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-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c254
1 files changed, 254 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c5eaf021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/* Copyright(c) 2013, Intel Corp. */
+
+/* Wrapper functions for Intel optimized implementation of AES-GCM */
+
+#ifdef USE_HW_AES
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "blapii.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
+#include "gcm.h"
+#include "ctr.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "prtypes.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "intel-gcm.h"
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#include <emmintrin.h>
+#include <tmmintrin.h>
+
+struct intel_AES_GCMContextStr {
+ unsigned char Htbl[16 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char X0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char CTR[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ AESContext *aes_context;
+ unsigned long tagBits;
+ unsigned long Alen;
+ unsigned long Mlen;
+};
+
+intel_AES_GCMContext *
+intel_AES_GCM_CreateContext(void *context,
+ freeblCipherFunc cipher,
+ const unsigned char *params,
+ unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+ intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm = NULL;
+ AESContext *aes = (AESContext *)context;
+ const CK_GCM_PARAMS *gcmParams = (const CK_GCM_PARAMS *)params;
+ unsigned char buff[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* aux buffer */
+
+ unsigned long IV_whole_len = gcmParams->ulIvLen & (~0xful);
+ unsigned int IV_remainder_len = gcmParams->ulIvLen & 0xful;
+ unsigned long AAD_whole_len = gcmParams->ulAADLen & (~0xful);
+ unsigned int AAD_remainder_len = gcmParams->ulAADLen & 0xful;
+
+ __m128i BSWAP_MASK = _mm_setr_epi8(15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);
+ __m128i ONE = _mm_set_epi32(0, 0, 0, 1);
+ unsigned int j;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (blocksize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ gcm = PORT_ZNew(intel_AES_GCMContext);
+
+ if (gcm == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* initialize context fields */
+ gcm->aes_context = aes;
+ gcm->tagBits = gcmParams->ulTagBits;
+ gcm->Alen = 0;
+ gcm->Mlen = 0;
+
+ /* first prepare H and its derivatives for ghash */
+ intel_aes_gcmINIT(gcm->Htbl, (unsigned char *)aes->expandedKey, aes->Nr);
+
+ /* Initial TAG value is zero */
+ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->T, _mm_setzero_si128());
+ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->X0, _mm_setzero_si128());
+
+ /* Init the counter */
+ if (gcmParams->ulIvLen == 12) {
+ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR,
+ _mm_setr_epi32(((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[0],
+ ((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[1],
+ ((unsigned int *)gcmParams->pIv)[2],
+ 0x01000000));
+ } else {
+ /* If IV size is not 96 bits, then the initial counter value is GHASH
+ * of the IV */
+ intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, gcmParams->pIv, IV_whole_len, gcm->T);
+
+ /* Partial block */
+ if (IV_remainder_len) {
+ PORT_Memset(buff, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memcpy(buff, gcmParams->pIv + IV_whole_len, IV_remainder_len);
+ intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, buff, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->T);
+ }
+
+ intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+ gcm->Htbl,
+ gcm->T,
+ gcmParams->ulIvLen,
+ 0,
+ gcm->X0,
+ gcm->CTR);
+
+ /* TAG should be zero again */
+ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->T, _mm_setzero_si128());
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt the initial counter, will be used to encrypt the GHASH value,
+ * in the end */
+ rv = (*cipher)(context, gcm->X0, &j, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->CTR,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Promote the counter by 1 */
+ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR, _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_add_epi32(ONE, _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *)gcm->CTR), BSWAP_MASK)), BSWAP_MASK));
+
+ /* Now hash AAD - it would actually make sense to seperate the context
+ * creation from the AAD, because that would allow to reuse the H, which
+ * only changes when the AES key changes, and not every package, like the
+ * IV and AAD */
+ intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, gcmParams->pAAD, AAD_whole_len, gcm->T);
+ if (AAD_remainder_len) {
+ PORT_Memset(buff, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ PORT_Memcpy(buff, gcmParams->pAAD + AAD_whole_len, AAD_remainder_len);
+ intel_aes_gcmAAD(gcm->Htbl, buff, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, gcm->T);
+ }
+ gcm->Alen += gcmParams->ulAADLen;
+ return gcm;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_Free(gcm);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ if (freeit) {
+ PORT_Free(gcm);
+ }
+}
+
+SECStatus
+intel_AES_GCM_EncryptUpdate(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+ unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+ unsigned int tagBytes;
+ unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ tagBytes = (gcm->tagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ if (UINT_MAX - inlen < tagBytes) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (maxout < inlen + tagBytes) {
+ *outlen = inlen + tagBytes;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ intel_aes_gcmENC(
+ inbuf,
+ outbuf,
+ gcm,
+ inlen);
+
+ gcm->Mlen += inlen;
+
+ intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+ gcm->Htbl,
+ gcm->T,
+ gcm->Mlen,
+ gcm->Alen,
+ gcm->X0,
+ T);
+
+ *outlen = inlen + tagBytes;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < tagBytes; j++) {
+ outbuf[inlen + j] = T[j];
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+intel_AES_GCM_DecryptUpdate(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+ unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+ unsigned int tagBytes;
+ unsigned char T[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ const unsigned char *intag;
+
+ tagBytes = (gcm->tagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+ /* get the authentication block */
+ if (inlen < tagBytes) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ inlen -= tagBytes;
+ intag = inbuf + inlen;
+
+ if (maxout < inlen) {
+ *outlen = inlen;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ intel_aes_gcmDEC(
+ inbuf,
+ outbuf,
+ gcm,
+ inlen);
+
+ gcm->Mlen += inlen;
+ intel_aes_gcmTAG(
+ gcm->Htbl,
+ gcm->T,
+ gcm->Mlen,
+ gcm->Alen,
+ gcm->X0,
+ T);
+
+ if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(T, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
+ memset(outbuf, 0, inlen);
+ *outlen = 0;
+ /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *outlen = inlen;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#endif
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