/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This code is made available to you under your choice of the following sets * of licensing terms: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ /* Copyright 2013 Mozilla Contributors * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900 // When building with -D_HAS_EXCEPTIONS=0, MSVC's <xtree> header triggers // warning C4702: unreachable code. // https://connect.microsoft.com/VisualStudio/feedback/details/809962 #pragma warning(push) #pragma warning(disable: 4702) #endif #include <map> #include <vector> #if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900 #pragma warning(pop) #endif #include "pkixgtest.h" #include "mozpkix/pkixder.h" using namespace mozilla::pkix; using namespace mozilla::pkix::test; static ByteString CreateCert(const char* issuerCN, // null means "empty name" const char* subjectCN, // null means "empty name" EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, /*optional modified*/ std::map<ByteString, ByteString>* subjectDERToCertDER = nullptr, /*optional*/ const ByteString* extension = nullptr, /*optional*/ const TestKeyPair* issuerKeyPair = nullptr, /*optional*/ const TestKeyPair* subjectKeyPair = nullptr) { static long serialNumberValue = 0; ++serialNumberValue; ByteString serialNumber(CreateEncodedSerialNumber(serialNumberValue)); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(serialNumber)); ByteString issuerDER(issuerCN ? CNToDERName(issuerCN) : Name(ByteString())); ByteString subjectDER(subjectCN ? CNToDERName(subjectCN) : Name(ByteString())); std::vector<ByteString> extensions; if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) { ByteString basicConstraints = CreateEncodedBasicConstraints(true, nullptr, Critical::Yes); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(basicConstraints)); extensions.push_back(basicConstraints); } if (extension) { extensions.push_back(*extension); } extensions.push_back(ByteString()); // marks the end of the list ScopedTestKeyPair reusedKey(CloneReusedKeyPair()); ByteString certDER(CreateEncodedCertificate( v3, sha256WithRSAEncryption(), serialNumber, issuerDER, oneDayBeforeNow, oneDayAfterNow, subjectDER, subjectKeyPair ? *subjectKeyPair : *reusedKey, extensions.data(), issuerKeyPair ? *issuerKeyPair : *reusedKey, sha256WithRSAEncryption())); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); if (subjectDERToCertDER) { (*subjectDERToCertDER)[subjectDER] = certDER; } return certDER; } class TestTrustDomain final : public DefaultCryptoTrustDomain { public: // The "cert chain tail" is a longish chain of certificates that is used by // all of the tests here. We share this chain across all the tests in order // to speed up the tests (generating keypairs for the certs is very slow). bool SetUpCertChainTail() { static char const* const names[] = { "CA1 (Root)", "CA2", "CA3", "CA4", "CA5", "CA6", "CA7" }; for (size_t i = 0; i < MOZILLA_PKIX_ARRAY_LENGTH(names); ++i) { const char* issuerName = i == 0 ? names[0] : names[i-1]; CreateCACert(issuerName, names[i]); if (i == 0) { rootCACertDER = leafCACertDER; } } return true; } void CreateCACert(const char* issuerName, const char* subjectName) { leafCACertDER = CreateCert(issuerName, subjectName, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, &subjectDERToCertDER); assert(!ENCODING_FAILED(leafCACertDER)); } ByteString GetLeafCACertDER() const { return leafCACertDER; } private: Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input candidateCert, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { trustLevel = InputEqualsByteString(candidateCert, rootCACertDER) ? TrustLevel::TrustAnchor : TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; return Success; } Result FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker, Time) override { ByteString subjectDER(InputToByteString(encodedIssuerName)); ByteString certDER(subjectDERToCertDER[subjectDER]); Input derCert; Result rv = derCert.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length()); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } bool keepGoing; rv = checker.Check(derCert, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/, keepGoing); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } return Success; } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { return Success; } Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time, const CertPolicyId&) override { return Success; } std::map<ByteString, ByteString> subjectDERToCertDER; ByteString leafCACertDER; ByteString rootCACertDER; }; class pkixbuild : public ::testing::Test { public: static void SetUpTestCase() { if (!trustDomain.SetUpCertChainTail()) { abort(); } } protected: static TestTrustDomain trustDomain; }; /*static*/ TestTrustDomain pkixbuild::trustDomain; TEST_F(pkixbuild, MaxAcceptableCertChainLength) { { ByteString leafCACert(trustDomain.GetLeafCACertDER()); Input certDER; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDER.Init(leafCACert.data(), leafCACert.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Success, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } { ByteString certDER(CreateCert("CA7", "Direct End-Entity", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Success, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } } TEST_F(pkixbuild, BeyondMaxAcceptableCertChainLength) { static char const* const caCertName = "CA Too Far"; trustDomain.CreateCACert("CA7", caCertName); { ByteString certDER(trustDomain.GetLeafCACertDER()); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } { ByteString certDER(CreateCert(caCertName, "End-Entity Too Far", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } } // A TrustDomain that checks certificates against a given root certificate. // It is initialized with the DER encoding of a root certificate that // is treated as a trust anchor and is assumed to have issued all certificates // (i.e. FindIssuer always attempts to build the next step in the chain with // it). class SingleRootTrustDomain : public DefaultCryptoTrustDomain { public: explicit SingleRootTrustDomain(ByteString aRootDER) : rootDER(aRootDER) { } // The CertPolicyId argument is unused because we don't care about EV. Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input candidateCert, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { Input rootCert; Result rv = rootCert.Init(rootDER.data(), rootDER.length()); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } if (InputsAreEqual(candidateCert, rootCert)) { trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor; } else { trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; } return Success; } Result FindIssuer(Input, IssuerChecker& checker, Time) override { // keepGoing is an out parameter from IssuerChecker.Check. It would tell us // whether or not to continue attempting other potential issuers. We only // know of one potential issuer, however, so we ignore it. bool keepGoing; Input rootCert; Result rv = rootCert.Init(rootDER.data(), rootDER.length()); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } return checker.Check(rootCert, nullptr, keepGoing); } Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time, const CertPolicyId&) override { return Success; } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { return Success; } private: ByteString rootDER; }; // A TrustDomain that explicitly fails if CheckRevocation is called. class ExpiredCertTrustDomain final : public SingleRootTrustDomain { public: explicit ExpiredCertTrustDomain(ByteString aRootDER) : SingleRootTrustDomain(aRootDER) { } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { ADD_FAILURE(); return NotReached("CheckRevocation should not be called", Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); } }; TEST_F(pkixbuild, NoRevocationCheckingForExpiredCert) { const char* rootCN = "Root CA"; ByteString rootDER(CreateCert(rootCN, rootCN, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, nullptr)); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(rootDER)); ExpiredCertTrustDomain expiredCertTrustDomain(rootDER); ByteString serialNumber(CreateEncodedSerialNumber(100)); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(serialNumber)); ByteString issuerDER(CNToDERName(rootCN)); ByteString subjectDER(CNToDERName("Expired End-Entity Cert")); ScopedTestKeyPair reusedKey(CloneReusedKeyPair()); ByteString certDER(CreateEncodedCertificate( v3, sha256WithRSAEncryption(), serialNumber, issuerDER, twoDaysBeforeNow, oneDayBeforeNow, subjectDER, *reusedKey, nullptr, *reusedKey, sha256WithRSAEncryption())); EXPECT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input cert; ASSERT_EQ(Success, cert.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE, BuildCertChain(expiredCertTrustDomain, cert, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr)); } class DSSTrustDomain final : public EverythingFailsByDefaultTrustDomain { public: Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor; return Success; } }; class pkixbuild_DSS : public ::testing::Test { }; TEST_F(pkixbuild_DSS, DSSEndEntityKeyNotAccepted) { DSSTrustDomain trustDomain; ByteString serialNumber(CreateEncodedSerialNumber(1)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(serialNumber)); ByteString subjectDER(CNToDERName("DSS")); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(subjectDER)); ScopedTestKeyPair subjectKey(GenerateDSSKeyPair()); ASSERT_TRUE(subjectKey.get()); ByteString issuerDER(CNToDERName("RSA")); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(issuerDER)); ScopedTestKeyPair issuerKey(CloneReusedKeyPair()); ASSERT_TRUE(issuerKey.get()); ByteString cert(CreateEncodedCertificate(v3, sha256WithRSAEncryption(), serialNumber, issuerDER, oneDayBeforeNow, oneDayAfterNow, subjectDER, *subjectKey, nullptr, *issuerKey, sha256WithRSAEncryption())); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(cert)); Input certDER; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDER.Init(cert.data(), cert.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } class IssuerNameCheckTrustDomain final : public DefaultCryptoTrustDomain { public: IssuerNameCheckTrustDomain(const ByteString& aIssuer, bool aExpectedKeepGoing) : issuer(aIssuer) , expectedKeepGoing(aExpectedKeepGoing) { } Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { trustLevel = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA ? TrustLevel::TrustAnchor : TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; return Success; } Result FindIssuer(Input, IssuerChecker& checker, Time) override { Input issuerInput; EXPECT_EQ(Success, issuerInput.Init(issuer.data(), issuer.length())); bool keepGoing; EXPECT_EQ(Success, checker.Check(issuerInput, nullptr /*additionalNameConstraints*/, keepGoing)); EXPECT_EQ(expectedKeepGoing, keepGoing); return Success; } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { return Success; } Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time, const CertPolicyId&) override { return Success; } private: const ByteString issuer; const bool expectedKeepGoing; }; struct IssuerNameCheckParams { const char* subjectIssuerCN; // null means "empty name" const char* issuerSubjectCN; // null means "empty name" bool matches; Result expectedError; }; static const IssuerNameCheckParams ISSUER_NAME_CHECK_PARAMS[] = { { "foo", "foo", true, Success }, { "foo", "bar", false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER }, { "f", "foo", false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER }, // prefix { "foo", "f", false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER }, // prefix { "foo", "Foo", false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER }, // case sensitive { "", "", true, Success }, { nullptr, nullptr, false, Result::ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME }, // empty issuer // check that certificate-related errors are deferred and superseded by // ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER when a chain can't be built due to name mismatches { "foo", nullptr, false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER }, { nullptr, "foo", false, Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER } }; class pkixbuild_IssuerNameCheck : public ::testing::Test , public ::testing::WithParamInterface<IssuerNameCheckParams> { }; TEST_P(pkixbuild_IssuerNameCheck, MatchingName) { const IssuerNameCheckParams& params(GetParam()); ByteString issuerCertDER(CreateCert(params.issuerSubjectCN, params.issuerSubjectCN, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, nullptr)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(issuerCertDER)); ByteString subjectCertDER(CreateCert(params.subjectIssuerCN, "end-entity", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(subjectCertDER)); Input subjectCertDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, subjectCertDERInput.Init(subjectCertDER.data(), subjectCertDER.length())); IssuerNameCheckTrustDomain trustDomain(issuerCertDER, !params.matches); ASSERT_EQ(params.expectedError, BuildCertChain(trustDomain, subjectCertDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(pkixbuild_IssuerNameCheck, pkixbuild_IssuerNameCheck, testing::ValuesIn(ISSUER_NAME_CHECK_PARAMS)); // Records the embedded SCT list extension for later examination. class EmbeddedSCTListTestTrustDomain final : public SingleRootTrustDomain { public: explicit EmbeddedSCTListTestTrustDomain(ByteString aRootDER) : SingleRootTrustDomain(aRootDER) { } virtual void NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension extension, Input extensionData) override { if (extension == AuxiliaryExtension::EmbeddedSCTList) { signedCertificateTimestamps = InputToByteString(extensionData); } else { ADD_FAILURE(); } } ByteString signedCertificateTimestamps; }; TEST_F(pkixbuild, CertificateTransparencyExtension) { // python security/pkix/tools/DottedOIDToCode.py --tlv // id-embeddedSctList 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2 static const uint8_t tlv_id_embeddedSctList[] = { 0x06, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x79, 0x02, 0x04, 0x02 }; static const uint8_t dummySctList[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05 }; ByteString ctExtension = TLV(der::SEQUENCE, BytesToByteString(tlv_id_embeddedSctList) + Boolean(false) + TLV(der::OCTET_STRING, // SignedCertificateTimestampList structure is encoded as an OCTET STRING // within the X.509v3 extension (see RFC 6962 section 3.3). // pkix decodes it internally and returns the actual structure. TLV(der::OCTET_STRING, BytesToByteString(dummySctList)))); const char* rootCN = "Root CA"; ByteString rootDER(CreateCert(rootCN, rootCN, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(rootDER)); ByteString certDER(CreateCert(rootCN, "Cert with SCT list", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr, /*subjectDERToCertDER*/ &ctExtension)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); EmbeddedSCTListTestTrustDomain extTrustDomain(rootDER); ASSERT_EQ(Success, BuildCertChain(extTrustDomain, certInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr /*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); ASSERT_EQ(BytesToByteString(dummySctList), extTrustDomain.signedCertificateTimestamps); } // This TrustDomain implements a hierarchy like so: // // A B // | | // C D // \ / // E // // where A is a trust anchor, B is not a trust anchor and has no known issuer, C // and D are intermediates with the same subject and subject public key, and E // is an end-entity (in practice, the end-entity will be generated by the test // functions using this trust domain). class MultiplePathTrustDomain: public DefaultCryptoTrustDomain { public: void SetUpCerts() { ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(CreateCert("UntrustedRoot", "UntrustedRoot", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, &subjectDERToCertDER))); // The subject DER -> cert DER mapping would be overwritten for subject // "Intermediate" when we create the second "Intermediate" certificate, so // we keep a copy of this "Intermediate". intermediateSignedByUntrustedRootCertDER = CreateCert("UntrustedRoot", "Intermediate", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(intermediateSignedByUntrustedRootCertDER)); rootCACertDER = CreateCert("TrustedRoot", "TrustedRoot", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, &subjectDERToCertDER); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(rootCACertDER)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(CreateCert("TrustedRoot", "Intermediate", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, &subjectDERToCertDER))); } private: Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input candidateCert, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { trustLevel = InputEqualsByteString(candidateCert, rootCACertDER) ? TrustLevel::TrustAnchor : TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; return Success; } Result CheckCert(ByteString& certDER, IssuerChecker& checker, bool& keepGoing) { Input derCert; Result rv = derCert.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length()); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } return checker.Check(derCert, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/, keepGoing); } Result FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker, Time) override { ByteString subjectDER(InputToByteString(encodedIssuerName)); ByteString certDER(subjectDERToCertDER[subjectDER]); assert(!ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); bool keepGoing; Result rv = CheckCert(certDER, checker, keepGoing); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } // Also try the other intermediate. if (keepGoing) { rv = CheckCert(intermediateSignedByUntrustedRootCertDER, checker, keepGoing); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } } return Success; } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { return Success; } Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time, const CertPolicyId&) override { return Success; } std::map<ByteString, ByteString> subjectDERToCertDER; ByteString rootCACertDER; ByteString intermediateSignedByUntrustedRootCertDER; }; TEST_F(pkixbuild, BadEmbeddedSCTWithMultiplePaths) { MultiplePathTrustDomain localTrustDomain; localTrustDomain.SetUpCerts(); // python security/pkix/tools/DottedOIDToCode.py --tlv // id-embeddedSctList 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2 static const uint8_t tlv_id_embeddedSctList[] = { 0x06, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x79, 0x02, 0x04, 0x02 }; static const uint8_t dummySctList[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05 }; ByteString ctExtension = TLV(der::SEQUENCE, BytesToByteString(tlv_id_embeddedSctList) + Boolean(false) + // The contents of the OCTET STRING are supposed to consist of an OCTET // STRING of useful data. We're testing what happens if it isn't, so shove // some bogus (non-OCTET STRING) data in there. TLV(der::OCTET_STRING, BytesToByteString(dummySctList))); ByteString certDER(CreateCert("Intermediate", "Cert with bogus SCT list", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr, /*subjectDERToCertDER*/ &ctExtension)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_BAD_DER, BuildCertChain(localTrustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } // Same as a MultiplePathTrustDomain, but the end-entity is revoked. class RevokedEndEntityTrustDomain final : public MultiplePathTrustDomain { public: Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) { return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; } return Success; } }; TEST_F(pkixbuild, RevokedEndEntityWithMultiplePaths) { RevokedEndEntityTrustDomain localTrustDomain; localTrustDomain.SetUpCerts(); ByteString certDER(CreateCert("Intermediate", "RevokedEndEntity", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity)); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, BuildCertChain(localTrustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } // This represents a collection of different certificates that all have the same // subject and issuer distinguished name. class SelfIssuedCertificatesTrustDomain final : public DefaultCryptoTrustDomain { public: void SetUpCerts(size_t totalCerts) { ASSERT_TRUE(totalCerts > 0); // First we generate a trust anchor. ScopedTestKeyPair rootKeyPair(GenerateKeyPair()); rootCACertDER = CreateCert("DN", "DN", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, nullptr, nullptr, rootKeyPair.get(), rootKeyPair.get()); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(rootCACertDER)); certs.push_back(rootCACertDER); ScopedTestKeyPair issuerKeyPair(rootKeyPair.release()); size_t subCAsGenerated; // Then we generate 6 sub-CAs (given that we were requested to generate at // least that many). for (subCAsGenerated = 0; subCAsGenerated < totalCerts - 1 && subCAsGenerated < 6; subCAsGenerated++) { // Each certificate has to have a unique SPKI (mozilla::pkix does loop // detection and stops searching if it encounters two certificates in a // path with the same subject and SPKI). ScopedTestKeyPair keyPair(GenerateKeyPair()); ByteString cert(CreateCert("DN", "DN", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, nullptr, nullptr, issuerKeyPair.get(), keyPair.get())); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(cert)); certs.push_back(cert); issuerKeyPair.reset(keyPair.release()); } // We set firstIssuerKey here because we can't end up with a path that has // more than 7 CAs in it (because mozilla::pkix limits the path length). firstIssuerKey.reset(issuerKeyPair.release()); // For any more sub CAs we generate, it doesn't matter what their keys are // as long as they're different. for (; subCAsGenerated < totalCerts - 1; subCAsGenerated++) { ScopedTestKeyPair keyPair(GenerateKeyPair()); ByteString cert(CreateCert("DN", "DN", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, nullptr, nullptr, keyPair.get(), keyPair.get())); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(cert)); certs.insert(certs.begin(), cert); } } const TestKeyPair* GetFirstIssuerKey() { return firstIssuerKey.get(); } private: Result GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA, const CertPolicyId&, Input candidateCert, /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) override { trustLevel = InputEqualsByteString(candidateCert, rootCACertDER) ? TrustLevel::TrustAnchor : TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; return Success; } Result FindIssuer(Input, IssuerChecker& checker, Time) override { bool keepGoing; for (auto& cert: certs) { Input certInput; Result rv = certInput.Init(cert.data(), cert.length()); if (rv != Success) { return rv; } rv = checker.Check(certInput, nullptr, keepGoing); if (rv != Success || !keepGoing) { return rv; } } return Success; } Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time, Duration, /*optional*/ const Input*, /*optional*/ const Input*) override { return Success; } Result IsChainValid(const DERArray&, Time, const CertPolicyId&) override { return Success; } std::vector<ByteString> certs; ByteString rootCACertDER; ScopedTestKeyPair firstIssuerKey; }; TEST_F(pkixbuild, AvoidUnboundedPathSearchingFailure) { SelfIssuedCertificatesTrustDomain localTrustDomain; // This creates a few hundred million potential paths of length 8 (end entity // + 6 sub-CAs + root). It would be prohibitively expensive to enumerate all // of these, so we give mozilla::pkix a budget that is spent when searching // paths. If the budget is exhausted, it simply returns an unknown issuer // error. In the future it might be nice to return a specific error that would // give the front-end a hint that maybe it shouldn't have so many certificates // that all have the same subject and issuer DN but different SPKIs. localTrustDomain.SetUpCerts(18); ByteString certDER(CreateCert("DN", "DN", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr, nullptr, localTrustDomain.GetFirstIssuerKey())); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, BuildCertChain(localTrustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); } TEST_F(pkixbuild, AvoidUnboundedPathSearchingSuccess) { SelfIssuedCertificatesTrustDomain localTrustDomain; // This creates a few hundred thousand possible potential paths of length 8 // (end entity + 6 sub-CAs + root). This will nearly exhaust mozilla::pkix's // search budget, so this should succeed. localTrustDomain.SetUpCerts(10); ByteString certDER(CreateCert("DN", "DN", EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, nullptr, nullptr, localTrustDomain.GetFirstIssuerKey())); ASSERT_FALSE(ENCODING_FAILED(certDER)); Input certDERInput; ASSERT_EQ(Success, certDERInput.Init(certDER.data(), certDER.length())); ASSERT_EQ(Success, BuildCertChain(localTrustDomain, certDERInput, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/)); }