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Diffstat (limited to 'netwerk/base/nsIProtocolHandler.idl')
| -rw-r--r-- | netwerk/base/nsIProtocolHandler.idl | 321 |
1 files changed, 321 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netwerk/base/nsIProtocolHandler.idl b/netwerk/base/nsIProtocolHandler.idl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95dc00ece --- /dev/null +++ b/netwerk/base/nsIProtocolHandler.idl @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsISupports.idl" + +%{C++ +#include "nsCOMPtr.h" +%} + +interface nsIURI; +interface nsIChannel; +interface nsILoadInfo; + +/** + * nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags + * + * Protocols that wish to return different flags depending on the URI should + * implement this interface. + */ +[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(65a8e823-0591-4fc0-a56a-03265e0a4ce8)] +interface nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags : nsISupports +{ + /* + * Returns protocol flags for the given URI, which may be different from the + * flags for another URI of the same scheme. + */ + unsigned long getFlagsForURI(in nsIURI aURI); +}; + +/** + * nsIProtocolHandler + */ +[scriptable, uuid(a87210e6-7c8c-41f7-864d-df809015193e)] +interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports +{ + /** + * The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file"). + */ + readonly attribute ACString scheme; + + /** + * The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses. + * If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:") + * then -1 will be returned. + */ + readonly attribute long defaultPort; + + /** + * Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below). + */ + readonly attribute unsigned long protocolFlags; + +%{C++ + // Helper method to get the protocol flags in the right way. + nsresult DoGetProtocolFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t* aFlags) + { + nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags> dh = do_QueryInterface(this); + return dh ? dh->GetFlagsForURI(aURI, aFlags) : GetProtocolFlags(aFlags); + } +%} + + /** + * Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol, + * where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string. The caller may + * provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that + * the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary) + * before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI + * string. (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time, + * so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin + * server.) + * + * @param aSpec - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending + * on the protocol implementation, unicode character + * sequences may or may not be %xx escaped. + * @param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI + * string originated. this corresponds to the + * charset that should be used when communicating + * this URI to an origin server, for example. if + * null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e., + * no charset transformation from aSpec). + * @param aBaseURI - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI. + * otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative + * to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol. + * If the protocol has no concept of relative + * URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored. + */ + nsIURI newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec, + [optional] in string aOriginCharset, + [optional] in nsIURI aBaseURI); + + /** + * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler and + * sets the loadInfo for the constructed channel. + */ + nsIChannel newChannel2(in nsIURI aURI, in nsILoadInfo aLoadinfo); + + /** + * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler. + */ + nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI); + + /** + * Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports. + * + * This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port + * that is blacklisted. For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail + * Transfer) is banned. When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things" + * port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the + * protocol handler wants to override the ban. + */ + boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme); + + + /************************************************************************** + * Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the + * others are deviations): + * + * NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand. + */ + + /** + * standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative + * URIs (http, ftp, ...) + */ + const unsigned long URI_STD = 0; + + /** + * no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...) + */ + const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0); + + /** + * no authority component (file, ...) + */ + const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1); + + /** + * This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http) + * (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.). If the protocol supports transparent + * proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler. + * + * If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support + * nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP + * flag (see below). + * + * @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler + */ + const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2); + + /** + * This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http, + * ftp, etc.). nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this + * protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead. This flag is + * ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set. + */ + const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3); + + /** + * The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so + * documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context + * from the document that loads them. + */ + const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4); + + /** + * "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh, + * certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application + * decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT + * the target) URI has this protocol flag. Note that the decision as to + * what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller + * of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. See documentation for that + * method for more information. + * + * A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that + * shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects + * to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader. + */ + const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5); + + /** + * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + * | | + * | ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS. | + * | | + * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ + * + * These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this + * protocol. Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the + * innermost URI matter. See nsINestedURI. + * + * If none of these five flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it + * had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol + * handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier. In this case, there may + * be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure" + * assumption is being made. At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0, + * most likely), these warnings will become errors. + */ + + /** + * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone. For example, any + * website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol. + * Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag. + */ + const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6); + + /** + * The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web) + * content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code + * which has the system principal). Various internal protocols should set + * this flag. + */ + const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7); + + /** + * The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the + * application's user interface. There are cases when such resources may + * be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is + * less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than + * URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. See the documentation for + * nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. + */ + const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8); + + /** + * Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be + * allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem. + * It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such + * access. Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this + * flag. + */ + const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9); + + /** + * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a + * principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and + * websites that are same origin as this uri. + */ + const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<10); + + /** + * Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable + * on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore + * do not return any data that we can use. + */ + const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11); + + /** + * URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources. This could + * be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE), + * or something else that would not hit the network. + */ + const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12); + + /** + * URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened. + */ + const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13); + + /** + * Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make + * it unsuitable for saving to a local file. + */ + const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<14); + + /** + * This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related + * protocols. + */ + const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1<<15); + + /** + * URIs for this protocol require the webapps permission on the principal + * when opening URIs for a different domain. See bug#773886 + */ + const unsigned long URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM = (1<<16); + + /** + * Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle + * Open() and reads on the resulting stream. + */ + const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<17); + + /** + * URI is secure to load in an https page and should not be blocked + * by nsMixedContentBlocker + */ + const unsigned long URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT = (1<<18); + + /** + * This URI may be fetched and the contents are visible to anyone. This is + * semantically equivalent to the resource being served with all-access CORS + * headers. + */ + const unsigned long URI_FETCHABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1 << 19); + + /** + * If this flag is set, then the origin for this protocol is the full URI + * spec, not just the scheme + host + port. + */ + const unsigned long ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC = (1 << 20); + + /** + * If this flag is set, the URI does not always allow content using the same + * protocol to link to it. + */ + const unsigned long URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE = (1 << 21); +}; + +%{C++ +/** + * Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix: + */ +#define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=" +/** + * For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http" + */ + +#define IS_ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC_DEFINED 1 +%} |