NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+    NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
+    NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
+
+    // If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which
+    // would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own
+    // security context. We do this even for the system principal.
+    if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) {
+        nsresult rv =
+            DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
+                                    nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) {
+        // Allow access
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
+    aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
+    if (!sourceURI) {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded = do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal);
+        if (expanded) {
+            nsTArray< nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> > *whiteList;
+            expanded->GetWhiteList(&whiteList);
+            for (uint32_t i = 0; i < whiteList->Length(); ++i) {
+                nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal((*whiteList)[i],
+                                                        aTargetURI,
+                                                        aFlags);
+                if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+                    // Allow access if it succeeded with one of the white listed principals
+                    return NS_OK;
+                }
+            }
+            // None of our whitelisted principals worked.
+            return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+        }
+        NS_ERROR("Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal "
+                 "must have a URI!");
+        return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+    }
+
+    // Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols.
+    if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) {
+        nsresult rv =
+            DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(sourceURI,
+                                    nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    // If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI);
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI);
+
+    //-- get the target scheme
+    nsAutoCString targetScheme;
+    nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+    //-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript:
+    if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) &&
+         targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript"))
+    {
+       return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+    }
+
+    // Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them
+    bool hasFlags;
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
+                             nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
+                             &hasFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (hasFlags) {
+        // check nothing else in the URI chain has flags that prevent
+        // access:
+        rv = CheckLoadURIFlags(sourceURI, aTargetURI, sourceBaseURI,
+                               targetBaseURI, aFlags);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+        // Check the principal is allowed to load the target.
+        return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, true, false);
+    }
+
+    //-- get the source scheme
+    nsAutoCString sourceScheme;
+    rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+    // When comparing schemes, if the relevant pref is set, view-source URIs
+    // are reachable from same-protocol (so e.g. file: can link to
+    // view-source:file). This is required for reftests.
+    static bool sViewSourceReachableFromInner = false;
+    static bool sCachedViewSourcePref = false;
+    if (!sCachedViewSourcePref) {
+        sCachedViewSourcePref = true;
+        mozilla::Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sViewSourceReachableFromInner,
+            "security.view-source.reachable-from-inner-protocol");
+    }
+
+    bool targetIsViewSource = false;
+
+    if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) {
+        // A null principal can target its own URI.
+        if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) {
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+    }
+    else if (sViewSourceReachableFromInner &&
+             sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase(targetScheme.get()) &&
+             NS_SUCCEEDED(aTargetURI->SchemeIs("view-source", &targetIsViewSource)) &&
+             targetIsViewSource)
+    {
+        // exception for foo: linking to view-source:foo for reftests...
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // If we get here, check all the schemes can link to each other, from the top down:
+    nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator stringComparator;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI = sourceURI;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentOtherURI = aTargetURI;
+
+    bool denySameSchemeLinks = false;
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE,
+                             &denySameSchemeLinks);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+    while (currentURI && currentOtherURI) {
+        nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme;
+        currentURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+        currentOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
+
+        bool schemesMatch = scheme.Equals(otherScheme, stringComparator);
+        bool isSamePage = false;
+        // about: URIs are special snowflakes.
+        if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && schemesMatch) {
+            nsAutoCString moduleName, otherModuleName;
+            // about: pages can always link to themselves:
+            isSamePage =
+              NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentURI, moduleName)) &&
+              NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentOtherURI, otherModuleName)) &&
+              moduleName.Equals(otherModuleName);
+            if (!isSamePage) {
+                // We will have allowed the load earlier if the source page has
+                // system principal. So we know the source has a content
+                // principal, and it's trying to link to something else.
+                // Linkable about: pages are always reachable, even if we hit
+                // the CheckLoadURIFlags call below.
+                // We punch only 1 other hole: iff the source is unlinkable,
+                // we let them link to other pages explicitly marked SAFE
+                // for content. This avoids world-linkable about: pages linking
+                // to non-world-linkable about: pages.
+                nsCOMPtr<nsIAboutModule> module, otherModule;
+                bool knowBothModules =
+                    NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModule(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(module))) &&
+                    NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModule(currentOtherURI, getter_AddRefs(otherModule)));
+                uint32_t aboutModuleFlags = 0;
+                uint32_t otherAboutModuleFlags = 0;
+                knowBothModules = knowBothModules &&
+                    NS_SUCCEEDED(module->GetURIFlags(currentURI, &aboutModuleFlags)) &&
+                    NS_SUCCEEDED(otherModule->GetURIFlags(currentOtherURI, &otherAboutModuleFlags));
+                if (knowBothModules) {
+                    isSamePage =
+                        !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) &&
+                        (otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT);
+                    if (isSamePage && otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) {
+                        //XXXgijs: this is a hack. The target will be nested
+                        // (with innerURI of moz-safe-about:whatever), and
+                        // the source isn't, so we won't pass if we finish
+                        // the loop. We *should* pass, though, so return here.
+                        // This hack can go away when bug 1228118 is fixed.
+                        return NS_OK;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            bool equalExceptRef = false;
+            rv = currentURI->EqualsExceptRef(currentOtherURI, &equalExceptRef);
+            isSamePage = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && equalExceptRef;
+        }
+
+        // If schemes are not equal, or they're equal but the target URI
+        // is different from the source URI and doesn't always allow linking
+        // from the same scheme, check if the URI flags of the current target
+        // URI allow the current source URI to link to it.
+        // The policy is specified by the protocol flags on both URIs.
+        if (!schemesMatch || (denySameSchemeLinks && !isSamePage)) {
+            return CheckLoadURIFlags(currentURI, currentOtherURI,
+                                     sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags);
+        }
+        // Otherwise... check if we can nest another level:
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(currentURI);
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(currentOtherURI);
+
+        // If schemes match and neither URI is nested further, we're OK.
+        if (!nestedURI && !nestedOtherURI) {
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+        // If one is nested and the other isn't, something is wrong.
+        if (!nestedURI != !nestedOtherURI) {
+            return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+        }
+        // Otherwise, both should be nested and we'll go through the loop again.
+        nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI));
+        nestedOtherURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentOtherURI));
+    }
+
+    // We should never get here. We should always return from inside the loop.
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper method to check whether the target URI and its innermost ("base") URI
+ * has protocol flags that should stop it from being loaded by the source URI
+ * (and/or the source URI's innermost ("base") URI), taking into account any
+ * nsIScriptSecurityManager flags originally passed to
+ * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal and friends.
+ *
+ * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
+ */
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFlags(nsIURI *aSourceURI,
+                                           nsIURI *aTargetURI,
+                                           nsIURI *aSourceBaseURI,
+                                           nsIURI *aTargetBaseURI,
+                                           uint32_t aFlags)
+{
+    // Note that the order of policy checks here is very important!
+    // We start from most restrictive and work our way down.
+    bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS);
+    NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(errorTag, "CheckLoadURIError");
+
+    nsAutoCString targetScheme;
+    nsresult rv = aTargetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
+
+    // Check for system target URI
+    rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
+                                 nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        // Deny access, since the origin principal is not system
+        if (reportErrors) {
+            ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
+        }
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Check for chrome target URI
+    bool hasFlags = false;
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
+                             nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
+                             &hasFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (hasFlags) {
+        if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
+
+            // For now, don't change behavior for resource:// or moz-icon:// and
+            // just allow them.
+            if (!targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
+                return NS_OK;
+            }
+
+            // Allow a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE source to link to a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE
+            // target if ALLOW_CHROME is set.
+            //
+            // ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell
+            // loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin
+            // principal). So we're effectively allowing resource://, chrome://,
+            // and moz-icon:// source URIs to load resource://, chrome://, and
+            // moz-icon:// files, so long as they're not loading it as a document.
+            bool sourceIsUIResource;
+            rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aSourceBaseURI,
+                                     nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
+                                     &sourceIsUIResource);
+            NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+            if (sourceIsUIResource) {
+                return NS_OK;
+            }
+
+            // Allow the load only if the chrome package is whitelisted.
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(do_GetService(
+                                                 NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
+            if (reg) {
+                bool accessAllowed = false;
+                reg->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
+                if (accessAllowed) {
+                    return NS_OK;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Special-case the hidden window: it's allowed to load
+        // URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE no matter what.  Bug 1145470 tracks removing this.
+        nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aSourceBaseURI->GetSpec(sourceSpec)) &&
+            sourceSpec.EqualsLiteral("resource://gre-resources/hiddenWindow.html")) {
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+
+        if (reportErrors) {
+            ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
+        }
+        return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+    }
+
+    // Check for target URI pointing to a file
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
+                             nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
+                             &hasFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (hasFlags) {
+        // Allow domains that were whitelisted in the prefs. In 99.9% of cases,
+        // this array is empty.
+        for (nsIURI* uri : EnsureFileURIWhitelist()) {
+            if (EqualOrSubdomain(aSourceURI, uri)) {
+                return NS_OK;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Allow chrome://
+        bool isChrome = false;
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aSourceBaseURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome)) && isChrome) {
+            return NS_OK;
+        }
+
+        // Nothing else.
+        if (reportErrors) {
+            ReportError(nullptr, errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI);
+        }
+        return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+    }
+
+    // OK, everyone is allowed to load this, since unflagged handlers are
+    // deprecated but treated as URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE.  But check whether we
+    // need to warn.  At some point we'll want to make this warning into an
+    // error and treat unflagged handlers as URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD.
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
+                             nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE,
+                             &hasFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    // NB: we also get here if the base URI is URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
+    // and none of the rest of the nested chain of URIs for aTargetURI
+    // prohibits the load, so avoid warning in that case:
+    bool hasSubsumersFlag = false;
+    rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
+                             nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
+                             &hasSubsumersFlag);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (!hasFlags && !hasSubsumersFlag) {
+        nsXPIDLString message;
+        NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetScheme(targetScheme);
+        const char16_t* formatStrings[] = { ucsTargetScheme.get() };
+        rv = sStrBundle->
+            FormatStringFromName(u"ProtocolFlagError",
+                                 formatStrings,
+                                 ArrayLength(formatStrings),
+                                 getter_Copies(message));
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
+              do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
+            NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+            console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
+        }
+    }
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(JSContext* cx, const nsAString& messageTag,
+                                     nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget)
+{
+    nsresult rv;
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER);
+
+    // Get the source URL spec
+    nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
+    rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // Get the target URL spec
+    nsAutoCString targetSpec;
+    rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // Localize the error message
+    nsXPIDLString message;
+    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsSourceSpec(sourceSpec);
+    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 ucsTargetSpec(targetSpec);
+    const char16_t *formatStrings[] = { ucsSourceSpec.get(), ucsTargetSpec.get() };
+    rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(PromiseFlatString(messageTag).get(),
+                                          formatStrings,
+                                          ArrayLength(formatStrings),
+                                          getter_Copies(message));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // If a JS context was passed in, set a JS exception.
+    // Otherwise, print the error message directly to the JS console
+    // and to standard output
+    if (cx)
+    {
+        SetPendingException(cx, message.get());
+    }
+    else // Print directly to the console
+    {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
+            do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
+        NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+        console->LogStringMessage(message.get());
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                                                      const nsACString& aTargetURIStr,
+                                                      uint32_t aFlags)
+{
+    nsresult rv;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> target;
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr,
+                   nullptr, nullptr, sIOService);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
+    if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
+        // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
+        // return values.
+        return rv;
+    }
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not
+    // an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading.
+    // Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> fixup = do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID);
+    if (!fixup) {
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    uint32_t flags[] = {
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE,
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_FIX_SCHEME_TYPOS,
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP,
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI,
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_ALLOW_KEYWORD_LOOKUP |
+        nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAGS_MAKE_ALTERNATE_URI
+    };
+
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) {
+        rv = fixup->CreateFixupURI(aTargetURIStr, flags[i], nullptr,
+                                   getter_AddRefs(target));
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+        rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags);
+        if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
+            // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
+            // return values.
+            return rv;
+        }
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal **result)
+{
+    NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal);
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                   nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs(NO_APP_ID, false);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                              nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  return GetNoAppCodebasePrincipal(aURI, aPrincipal);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
+                                                 JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+  if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateCodebasePrincipalFromOrigin(const nsACString& aOrigin,
+                                                           nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("["))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME ":"))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aOrigin);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateNullPrincipal(JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
+                                             JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+  if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = nsNullPrincipal::Create(attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetAppCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                 uint32_t aAppId,
+                                                 bool aInIsolatedMozBrowser,
+                                                 nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aAppId != nsIScriptSecurityManager::UNKNOWN_APP_ID,
+                 NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
+
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs(aAppId, aInIsolatedMozBrowser);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::
+  GetLoadContextCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                  nsILoadContext* aLoadContext,
+                                  nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  NS_ENSURE_STATE(aLoadContext);
+  DocShellOriginAttributes docShellAttrs;
+  bool result = aLoadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs);;
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(result, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+  attrs.InheritFromDocShellToDoc(docShellAttrs, aURI);
+
+  nsresult rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, aURI);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellCodebasePrincipal(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                      nsIDocShell* aDocShell,
+                                                      nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal)
+{
+  PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs;
+  attrs.InheritFromDocShellToDoc(nsDocShell::Cast(aDocShell)->GetOriginAttributes(), aURI);
+
+  nsresult rv = MaybeSetAddonIdFromURI(attrs, aURI);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateCodebasePrincipal(aURI, attrs);
+  prin.forget(aPrincipal);
+  return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+// static
+nsIPrincipal*
+nsScriptSecurityManager::doGetObjectPrincipal(JSObject *aObj)
+{
+    JSCompartment *compartment = js::GetObjectCompartment(aObj);
+    JSPrincipals *principals = JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals(compartment);
+    return nsJSPrincipals::get(principals);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext *cx,
+                                          const nsIID &aIID,
+                                          nsISupports *aObj,
+                                          nsIClassInfo *aClassInfo)
+{
+// XXX Special case for nsIXPCException ?
+    ClassInfoData objClassInfo = ClassInfoData(aClassInfo, nullptr);
+    if (objClassInfo.IsDOMClass())
+    {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // We give remote-XUL whitelisted domains a free pass here. See bug 932906.
+    if (!xpc::AllowContentXBLScope(js::GetContextCompartment(cx)))
+    {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome())
+    {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    //-- Access denied, report an error
+    NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 strName("CreateWrapperDenied");
+    nsAutoCString origin;
+    nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
+    GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, origin);
+    NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUnicode(origin);
+    NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 classInfoName(objClassInfo.GetName());
+    const char16_t* formatStrings[] = {
+        classInfoName.get(),
+        originUnicode.get()
+    };
+    uint32_t length = ArrayLength(formatStrings);
+    if (originUnicode.IsEmpty()) {
+        --length;
+    } else {
+        strName.AppendLiteral("ForOrigin");
+    }
+    nsXPIDLString errorMsg;
+    nsresult rv = sStrBundle->FormatStringFromName(strName.get(),
+                                                   formatStrings,
+                                                   length,
+                                                   getter_Copies(errorMsg));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext *cx,
+                                           const nsCID &aCID)
+{
+    if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    //-- Access denied, report an error
+    nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID=");
+    char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
+    aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
+    errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
+    SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext *cx,
+                                       const nsCID &aCID)
+{
+    if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    //-- Access denied, report an error
+    nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID=");
+    char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
+    aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
+    errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
+    SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////
+// Method implementing nsIObserver //
+/////////////////////////////////////
+const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled";
+const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] =
+    "security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy";
+
+static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {
+  sJSEnabledPrefName,
+  sFileOriginPolicyPrefName,
+  "capability.policy.",
+  nullptr
+};
+
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::Observe(nsISupports* aObject, const char* aTopic,
+                                 const char16_t* aMessage)
+{
+    ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Constructor, Destructor, Initialization //
+/////////////////////////////////////////////
+nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
+    : mPrefInitialized(false)
+    , mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false)
+{
+    static_assert(sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*),
+                  "intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. "
+                  "This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union.");
+}
+
+nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init()
+{
+    nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    InitPrefs();
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
+        mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
+    if (!bundleService)
+        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+
+    rv = bundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties", &sStrBundle);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // Create our system principal singleton
+    RefPtr<nsSystemPrincipal> system = new nsSystemPrincipal();
+
+    mSystemPrincipal = system;
+
+    //-- Register security check callback in the JS engine
+    //   Currently this is used to control access to function.caller
+    sContext = danger::GetJSContext();
+
+    static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
+        ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction,
+        JSPrincipalsSubsume,
+    };
+
+    MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(sContext));
+    JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sContext, &securityCallbacks);
+    JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(sContext, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy);
+
+    JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sContext, system);
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static StaticRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> gScriptSecMan;
+
+nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
+{
+    Preferences::RemoveObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
+    if (mDomainPolicy) {
+        mDomainPolicy->Deactivate();
+    }
+    // ContentChild might hold a reference to the domain policy,
+    // and it might release it only after the security manager is
+    // gone. But we can still assert this for the main process.
+    MOZ_ASSERT_IF(XRE_IsParentProcess(),
+                  !mDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown()
+{
+    if (sContext) {
+        JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(sContext, nullptr);
+        JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(sContext, nullptr);
+        sContext = nullptr;
+    }
+
+    NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService);
+    NS_IF_RELEASE(sStrBundle);
+}
+
+nsScriptSecurityManager *
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager()
+{
+    return gScriptSecMan;
+}
+
+/* static */ void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::InitStatics()
+{
+    RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager();
+    nsresult rv = ssManager->Init();
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        MOZ_CRASH("ssManager->Init() failed");
+    }
+
+    ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan);
+    gScriptSecMan = ssManager;
+}
+
+// Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad
+// (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal
+// singleton.
+nsSystemPrincipal *
+nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor()
+{
+    nsIPrincipal *sysprin = nullptr;
+    if (gScriptSecMan)
+        NS_ADDREF(sysprin = gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal);
+    return static_cast<nsSystemPrincipal*>(sysprin);
+}
+
+struct IsWhitespace {
+    static bool Test(char aChar) { return NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
+};
+struct IsWhitespaceOrComma {
+    static bool Test(char aChar) { return aChar == ',' || NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
+};
+
+template <typename Predicate>
+uint32_t SkipPast(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base)
+{
+    while (base < str.Length() && Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
+        ++base;
+    }
+    return base;
+}
+
+template <typename Predicate>
+uint32_t SkipUntil(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base)
+{
+    while (base < str.Length() && !Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
+        ++base;
+    }
+    return base;
+}
+
+inline void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged()
+{
+    MOZ_ASSERT(mPrefInitialized);
+    mIsJavaScriptEnabled =
+        Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled);
+    sStrictFileOriginPolicy =
+        Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false);
+    mFileURIWhitelist.reset();
+}
+
+void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(const nsCString& aSiteList)
+{
+    for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, 0), bound = 0;
+         base < aSiteList.Length();
+         base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, bound))
+    {
+        // Grab the current site.
+        bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, base);
+        nsAutoCString site(Substring(aSiteList, base, bound - base));
+
+        // Check if the URI is schemeless. If so, add both http and https.
+        nsAutoCString unused;
+        if (NS_FAILED(sIOService->ExtractScheme(site, unused))) {
+            AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("http://") + site);
+            AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("https://") + site);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Convert it to a URI and add it to our list.
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+        nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), site, nullptr, nullptr, sIOService);
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+            mFileURIWhitelist.ref().AppendElement(uri);
+        } else {
+            nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
+            if (console) {
+                nsAutoString msg = NS_LITERAL_STRING("Unable to to add site to file:// URI whitelist: ") +
+                                   NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(site);
+                console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+nsresult
+nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs()
+{
+    nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+    mPrefInitialized = true;
+
+    // Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs
+    ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
+
+    // set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change
+    Preferences::AddStrongObservers(this, kObservedPrefs);
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDomainPolicyActive(bool *aRv)
+{
+    *aRv = !!mDomainPolicy;
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicy(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv)
+{
+    if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+        return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+    }
+
+    return ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(aRv);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv)
+{
+    // We only allow one domain policy at a time. The holder of the previous
+    // policy must explicitly deactivate it first.
+    if (mDomainPolicy) {
+        return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+    }
+
+    mDomainPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainPolicy> ptr = mDomainPolicy;
+    ptr.forget(aRv);
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Intentionally non-scriptable. Script must have a reference to the
+// nsIDomainPolicy to deactivate it.
+void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::DeactivateDomainPolicy()
+{
+    mDomainPolicy = nullptr;
+}
+
+void
+nsScriptSecurityManager::CloneDomainPolicy(DomainPolicyClone* aClone)
+{
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aClone);
+    if (mDomainPolicy) {
+        mDomainPolicy->CloneDomainPolicy(aClone);
+    } else {
+        aClone->active() = false;
+    }
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsScriptSecurityManager::PolicyAllowsScript(nsIURI* aURI, bool *aRv)
+{
+    nsresult rv;
+
+    // Compute our rule. If we don't have any domain policy set up that might
+    // provide exceptions to this rule, we're done.
+    *aRv = mIsJavaScriptEnabled;
+    if (!mDomainPolicy) {
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    // We have a domain policy. Grab the appropriate set of exceptions to the
+    // rule (either the blacklist or the whitelist, depending on whether script
+    // is enabled or disabled by default).
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> exceptions;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> superExceptions;
+    if (*aRv) {
+        mDomainPolicy->GetBlacklist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
+        mDomainPolicy->GetSuperBlacklist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
+    } else {
+        mDomainPolicy->GetWhitelist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
+        mDomainPolicy->GetSuperWhitelist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
+    }
+
+    bool contains;
+    rv = exceptions->Contains(aURI, &contains);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (contains) {
+        *aRv = !*aRv;
+        return NS_OK;
+    }
+    rv = superExceptions->ContainsSuperDomain(aURI, &contains);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (contains) {
+        *aRv = !*aRv;
+    }
+
+    return NS_OK;
+}
+
+const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIURI>>&
+nsScriptSecurityManager::EnsureFileURIWhitelist()
+{
+    if (mFileURIWhitelist.isSome()) {
+        return mFileURIWhitelist.ref();
+    }
+
+    //
+    // Rebuild the set of principals for which we allow file:// URI loads. This
+    // implements a small subset of an old pref-based CAPS people that people
+    // have come to depend on. See bug 995943.
+    //
+
+    mFileURIWhitelist.emplace();
+    auto policies = mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames");
+    for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, 0), bound = 0;
+         base < policies.Length();
+         base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, bound))
+    {
+        // Grab the current policy name.
+        bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, base);
+        auto policyName = Substring(policies, base, bound - base);
+
+        // Figure out if this policy allows loading file:// URIs. If not, we can skip it.
+        nsCString checkLoadURIPrefName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("capability.policy.") +
+                                         policyName +
+                                         NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".checkloaduri.enabled");
+        if (!Preferences::GetString(checkLoadURIPrefName.get()).LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allaccess")) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Grab the list of domains associated with this policy.
+        nsCString domainPrefName = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("capability.policy.") +
+                                   policyName +
+                                   NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".sites");
+        auto siteList = Preferences::GetCString(domainPrefName.get());
+        AddSitesToFileURIWhitelist(siteList);
+    }
+
+    return mFileURIWhitelist.ref();
+}