1 files changed, 266 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js b/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99ea33a3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+"use strict";
+
+// These tests ensure content signatures are working correctly.
+
+// First, we need to set up some data
+const PREF_SIGNATURE_ROOT = "security.content.signature.root_hash";
+
+const TEST_DATA_DIR = "test_content_signing/";
+
+const ONECRL_NAME = "oneCRL-signer.mozilla.org";
+const ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME = "remotenewtab.content-signature.mozilla.org";
+
+function getSignatureVerifier() {
+  return Cc["@mozilla.org/security/contentsignatureverifier;1"]
+           .createInstance(Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier);
+}
+
+function setRoot(filename) {
+  let cert = constructCertFromFile(filename);
+  Services.prefs.setCharPref(PREF_SIGNATURE_ROOT, cert.sha256Fingerprint);
+}
+
+function loadChain(prefix, names) {
+  let chain = [];
+  for (let name of names) {
+    let filename = `${prefix}_${name}.pem`;
+    chain.push(readFile(do_get_file(filename)));
+  }
+  return chain;
+}
+
+function run_test() {
+  // set up some data
+  const DATA = readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + 'test.txt'));
+  const GOOD_SIGNATURE = "p384ecdsa=" +
+      readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + 'test.txt.signature'))
+      .trim();
+
+  const BAD_SIGNATURE = "p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2r" +
+                        "UWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1G" +
+                        "q25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L";
+
+  let remoteNewTabChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
+                                    ["remote_newtab_ee", "int", "root"]);
+
+  let oneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
+                              ["onecrl_ee", "int", "root"]);
+
+  let oneCRLBadKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
+                                    ["onecrl_wrong_key_ee", "int", "root"]);
+
+  let oneCRLRSAKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
+                                    ["onecrl_RSA_ee", "int", "root"]);
+
+  let noSANChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
+                             ["onecrl_no_SAN_ee", "int", "root"]);
+
+  // Check signature verification works without error before the root is set
+  let chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  let verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
+     "Before the root is set, signatures should fail to verify but not throw.");
+
+  setRoot(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing_root.pem");
+
+  // Check good signatures from good certificates with the correct SAN
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A OneCRL signature should verify with the OneCRL chain");
+  let chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain2,
+                                     ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME),
+     "A newtab signature should verify with the newtab chain");
+
+  // Check a bad signature when a good chain is provided
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, BAD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A bad signature should not verify");
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
+  // one used to create the signature
+  let badKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, badKeyChain,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong");
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
+  // one used to create the signature (this time, an RSA key)
+  let rsaKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, rsaKeyChain,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong (RSA)");
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with chain missing root
+  let missingRoot = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[1]].join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, missingRoot,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing root)");
+
+  // Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with no path to root
+  let missingInt = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, missingInt,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing int)");
+
+  // Check good signatures from good certificates with the wrong SANs
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
+                                      ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME),
+     "A OneCRL signature should not verify if we require the newtab SAN");
+
+  chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain2,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A newtab signature should not verify if we require the OneCRL SAN");
+
+  // Check good signatures with good chains with some other invalid names
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ""),
+     "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match an empty name");
+
+  let relatedName = "subdomain." + ONECRL_NAME;
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
+                                      relatedName),
+     "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a related name");
+
+  let randomName = "\xb1\x9bU\x1c\xae\xaa3\x19H\xdb\xed\xa1\xa1\xe0\x81\xfb" +
+                   "\xb2\x8f\x1cP\xe5\x8b\x9c\xc2s\xd3\x1f\x8e\xbbN";
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, randomName),
+     "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a random name");
+
+  // check good signatures with chains that have strange or missing SANs
+  chain1 = noSANChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME),
+     "A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a supplied name");
+
+  // Check malformed signature data
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  let bad_signatures = [
+    // wrong length
+    "p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-" +
+    "7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L==",
+    // incorrectly encoded
+    "p384ecdsa='WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi" +
+    "-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L=",
+    // missing directive
+    "other_directive=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ec" +
+    "HiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L",
+    // actually sha256 with RSA
+    "p384ecdsa=XS_jiQsS5qlzQyUKaA1nAnQn_OvxhvDfKybflB8Xe5gNH1wNmPGK1qN-jpeTfK" +
+    "6ob3l3gCTXrsMnOXMeht0kPP3wLfVgXbuuO135pQnsv0c-ltRMWLe56Cm4S4Z6E7WWKLPWaj" +
+    "jhAcG5dZxjffP9g7tuPP4lTUJztyc4d1z_zQZakEG7R0vN7P5_CaX9MiMzP4R7nC3H4Ba6yi" +
+    "yjlGvsZwJ_C5zDQzWWs95czUbMzbDScEZ_7AWnidw91jZn-fUK3xLb6m-Zb_b4GAqZ-vnXIf" +
+    "LpLB1Nzal42BQZn7i4rhAldYdcVvy7rOMlsTUb5Zz6vpVW9LCT9lMJ7Sq1xbU-0g=="
+    ];
+  for (let badSig of bad_signatures) {
+    throws(() => {
+      verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+      verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, badSig, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+    }, /NS_ERROR/, `Bad or malformed signature "${badSig}" should be rejected`);
+  }
+
+  // Check malformed and missing certificate chain data
+  let chainSuffix = [oneCRLChain[1], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
+  let badChains = [
+    // no data
+    "",
+    // completely wrong data
+    "blah blah \n blah",
+    ];
+
+  let badSections = [
+    // data that looks like PEM but isn't
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n",
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+    // data that will start to parse but won't base64decode
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+    // data with garbage outside of PEM sections
+    "this data is garbage\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n" +
+    "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+    ];
+
+  for (let badSection of badSections) {
+    // ensure we test each bad section on its own...
+    badChains.push(badSection);
+    // ... and as part of a chain with good certificates
+    badChains.push(badSection + '\n' + chainSuffix);
+  }
+
+  for (let badChain of badChains) {
+    throws(() => {
+      verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+      verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, badChain,
+                                      ONECRL_NAME);
+    }, /NS_ERROR/, `Bad chain data starting "${badChain.substring(0, 80)}" ` +
+                   "should be rejected");
+  }
+
+  // Check the streaming interface works OK when a good chain / data
+  // combination is provided
+  chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  verifier.update(DATA);
+  ok(verifier.end(),
+     "A good signature should verify using the stream interface");
+
+  // Check that the streaming interface works with multiple update calls
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  for (let c of DATA) {
+    verifier.update(c);
+  }
+  ok(verifier.end(),
+     "A good signature should verify using multiple updates");
+
+  // Check that the streaming interface works with multiple update calls and
+  // some data provided in CreateContext
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  let start = DATA.substring(0, 5);
+  let rest = DATA.substring(start.length);
+  verifier.createContext(start, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  for (let c of rest) {
+    verifier.update(c);
+  }
+  ok(verifier.end(),
+     "A good signature should verify using data in CreateContext and updates");
+
+  // Check that a bad chain / data combination fails
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  ok(!verifier.end(),
+     "A bad signature should fail using the stream interface");
+
+  // Check that re-creating a context throws ...
+  verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
+  verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+
+  // ... firstly, creating a context explicitly
+  throws(() => {
+    verifier.createContext(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  }, /NS_ERROR/, "Ensure a verifier cannot be re-used with createContext");
+
+  // ... secondly, by calling verifyContentSignature
+  throws(() => {
+    verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
+  }, /NS_ERROR/, "Ensure a verifier cannot be re-used with verifyContentSignature");
+
+  run_next_test();
+}