1 files changed, 0 insertions, 114 deletions
diff --git a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e758e0312..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H_
-#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H_
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include "base/files/scoped_file.h"
-#include "base/macros.h"
-#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/codegen.h"
-#include "sandbox/sandbox_export.h"
-
-namespace sandbox {
-struct arch_seccomp_data;
-namespace bpf_dsl {
-class Policy;
-}
-
-// This class can be used to apply a syscall sandboxing policy expressed in a
-// bpf_dsl::Policy object to the current process.
-// Syscall sandboxing policies get inherited by subprocesses and, once applied,
-// can never be removed for the lifetime of the process.
-class SANDBOX_EXPORT SandboxBPF {
- public:
-  enum class SeccompLevel {
-    SINGLE_THREADED,
-    MULTI_THREADED,
-  };
-
-  // Ownership of |policy| is transfered here to the sandbox object.
-  // nullptr is allowed for unit tests.
-  explicit SandboxBPF(bpf_dsl::Policy* policy);
-  // NOTE: Setting a policy and starting the sandbox is a one-way operation.
-  // The kernel does not provide any option for unloading a loaded sandbox. The
-  // sandbox remains engaged even when the object is destructed.
-  ~SandboxBPF();
-
-  // Detect if the kernel supports the specified seccomp level.
-  // See StartSandbox() for a description of these.
-  static bool SupportsSeccompSandbox(SeccompLevel level);
-
-  // This is the main public entry point. It sets up the resources needed by
-  // the sandbox, and enters Seccomp mode.
-  // The calling process must provide a |level| to tell the sandbox which type
-  // of kernel support it should engage.
-  // SINGLE_THREADED will only sandbox the calling thread. Since it would be a
-  // security risk, the sandbox will also check that the current process is
-  // single threaded and crash if it isn't the case.
-  // MULTI_THREADED requires more recent kernel support and allows to sandbox
-  // all the threads of the current process. Be mindful of potential races,
-  // with other threads using disallowed system calls either before or after
-  // the sandbox is engaged.
-  //
-  // It is possible to stack multiple sandboxes by creating separate "Sandbox"
-  // objects and calling "StartSandbox()" on each of them. Please note, that
-  // this requires special care, though, as newly stacked sandboxes can never
-  // relax restrictions imposed by earlier sandboxes. Furthermore, installing
-  // a new policy requires making system calls, that might already be
-  // disallowed.
-  // Finally, stacking does add more kernel overhead than having a single
-  // combined policy. So, it should only be used if there are no alternatives.
-  bool StartSandbox(SeccompLevel level) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-  // The sandbox needs to be able to access files in "/proc/self/". If
-  // this directory is not accessible when "StartSandbox()" gets called, the
-  // caller must provide an already opened file descriptor by calling
-  // "SetProcFd()".
-  // The sandbox becomes the new owner of this file descriptor and will
-  // close it when "StartSandbox()" executes or when the sandbox object
-  // disappears.
-  void SetProcFd(base::ScopedFD proc_fd);
-
-  // Checks whether a particular system call number is valid on the current
-  // architecture.
-  static bool IsValidSyscallNumber(int sysnum);
-
-  // UnsafeTraps require some syscalls to always be allowed.
-  // This helper function returns true for these calls.
-  static bool IsRequiredForUnsafeTrap(int sysno);
-
-  // From within an UnsafeTrap() it is often useful to be able to execute
-  // the system call that triggered the trap. The ForwardSyscall() method
-  // makes this easy. It is more efficient than calling glibc's syscall()
-  // function, as it avoid the extra round-trip to the signal handler. And
-  // it automatically does the correct thing to report kernel-style error
-  // conditions, rather than setting errno. See the comments for TrapFnc for
-  // details. In other words, the return value from ForwardSyscall() is
-  // directly suitable as a return value for a trap handler.
-  static intptr_t ForwardSyscall(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args);
-
- private:
-  friend class SandboxBPFTestRunner;
-
-  // Assembles a BPF filter program from the current policy. After calling this
-  // function, you must not call any other sandboxing function.
-  CodeGen::Program AssembleFilter();
-
-  // Assembles and installs a filter based on the policy that has previously
-  // been configured with SetSandboxPolicy().
-  void InstallFilter(bool must_sync_threads);
-
-  base::ScopedFD proc_fd_;
-  bool sandbox_has_started_;
-  scoped_ptr<bpf_dsl::Policy> policy_;
-
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SandboxBPF);
-};
-
-}  // namespace sandbox
-
-#endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H_