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Diffstat (limited to 'dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp | 336 |
1 files changed, 336 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7344e19fa --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "mozilla/Logging.h" +#include "nsString.h" +#include "nsCOMPtr.h" +#include "nsIURI.h" +#include "nsIPrincipal.h" +#include "nsIObserver.h" +#include "nsIContent.h" +#include "nsCSPService.h" +#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h" +#include "nsError.h" +#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h" +#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h" +#include "mozilla/Preferences.h" +#include "nsIScriptError.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" +#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" +#include "nsPrincipal.h" + +using namespace mozilla; + +/* Keeps track of whether or not CSP is enabled */ +bool CSPService::sCSPEnabled = true; + +static LazyLogModule gCspPRLog("CSP"); + +CSPService::CSPService() +{ + Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(&sCSPEnabled, "security.csp.enable"); +} + +CSPService::~CSPService() +{ + mAppStatusCache.Clear(); +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPService, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink) + +// Helper function to identify protocols and content types not subject to CSP. +bool +subjectToCSP(nsIURI* aURI, nsContentPolicyType aContentType) { + // These content types are not subject to CSP content policy checks: + // TYPE_CSP_REPORT -- csp can't block csp reports + // TYPE_REFRESH -- never passed to ShouldLoad (see nsIContentPolicy.idl) + // TYPE_DOCUMENT -- used for frame-ancestors + if (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT || + aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_REFRESH || + aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) { + return false; + } + + // The three protocols: data:, blob: and filesystem: share the same + // protocol flag (URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE) with other protocols, like + // chrome:, resource:, moz-icon:, but those three protocols get + // special attention in CSP and are subject to CSP, hence we have + // to make sure those protocols are subject to CSP, see: + // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-guid-matching + bool match = false; + nsresult rv = aURI->SchemeIs("data", &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return true; + } + rv = aURI->SchemeIs("blob", &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return true; + } + rv = aURI->SchemeIs("filesystem", &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return true; + } + // finally we have to whitelist "about:" which does not fall in + // any of the two categories underneath but is not subject to CSP. + rv = aURI->SchemeIs("about", &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return false; + } + + // Other protocols are not subject to CSP and can be whitelisted: + // * URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE + // e.g. chrome:, data:, blob:, resource:, moz-icon: + // * URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT + // e.g. javascript: + // + // Please note that it should be possible for websites to + // whitelist their own protocol handlers with respect to CSP, + // hence we use protocol flags to accomplish that. + rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE, &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return false; + } + rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT, &match); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) { + return false; + } + // all other protocols are subject To CSP. + return true; +} + +/* nsIContentPolicy implementation */ +NS_IMETHODIMP +CSPService::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType, + nsIURI *aContentLocation, + nsIURI *aRequestOrigin, + nsISupports *aRequestContext, + const nsACString &aMimeTypeGuess, + nsISupports *aExtra, + nsIPrincipal *aRequestPrincipal, + int16_t *aDecision) +{ + if (!aContentLocation) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) { + MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CSPService::ShouldLoad called for %s", + aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + + // default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + + // No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol + // or type is *not* subject to CSP. + // Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom + // protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags + // that are whitelistet in subjectToCSP() + if (!sCSPEnabled || !subjectToCSP(aContentLocation, aContentType)) { + return NS_OK; + } + + // query the principal of the document; if no document is passed, then + // fall back to using the requestPrincipal (e.g. service workers do not + // pass a document). + nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node(do_QueryInterface(aRequestContext)); + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = node ? node->NodePrincipal() + : aRequestPrincipal; + if (!principal) { + // if we can't query a principal, then there is nothing to do. + return NS_OK; + } + nsresult rv = NS_OK; + + // 1) Apply speculate CSP for preloads + bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentType); + + if (isPreload) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp; + rv = principal->GetPreloadCsp(getter_AddRefs(preloadCsp)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + if (preloadCsp) { + // obtain the enforcement decision + // (don't pass aExtra, we use that slot for redirects) + rv = preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(aContentType, + aContentLocation, + aRequestOrigin, + aRequestContext, + aMimeTypeGuess, + nullptr, // aExtra + aDecision); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // if the preload policy already denied the load, then there + // is no point in checking the real policy + if (NS_CP_REJECTED(*aDecision)) { + return NS_OK; + } + } + } + + // 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads + nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp; + rv = principal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + if (csp) { + // obtain the enforcement decision + // (don't pass aExtra, we use that slot for redirects) + rv = csp->ShouldLoad(aContentType, + aContentLocation, + aRequestOrigin, + aRequestContext, + aMimeTypeGuess, + nullptr, + aDecision); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +CSPService::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType, + nsIURI *aContentLocation, + nsIURI *aRequestOrigin, + nsISupports *aRequestContext, + const nsACString &aMimeTypeGuess, + nsISupports *aExtra, + nsIPrincipal *aRequestPrincipal, + int16_t *aDecision) +{ + if (!aContentLocation) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) { + MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("CSPService::ShouldProcess called for %s", + aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); + } + + // ShouldProcess is only relevant to TYPE_OBJECT, so let's convert the + // internal contentPolicyType to the mapping external one. + // If it is not TYPE_OBJECT, we can return at this point. + // Note that we should still pass the internal contentPolicyType + // (aContentType) to ShouldLoad(). + uint32_t policyType = + nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType); + + if (policyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + return ShouldLoad(aContentType, + aContentLocation, + aRequestOrigin, + aRequestContext, + aMimeTypeGuess, + aExtra, + aRequestPrincipal, + aDecision); +} + +/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation */ +NS_IMETHODIMP +CSPService::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel *oldChannel, + nsIChannel *newChannel, + uint32_t flags, + nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *callback) +{ + net::nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(callback); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri; + nsresult rv = newChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = oldChannel->GetLoadInfo(); + + // if no loadInfo on the channel, nothing for us to do + if (!loadInfo) { + return NS_OK; + } + + // No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol + // is *not* subject to CSP. + // Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom + // protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags + // that are whitelistet in subjectToCSP() + nsContentPolicyType policyType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType(); + if (!sCSPEnabled || !subjectToCSP(newUri, policyType)) { + return NS_OK; + } + + /* Since redirecting channels don't call into nsIContentPolicy, we call our + * Content Policy implementation directly when redirects occur using the + * information set in the LoadInfo when channels are created. + * + * We check if the CSP permits this host for this type of load, if not, + * we cancel the load now. + */ + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalUri; + rv = oldChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalUri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(policyType); + + /* On redirect, if the content policy is a preload type, rejecting the preload + * results in the load silently failing, so we convert preloads to the actual + * type. See Bug 1219453. + */ + policyType = + nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternalOrWorker(policyType); + + int16_t aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + // 1) Apply speculative CSP for preloads + if (isPreload) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp; + loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()->GetPreloadCsp(getter_AddRefs(preloadCsp)); + + if (preloadCsp) { + // Pass originalURI as aExtra to indicate the redirect + preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(policyType, // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t) + newUri, // nsIURI + nullptr, // nsIURI + nullptr, // nsISupports + EmptyCString(), // ACString - MIME guess + originalUri, // aExtra + &aDecision); + + // if the preload policy already denied the load, then there + // is no point in checking the real policy + if (NS_CP_REJECTED(aDecision)) { + autoCallback.DontCallback(); + return NS_BINDING_FAILED; + } + } + } + + // 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads + nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp; + loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp)); + + if (csp) { + // Pass originalURI as aExtra to indicate the redirect + csp->ShouldLoad(policyType, // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t) + newUri, // nsIURI + nullptr, // nsIURI + nullptr, // nsISupports + EmptyCString(), // ACString - MIME guess + originalUri, // aExtra + &aDecision); + } + + // if ShouldLoad doesn't accept the load, cancel the request + if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(aDecision)) { + autoCallback.DontCallback(); + return NS_BINDING_FAILED; + } + return NS_OK; +} |