diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c')
| -rwxr-xr-x | netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c | 2336 |
1 files changed, 2336 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c new file mode 100755 index 000000000..50432ad8a --- /dev/null +++ b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,2336 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF + * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c 271673 2014-09-16 14:20:33Z tuexen $"); +#endif + +#include <netinet/sctp_os.h> +#include <netinet/sctp.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_header.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_var.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h> +#include <netinet/sctputil.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_indata.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_output.h> +#include <netinet/sctp_auth.h> + +#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG +#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1) +#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2 (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2) +#endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */ + + +void +sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist) +{ + bzero(chklist, sizeof(*chklist)); + /* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */ +} + +sctp_auth_chklist_t * +sctp_alloc_chunklist(void) +{ + sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist; + + SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist), + SCTP_M_AUTH_CL); + if (chklist == NULL) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n"); + } else { + sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist); + } + return (chklist); +} + +void +sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + if (list != NULL) + SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL); +} + +sctp_auth_chklist_t * +sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list; + + if (list == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* get a new list */ + new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist(); + if (new_list == NULL) + return (NULL); + /* copy it */ + bcopy(list, new_list, sizeof(*new_list)); + + return (new_list); +} + + +/* + * add a chunk to the required chunks list + */ +int +sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + if (list == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* is chunk restricted? */ + if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) || + (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) || + (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) || + (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) { + return (-1); + } + if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) { + list->chunks[chunk] = 1; + list->num_chunks++; + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n", + chunk, chunk); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * delete a chunk from the required chunks list + */ +int +sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + if (list == NULL) + return (-1); + + if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) { + list->chunks[chunk] = 0; + list->num_chunks--; + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n", + chunk, chunk); + } + return (0); +} + +size_t +sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + if (list == NULL) + return (0); + else + return (list->num_chunks); +} + +/* + * return the current number and list of required chunks caller must + * guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes + */ +int +sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + if (list == NULL) + return (0); + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (list->chunks[i] != 0) { + *ptr++ = i; + count++; + } + } + return (count); +} + +int +sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int i, size = 0; + + if (list == NULL) + return (0); + + if (list->num_chunks <= 32) { + /* just list them, one byte each */ + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (list->chunks[i] != 0) { + *ptr++ = i; + size++; + } + } + } else { + int index, offset; + + /* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */ + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (list->chunks[i] != 0) { + index = i / 8; + offset = i % 8; + ptr[index] |= (1 << offset); + } + } + size = 32; + } + return (size); +} + +int +sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t *ptr, uint8_t num_chunks, + sctp_auth_chklist_t *list) +{ + int i; + int size; + + if (list == NULL) + return (0); + + if (num_chunks <= 32) { + /* just pull them, one byte each */ + for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) { + (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list); + } + size = num_chunks; + } else { + int index, offset; + + /* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */ + for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) { + for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) { + if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) { + (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list); + } + } + } + size = 32; + } + return (size); +} + + +/* + * allocate structure space for a key of length keylen + */ +sctp_key_t * +sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen) +{ + sctp_key_t *new_key; + + SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen, + SCTP_M_AUTH_KY); + if (new_key == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + new_key->keylen = keylen; + return (new_key); +} + +void +sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t *key) +{ + if (key != NULL) + SCTP_FREE(key,SCTP_M_AUTH_KY); +} + +void +sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str) +{ + uint32_t i; + + if (key == NULL) { + SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str); + return; + } + SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen); + if (key->keylen) { + for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++) + SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]); + SCTP_PRINTF("\n"); + } else { + SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n"); + } +} + +void +sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str) +{ + uint32_t i; + + if (key == NULL) { + SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str); + return; + } + SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen); + if (key->keylen) { + for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++) + SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]); + SCTP_PRINTF("\n"); + } else { + SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n"); + } +} + +static uint32_t +sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t *key) +{ + if (key != NULL) + return (key->keylen); + else + return (0); +} + +/* + * generate a new random key of length 'keylen' + */ +sctp_key_t * +sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen) +{ + sctp_key_t *new_key; + + new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen); + if (new_key == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen); + new_key->keylen = keylen; + return (new_key); +} + +sctp_key_t * +sctp_set_key(uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen) +{ + sctp_key_t *new_key; + + new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen); + if (new_key == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + bcopy(key, new_key->key, keylen); + return (new_key); +} + +/*- + * given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller" + * returns: 1 if key1 > key2 + * -1 if key1 < key2 + * 0 if key1 = key2 + */ +static int +sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2) +{ + uint32_t maxlen; + uint32_t i; + uint32_t key1len, key2len; + uint8_t *key_1, *key_2; + uint8_t val1, val2; + + /* sanity/length check */ + key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1); + key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2); + if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0)) + return (0); + else if (key1len == 0) + return (-1); + else if (key2len == 0) + return (1); + + if (key1len < key2len) { + maxlen = key2len; + } else { + maxlen = key1len; + } + key_1 = key1->key; + key_2 = key2->key; + /* check for numeric equality */ + for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) { + /* left-pad with zeros */ + val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++); + val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++); + if (val1 > val2) { + return (1); + } else if (val1 < val2) { + return (-1); + } + } + /* keys are equal value, so check lengths */ + if (key1len == key2len) + return (0); + else if (key1len < key2len) + return (-1); + else + return (1); +} + +/* + * generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the + * shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific + * order for concatenation + */ +sctp_key_t * +sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, sctp_key_t *shared) +{ + uint32_t keylen; + sctp_key_t *new_key; + uint8_t *key_ptr; + + keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) + + sctp_get_keylen(shared); + + if (keylen > 0) { + /* get space for the new key */ + new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen); + if (new_key == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + new_key->keylen = keylen; + key_ptr = new_key->key; + } else { + /* all keys empty/null?! */ + return (NULL); + } + + /* concatenate the keys */ + if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) { + /* key is shared + key1 + key2 */ + if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) { + bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen); + key_ptr += shared->keylen; + } + if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) { + bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen); + key_ptr += key1->keylen; + } + if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) { + bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen); + } + } else { + /* key is shared + key2 + key1 */ + if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) { + bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen); + key_ptr += shared->keylen; + } + if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) { + bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen); + key_ptr += key2->keylen; + } + if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) { + bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen); + } + } + return (new_key); +} + + +sctp_sharedkey_t * +sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key; + + SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key), + SCTP_M_AUTH_KY); + if (new_key == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + new_key->keyid = 0; + new_key->key = NULL; + new_key->refcount = 1; + new_key->deactivated = 0; + return (new_key); +} + +void +sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t *skey) +{ + if (skey == NULL) + return; + + if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) { + if (skey->key != NULL) + sctp_free_key(skey->key); + SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY); + } +} + +sctp_sharedkey_t * +sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) { + if (skey->keyid == key_id) + return (skey); + } + return (NULL); +} + +int +sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, + sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL)) + return (EINVAL); + + /* insert into an empty list? */ + if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) { + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next); + return (0); + } + /* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */ + LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) { + if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) { + /* insert it before here */ + LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next); + return (0); + } else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) { + /* replace the existing key */ + /* verify this key *can* be replaced */ + if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "can't replace shared key id %u\n", + new_skey->keyid); + return (EBUSY); + } + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "replacing shared key id %u\n", + new_skey->keyid); + LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next); + LIST_REMOVE(skey, next); + sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); + return (0); + } + if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) { + /* belongs at the end of the list */ + LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next); + return (0); + } + } + /* shouldn't reach here */ + return (0); +} + +void +sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + /* find the shared key */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id); + + /* bump the ref count */ + if (skey) { + atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2, + "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount); + } +} + +void +sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked +#if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING) + SCTP_UNUSED +#endif +) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + /* find the shared key */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id); + + /* decrement the ref count */ + if (skey) { + sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2, + "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount); + + /* see if a notification should be generated */ + if ((skey->refcount <= 1) && (skey->deactivated)) { + /* notify ULP that key is no longer used */ + sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, + key_id, 0, so_locked); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2, + "%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount); + } + } +} + +static sctp_sharedkey_t * +sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t *skey) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey; + + if (skey == NULL) + return (NULL); + new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey(); + if (new_skey == NULL) + return (NULL); + if (skey->key != NULL) + new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen); + else + new_skey->key = NULL; + new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid; + return (new_skey); +} + +int +sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey; + int count = 0; + + if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL)) + return (0); + LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) { + new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey); + if (new_skey != NULL) { + (void)sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey); + count++; + } + } + return (count); +} + + +sctp_hmaclist_t * +sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint16_t num_hmacs) +{ + sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list; + int alloc_size; + + alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]); + SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size, + SCTP_M_AUTH_HL); + if (new_list == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs; + new_list->num_algo = 0; + return (new_list); +} + +void +sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list) +{ + if (list != NULL) { + SCTP_FREE(list,SCTP_M_AUTH_HL); + list = NULL; + } +} + +int +sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t hmac_id) +{ + int i; + if (list == NULL) + return (-1); + if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id); + return (-1); + } +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) && + (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) { +#else + if (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) { +#endif + return (-1); + } + /* Now is it already in the list */ + for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) { + if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) { + /* already in list */ + return (-1); + } + } + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id); + list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id; + return (0); +} + +sctp_hmaclist_t * +sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list) +{ + sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list; + int i; + + if (list == NULL) + return (NULL); + /* get a new list */ + new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo); + if (new_list == NULL) + return (NULL); + /* copy it */ + new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo; + new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo; + for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) + new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i]; + return (new_list); +} + +sctp_hmaclist_t * +sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void) +{ + sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list; + +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2); +#else + new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(1); +#endif + if (new_list == NULL) + return (NULL); +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + /* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */ + (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256); +#endif + (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1); + return (new_list); +} + +/*- + * HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order + * find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support + */ +uint16_t +sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *peer, sctp_hmaclist_t *local) +{ + int i, j; + + if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL)) + return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD); + + for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) { + if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) { + /* found the "best" one */ + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n", + peer->hmac[i]); + return (peer->hmac[i]); + } + } + } + /* didn't find one! */ + return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD); +} + +/*- + * serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used + * caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space + */ +int +sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int i; + uint16_t hmac_id; + + if (list == NULL) + return (0); + + for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) { + hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]); + bcopy(&hmac_id, ptr, sizeof(hmac_id)); + ptr += sizeof(hmac_id); + } + return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id)); +} + +int +sctp_verify_hmac_param (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs) +{ + uint32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) { + if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) { + return (0); + } + } + return (-1); +} + +sctp_authinfo_t * +sctp_alloc_authinfo(void) +{ + sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo; + + SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo), + SCTP_M_AUTH_IF); + + if (new_authinfo == NULL) { + /* out of memory */ + return (NULL); + } + bzero(new_authinfo, sizeof(*new_authinfo)); + return (new_authinfo); +} + +void +sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t *authinfo) +{ + if (authinfo == NULL) + return; + + if (authinfo->random != NULL) + sctp_free_key(authinfo->random); + if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL) + sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random); + if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL) + sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key); + if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL) + sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key); + + /* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */ + /* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */ +} + + +uint32_t +sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo) +{ + int size; + + size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + return (SCTP_SIZE32(size)); +} + +uint32_t +sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo) +{ + switch (hmac_algo) { + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1: + return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1); +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256: + return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256); +#endif + default: + /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */ + return (0); + } /* end switch */ +} + +static inline int +sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo) +{ + switch (hmac_algo) { + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1: + return (64); +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256: + return (64); +#endif + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD: + default: + /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */ + return (0); + } /* end switch */ +} + +#if defined(__Userspace__) +/* __Userspace__ SHA1_Init is defined in libcrypto.a (libssl-dev on Ubuntu) */ +#endif +static void +sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx) +{ + switch (hmac_algo) { + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1: + SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1); + break; +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256: + SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256); + break; +#endif + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD: + default: + /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */ + return; + } /* end switch */ +} + +static void +sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx, + uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen) +{ + switch (hmac_algo) { + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1: + SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen); + break; +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256: + SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen); + break; +#endif + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD: + default: + /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */ + return; + } /* end switch */ +} + +static void +sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx, + uint8_t *digest) +{ + switch (hmac_algo) { + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1: + SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1); + break; +#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256) + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256: + SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256); + break; +#endif + case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD: + default: + /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */ + return; + } /* end switch */ +} + +/*- + * Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104) + * + * Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC + * algorithm. Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length + * is returned, if the HMAC was performed. + * + * WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the + * resultant digest. + */ +uint32_t +sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen, + uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest) +{ + uint32_t digestlen; + uint32_t blocklen; + sctp_hash_context_t ctx; + uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */ + uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + uint32_t i; + + /* sanity check the material and length */ + if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) || + (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) { + /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */ + return (0); + } + /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + if (digestlen == 0) + return (0); + + /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */ + blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo); + if (keylen > blocklen) { + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + /* set the hashed key as the key */ + keylen = digestlen; + key = temp; + } + /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */ + bzero(ipad, blocklen); + bzero(opad, blocklen); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + + /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */ + for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + /* perform inner hash */ + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + + /* perform outer hash */ + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest); + + return (digestlen); +} + +/* mbuf version */ +uint32_t +sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen, + struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest, uint32_t trailer) +{ + uint32_t digestlen; + uint32_t blocklen; + sctp_hash_context_t ctx; + uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */ + uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + uint32_t i; + struct mbuf *m_tmp; + + /* sanity check the material and length */ + if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) { + /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */ + return (0); + } + /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + if (digestlen == 0) + return (0); + + /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */ + blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo); + if (keylen > blocklen) { + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + /* set the hashed key as the key */ + keylen = digestlen; + key = temp; + } + /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */ + bzero(ipad, blocklen); + bzero(opad, blocklen); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + + /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */ + for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + /* perform inner hash */ + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen); + /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */ + m_tmp = m; + while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) { + m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp); + m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp); + } + /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */ + while (m_tmp != NULL) { + if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) { + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset, + SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer+m_offset)); + } else { + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset, + SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset); + } + + /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */ + m_offset = 0; + m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp); + } + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + + /* perform outer hash */ + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest); + + return (digestlen); +} + +/*- + * verify the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC + * algorithm. + * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success. + */ +int +sctp_verify_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen, + uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, + uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen) +{ + uint32_t len; + uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + + /* sanity check the material and length */ + if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || + (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) { + /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest */ + return (-1); + } + len = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + if ((len == 0) || (digestlen != len)) + return (-1); + + /* compute the expected hash */ + if (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key, keylen, text, textlen, temp) != len) + return (-1); + + if (memcmp(digest, temp, digestlen) != 0) + return (-1); + else + return (0); +} + + +/* + * computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if + * the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len). + */ +uint32_t +sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, uint8_t *text, + uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest) +{ + uint32_t digestlen; + uint32_t blocklen; + sctp_hash_context_t ctx; + uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + + /* sanity check */ + if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) || + (digest == NULL)) { + /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */ + return (0); + } + /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + if (digestlen == 0) + return (0); + + /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */ + blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo); + if (key->keylen > blocklen) { + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + /* save the hashed key as the new key */ + key->keylen = digestlen; + bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen); + } + return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen, + digest)); +} + +/* mbuf version */ +uint32_t +sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, struct mbuf *m, + uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest) +{ + uint32_t digestlen; + uint32_t blocklen; + sctp_hash_context_t ctx; + uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + + /* sanity check */ + if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) { + /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */ + return (0); + } + /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo); + if (digestlen == 0) + return (0); + + /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */ + blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo); + if (key->keylen > blocklen) { + sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx); + sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen); + sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp); + /* save the hashed key as the new key */ + key->keylen = digestlen; + bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen); + } + return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0)); +} + +int +sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t id) +{ + int i; + + if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD)) + return (0); + + for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) + if (list->hmac[i] == id) + return (1); + + /* not in the list */ + return (0); +} + + +/*- + * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association. + * the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use. + * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held + */ +void +sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid) +{ + if (stcb == NULL) + return; + + if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) { + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL; + } + if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) { + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL; + } +} + +/*- + * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on + * an endpoint. + * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held + */ +void +sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid) +{ + struct sctp_tcb *stcb; + + if (inp == NULL) + return; + + /* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */ + LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) { + SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb); + sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid); + SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb); + } +} + +/*- + * delete a shared key from an association + * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + if (stcb == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */ + if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid) + return (-1); + + /* does the key exist? */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */ + if (skey->refcount > 1) + return (-1); + + /* remove it */ + LIST_REMOVE(skey, next); + sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */ + + /* clear any cached keys */ + sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid); + return (0); +} + +/*- + * deletes a shared key from the endpoint + * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + if (inp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */ + if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid) + return (-1); + + /* does the key exist? */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */ + + /* remove it */ + LIST_REMOVE(skey, next); + sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */ + + /* clear any cached keys */ + sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid); + return (0); +} + +/*- + * set the active key on an association + * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL; + + /* find the key on the assoc */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) { + /* that key doesn't exist */ + return (-1); + } + if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) { + /* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */ + return (-1); + } + + /* set the (new) active key */ + stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid; + /* reset the deactivated flag */ + skey->deactivated = 0; + + return (0); +} + +/*- + * set the active key on an endpoint + * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + /* find the key */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) { + /* that key doesn't exist */ + return (-1); + } + inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid; + return (0); +} + +/*- + * deactivates a shared key from the association + * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + if (stcb == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */ + if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid) + return (-1); + + /* does the key exist? */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */ + if (skey->refcount == 1) { + /* no other users, send a notification for this key */ + sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, keyid, 0, + SCTP_SO_LOCKED); + } + + /* mark the key as deactivated */ + skey->deactivated = 1; + + return (0); +} + +/*- + * deactivates a shared key from the endpoint + * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held + */ +int +sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid) +{ + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + + if (inp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */ + if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid) + return (-1); + + /* does the key exist? */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid); + if (skey == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */ + + /* remove it */ + LIST_REMOVE(skey, next); + sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */ + + return (0); +} + +/* + * get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK) + */ +void +sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t length) +{ + struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param; + uint16_t plen, ptype; + uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL; + uint16_t random_len = 0; + uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL; + uint16_t hmacs_len = 0; + uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL; + uint16_t num_chunks = 0; + sctp_key_t *new_key; + uint32_t keylen; + + /* convert to upper bound */ + length += offset; + + phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *)&tmp_param); + while (phdr != NULL) { + ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type); + plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length); + + if ((plen == 0) || (offset + plen > length)) + break; + + if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) { + if (plen > sizeof(random_store)) + break; + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, min(plen, sizeof(random_store))); + if (phdr == NULL) + return; + /* save the random and length for the key */ + p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr; + random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random); + } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) { + uint16_t num_hmacs; + uint16_t i; + + if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store)) + break; + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, min(plen,sizeof(hmacs_store))); + if (phdr == NULL) + return; + /* save the hmacs list and num for the key */ + hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr; + hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs); + num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]); + if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) + sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs); + stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs); + if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) { + (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, + ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i])); + } + } + } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) { + int i; + + if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store)) + break; + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store))); + if (phdr == NULL) + return; + chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr; + num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks); + /* save chunks list and num for the key */ + if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) + sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks); + else + stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist(); + for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) { + (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i], + stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks); + } + } + /* get next parameter */ + offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen); + if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length) + break; + phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), + (uint8_t *)&tmp_param); + } + /* concatenate the full random key */ + keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len; + if (chunks != NULL) { + keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks; + } + new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen); + if (new_key != NULL) { + /* copy in the RANDOM */ + if (p_random != NULL) { + keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len; + bcopy(p_random, new_key->key, keylen); + } + /* append in the AUTH chunks */ + if (chunks != NULL) { + bcopy(chunks, new_key->key + keylen, + sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks); + keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks; + } + /* append in the HMACs */ + if (hmacs != NULL) { + bcopy(hmacs, new_key->key + keylen, + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len); + } + } + if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL) + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key; + stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len; + sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid); + sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid); + + /* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */ + stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs, + stcb->asoc.local_hmacs); + + /* copy defaults from the endpoint */ + /* FIX ME: put in cookie? */ + stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid; + /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */ + (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys, + &stcb->asoc.shared_keys); +} + +/* + * compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet + */ +void +sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset, + struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid) +{ + uint32_t digestlen; + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + sctp_key_t *key; + + if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL)) + return; + + /* zero the digest + chunk padding */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id); + bzero(auth->hmac, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen)); + + /* is the desired key cached? */ + if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) || + (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) { + if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) { + /* free the old cached key */ + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key); + } + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid); + /* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */ + if (skey != NULL) + key = skey->key; + else + key = NULL; + /* compute a new assoc key and cache it */ + stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = + sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random, + stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid; + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n", + stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid); +#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG + if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG) + sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key, + "Assoc Key"); +#endif + } + + /* set in the active key id */ + auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid); + + /* compute and fill in the digest */ + (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key, + m, auth_offset, auth->hmac); +} + + +static void +sctp_bzero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size) +{ + struct mbuf *m_tmp; + uint8_t *data; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return; + + /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */ + m_tmp = m; + while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) { + m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp); + m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp); + } + /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */ + while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) { + data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset; + if (size > (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)) { + bzero(data, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)); + size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp); + } else { + bzero(data, size); + size = 0; + } + /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */ + m_offset = 0; + m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp); + } +} + +/*- + * process the incoming Authentication chunk + * return codes: + * -1 on any authentication error + * 0 on authentication verification + */ +int +sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, + struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset) +{ + uint16_t chunklen; + uint16_t shared_key_id; + uint16_t hmac_id; + sctp_sharedkey_t *skey; + uint32_t digestlen; + uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + + /* auth is checked for NULL by caller */ + chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length); + if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed); + return (-1); + } + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth); + + /* get the auth params */ + shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id); + hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n", + shared_key_id, hmac_id); + + /* is the indicated HMAC supported? */ + if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) { + struct mbuf *m_err; + struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *err; + + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n", + hmac_id); + /* + * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC + * Identifier + */ + m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 0, M_NOWAIT, + 1, MT_HEADER); + if (m_err != NULL) { + /* pre-reserve some space */ + SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); + /* fill in the error */ + err = mtod(m_err, struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *); + bzero(err, sizeof(*err)); + err->ph.param_type = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID); + err->ph.param_length = htons(sizeof(*err)); + err->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id); + SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_err) = sizeof(*err); + /* queue it */ + sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, m_err); + } + return (-1); + } + /* get the indicated shared key, if available */ + if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) || + (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) { + /* find the shared key on the assoc first */ + skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, + shared_key_id); + /* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */ + if (skey == NULL) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n", + shared_key_id); + return (-1); + } + /* generate a notification if this is a new key id */ + if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id) + /* + * sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb, + * shared_key_id, (void + * *)stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid); + */ + sctp_notify_authentication(stcb, SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY, + shared_key_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid, + SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED); + /* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */ + if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL) + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = + sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random, + stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id; +#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG + if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG) + sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key"); +#endif + } + /* validate the digest length */ + digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id); + if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) { + /* invalid digest length */ + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n"); + return (-1); + } + /* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */ + bcopy(auth->hmac, digest, digestlen); + sctp_bzero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen)); + (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, + m, offset, computed_digest); + + /* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */ + if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) { + SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed); + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n"); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * Generate NOTIFICATION + */ +void +sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication, + uint16_t keyid, uint16_t alt_keyid, int so_locked +#if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING) + SCTP_UNUSED +#endif +) +{ + struct mbuf *m_notify; + struct sctp_authkey_event *auth; + struct sctp_queued_to_read *control; + + if ((stcb == NULL) || + (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_GONE) || + (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_ALLGONE) || + (stcb->asoc.state & SCTP_STATE_CLOSED_SOCKET) + ) { + /* If the socket is gone we are out of here */ + return; + } + + if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT)) + /* event not enabled */ + return; + + m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event), + 0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER); + if (m_notify == NULL) + /* no space left */ + return; + + SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0; + auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *); + memset(auth, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event)); + auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT; + auth->auth_flags = 0; + auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth); + auth->auth_keynumber = keyid; + auth->auth_altkeynumber = alt_keyid; + auth->auth_indication = indication; + auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb); + + SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth); + SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL; + + /* append to socket */ + control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination, + 0, 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify); + if (control == NULL) { + /* no memory */ + sctp_m_freem(m_notify); + return; + } + control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION; + control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify); + /* not that we need this */ + control->tail_mbuf = m_notify; + sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control, + &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1, SCTP_READ_LOCK_NOT_HELD, so_locked); +} + + +/*- + * validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK + * Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline + * with sctp_load_addresses_from_init() + */ +int +sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit) +{ + struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, parm_buf; + uint16_t ptype, plen; + int peer_supports_asconf = 0; + int peer_supports_auth = 0; + int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0; + uint8_t saw_asconf = 0; + uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0; + + /* go through each of the params. */ + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf, sizeof(parm_buf)); + while (phdr) { + ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type); + plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length); + + if (offset + plen > limit) { + break; + } + if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) { + break; + } + if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) { + /* A supported extension chunk */ + struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported; + uint8_t local_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; + int num_ent, i; + + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store, min(plen,sizeof(local_store))); + if (phdr == NULL) { + return (-1); + } + pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr; + num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); + for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) { + switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) { + case SCTP_ASCONF: + case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK: + peer_supports_asconf = 1; + break; + default: + /* one we don't care about */ + break; + } + } + } else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) { + got_random = 1; + /* enforce the random length */ + if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) + + SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n"); + return (-1); + } + } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) { + uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs; + int num_hmacs; + + if (plen > sizeof(store)) + break; + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store, min(plen,sizeof(store))); + if (phdr == NULL) + return (-1); + hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr; + num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) / + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]); + /* validate the hmac list */ + if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n"); + return (-1); + } + got_hmacs = 1; + } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) { + int i, num_chunks; + uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE]; + /* did the peer send a non-empty chunk list? */ + struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL; + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, + (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, + min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store))); + if (phdr == NULL) + return (-1); + + /*- + * Flip through the list and mark that the + * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack. + */ + chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr; + num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks); + for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) { + /* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */ + if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF) + saw_asconf = 1; + if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK) + saw_asconf_ack = 1; + + } + if (num_chunks) + got_chklist = 1; + } + + offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen); + if (offset >= limit) { + break; + } + phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf, + sizeof(parm_buf)); + } + /* validate authentication required parameters */ + if (got_random && got_hmacs) { + peer_supports_auth = 1; + } else { + peer_supports_auth = 0; + } + if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n"); + return (-1); + } + if (peer_supports_asconf && !peer_supports_auth) { + SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, + "SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n"); + return (-1); + } else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) && + ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) { + return (-2); + } + return (0); +} + +void +sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb) +{ + uint16_t chunks_len = 0; + uint16_t hmacs_len = 0; + uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT; + sctp_key_t *new_key; + uint16_t keylen; + + /* initialize hmac list from endpoint */ + stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs); + if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) { + hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo * + sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]); + } + /* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */ + stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = + sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks); + if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i]) + chunks_len++; + } + } + /* copy defaults from the endpoint */ + stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid; + + /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */ + (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, + &stcb->asoc.shared_keys); + + /* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */ + /* key includes parameter headers */ + keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len + + hmacs_len; + new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen); + if (new_key != NULL) { + struct sctp_paramhdr *ph; + int plen; + /* generate and copy in the RANDOM */ + ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key; + ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM); + plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len; + ph->param_length = htons(plen); + SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len); + keylen = plen; + + /* append in the AUTH chunks */ + /* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */ + ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen); + ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST); + plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len; + ph->param_length = htons(plen); + keylen += sizeof(*ph); + if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i]) + new_key->key[keylen++] = i; + } + } + + /* append in the HMACs */ + ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen); + ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST); + plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len; + ph->param_length = htons(plen); + keylen += sizeof(*ph); + (void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, + new_key->key + keylen); + } + if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL) + sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random); + stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key; + stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len; +} + + +#ifdef SCTP_HMAC_TEST +/* + * HMAC and key concatenation tests + */ +static void +sctp_print_digest(uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen, const char *str) +{ + uint32_t i; + + SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s: 0x", str); + if (digest == NULL) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < digestlen; i++) + SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", digest[i]); +} + +static int +sctp_test_hmac(const char *str, uint16_t hmac_id, uint8_t *key, + uint32_t keylen, uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, + uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen) +{ + uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX]; + + SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s:", str); + sctp_hmac(hmac_id, key, keylen, text, textlen, computed_digest); + sctp_print_digest(digest, digestlen, "Expected digest"); + sctp_print_digest(computed_digest, digestlen, "Computed digest"); + if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) { + SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED"); + return (-1); + } else { + SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED"); + return (0); + } +} + + +/* + * RFC 2202: HMAC-SHA1 test cases + */ +void +sctp_test_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + uint8_t *digest; + uint8_t key[128]; + uint32_t keylen; + uint8_t text[128]; + uint32_t textlen; + uint32_t digestlen = 20; + int failed = 0; + + /*- + * test_case = 1 + * key = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b + * key_len = 20 + * data = "Hi There" + * data_len = 8 + * digest = 0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00 + */ + keylen = 20; + memset(key, 0x0b, keylen); + textlen = 8; + strcpy(text, "Hi There"); + digest = "\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 1", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 2 + * key = "Jefe" + * key_len = 4 + * data = "what do ya want for nothing?" + * data_len = 28 + * digest = 0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79 + */ + keylen = 4; + strcpy(key, "Jefe"); + textlen = 28; + strcpy(text, "what do ya want for nothing?"); + digest = "\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 2", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 3 + * key = 0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa + * key_len = 20 + * data = 0xdd repeated 50 times + * data_len = 50 + * digest = 0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3 + */ + keylen = 20; + memset(key, 0xaa, keylen); + textlen = 50; + memset(text, 0xdd, textlen); + digest = "\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 3", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 4 + * key = 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819 + * key_len = 25 + * data = 0xcd repeated 50 times + * data_len = 50 + * digest = 0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da + */ + keylen = 25; + memcpy(key, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", keylen); + textlen = 50; + memset(text, 0xcd, textlen); + digest = "\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 4", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 5 + * key = 0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c + * key_len = 20 + * data = "Test With Truncation" + * data_len = 20 + * digest = 0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04 + * digest-96 = 0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1 + */ + keylen = 20; + memset(key, 0x0c, keylen); + textlen = 20; + strcpy(text, "Test With Truncation"); + digest = "\x4c\x1a\x03\x42\x4b\x55\xe0\x7f\xe7\xf2\x7b\xe1\xd5\x8b\xb9\x32\x4a\x9a\x5a\x04"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 5", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 6 + * key = 0xaa repeated 80 times + * key_len = 80 + * data = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First" + * data_len = 54 + * digest = 0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112 + */ + keylen = 80; + memset(key, 0xaa, keylen); + textlen = 54; + strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"); + digest = "\xaa\x4a\xe5\xe1\x52\x72\xd0\x0e\x95\x70\x56\x37\xce\x8a\x3b\x55\xed\x40\x21\x12"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 6", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /*- + * test_case = 7 + * key = 0xaa repeated 80 times + * key_len = 80 + * data = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data" + * data_len = 73 + * digest = 0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91 + */ + keylen = 80; + memset(key, 0xaa, keylen); + textlen = 73; + strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"); + digest = "\xe8\xe9\x9d\x0f\x45\x23\x7d\x78\x6d\x6b\xba\xa7\x96\x5c\x78\x08\xbb\xff\x1a\x91"; + if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 7", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen, + text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0) + failed++; + + /* done with all tests */ + if (failed) + SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: %d cases failed", failed); + else + SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: all test cases passed"); +} + +/* + * test assoc key concatenation + */ +static int +sctp_test_key_concatenation(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, + sctp_key_t *expected_key) +{ + sctp_key_t *key; + int ret_val; + + sctp_show_key(key1, "\nkey1"); + sctp_show_key(key2, "\nkey2"); + key = sctp_compute_hashkey(key1, key2, NULL); + sctp_show_key(expected_key, "\nExpected"); + sctp_show_key(key, "\nComputed"); + if (memcmp(key, expected_key, expected_key->keylen) != 0) { + SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED"); + ret_val = -1; + } else { + SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED"); + ret_val = 0; + } + sctp_free_key(key1); + sctp_free_key(key2); + sctp_free_key(expected_key); + sctp_free_key(key); + return (ret_val); +} + + +void +sctp_test_authkey(void) +{ + sctp_key_t *key1, *key2, *expected_key; + int failed = 0; + + /* test case 1 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01", 4); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x02\x03\x04", 4); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x02\x03\x04", 8); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 2 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x02", 1); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02", 5); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 3 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x02", 4); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02", 5); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 4 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 5 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 6 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* test case 7 */ + key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11); + key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11); + expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22); + if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0) + failed++; + + /* done with all tests */ + if (failed) + SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: %d cases failed", failed); + else + SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: all test cases passed"); +} + + +#if defined(STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST) +int +main(void) +{ + sctp_test_hmac_sha1(); + sctp_test_authkey(); +} + +#endif /* STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST */ + +#endif /* SCTP_HMAC_TEST */ |