diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c | 4512 |
1 files changed, 4512 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c6a584748 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c @@ -0,0 +1,4512 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * TLS 1.3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "stdarg.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "prerr.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13con.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" + +typedef enum { + TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + TrafficKeyHandshake, + TrafficKeyApplicationData +} TrafficKeyType; + +typedef enum { + CipherSpecRead, + CipherSpecWrite, +} CipherSpecDirection; + +static SECStatus tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, TrafficKeyType type, + CipherSpecDirection install, + PRBool deleteSecret); +static SECStatus tls13_AESGCM( + ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, + PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, int additionalDataLen); +static SECStatus tls13_ChaCha20Poly1305( + ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, + PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, int additionalDataLen); +static SECStatus tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss); +static void tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, + TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare); +static SECStatus tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup); + +static SECStatus tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificate( + sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateVerify( + sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, + sslSessionID *sid); +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *prefix, + const char *suffix, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PK11SymKey **dest); +static void tls13_SetNullCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec **specp); +static SECStatus tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, + unsigned long prefixLength, + SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType message, + PK11SymKey *secret, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinished( + sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, + unsigned int maxOutputLen); +static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +const char kHkdfLabelClient[] = "client"; +const char kHkdfLabelServer[] = "server"; +const char kHkdfLabelPskBinderKey[] = "resumption psk binder key"; +const char kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "early traffic secret"; +const char kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "early exporter master secret"; +const char kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret[] = "handshake traffic secret"; +const char kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret[] = "application traffic secret"; +const char kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret[] = "finished"; +const char kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret[] = "resumption master secret"; +const char kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret[] = "exporter master secret"; +const char kHkdfPurposeKey[] = "key"; +const char kHkdfPurposeIv[] = "iv"; + +#define TRAFFIC_SECRET(ss, dir, name) ((ss->sec.isServer ^ \ + (dir == CipherSpecWrite)) \ + ? ss->ssl3.hs.client##name \ + : ss->ssl3.hs.server##name) + +const SSL3ProtocolVersion kTlsRecordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; +const SSL3ProtocolVersion kDtlsRecordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1; + +/* Belt and suspenders in case we ever add a TLS 1.4. */ +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED <= + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + +/* Use this instead of FATAL_ERROR when an alert isn't possible. */ +#define LOG_ERROR(ss, prError) \ + do { \ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)", \ + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, prError, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \ + PORT_SetError(prError); \ + } while (0) + +/* Log an error and generate an alert because something is irreparably wrong. */ +#define FATAL_ERROR(ss, prError, desc) \ + do { \ + LOG_ERROR(ss, prError); \ + tls13_FatalError(ss, prError, desc); \ + } while (0) + +void +tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + PORT_Assert(desc != internal_error); /* These should never happen */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + PORT_SetError(prError); +} + +#ifdef TRACE +#define STATE_CASE(a) \ + case a: \ + return #a +static char * +tls13_HandshakeState(SSL3WaitState st) +{ + switch (st) { + STATE_CASE(wait_client_hello); + STATE_CASE(wait_client_cert); + STATE_CASE(wait_cert_verify); + STATE_CASE(wait_finished); + STATE_CASE(wait_server_hello); + STATE_CASE(wait_server_cert); + STATE_CASE(wait_cert_request); + STATE_CASE(wait_encrypted_extensions); + STATE_CASE(idle_handshake); + default: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return "unknown"; +} +#endif + +#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK 0x80 + +#define TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ws) (ws & ~TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK) +/* We don't mask idle_handshake because other parts of the code use it*/ +#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) (((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK) +#define TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, err, ...) \ + tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, #err, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + __VA_ARGS__, \ + wait_invalid) +void +tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws, + const char *func, const char *file, int line) +{ +#ifdef TRACE + const char *new_state_name = + tls13_HandshakeState(ws); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)), + new_state_name, + func, file, line)); +#endif + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws); +} + +static PRBool +tls13_InHsStateV(sslSocket *ss, va_list ap) +{ + SSL3WaitState ws; + + while ((ws = va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)) != wait_invalid) { + if (TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) == ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...) +{ + PRBool found; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, ss); + found = tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return found; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_CheckHsState(sslSocket *ss, int err, const char *error_name, + const char *func, const char *file, int line, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, line); + if (tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap)) { + va_end(ap); + return SECSuccess; + } + va_end(ap); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + error_name, + tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)), + func, file, line)); + tls13_FatalError(ss, err, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; +} + +SSLHashType +tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipherDef = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + PORT_Assert(cipherDef); + if (!cipherDef) { + return ssl_hash_none; + } + return cipherDef->prf_hash; +} + +SSLHashType +tls13_GetHash(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* All TLS 1.3 cipher suites must have an explict PRF hash. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none); + return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; +} + +unsigned int +tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return 32; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return 48; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return 32; +} + +unsigned int +tls13_GetHashSize(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256; +} + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(sslSocket *ss) +{ + return tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_GetHmacMechanism(sslSocket *ss) +{ + switch (tls13_GetHash(ss)) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKM_SHA256_HMAC; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_SHA384_HMAC; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_SHA256_HMAC; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_CreateKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + const ssl3DHParams *params; + + PORT_Assert(groupDef); + switch (groupDef->keaType) { + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); + PORT_Assert(params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom); + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, unsigned int count) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->additionalShares = count; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Generate shares for ECDHE and FFDHE. This picks the first enabled group of + * the requisite type and creates a share for that. + * + * Called from ssl3_SendClientHello. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int i; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + unsigned int numShares = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + + /* Select the first enabled group. + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): be smarter about offering the group + * that the other side negotiated if we are resuming. */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + SECStatus rv; + if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]) { + continue; + } + rv = tls13_CreateKeyShare(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (++numShares > ss->additionalShares) { + break; + } + } + + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Below here checks if we can do stateless resumption. */ + if (sid->cached == never_cached || + sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. */ + session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + PORT_Assert(session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data); + + if (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 || + (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint + + session_ticket->received_timestamp > + ssl_Time())) { + ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid); + rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->sch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem publicValue = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + publicValue.data = b; + publicValue.len = length; + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&pubKey->u.dh.prime, &publicValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, + &pubKey->u.dh.prime); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, + &pubKey->u.dh.base); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, + &publicValue); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, + sslKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + PORTCheapArenaPool arena; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + PRErrorCode errorCode; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(&arena.arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + peerKey->arena = &arena.arena; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + switch (entry->group->keaType) { + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(ss, peerKey, + entry->key_exchange.data, + entry->key_exchange.len, + entry->group); + mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE; + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(ss, peerKey, + entry->key_exchange.data, + entry->key_exchange.len, + keyPair->pubKey); + mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF( + keyPair->privKey, peerKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, mechanism, + tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss), CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + errorCode = PORT_GetError(); /* don't overwrite the error code */ + tls13_FatalError(ss, errorCode, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr) +{ + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s successfully decrypted handshake after" + "failed 0-RTT", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Would it be better to check all the states here? */ + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case certificate: + return tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + + case certificate_request: + return tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + + case certificate_verify: + if (!hashesPtr) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + return tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + + case encrypted_extensions: + return tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(ss, b, length); + + case new_session_ticket: + return tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + + case finished: + if (!hashesPtr) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + return tls13_ServerHandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + } else { + return tls13_ClientHandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + } + + default: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(0); /* Unreached */ + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + SECItem wrappedMS = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashType; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* I think this can't happen. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now find the hash used as the PRF for the previous handshake. */ + hashType = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite); + + /* If we are the server, we compute the wrapping key, but if we + * are the client, it's coordinates are stored with the ticket. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType); + PORT_Assert(serverCert); + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, serverCert, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + } else { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (!slot) + return SECFailure; + + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (!wrapKey) { + return SECFailure; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + /* unwrap the "master secret" which is actually RMS. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags( + wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, + tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType), + CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_KEY(50, (ss, "Recovered RMS", ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret)); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Key Derivation Functions. + * + * Below is the key schedule from [draft-ietf-tls-tls13]. + * + * * The relevant functions from this file are indicated by tls13_Foo(). + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract + * | + * v + * Early Secret ---> Derive-Secret(., "client early traffic secret", + * | ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract + * | + * v + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "client handshake traffic secret", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "server handshake traffic secret", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract + * | + * v + * Master Secret + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "client application traffic secret", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished) + * | = client_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "server application traffic secret", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished) + * | = server_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "exporter master secret", + * | ClientHello...Client Finished) + * | = exporter_secret + * | + * +---------> Derive-Secret(., "resumption master secret", + * ClientHello...Client Finished) + * = resumption_secret + * + */ + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* Extract off the resumptionMasterSecret (if present), else pass the NULL + * resumptionMasterSecret which will be internally translated to zeroes. */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret, + tls13_GetHash(ss), &ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume == (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret != NULL)); + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PRUint8 buf[1] = { 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; + + rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss)), + hashes.u.raw, buf, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + hashes.len = tls13_GetHashSize(ss); + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelPskBinderKey, &hashes, + &ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret, + &hashes, &ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* First update |currentSecret| to add |dheSecret|, if any. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret, + tls13_GetHash(ss), &newSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; + + /* Now compute |*HsTrafficSecret| */ + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelServer, + kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* Crank HKDF forward to make master secret, which we + * stuff in current secret. */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + &newSecret); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, + NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelServer, + kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, + NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret, + NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret, + NULL, &resumptionMasterSecret); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* This is pretty gross. TLS 1.3 uses a number of master secrets: + * The master secret to generate the keys and then the resumption + * master secret for future connections. To make this work without + * refactoring too much of the SSLv3 code, we store the RMS in + * |crSpec->master_secret| and |cwSpec->master_secret|. + */ + ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret = resumptionMasterSecret; + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void +tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + /* Set these to match the cached value. + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Make a version with the "true" values. + * Bug 1256137. + */ + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; +} + +/* Check whether resumption-PSK is allowed. */ +static PRBool +tls13_CanResume(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + const sslServerCert *sc; + + if (!sid) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sid->version != ss->version) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* Server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, but they + * do remember the type of certificate we originally used, so we can locate + * it again, provided that the current ssl socket has had its server certs + * configured the same as the previous one. */ + sc = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType); + if (!sc || !sc->serverCert) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +static PRBool +tls13_AlpnTagAllowed(const sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *tag) +{ + const unsigned char *data = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data; + unsigned int length = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; + unsigned int offset = 0; + + if (!tag->len) + return PR_TRUE; + + while (offset < length) { + unsigned int taglen = (unsigned int)data[offset]; + if ((taglen == tag->len) && + !PORT_Memcmp(data + offset + 1, tag->data, tag->len)) + return PR_TRUE; + offset += 1 + taglen; + } + + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent); + + if (!sid) + return PR_FALSE; + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume); + if (!ss->statelessResume) + return PR_FALSE; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + return PR_FALSE; + if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) + return PR_FALSE; + if (!(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data)) + return PR_FALSE; + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&ss->xtnData.nextProto, + &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != 0) + return PR_FALSE; + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Called from tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 to update the state of 0-RTT handling. + * + * 0-RTT is only permitted if: + * 1. The early data extension was present. + * 2. We are resuming a session. + * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. + * 4. The ticket allowed 0-RTT. + * 5. We negotiated the same ALPN value as in the ticket. + */ +static void +tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid)); + + /* tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn sets this to ssl_0rtt_sent, so this will + * be ssl_0rtt_none unless early_data is present. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) { + return; + } + + /* If we rejected 0-RTT on the first ClientHello, then we can just say that + * there is no 0-RTT for the second. We shouldn't get any more. Reset the + * ignore state so that we treat decryption failure normally. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; + return; + } + + if (!tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore 0-RTT", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; + return; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: enable 0-RTT", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; +} + +/* Check if the offered group is acceptable. */ +static PRBool +tls13_isGroupAcceptable(const sslNamedGroupDef *offered, + const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup) +{ + /* We accept epsilon (e) bits around the offered group size. */ + const unsigned int e = 2; + + PORT_Assert(offered); + PORT_Assert(preferredGroup); + + if (offered->bits >= preferredGroup->bits - e && + offered->bits <= preferredGroup->bits + e) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Find remote key share for given group and return it. + * Returns NULL if no key share is found. */ +static TLS13KeyShareEntry * +tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) +{ + PRCList *cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + while (cur_p != &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares) { + TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p; + if (offer->group == group) { + return offer; + } + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p); + } + return NULL; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, TLS13KeyShareEntry **clientShare) +{ + unsigned int index; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry = NULL; + const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup = NULL; + + /* We insist on DHE. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!memchr(ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.data, tls13_psk_dh_ke, + ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.len)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client offered PSK without DH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + /* Now figure out which key share we like the best out of the + * mutually supported groups, regardless of what the client offered + * for key shares. + */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected KE = %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->statelessResume ? "PSK + (EC)DHE" : "(EC)DHE")); + + /* Find the preferred group and an according client key share available. */ + for (index = 0; index < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++index) { + /* Continue to the next group if this one is not enabled. */ + if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]) { + /* There's a gap in the preferred groups list. Assume this is a group + * that's not supported by the client but preferred by the server. */ + if (preferredGroup) { + entry = NULL; + break; + } + continue; + } + + /* Check if the client sent a key share for this group. */ + entry = tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]); + + if (preferredGroup) { + /* We already found our preferred group but the group didn't have a share. */ + if (entry) { + /* The client sent a key share with group ss->namedGroupPreferences[index] */ + if (tls13_isGroupAcceptable(ss->namedGroupPreferences[index], + preferredGroup)) { + /* This is not the preferred group, but it's acceptable */ + preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; + } else { + /* The proposed group is not acceptable. */ + entry = NULL; + } + } + break; + } else { + /* The first enabled group is the preferred group. */ + preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; + if (entry) { + break; + } + } + } + + if (!preferredGroup) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: group = %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + preferredGroup->name)); + + if (!entry) { + return tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(ss, preferredGroup); + } + + PORT_Assert(preferredGroup == entry->group); + *clientShare = entry; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* This picks the first certificate that has: + * a) the right authentication method, and + * b) the right named curve (EC only) + * + * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all + * based on what order they are configured in. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + + if (cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_rsa_pss || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt) { + continue; + } + + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, + cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey, + cert->serverKeyPair->privKey, + ss->xtnData.clientSigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numClientSigScheme, + PR_FALSE); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* Found one. */ + ss->sec.serverCert = cert; + ss->sec.authType = cert->certType.authType; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = cert->certType.authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, + handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected PSK authentication", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected certificate authentication", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + /* We've now established that we need to sign.... */ + rv = tls13_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = + ss->sec.serverCert->certType.authType; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleClientHello after we have parsed the + * ClientHello and are sure that we are going to do TLS 1.3 + * or fail. */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *suites, + sslSessionID *sid) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + TLS13KeyShareEntry *clientShare = NULL; + int j; + ssl3CipherSuite previousCipherSuite; + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Save the null spec, which we should be currently reading. We will + * use this when 0-RTT sending is over. */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + tls13_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + } + } + +#ifndef PARANOID + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + goto loser; + } +#endif + + previousCipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, handshake_failure); + goto loser; + } + /* If we are going around again, then we should make sure that the cipher + * suite selection doesn't change. That's a sign of client shennanigans. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != previousCipherSuite) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, handshake_failure); + goto loser; + } + + /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; + + /* Note: We call this quite a bit earlier than with TLS 1.2 and + * before. */ + rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* An alert has already been sent. */ + } + + /* Check if we could in principle resume. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!tls13_CanResume(ss, sid)) { + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + /* Select key exchange. */ + rv = tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(ss, &clientShare); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* If we didn't find a client key share, we have to retry. */ + if (!clientShare) { + if (sid) { /* Free the sid. */ + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Select the authentication (this is also handshake shape). */ + rv = tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* We are now committed to trying to resume. */ + PORT_Assert(sid); + + /* Check that the negotiated SNI and the cached SNI match. */ + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, + &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName) != SECEqual) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, + handshake_failure); + goto loser; + } + + rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); + + ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender( + ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn); + + tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid); + } else { + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + if (ss->sec.uncache) + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, NULL); + } + + /* Need to compute early secrets. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now that we have the binder key check the binder. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(ss, ss->xtnData.pskBinderPrefixLen, + &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + rv = tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, client_hello, + ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.data, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.len, + &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* This needs to go after we verify the psk binder. */ + rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* If this is TLS 1.3 we are expecting a ClientKeyShare + * extension. Missing/absent extension cause failure + * below. */ + rv = tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(ss, clientShare); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* An alert was sent already. */ + } + + /* From this point we are either committed to resumption, or not. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_hits); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_stateless_resumes); + } else { + if (sid) { + /* We had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it. */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } else { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_misses); + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (!sid) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + /* Take ownership of the session. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + sid = NULL; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret, + NULL, /* Current running hash. */ + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send hello retry request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* We asked already, but made no progress. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_retry_request, + 2 + /* version */ + 2 + /* extension length */ + 2 + /* group extension id */ + 2 + /* group extension length */ + 2 /* group */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber( + ss, tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(ss->version), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* Length of extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2 + 2 + 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* Key share extension - currently the only reason we send this. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + /* Key share extension length. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, selectedGroup->name, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + + /* We received early data but have to ignore it because we sent a retry. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from tls13_HandleClientHello. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; /* ours */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(peerShare); + + tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, peerShare->group); + + /* Generate our key */ + rv = tls13_CreateKeyShare(ss, peerShare->group); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + /* We should have exactly one key share. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + + keyPair = ((sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); + + /* Register the sender */ + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + + rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, peerShare, keyPair->keys); + return rv; /* Error code set already. */ +} + +/* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.3.2 + * + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; + * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateExtension; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int calen; + SECItem *names; + int nnames; + SECItem *name; + int i; + PRUint8 sigSchemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; + unsigned int sigSchemesLength = 0; + int length; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, sigSchemes, sizeof(sigSchemes), + &sigSchemesLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); + length = 1 + 0 /* length byte for empty request context */ + + 2 + sigSchemesLength + 2 + calen + 2; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigSchemes, sigSchemesLength, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 tmp; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle hello retry request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Client only. */ + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + wait_server_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice... */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + /* Oh well, back to the start. */ + tls13_SetNullCipherSpec(ss, &ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none); + } + + /* Version. */ + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (version > ss->vrange.max || version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + protocol_version); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Extensions. */ + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (tmp < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* error code already set */ + } + /* Extensions must be non-empty and use the remainder of the message. + * This means that a HelloRetryRequest cannot be a no-op: we must have an + * extension, it must be one that we understand and recognize as being valid + * for HelloRetryRequest, and all the extensions we permit cause us to + * modify our ClientHello in some way. */ + if (!tmp || tmp != length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b, &length, hello_retry_request); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_retry); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + TLS13CertificateRequest *certRequest = NULL; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PLArenaPool *arena; + PRInt32 extensionsLength; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Client */ + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, + wait_cert_request); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest == NULL); + + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (!arena) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* We don't support post-handshake client auth, the certificate request + * context must always be null. */ + if (context.len > 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + certRequest = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, TLS13CertificateRequest); + if (!certRequest) + goto loser; + certRequest->arena = arena; + certRequest->ca_list.arena = arena; + + rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena, + &certRequest->signatureSchemes, + &certRequest->signatureSchemeCount, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, + decode_error); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, + &certRequest->ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + + /* Verify that the extensions length is correct. */ + extensionsLength = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (extensionsLength < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extensionsLength != length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, + illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &certRequest->context, &context); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_cert); + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = certRequest; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + CipherSpecWrite, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders = ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated( + ss, ssl_tls13_short_header_xtn); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendEarlyDataXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none) { + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; + + rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + svrPrivKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, svrPrivKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRErrorCode err = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + err = PORT_GetError(); + } + /* Even if we get an error, since the ServerHello was successfully + * serialized, we should give it a chance to reach the network. This gives + * the client a chance to perform the key exchange and decrypt the alert + * we're about to send. */ + rv |= ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (err) { + PORT_SetError(err); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Compute the rest of the secrets except for the resumption + * and exporter secret. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError()); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + CipherSpecWrite, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, + TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + CipherSpecRead, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored); + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, + TrafficKeyHandshake, + CipherSpecRead, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, + ss->opt.requestCertificate ? wait_client_cert + : wait_finished); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume); + } else { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + } + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + if (tls13_GetHash(ss) != + tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* PSK */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; + tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); + if (sid->peerCert) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_hits); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); + } else { + /* !PSK */ + if (ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_misses); + } + if (sid->cached == in_client_cache) { + /* If we tried to resume and failed, let's not try again. */ + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + } + } + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->statelessResume); + + /* If we don't already have the Early Secret we need to make it + * now. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Discard current SID and make a new one, though it may eventually + * end up looking a lot like the old one. + */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + } + sid->version = ss->version; + + rv = tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders = ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated( + ss, ssl_tls13_short_header_xtn); + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + CipherSpecRead, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_encrypted_extensions); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void +tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) +{ + ss->sec.keaGroup = group; + switch (group->keaType) { + /* Note: These overwrite on resumption.... so if you start with ECDH + * and resume with DH, we report DH. That's fine, since no answer + * is really right. */ + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = + ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_ecdh_psk : ssl_kea_ecdh; + ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_ecdh; + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = + ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_dh_psk : ssl_kea_dh; + ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_dh; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* This list should have one entry. */ + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + entry = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + PORT_Assert(PR_NEXT_LINK(&entry->link) == &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + + /* Now get our matching key. */ + keyPair = ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair(ss, entry->group); + if (!keyPair) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, entry->group)); + + rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, entry, keyPair->keys); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* Error code set by caller. */ + + tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, entry->group); + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>; + * + * struct { + * ASN1Cert cert_data; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int certChainLen = 0; + int i; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRInt32 extensionsLen = 0; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.localCert); + /* A server certificate is selected in tls13_SelectServerCert(). */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + } else { + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + } + + /* Get the extensions length. This only applies to the leaf cert, + * because we don't yet send extensions for non-leaf certs. */ + extensionsLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.certificateSenders[0]); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); + context = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + certChainLen += + 3 + certChain->certs[i].len + /* cert length + cert */ + 2 + (!i ? extensionsLen : 0); /* extensions length + extensions */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, + 1 + context.len + + 3 + certChainLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, + context.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + PRInt32 sentLen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (i) { + /* Not end-entity. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + continue; + } + + /* End-entity, send extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensionsLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + sentLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_TRUE, extensionsLen, + &ss->xtnData.certificateSenders[0]); + PORT_Assert(sentLen == extensionsLen); + if (sentLen != extensionsLen) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, PRBool first, + CERTCertificate **certp) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem certData; + SECItem extensionsData; + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certData, + 3, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionsData, + 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse all the extensions. */ + if (first && !ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensionsData.data, + &extensionsData.len, + certificate); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Copy out SCTs. Bug 1315727. */ + } + + cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certData, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + + if (!cert) { + PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, errCode, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + default: + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + *certp = cert; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * tls13 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem certList; + PRBool first = PR_TRUE; + ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, + wait_client_cert); + } else { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, + wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* Process the context string */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + if (context.len) { + /* The context string MUST be empty */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certList, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!certList.len) { + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Servers always need to send some cert. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate); + return SECFailure; + } else { + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + /* Now clean up. */ + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + while (certList.len) { + CERTCertificate *cert; + + rv = tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(ss, &certList, first, + &cert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + return SECFailure; + } + + if (first) { + ss->sec.peerCert = cert; + + if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, + &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } else { + ssl3CertNode *c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, + ssl3CertNode); + if (!c) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + c->cert = cert; + c->next = NULL; + + if (lastCert) { + lastCert->next = c; + } else { + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; + } + lastCert = c; + } + + first = PR_FALSE; + } + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ +} + +void +tls13_CipherSpecAddRef(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + ++spec->refCt; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[-]: Increment ref ct for spec %d. new ct = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), spec, spec->refCt)); +} + +/* This function is never called on a spec which is on the + * cipherSpecs list. */ +void +tls13_CipherSpecRelease(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + PORT_Assert(spec->refCt > 0); + --spec->refCt; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[-]: decrement refct for spec %d. phase=%s new ct = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), spec, spec->phase, spec->refCt)); + if (!spec->refCt) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[-]: Freeing spec %d. phase=%s", + SSL_GETPID(), spec, spec->phase)); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&spec->link); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(spec, PR_TRUE); + PORT_Free(spec); + } +} + +/* Add context to the hash functions as described in + [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 4.9.1] */ +SECStatus +tls13_AddContextToHashes(sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + SSLHashType algorithm, PRBool sending, + SSL3Hashes *tbsHash) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PK11Context *ctx; + const unsigned char context_padding[] = { + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + }; + + const char *client_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + const char *server_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + const char *context_string = (sending ^ ss->sec.isServer) ? client_cert_verify_string + : server_cert_verify_string; + unsigned int hashlength; + + /* Double check that we are doing the same hash.*/ + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(algorithm)); + if (!ctx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(SECFailure); + PORT_Assert(!SECSuccess); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash without context", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Context string", context_string, strlen(context_string))); + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, context_padding, sizeof(context_padding)); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char *)context_string, + strlen(context_string) + 1); /* +1 includes the terminating 0 */ + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + /* Update the hash in-place */ + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, tbsHash->u.raw, &hashlength, sizeof(tbsHash->u.raw)); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash with context", tbsHash->u.raw, hashlength)); + + tbsHash->len = hashlength; + tbsHash->hashAlg = algorithm; + + if (rv) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, + * Hash(Messages) + Hash(resumption_context), L)) + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *prefix, + const char *suffix, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PK11SymKey **dest) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Hashes hashesTmp; + char buf[100]; + const char *label; + + if (prefix) { + if ((strlen(prefix) + strlen(suffix) + 2) > sizeof(buf)) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + (void)PR_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s", + prefix, suffix); + label = buf; + } else { + label = suffix; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving secret '%s'", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, label)); + if (!hashes) { + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashesTmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + hashes = &hashesTmp; + } + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(key, tls13_GetHash(ss), + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len, + label, strlen(label), + tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss), + tls13_GetHashSize(ss), dest); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Derive traffic keys for the next cipher spec in the queue. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + TrafficKeyType type, + CipherSpecDirection direction, + PRBool deleteSecret) +{ + size_t keySize = spec->cipher_def->key_size; + size_t ivSize = spec->cipher_def->iv_size + + spec->cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; /* This isn't always going to + * work, but it does for + * AES-GCM */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkAlgorithm = ssl3_Alg2Mech(spec->cipher_def->calg); + PK11SymKey **prkp = NULL; + PK11SymKey *prk = NULL; + PRBool clientKey; + ssl3KeyMaterial *target; + const char *phase; + SECStatus rv; + /* These labels are just used for debugging. */ + static const char kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys[] = "early application data"; + static const char kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys[] = "handshake data"; + static const char kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys[] = "application data"; + + if (ss->sec.isServer ^ (direction == CipherSpecWrite)) { + clientKey = PR_TRUE; + target = &spec->client; + } else { + clientKey = PR_FALSE; + target = &spec->server; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (type) { + case TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData: + PORT_Assert(clientKey); + phase = kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys; + prkp = &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret; + break; + case TrafficKeyHandshake: + phase = kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys; + prkp = clientKey ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret; + break; + case TrafficKeyApplicationData: + phase = kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys; + prkp = clientKey ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret; + break; + default: + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(prkp != NULL); + prk = *prkp; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys phase='%s'", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + (direction == CipherSpecWrite) ? "write" : "read", phase)); + PORT_Assert(phase); + spec->phase = phase; + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + kHkdfPurposeKey, strlen(kHkdfPurposeKey), + bulkAlgorithm, keySize, + &target->write_key); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + kHkdfPurposeIv, strlen(kHkdfPurposeIv), + target->write_iv, ivSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + + if (deleteSecret) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(prk); + *prkp = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pSpec; + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *bulk = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef( + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + pSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + /* Version isn't set when we send 0-RTT data. */ + pSpec->version = PR_MAX(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, ss->version); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Set Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + pSpec->cipher_def = bulk; + + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Install a new cipher spec for this direction. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, TrafficKeyType type, + CipherSpecDirection direction, PRBool deleteSecret) +{ + SECStatus rv; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL; + ssl3CipherSpec **specp = (direction == CipherSpecRead) ? &ss->ssl3.crSpec : &ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + /* Flush out old handshake data. */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Create the new spec. */ + spec = PORT_ZNew(ssl3CipherSpec); + if (!spec) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + spec->refCt = 1; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&spec->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec = spec; + + rv = tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + switch (spec->cipher_def->calg) { + case calg_aes_gcm: + spec->aead = tls13_AESGCM; + break; + case calg_chacha20: + spec->aead = tls13_ChaCha20Poly1305; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + return SECFailure; + break; + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(ss, spec, type, direction, + deleteSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We use the epoch for cipher suite identification, so increment + * it in both TLS and DTLS. */ + if ((*specp)->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + return SECFailure; + } + spec->epoch = (*specp)->epoch + 1; + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->read_seq_num = spec->write_seq_num = 0; + } else { + /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */ + spec->read_seq_num = spec->write_seq_num = + (sslSequenceNumber)spec->epoch << 48; + + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); + } + + /* Now that we've set almost everything up, finally cut over. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + tls13_CipherSpecRelease(*specp); /* May delete old cipher. */ + *specp = spec; /* Overwrite. */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for phase='%s'.%d dir=%s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + spec->phase, spec->epoch, + direction == CipherSpecRead ? "read" : "write")); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *ctx = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { + /* Backup: if we haven't done any hashing, then hash now. + * This happens when we are doing 0-RTT on the client. */ + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss))); + if (!ctx) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages", + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len)); + + if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } else { + ctx = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + if (!ctx) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, + &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; +} + +void +tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer) +{ + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&offer->key_exchange, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(offer, sizeof(*offer)); +} + +void +tls13_DestroyKeyShares(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + /* The list must be initialized. */ + PORT_Assert(PR_LIST_HEAD(list)); + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry((TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p); + } +} + +void +tls13_DestroyEarlyData(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + TLS13EarlyData *msg; + + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + msg = (TLS13EarlyData *)cur_p; + + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&msg->data, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(msg, sizeof(*msg)); + } +} + +void +tls13_DestroyCipherSpecs(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec((ssl3CipherSpec *)cur_p, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Free(cur_p); + } +} + +/* draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.2.2 specifies the following + * nonce algorithm: + * + * The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes, + * N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD + * algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS. + * The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows: + * + * 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with + * zeroes to iv_length. + * + * 2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static + * client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role. + * + * The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per- + * record nonce. + * + * Existing suites have the same nonce size: N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 bytes + * + * See RFC 5288 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 + */ +static void +tls13_WriteNonce(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, + const unsigned char *seqNumBuf, unsigned int seqNumLen, + unsigned char *nonce, unsigned int nonceLen) +{ + size_t i; + + PORT_Assert(nonceLen == 12); + memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 12); + + /* XOR the last 8 bytes of the IV with the sequence number. */ + PORT_Assert(seqNumLen == 8); + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + nonce[4 + i] ^= seqNumBuf[i]; + } +} + +/* Implement the SSLAEADCipher interface defined in sslimpl.h. + * + * That interface takes the additional data (see below) and reinterprets that as + * a sequence number. In TLS 1.3 there is no additional data so this value is + * just the encoded sequence number. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_AEAD(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, + unsigned char *aeadParams, unsigned int aeadParamLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int uOutLen = 0; + SECItem param = { + siBuffer, aeadParams, aeadParamLength + }; + + if (doDecrypt) { + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, mechanism, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + } else { + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, mechanism, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + } + *outlen = (int)uOutLen; + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, + PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, + int *outlen, + int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, + int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + + memset(&gcmParams, 0, sizeof(gcmParams)); + gcmParams.pIv = nonce; + gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce); + gcmParams.pAAD = NULL; + gcmParams.ulAADLen = 0; + gcmParams.ulTagBits = 128; /* GCM measures tag length in bits. */ + + tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, additionalDataLen, + nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + return tls13_AEAD(keys, doDecrypt, out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen, + CKM_AES_GCM, + (unsigned char *)&gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams)); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + + memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams)); + aeadParams.pNonce = nonce; + aeadParams.ulNonceLen = sizeof(nonce); + aeadParams.pAAD = NULL; /* No AAD in TLS 1.3. */ + aeadParams.ulAADLen = 0; + aeadParams.ulTagLen = 16; /* The Poly1305 tag is 16 octets. */ + + tls13_WriteNonce(keys, additionalData, additionalDataLen, + nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + return tls13_AEAD(keys, doDecrypt, out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen, + CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + (unsigned char *)&aeadParams, sizeof(aeadParams)); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 innerLength; + SECItem oldNpn = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + wait_encrypted_extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + innerLength = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (innerLength < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* Alert already sent. */ + } + if (innerLength != length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If we are doing 0-RTT, then we already have an NPN value. Stash + * it for comparison. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent && + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE) { + oldNpn = ss->xtnData.nextProto; + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data = NULL; + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b, &length, encrypted_extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ + } + + /* We can only get here if we offered 0-RTT. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent); + if (!ss->statelessResume) { + /* Illegal to accept 0-RTT without also accepting PSK. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + } + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; + + /* Check that the server negotiated the same ALPN (if any). */ + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&oldNpn, &ss->xtnData.nextProto)) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldNpn, PR_FALSE); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check that the server negotiated the same cipher suite. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + /* Though we sent 0-RTT, the early_data extension wasn't present so the + * state is unmodified; the server must have rejected 0-RTT. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || + (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)); + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldNpn, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; + PRInt32 sent_len = 0; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.encryptedExtensionsSenders[0]); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, encrypted_extensions, + extensions_len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, + &ss->xtnData.encryptedExtensionsSenders[0]); + PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len); + if (sent_len != extensions_len) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(sent_len == 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes hash; + SSL3Hashes tbsHash; /* The hash "to be signed". */ + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single); + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We should have picked a signature scheme when we received a + * CertificateRequest, or when we picked a server certificate. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme == ssl_sig_none) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, &hash, hashAlg, + PR_TRUE, &tbsHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &tbsHash, privKey, &buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + * Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + * These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + len = buf.len + 2 + 2; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshakeNumber */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + /* For parity with the allocation functions, which don't use + * SECITEM_AllocItem(). */ + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * tls13 CertificateVerify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes tbsHash; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, + wait_cert_verify); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(hashes); + + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Error set already */ + return SECFailure; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + + rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, hashes, hashAlg, PR_FALSE, &tbsHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &tbsHash, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), decrypt_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Set the auth type. */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + switch (ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(sigScheme)) { + case rsaKey: + ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_rsa_sign; + break; + case ecKey: + ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_ecdsa; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + } + } + + /* Request a client certificate now if one was requested. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) { + TLS13CertificateRequest *req = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + rv = ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(ss, req->signatureSchemes, + req->signatureSchemeCount, + &req->ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return rv; + } + } + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned long prefixLength, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(prefixLength <= ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len); + + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "Handshake hash computed over ClientHello prefix", + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, prefixLength)); + rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss)), + hashes->u.raw, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, prefixLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + hashes->len = tls13_GetHashSize(ss); + + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "PSK Binder hash", + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} +/* Compute the PSK Binder This is kind of sneaky.*/ +SECStatus +tls13_ComputePskBinder(sslSocket *ss, PRBool sending, + unsigned int prefixLength, + PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, + unsigned int maxOutputLen) +{ + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(ss, prefixLength, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + return tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey, &hashes, + sending, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, + unsigned int maxOutputLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *hmacCtx = NULL; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg = tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss); + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int outputLenUint; + const char *label = kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret; + PK11SymKey *secret = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(baseKey); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s calculate finished", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + + /* Now derive the appropriate finished secret from the base secret. */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(baseKey, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + label, strlen(label), + tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss), + tls13_GetHashSize(ss), &secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto abort; + } + + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + hmacCtx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macAlg, CKA_SIGN, + secret, ¶m); + if (!hmacCtx) { + goto abort; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmacCtx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmacCtx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + + PORT_Assert(maxOutputLen >= tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmacCtx, output, &outputLenUint, maxOutputLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + *outputLen = outputLenUint; + + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE); + return SECSuccess; + +abort: + if (secret) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + } + + if (hmacCtx) { + PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE); + } + + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE]; + unsigned int finishedLen; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, baseKey, &hashes, PR_TRUE, + finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, finishedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, finishedBuf, finishedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Record key log */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType message, + PK11SymKey *secret, + SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE]; + unsigned int finishedLen; + + if (!hashes) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, secret, hashes, PR_FALSE, + finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length != finishedLen) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + FATAL_ERROR(ss, message == finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(b, finishedBuf, finishedLen) != 0) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, + decrypt_error); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, + wait_finished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, finished, + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret, + b, length, hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + return tls13_SendClientSecondRound(ss); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *secret; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, wait_finished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished)) { + secret = ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret; + } else { + secret = ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret; + } + + rv = tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, finished, secret, b, length, hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + CipherSpecRead, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code and alerts handled below */ + } + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) { + rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; /* Error code and alerts handled below */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); + + rv = tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + + /* Don't need this. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake); + + ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Do the parts of sending the client's second round that require + * the XmitBuf lock. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(sslSocket *ss, PRBool sendClientCert, + SSL3AlertDescription *sendAlert) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + *sendAlert = internal_error; + + if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else if (sendClientCert) { + rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) { + PORT_FreeArena(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; + } + + if (sendClientCert) { + rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err is set. */ + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, IS_DTLS(ss) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT : 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* No point in sending an alert here because we're not going to + * be able to send it if we couldn't flush the handshake. */ + *sendAlert = no_alert; + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set. */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sendClientCert; + SSL3AlertDescription sendAlert = no_alert; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; + + /* Defer client authentication sending if we are still waiting for server + * authentication. This avoids unnecessary disclosure of client credentials + * to an unauthenticated server. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendClientSecondRound; + return SECWouldBlock; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_none) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + /* Reset the counters so that the next epoch isn't set + * incorrectly. */ + tls13_SetNullCipherSpec(ss, &ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + } + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + CipherSpecWrite, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + CipherSpecRead, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + rv = tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(ss, sendClientCert, &sendAlert); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sendAlert != no_alert) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), sendAlert); + } else { + LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError()); + } + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + CipherSpecWrite, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The handshake is now finished */ + return tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); +} + +/* + * enum { (65535) } TicketExtensionType; + * + * struct { + * TicketExtensionType extension_type; + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } TicketExtension; + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * TicketExtension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + */ + +#define MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE (2 << 16) /* Arbitrary limit. */ + +SECStatus +tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRUint16 message_length; + SECItem ticket_data = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; + PRUint32 max_early_data_size_len = 0; + ticket.flags = 0; + if (ss->opt.enable0RttData) { + ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; + max_early_data_size_len = 8; /* type + len + value. */ + } + ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT; + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &ticket, &ticket_data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + message_length = + 4 + /* lifetime */ + 4 + /* ticket_age_add */ + 2 + max_early_data_size_len + /* max_early_data_size_len */ + 2 + /* ticket length */ + ticket_data.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, + message_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This is a fixed value. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* The ticket age obfuscator. */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom((PRUint8 *)&ticket.ticket_age_add, + sizeof(ticket.ticket_age_add)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_age_add, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Encode the ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, ticket_data.data, ticket_data.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, max_early_data_size_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + if (max_early_data_size_len) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber( + ss, ssl_tls13_ticket_early_data_info_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Length */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ticket_data.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 tmp; + PRUint32 utmp; + NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; + SECItem data; + SECItem ticket_data; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle new session ticket message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->firstHsDone || ss->sec.isServer) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + ticket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(); + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length); + if (tmp < 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = (PRUint32)tmp; + ticket.ticket.type = siBuffer; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp), + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + ticket.ticket_age_add = PR_ntohl(utmp); + + /* Get the ticket value. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticket_data, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !ticket_data.len) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &data, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &data.data, + &data.len, new_session_ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size) { + ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; + ticket.max_early_data_size = ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size; + } + + if (length != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ticket.ticket, &ticket_data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Caching session ticket", + ticket.ticket.data, + ticket.ticket.len)); + + /* Replace a previous session ticket when + * we receive a second NewSessionTicket message. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_client_cache) { + /* Create a new session ID. */ + sslSessionID *sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Copy over the peerCert. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); + if (!sid->peerCert) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Destroy the old SID. */ + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + } + + ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ticket); + PORT_Assert(!ticket.ticket.data); + + rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* Cache the session. */ + ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +typedef enum { + ExtensionNotUsed, + ExtensionClientOnly, + ExtensionSendClear, + ExtensionSendClearOrHrr, + ExtensionSendHrr, + ExtensionSendEncrypted, + ExtensionSendCertificate, + ExtensionNewSessionTicket +} Tls13ExtensionStatus; + +static const struct { + PRUint16 ex_value; + Tls13ExtensionStatus status; +} KnownExtensions[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, ExtensionSendEncrypted }, + { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, ExtensionSendEncrypted }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, ExtensionNotUsed }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, ExtensionClientOnly }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, ExtensionSendEncrypted }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, ExtensionSendEncrypted }, + { ssl_padding_xtn, ExtensionNotUsed }, + { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, ExtensionNotUsed }, + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, ExtensionClientOnly }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, ExtensionSendClearOrHrr }, + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, ExtensionSendClear }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, ExtensionSendEncrypted }, + { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, ExtensionNotUsed }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, ExtensionNotUsed }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, ExtensionSendCertificate }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, ExtensionSendCertificate }, + { ssl_tls13_ticket_early_data_info_xtn, ExtensionNewSessionTicket }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, ExtensionSendHrr }, + { ssl_tls13_short_header_xtn, ExtensionSendClear } +}; + +PRBool +tls13_ExtensionAllowed(PRUint16 extension, SSL3HandshakeType message) +{ + unsigned int i; + + PORT_Assert((message == client_hello) || + (message == server_hello) || + (message == hello_retry_request) || + (message == encrypted_extensions) || + (message == new_session_ticket) || + (message == certificate)); + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions); i++) { + if (KnownExtensions[i].ex_value == extension) + break; + } + if (i == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions)) { + /* We have never heard of this extension which is OK + * in client_hello and new_session_ticket. */ + return (message == client_hello) || + (message == new_session_ticket); + } + + switch (KnownExtensions[i].status) { + case ExtensionNotUsed: + return PR_FALSE; + case ExtensionClientOnly: + return message == client_hello; + case ExtensionSendClear: + return message == client_hello || + message == server_hello; + case ExtensionSendClearOrHrr: + return message == client_hello || + message == server_hello || + message == hello_retry_request; + case ExtensionSendHrr: + return message == client_hello || + message == hello_retry_request; + case ExtensionSendEncrypted: + return message == client_hello || + message == encrypted_extensions; + case ExtensionNewSessionTicket: + return message == new_session_ticket; + case ExtensionSendCertificate: + return message == client_hello || + message == certificate; + } + + PORT_Assert(0); + + /* Not reached */ + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* TLS 1.3 doesn't actually have additional data but the aead function + * signature overloads additional data to carry the record sequence + * number and that's what we put here. The TLS 1.3 AEAD functions + * just use this input as the sequence number and not as additional + * data. */ +static void +tls13_FormatAdditionalData(PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int length, + sslSequenceNumber seqNum) +{ + PRUint8 *ptr = aad; + + PORT_Assert(length == 8); + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(seqNum, 8, ptr); + PORT_Assert((ptr - aad) == length); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d (%s) protect record 0x%0llx len=%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->phase, + cwSpec->write_seq_num, contentLen)); + + if (contentLen + 1 + tagLen > wrBuf->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Copy the data into the wrBuf. We're going to encrypt in-place + * in the AEAD branch anyway */ + PORT_Memcpy(wrBuf->buf, pIn, contentLen); + + if (cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { + /* Shortcut for plaintext */ + wrBuf->len = contentLen; + } else { + PRUint8 aad[8]; + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead); + + /* Add the content type at the end. */ + wrBuf->buf[contentLen] = type; + + tls13_FormatAdditionalData(aad, sizeof(aad), cwSpec->write_seq_num); + rv = cwSpec->aead( + ss->sec.isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client, + PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */ + wrBuf->buf, /* output */ + (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */ + wrBuf->space, /* max out */ + wrBuf->buf, contentLen + 1, /* input */ + aad, sizeof(aad)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Unprotect a TLS 1.3 record and leave the result in plaintext. + * + * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. + * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). + * + * If SECFailure is returned, we: + * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. + * 2. Call PORT_SetError() witn an appropriate code. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + PRUint8 aad[8]; + SECStatus rv; + + *alert = bad_record_mac; /* Default alert for most issues. */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d (%s) unprotect record 0x%0llx len=%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, crSpec, crSpec->phase, + crSpec->read_seq_num, cText->buf->len)); + + /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total + * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ + if (cText->buf->len < cipher_def->tag_size) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Verify that the content type is right, even though we overwrite it. */ + if (cText->type != content_application_data) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + /* Do we need a better error here? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Check the version number in the record */ + if ((IS_DTLS(ss) && cText->version != kDtlsRecordVersion) || + (!IS_DTLS(ss) && cText->version != kTlsRecordVersion)) { + /* Do we need a better error here? */ + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Decrypt */ + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead); + tls13_FormatAdditionalData(aad, sizeof(aad), + IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num + : crSpec->read_seq_num); + rv = crSpec->aead( + ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server, + PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ + plaintext->buf, /* out */ + (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */ + plaintext->space, /* maxout */ + cText->buf->buf, /* in */ + cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ + aad, sizeof(aad)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The record is right-padded with 0s, followed by the true + * content type, so read from the right until we receive a + * nonzero byte. */ + while (plaintext->len > 0 && !(plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1])) { + --plaintext->len; + } + + /* Bogus padding. */ + if (plaintext->len < 1) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + /* It's safe to report this specifically because it happened + * after the MAC has been verified. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Record the type. */ + cText->type = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + --plaintext->len; + + SSL_TRC(10, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + plaintext->len, cText->type)); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* 0-RTT is only permitted if: + * + * 1. We are doing TLS 1.3 + * 2. This isn't a second ClientHello (in response to HelloRetryRequest) + * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. + * 4. We have a valid ticket. + * 5. The server is willing to accept 0-RTT. + * 6. We have not changed our ALPN settings to disallow the ALPN tag + * in the ticket. + * + * Called from tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(). + */ +PRBool +tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + /* We checked that the cipher suite was still allowed back in + * ssl3_SendClientHello. */ + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + return PR_FALSE; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) + return PR_FALSE; + if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) + return PR_FALSE; + if (!ss->statelessResume) + return PR_FALSE; + if ((sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) == 0) + return PR_FALSE; + return tls13_AlpnTagAllowed(ss, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Don't do anything if there is no early_data xtn, which means we're + * not doing early data. */ + if (!ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: in 0-RTT mode", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Set the ALPN data as if it was negotiated. We check in the ServerHello + * handler that the server negotiates the same value. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len) { + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.nextProto, + &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + } + + /* Null spec... */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + tls13_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + + /* Cipher suite already set in tls13_SetupClientHello. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com) Fill this in. + * bug 1281255. */ + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret, + NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + CipherSpecWrite, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRInt32 +tls13_Read0RttData(sslSocket *ss, void *buf, PRInt32 len) +{ + TLS13EarlyData *msg; + + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)); + msg = (TLS13EarlyData *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&msg->link); + if (msg->data.len > len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + len = msg->data.len; + + PORT_Memcpy(buf, msg->data.data, msg->data.len); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&msg->data, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(msg, sizeof(*msg)); + + return len; +} + +/* 0-RTT data will be followed by a different cipher spec; this resets the + * current spec to the null spec so that the following state can be set as + * though 0-RTT didn't happen. TODO: work out if this is the best plan. */ +static void +tls13_SetNullCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec **specp) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + tls13_CipherSpecRelease(*specp); + *specp = ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.nullSpec = NULL; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send end_of_early_data extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, end_of_early_data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, ss->opt.requestCertificate ? wait_client_cert : wait_finished)); + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Reset the cipher spec so that the epoch counter is properly reset. */ + tls13_SetNullCipherSpec(ss, &ss->ssl3.crSpec); + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + CipherSpecRead, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + TLS13EarlyData *ed; + SECItem it = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + /* Belt and suspenders. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(3, (NULL, "Received early application data", + origBuf->buf, origBuf->len)); + ed = PORT_ZNew(TLS13EarlyData); + if (!ed) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + it.data = origBuf->buf; + it.len = origBuf->len; + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ed->data, &it) != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&ed->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRUint16 +tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version) +{ +#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + if (version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return 0x7f00 | TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION; + } +#endif + return (PRUint16)version; +} + +/* Pick the highest version we support that is also advertised. */ +SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, const TLSExtension *supported_versions) +{ + PRUint16 version; + /* Make a copy so we're nondestructive*/ + SECItem data = supported_versions->data; + SECItem versions; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &versions, 1, + &data.data, &data.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (data.len || !versions.len || (versions.len & 1)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) { + PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(version); + unsigned long offset; + + for (offset = 0; offset < versions.len; offset += 2) { + PRUint16 supported = + (versions.data[offset] << 8) | versions.data[offset + 1]; + if (supported == wire) { + ss->version = version; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + } + + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version); + return SECFailure; +} |