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-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c270
1 files changed, 270 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e69bb882
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 Protocol
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslt.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+
+/* This table contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the
+ * PKCS#11 identifiers */
+static const struct {
+ SSLHashType hash;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pkcs11Mech;
+ unsigned int hashSize;
+} kTlsHkdfInfo[] = {
+ { ssl_hash_none, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_md5, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha1, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha224, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha256, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, 32 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha384, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, 48 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha512, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, 64 }
+};
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2in, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ PK11SymKey **prkp)
+{
+ CK_NSS_HKDFParams params;
+ SECItem paramsi;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem *salt;
+ PK11SymKey *prk;
+ static const PRUint8 zeroKeyBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ PK11SymKey *zeroKey = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *ikm2;
+
+ params.bExtract = CK_TRUE;
+ params.bExpand = CK_FALSE;
+ params.pInfo = NULL;
+ params.ulInfoLen = 0UL;
+
+ if (ikm1) {
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This violates the PKCS#11 key boundary
+ * but is imposed on us by the present HKDF interface. */
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ikm1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ salt = PK11_GetKeyData(ikm1);
+ if (!salt)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ params.pSalt = salt->data;
+ params.ulSaltLen = salt->len;
+ PORT_Assert(salt->len > 0);
+ } else {
+ /* Per documentation for CKM_NSS_HKDF_*:
+ *
+ * If the optional salt is given, it is used; otherwise, the salt is
+ * set to a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC output.
+ */
+ params.pSalt = NULL;
+ params.ulSaltLen = 0UL;
+ }
+ paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
+
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech);
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize);
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hash == baseHash);
+
+ /* A zero ikm2 is a key of hash-length 0s. */
+ if (!ikm2in) {
+ SECItem zeroItem = {
+ siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)zeroKeyBuf,
+ kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize
+ };
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ zeroKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot,
+ kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DERIVE, &zeroItem, NULL);
+ if (!zeroKey)
+ return SECFailure;
+ ikm2 = zeroKey;
+ } else {
+ ikm2 = ikm2in;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(ikm2);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM1/Salt", params.pSalt, params.ulSaltLen));
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM2", ikm2));
+
+ prk = PK11_Derive(ikm2, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
+ &paramsi, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
+ CKA_DERIVE, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize);
+ if (zeroKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(zeroKey);
+ if (slot)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (!prk)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract", prk));
+ *prkp = prk;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
+ PK11SymKey **keyp)
+{
+ CK_NSS_HKDFParams params;
+ SECItem paramsi = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ /* Size of info array needs to be big enough to hold the maximum Prefix,
+ * Label, plus HandshakeHash. If it's ever to small, the code will abort.
+ */
+ PRUint8 info[256];
+ PRUint8 *ptr = info;
+ unsigned int infoLen;
+ PK11SymKey *derived;
+ const char *kLabelPrefix = "TLS 1.3, ";
+ const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen = strlen(kLabelPrefix);
+
+ if (handshakeHash) {
+ if (handshakeHashLen > 255) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(!handshakeHashLen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 7.1:
+ *
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) =
+ * HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
+ *
+ * Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
+ *
+ * struct HkdfLabel {
+ * uint16 length;
+ * opaque label<9..255>;
+ * opaque hash_value<0..255>;
+ * };
+ *
+ * Where:
+ * - HkdfLabel.length is Length
+ * - HkdfLabel.hash_value is HashValue.
+ * - HkdfLabel.label is "TLS 1.3, " + Label
+ *
+ */
+ infoLen = 2 + 1 + kLabelPrefixLen + labelLen + 1 + handshakeHashLen;
+ if (infoLen > sizeof(info)) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(keySize, 2, ptr);
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(labelLen + kLabelPrefixLen, 1, ptr);
+ PORT_Memcpy(ptr, kLabelPrefix, kLabelPrefixLen);
+ ptr += kLabelPrefixLen;
+ PORT_Memcpy(ptr, label, labelLen);
+ ptr += labelLen;
+ ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(handshakeHashLen, 1, ptr);
+ if (handshakeHash) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(ptr, handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen);
+ ptr += handshakeHashLen;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert((ptr - info) == infoLen);
+
+ params.bExtract = CK_FALSE;
+ params.bExpand = CK_TRUE;
+ params.pInfo = info;
+ params.ulInfoLen = infoLen;
+ paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
+
+ derived = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(prk, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
+ &paramsi, algorithm,
+ CKA_DERIVE, keySize,
+ CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY);
+ if (!derived)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ *keyp = derived;
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+ if (ssl_trace >= 10) {
+ /* Make sure the label is null terminated. */
+ char labelStr[100];
+ PORT_Memcpy(labelStr, label, labelLen);
+ labelStr[labelLen] = 0;
+ SSL_TRC(50, ("HKDF Expand: label=[TLS 1.3, ] + '%s',requested length=%d",
+ labelStr, keySize));
+ }
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "PRK", prk));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Hash", handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Info", info, infoLen));
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "Derived key", derived));
+#endif
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+abort:
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ unsigned char *output, unsigned int outputLen)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *derived = NULL;
+ SECItem *rawkey;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, baseHash, handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
+ label, labelLen,
+ kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech, outputLen,
+ &derived);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || !derived) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(derived);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ rawkey = PK11_GetKeyData(derived);
+ if (!rawkey) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(rawkey->len == outputLen);
+ memcpy(output, rawkey->data, outputLen);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derived);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+abort:
+ if (derived) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derived);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}