/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- * vim: ft=cpp tw=78 sw=2 et ts=2 sts=2 cin * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsISupports.idl" #include "nsIContentPolicy.idl" interface nsIDOMDocument; interface nsINode; interface nsIPrincipal; native LoadContextRef(already_AddRefed<nsISupports>); %{C++ #include "nsTArray.h" #include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h" #include "mozilla/LoadTainting.h" class nsCString; %} [ref] native const_nsIPrincipalArray(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>); native NeckoOriginAttributes(mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes); [ref] native const_OriginAttributesRef(const mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes); [ref] native StringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCString>); typedef unsigned long nsSecurityFlags; /** * The LoadInfo object contains information about a network load, why it * was started, and how we plan on using the resulting response. * If a network request is redirected, the new channel will receive a new * LoadInfo object. The new object will contain mostly the same * information as the pre-redirect one, but updated as appropriate. * For detailed information about what parts of LoadInfo are updated on * redirect, see documentation on individual properties. */ [scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(ddc65bf9-2f60-41ab-b22a-4f1ae9efcd36)] interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports { /** * *** DEPRECATED *** * No LoadInfo created within Gecko should contain this security flag. * Please use any of the five security flags defined underneath. * We only keep this security flag to provide backwards compatibilty. */ const unsigned long SEC_NORMAL = 0; /** * The following five flags determine the security mode and hence what kind of * security checks should be performed throughout the lifetime of the channel. * * * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS * * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED * * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS * * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL * * SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS * * Exactly one of these flags are required to be set in order to allow * the channel to perform the correct security checks (SOP, CORS, ...) and * return the correct result principal. If none or more than one of these * flags are set AsyncOpen2 will fail. */ /* * Enforce the same origin policy where data: loads inherit * the principal. */ const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<0); /* * Enforce the same origin policy but data: loads are blocked. */ const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED = (1<<1); /** * Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will inherit * the principal of the origin that triggered the load. * Commonly used by plain <img>, <video>, <link rel=stylesheet> etc. */ const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<2); /** * Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will be allowed, * but the resulting resource will get a null principal. * Used in blink/webkit for <iframe>s. Likely also the mode * that should be used by most Chrome code. */ const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL = (1<<3); /** * Allow loads from any origin, but require CORS for cross-origin * loads. Loads from data: are allowed and the result will inherit * the principal of the origin that triggered the load. * Commonly used by <img crossorigin>, <video crossorigin>, * XHR, fetch(), etc. */ const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<4); /** * Choose cookie policy. The default policy is equivalent to "INCLUDE" for * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* and SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* modes, and * equivalent to "SAME_ORIGIN" for SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS mode. * * This means that if you want to perform a CORS load with credentials, pass * SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE. * * Note that these flags are still subject to the user's cookie policies. * For example, if the user is blocking 3rd party cookies, those cookies * will be blocked no matter which of these flags are set. */ const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT = (0 << 5); const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE = (1 << 5); const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN = (2 << 5); const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_OMIT = (3 << 5); /** * Force inheriting of the Principal. The resulting resource will use the * principal of the document which is doing the load. Setting this flag * will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the same principal as * the loading principal that's passed in when creating the channel. * * This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the * channel is loading. * * So if the loading document comes from "http://a.com/", and the channel * is loading the URI "http://b.com/whatever", GetChannelResultPrincipal * will return a principal from "http://a.com/". * * This flag can not be used together with SEC_SANDBOXED. If both are passed * to the LoadInfo constructor then this flag will be dropped. If you need * to know whether this flag would have been present but was dropped due to * sandboxing, check for the forceInheritPrincipalDropped flag. */ const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = (1<<7); /** * Sandbox the load. The resulting resource will use a freshly created * null principal. So GetChannelResultPrincipal will always return a * null principal whenever this flag is set. * * This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the * channel is loading. * * This flag can not be used together with SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL. */ const unsigned long SEC_SANDBOXED = (1<<8); /** * Inherit the Principal for about:blank. */ const unsigned long SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS = (1<<9); /** * Allow access to chrome: packages that are content accessible. */ const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CHROME = (1<<10); /** * Disallow access to javascript: uris. */ const unsigned long SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT = (1<<11); /** * Don't follow redirects. Instead the redirect response is returned * as a successful response for the channel. * * Redirects not initiated by a server response, i.e. REDIRECT_INTERNAL and * REDIRECT_STS_UPGRADE, are still followed. * * Note: If this flag is set and the channel response is a redirect, then * the response body might not be available. * This can happen if the redirect was cached. */ const unsigned long SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS = (1<<12); /** * Load an error page, it should be one of following : about:neterror, * about:certerror, about:blocked, or about:tabcrashed. */ const unsigned long SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE = (1<<13); /** * Force inheriting of the principalToInherit, overruling any owner * that might be set on the channel. (Please note that channel.owner * is deprecated and will be removed within Bug 1286838). * Setting this flag will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the * principalToInherit set in the loadInfo. * * This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the * channel is loading. */ const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER = (1<<14); /** * This is the principal of the network request's caller/requester where * the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is the principal which * will get access to the result of the request. (Where "get access to" * might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of resource that is * loaded). * * For example for an image, it is the principal of the document where * the image is rendered. For a stylesheet it is the principal of the * document where the stylesheet will be applied. * * So if document at http://a.com/page.html loads an image from * http://b.com/pic.jpg, then loadingPrincipal will be * http://a.com/page.html. * * For <iframe> and <frame> loads, the LoadingPrincipal is the * principal of the parent document. For top-level loads, the * LoadingPrincipal is null. For all loads except top-level loads * the LoadingPrincipal is never null. * * If the loadingPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks * will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial * load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no * nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of * this, never set the loadingPrincipal to the system principal when * the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage. * If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both * codebase-principals, then we will always call into * nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies * and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin * with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal. */ readonly attribute nsIPrincipal loadingPrincipal; /** * A C++-friendly version of loadingPrincipal. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingPrincipal)] nsIPrincipal binaryLoadingPrincipal(); /** * This is the principal which caused the network load to start. I.e. * this is the principal which provided the URL to be loaded. This is * often the same as the LoadingPrincipal, but there are a few cases * where that's not true. * * For example for loads into an <iframe>, the LoadingPrincipal is always * the principal of the parent document. However the triggeringPrincipal * is the principal of the document which provided the URL that the * <iframe> is navigating to. This could be the previous document inside * the <iframe> which set document.location. Or a document elsewhere in * the frame tree which contained a <a target="..."> which targetted the * <iframe>. * * If a stylesheet links to a sub-resource, like an @imported stylesheet, * or a background image, then the triggeringPrincipal is the principal * of the stylesheet, while the LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the * document being styled. * * The triggeringPrincipal is never null. * * If the triggeringPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks * will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial * load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no * nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of * this, never set the triggeringPrincipal to the system principal when * the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage. * If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both * codebase-principals, then we will always call into * nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies * and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin * with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal. */ readonly attribute nsIPrincipal triggeringPrincipal; /** * A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(TriggeringPrincipal)] nsIPrincipal binaryTriggeringPrincipal(); /** * For non-document loads the principalToInherit is always null. For * loads of type TYPE_DOCUMENT or TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT the principalToInherit * might be null. If it's non null, then this is the principal that is * inherited if a principal needs to be inherited. If the principalToInherit * is null but the inherit flag is set, then the triggeringPrincipal is * the principal that is inherited. */ attribute nsIPrincipal principalToInherit; /** * A C++-friendly version of principalToInherit. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(PrincipalToInherit)] nsIPrincipal binaryPrincipalToInherit(); /** * This is the ownerDocument of the LoadingNode. Unless the LoadingNode * is a Document, in which case the LoadingDocument is the same as the * LoadingNode. * * For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the * LoadingDocument is null. When the LoadingDocument is not null, the * LoadingPrincipal is set to the principal of the LoadingDocument. */ readonly attribute nsIDOMDocument loadingDocument; /** * A C++-friendly version of loadingDocument (loadingNode). * This is the Node where the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is * the Node which will get access to the result of the request. (Where * "get access to" might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of * resource that is loaded). * * For example for an <img>/<video> it is the image/video element. For * document loads inside <iframe> and <frame>s, the LoadingNode is the * <iframe>/<frame> element. For an XMLHttpRequest, it is the Document * which contained the JS which initiated the XHR. For a stylesheet, it * is the Document that contains <link rel=stylesheet>. * * For loads triggered by the HTML pre-parser, the LoadingNode is the * Document which is currently being parsed. * * For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the * LoadingNode is null. If the LoadingNode is non-null, then the * LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the LoadingNode. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingNode)] nsINode binaryLoadingNode(); /** * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext for toplevel loads. * Most likely you want to query the ownerDocument or LoadingNode * and not this context only available for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads. * Please note that except for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, this * ContextForTopLevelLoad will always return null. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(ContextForTopLevelLoad)] nsISupports binaryContextForTopLevelLoad(); /** * For all loads except loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, the loadingContext * simply returns the loadingNode. For loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT this * will return the context available for top-level loads which * do not have a loadingNode. */ [binaryname(LoadingContextXPCOM)] readonly attribute nsISupports loadingContext; /** * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(GetLoadingContext)] LoadContextRef binaryGetLoadingContext(); /** * The securityFlags of that channel. */ readonly attribute nsSecurityFlags securityFlags; %{ C++ inline nsSecurityFlags GetSecurityFlags() { nsSecurityFlags result; mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetSecurityFlags(&result); MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)); return result; } %} /** * Allows to query only the security mode bits from above. */ [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long securityMode; /** * True if this request is embedded in a context that can't be third-party * (i.e. an iframe embedded in a cross-origin parent window). If this is * false, then this request may be third-party if it's a third-party to * loadingPrincipal. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isInThirdPartyContext; /** * See the SEC_COOKIES_* flags above. This attribute will never return * SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, but will instead return what the policy resolves to. * I.e. SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN for CORS mode, and SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE * otherwise. */ [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long cookiePolicy; /** * If forceInheritPrincipal is true, the data coming from the channel should * use loadingPrincipal for its principal, even when the data is loaded over * http:// or another protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal. * This attribute will never be true when loadingSandboxed is true. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipal; /** * If forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner is true, the data coming from the * channel should use principalToInherit for its principal, even when the * data is loaded over http:// or another protocol that would normally use * a URI-based principal. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner; /** * If loadingSandboxed is true, the data coming from the channel is * being loaded sandboxed, so it should have a nonce origin and * hence should use a NullPrincipal. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadingSandboxed; /** * If aboutBlankInherits is true, then about:blank should inherit * the principal. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean aboutBlankInherits; /** * If allowChrome is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME * when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(). */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean allowChrome; /** * If disallowScript is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT * when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(). */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean disallowScript; /** * Returns true if SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS is set. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean dontFollowRedirects; /** * Returns true if SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE is set. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadErrorPage; /** * The external contentPolicyType of the channel, used for security checks * like Mixed Content Blocking and Content Security Policy. * * Specifically, content policy types with _INTERNAL_ in their name will * never get returned from this attribute. */ readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType externalContentPolicyType; %{ C++ inline nsContentPolicyType GetExternalContentPolicyType() { nsContentPolicyType result; mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetExternalContentPolicyType(&result); MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)); return result; } %} /** * The internal contentPolicyType of the channel, used for constructing * RequestContext values when creating a fetch event for an intercepted * channel. * * This should not be used for the purposes of security checks, since * the content policy implementations cannot be expected to deal with * _INTERNAL_ values. Please use the contentPolicyType attribute above * for that purpose. */ [noscript, notxpcom] nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType(); /** * Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors * up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive * 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. Used to identify upgrade * requests in e10s where the loadingDocument is not available. * * Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the * upgradeInsecureRequests is false. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean upgradeInsecureRequests; /** * If true, the content of the channel is queued up and checked * if it matches a content signature. Note, setting this flag * to true will negatively impact performance since the preloader * can not start until all of the content is fetched from the * netwerk. * * Only use that in combination with TYPE_DOCUMENT. */ [infallible] attribute boolean verifySignedContent; /** * If true, this load will fail if it has no SRI integrity */ [infallible] attribute boolean enforceSRI; /** * If true, toplevel data: URI navigation is allowed */ [infallible] attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI; /** * The SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL flag may be dropped when a load info * object is created. Specifically, it will be dropped if the SEC_SANDBOXED * flag is also present. This flag is set if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was * dropped. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalDropped; /** * These are the window IDs of the window in which the element being * loaded lives. parentOuterWindowID is the window ID of this window's * parent. * * Note that these window IDs can be 0 if the window is not * available. parentOuterWindowID will be the same as outerWindowID if the * window has no parent. */ [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long innerWindowID; [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long outerWindowID; [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long parentOuterWindowID; /** * Only when the element being loaded is <frame src="foo.html"> * (or, more generally, if the element QIs to nsIFrameLoaderOwner), * the frameOuterWindowID is the outer window containing the * foo.html document. * * Note: For other cases, frameOuterWindowID is 0. */ [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long frameOuterWindowID; /** * For all loads of none TYPE_DOUCMENT this function resets the * LoadingPrincipal, the TriggeringPrincipal and the * PrincipalToInherit to a freshly created NullPrincipal which inherits * the current origin attributes from the loadinfo. * For loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT this function resets only the * TriggeringPrincipal as well as the PrincipalToInherit to a freshly * created NullPrincipal which inherits the origin attributes from * the loadInfo. (Please note that the LoadingPrincipal for TYPE_DOCUMENT * loads is always null.) * * WARNING: Please only use that function if you know exactly what * you are doing!!! */ void resetPrincipalsToNullPrincipal(); /** * Customized NeckoOriginAttributes within LoadInfo to allow overwriting of the * default originAttributes from the loadingPrincipal. * * In chrome side, originAttributes.privateBrowsingId will always be 0 even if * the usePrivateBrowsing is true, because chrome docshell won't set * privateBrowsingId on origin attributes (See bug 1278664). This is to make * sure nsILoadInfo and nsILoadContext have the same origin attributes. */ [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(ScriptableOriginAttributes)] attribute jsval originAttributes; [noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(GetOriginAttributes)] NeckoOriginAttributes binaryGetOriginAttributes(); [noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(SetOriginAttributes)] void binarySetOriginAttributes(in const_OriginAttributesRef aOriginAttrs); %{ C++ inline mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes GetOriginAttributes() { mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes result; mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetOriginAttributes(&result); MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)); return result; } %} /** * Whenever a channel is openend by asyncOpen2() [or also open2()], * lets set this flag so that redirects of such channels are also * openend using asyncOpen2() [open2()]. * * Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true * throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it * to anything else than true will be discareded. * */ [infallible] attribute boolean enforceSecurity; /** * Whenever a channel is evaluated by the ContentSecurityManager * the first time, we set this flag to true to indicate that * subsequent calls of AsyncOpen2() do not have to enforce all * security checks again. E.g., after a redirect there is no * need to set up CORS again. We need this separate flag * because the redirectChain might also contain internal * redirects which might pollute the redirectChain so we can't * rely on the size of the redirectChain-array to query whether * a channel got redirected or not. * * Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true * throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it * to anything else than true will be discarded. * */ [infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone; /** * Returns true if the load was triggered from an external application * (e.g. Thunderbird). Please note that this flag will only ever be true * if the load is of TYPE_DOCUMENT. */ [infallible] attribute boolean loadTriggeredFromExternal; /** * Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the principal of the * channel [before the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo, * so that at every point this array lets us reason about all the * redirects this channel went through. * @param aPrincipal, the channelURIPrincipal before the channel * got redirected. * @param aIsInternalRedirect should be true if the channel is going * through an internal redirect, otherwise false. */ void appendRedirectedPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal principal, in boolean isInternalRedirect); /** * An array of nsIPrincipals which stores redirects associated with this * channel. This array is filled whether or not the channel has ever been * opened. The last element of the array is associated with the most recent * redirect. Please note, that this array *includes* internal redirects. */ [implicit_jscontext] readonly attribute jsval redirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects; /** * A C++-friendly version of redirectChain. * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the * loadInfo object - use with caution! */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)] const_nsIPrincipalArray binaryRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects(); /** * Same as RedirectChain but does *not* include internal redirects. */ [implicit_jscontext] readonly attribute jsval redirectChain; /** * A C++-friendly version of redirectChain. * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the * loadInfo object - use with caution! */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChain)] const_nsIPrincipalArray binaryRedirectChain(); /** * Sets the list of unsafe headers according to CORS spec, as well as * potentially forces a preflight. * Note that you do not need to set the Content-Type header. That will be * automatically detected as needed. * * Only call this function when using the SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS mode. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall] void setCorsPreflightInfo(in StringArrayRef unsafeHeaders, in boolean forcePreflight); /** * A C++-friendly getter for the list of cors-unsafe headers. * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the * loadInfo object - use with caution! */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(CorsUnsafeHeaders)] StringArrayRef corsUnsafeHeaders(); /** * Returns value set through setCorsPreflightInfo. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forcePreflight; /** * A C++ friendly getter for the forcePreflight flag. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isPreflight; /** * Constants reflecting the channel tainting. These are mainly defined here * for script. Internal C++ code should use the enum defined in LoadTainting.h. * See LoadTainting.h for documentation. */ const unsigned long TAINTING_BASIC = 0; const unsigned long TAINTING_CORS = 1; const unsigned long TAINTING_OPAQUE = 2; /** * Determine the associated channel's current tainting. Note, this can * change due to a service worker intercept, so it should be checked after * OnStartRequest() fires. */ readonly attribute unsigned long tainting; /** * Note a new tainting level and possibly increase the current tainting * to match. If the tainting level is already greater than the given * value, then there is no effect. It is not possible to reduce the tainting * level on an existing channel/loadinfo. */ void maybeIncreaseTainting(in unsigned long aTainting); /** * Various helper code to provide more convenient C++ access to the tainting * attribute and maybeIncreaseTainting(). */ %{C++ static_assert(TAINTING_BASIC == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Basic), "basic tainting enums should match"); static_assert(TAINTING_CORS == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::CORS), "cors tainting enums should match"); static_assert(TAINTING_OPAQUE == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Opaque), "opaque tainting enums should match"); mozilla::LoadTainting GetTainting() { uint32_t tainting = TAINTING_BASIC; MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(GetTainting(&tainting)); return static_cast<mozilla::LoadTainting>(tainting); } void MaybeIncreaseTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting aTainting) { uint32_t tainting = static_cast<uint32_t>(aTainting); MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(MaybeIncreaseTainting(tainting)); } %} /** * Returns true if this load is for top level document. * Note that the load for a sub-frame's document will return false here. */ [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isTopLevelLoad; };