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authorjanekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>2018-04-30 21:04:56 +0200
committerjanekptacijarabaci <janekptacijarabaci@seznam.cz>2018-04-30 21:04:56 +0200
commitf799598d65a59660ef67ed965849853c8e5ca1e6 (patch)
tree483c9c4626cb57b1cdaad084dfa5a27d733402a4
parente66562aa8b7bed7f194355eb3953ead052e2aa48 (diff)
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Bug 1182569: Update ContentSecurityManager to handle docshell loads
-rw-r--r--dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp81
-rw-r--r--netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp14
2 files changed, 68 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
index 0cc4933fe..70e574445 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
+#include "nsINestedURI.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
@@ -244,10 +247,6 @@ DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
static nsresult
DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
- nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
- nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
-
nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
@@ -255,12 +254,24 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestingContext = nullptr;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
- // initiated by javascript tests.
- bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
- skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
-#endif
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+ nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+ if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
+ // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
+ // perform proper security checks.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
+ rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ uri = fixedURI;
+ }
+ }
+ }
switch(contentPolicyType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
@@ -294,16 +305,14 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
- MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck || false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
+ mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
+ requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
- MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
- requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
- "type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document");
break;
}
@@ -470,18 +479,32 @@ DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
}
+ // For document loads we use the triggeringPrincipal as the originPrincipal.
+ // Note the the loadingPrincipal for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT is a nullptr.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal =
+ (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)
+ ? aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()
+ : aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
+
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType,
uri,
- aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(),
+ principal,
requestingContext,
mimeTypeGuess,
nullptr, //extra,
&shouldLoad,
nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(),
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager());
- NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
- if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+ if ((NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) &&
+ (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
+ // for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
+ return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
+ }
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
@@ -629,6 +652,30 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+ nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+ loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+ if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+ contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+ // query the nested URI for security checks like in the case of view-source
+ nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri);
+ if (nestedURI) {
+ nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+ }
+
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
+ // be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
+ // perform proper security checks.
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
+ rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+ uri = fixedURI;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
// Handle cookie policies
uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
index 8ff3e788f..bc9bcf88a 100644
--- a/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
+++ b/netwerk/base/nsNetUtil.cpp
@@ -1285,16 +1285,10 @@ NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(nsIChannel* aChannel, bool aReport)
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(loadInfo, "Origin tracking only works for channels created with a loadinfo");
-#ifdef DEBUG
- // Don't enforce TYPE_DOCUMENT assertions for loads
- // initiated by javascript tests.
- bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
- skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
-#endif
-
- MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck ||
- loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
- "calling NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin on a top level load");
+ // TYPE_DOCUMENT loads have a null LoadingPrincipal and can not be cross origin.
+ if (!loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()) {
+ return false;
+ }
// Always treat tainted channels as cross-origin.
if (loadInfo->GetTainting() != LoadTainting::Basic) {