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author | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
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committer | Matt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain> | 2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500 |
commit | 5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch) | |
tree | 10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp | |
parent | 49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff) | |
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp | 665 |
1 files changed, 665 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e4cf68c98 --- /dev/null +++ b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,665 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsEscape.h" +#include "nsString.h" +#include "nsIURI.h" +#include "nsUrlClassifierUtils.h" +#include "nsTArray.h" +#include "nsReadableUtils.h" +#include "plbase64.h" +#include "nsPrintfCString.h" +#include "safebrowsing.pb.h" +#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h" +#include "mozilla/Mutex.h" + +#define DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION "2.2" + +static char int_to_hex_digit(int32_t i) +{ + NS_ASSERTION((i >= 0) && (i <= 15), "int too big in int_to_hex_digit"); + return static_cast<char>(((i < 10) ? (i + '0') : ((i - 10) + 'A'))); +} + +static bool +IsDecimal(const nsACString & num) +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num.Length(); i++) { + if (!isdigit(num[i])) { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +static bool +IsHex(const nsACString & num) +{ + if (num.Length() < 3) { + return false; + } + + if (num[0] != '0' || !(num[1] == 'x' || num[1] == 'X')) { + return false; + } + + for (uint32_t i = 2; i < num.Length(); i++) { + if (!isxdigit(num[i])) { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +static bool +IsOctal(const nsACString & num) +{ + if (num.Length() < 2) { + return false; + } + + if (num[0] != '0') { + return false; + } + + for (uint32_t i = 1; i < num.Length(); i++) { + if (!isdigit(num[i]) || num[i] == '8' || num[i] == '9') { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// SafeBrowsing V4 related utits. + +namespace mozilla { +namespace safebrowsing { + +static PlatformType +GetPlatformType() +{ +#if defined(ANDROID) + return ANDROID_PLATFORM; +#elif defined(XP_MACOSX) + return OSX_PLATFORM; +#elif defined(XP_LINUX) + return LINUX_PLATFORM; +#elif defined(XP_WIN) + return WINDOWS_PLATFORM; +#else + return PLATFORM_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED; +#endif +} + +typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest ListUpdateRequest; +typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest_Constraints Constraints; + +static void +InitListUpdateRequest(ThreatType aThreatType, + const char* aStateBase64, + ListUpdateRequest* aListUpdateRequest) +{ + aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_type(aThreatType); + aListUpdateRequest->set_platform_type(GetPlatformType()); + aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_entry_type(URL); + + Constraints* contraints = new Constraints(); + contraints->add_supported_compressions(RICE); + aListUpdateRequest->set_allocated_constraints(contraints); + + // Only set non-empty state. + if (aStateBase64[0] != '\0') { + nsCString stateBinary; + nsresult rv = Base64Decode(nsCString(aStateBase64), stateBinary); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { + aListUpdateRequest->set_state(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length()); + } + } +} + +static ClientInfo* +CreateClientInfo() +{ + ClientInfo* c = new ClientInfo(); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = + do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + + nsXPIDLCString clientId; + nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref("browser.safebrowsing.id", + getter_Copies(clientId)); + + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + clientId = "Firefox"; // Use "Firefox" as fallback. + } + + c->set_client_id(clientId.get()); + + return c; +} + +} // end of namespace safebrowsing. +} // end of namespace mozilla. + +nsUrlClassifierUtils::nsUrlClassifierUtils() + : mEscapeCharmap(nullptr) + , mProviderDictLock("nsUrlClassifierUtils.mProviderDictLock") +{ +} + +nsresult +nsUrlClassifierUtils::Init() +{ + // Everything but alpha numerics, - and . + mEscapeCharmap = new Charmap(0xffffffff, 0xfc009fff, 0xf8000001, 0xf8000001, + 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff); + if (!mEscapeCharmap) + return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + // nsIUrlClassifierUtils is a thread-safe service so it's + // allowed to use on non-main threads. However, building + // the provider dictionary must be on the main thread. + // We forcefully load nsUrlClassifierUtils in + // nsUrlClassifierDBService::Init() to ensure we must + // now be on the main thread. + nsresult rv = ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // Add an observer for shutdown + nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService = + mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); + if (!observerService) + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + + observerService->AddObserver(this, "xpcom-shutdown-threads", false); + Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this, "browser.safebrowsing"); + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsUrlClassifierUtils, + nsIUrlClassifierUtils, + nsIObserver) + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// nsIUrlClassifierUtils + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetKeyForURI(nsIURI * uri, nsACString & _retval) +{ + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(uri); + if (!innerURI) + innerURI = uri; + + nsAutoCString host; + innerURI->GetAsciiHost(host); + + if (host.IsEmpty()) { + return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI; + } + + nsresult rv = CanonicalizeHostname(host, _retval); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsAutoCString path; + rv = innerURI->GetPath(path); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // strip out anchors + int32_t ref = path.FindChar('#'); + if (ref != kNotFound) + path.SetLength(ref); + + nsAutoCString temp; + rv = CanonicalizePath(path, temp); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + _retval.Append(temp); + + return NS_OK; +} + +// We use "goog-*-proto" as the list name for v4, where "proto" indicates +// it's updated (as well as hash completion) via protobuf. +// +// In the mozilla official build, we are allowed to use the +// private phishing list (goog-phish-proto). See Bug 1288840. +static const struct { + const char* mListName; + uint32_t mThreatType; +} THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[] = { + { "goog-malware-proto", MALWARE_THREAT}, // 1 + { "googpub-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2 + { "goog-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3 + { "goog-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING}, // 5 + + // For testing purpose. + { "test-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2 + { "test-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3 +}; + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(uint32_t aThreatType, + nsACString& aListNames) +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) { + if (aThreatType == THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType) { + if (!aListNames.IsEmpty()) { + aListNames.AppendLiteral(","); + } + aListNames += THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName; + } + } + + return aListNames.IsEmpty() ? NS_ERROR_FAILURE : NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertListNameToThreatType(const nsACString& aListName, + uint32_t* aThreatType) +{ + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) { + if (aListName.EqualsASCII(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName)) { + *aThreatType = THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType; + return NS_OK; + } + } + + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProvider(const nsACString& aTableName, + nsACString& aProvider) +{ + MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock); + nsCString* provider = nullptr; + if (mProviderDict.Get(aTableName, &provider)) { + aProvider = provider ? *provider : EmptyCString(); + } else { + aProvider = EmptyCString(); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProtocolVersion(const nsACString& aProvider, + nsACString& aVersion) +{ + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (prefBranch) { + nsPrintfCString prefName("browser.safebrowsing.provider.%s.pver", + nsCString(aProvider).get()); + nsXPIDLCString version; + nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(prefName.get(), getter_Copies(version)); + + aVersion = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) ? version : DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } else { + aVersion = DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeUpdateRequestV4(const char** aListNames, + const char** aStatesBase64, + uint32_t aCount, + nsACString &aRequest) +{ + using namespace mozilla::safebrowsing; + + FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest r; + r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo()); + + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aCount; i++) { + nsCString listName(aListNames[i]); + uint32_t threatType; + nsresult rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(listName, &threatType); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + continue; // Unknown list name. + } + auto lur = r.mutable_list_update_requests()->Add(); + InitListUpdateRequest(static_cast<ThreatType>(threatType), aStatesBase64[i], lur); + } + + // Then serialize. + std::string s; + r.SerializeToString(&s); + + nsCString out; + nsresult rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(), + (const uint8_t*)s.c_str(), + Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include, + out); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + aRequest = out; + + return NS_OK; +} + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// nsIObserver + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsUrlClassifierUtils::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic, + const char16_t *aData) +{ + if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID)) { + MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock); + return ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict); + } + + if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, "xpcom-shutdown-threads")) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); + return prefs->RemoveObserver("browser.safebrowsing", this); + } + + return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; +} + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// non-interface methods + +nsresult +nsUrlClassifierUtils::ReadProvidersFromPrefs(ProviderDictType& aDict) +{ + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "ReadProvidersFromPrefs must be on main thread"); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE); + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch; + nsresult rv = prefs->GetBranch("browser.safebrowsing.provider.", + getter_AddRefs(prefBranch)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // We've got a pref branch for "browser.safebrowsing.provider.". + // Enumerate all children prefs and parse providers. + uint32_t childCount; + char** childArray; + rv = prefBranch->GetChildList("", &childCount, &childArray); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // Collect providers from childArray. + nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> providers; + for (uint32_t i = 0; i < childCount; i++) { + nsCString child(childArray[i]); + auto dotPos = child.FindChar('.'); + if (dotPos < 0) { + continue; + } + + nsDependentCSubstring provider = Substring(child, 0, dotPos); + + providers.PutEntry(provider); + } + NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(childCount, childArray); + + // Now we have all providers. Check which one owns |aTableName|. + // e.g. The owning lists of provider "google" is defined in + // "browser.safebrowsing.provider.google.lists". + for (auto itr = providers.Iter(); !itr.Done(); itr.Next()) { + auto entry = itr.Get(); + nsCString provider(entry->GetKey()); + nsPrintfCString owninListsPref("%s.lists", provider.get()); + + nsXPIDLCString owningLists; + nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(owninListsPref.get(), + getter_Copies(owningLists)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + continue; + } + + // We've got the owning lists (represented as string) of |provider|. + // Build the dictionary for the owning list and the current provider. + nsTArray<nsCString> tables; + Classifier::SplitTables(owningLists, tables); + for (auto tableName : tables) { + aDict.Put(tableName, new nsCString(provider)); + } + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult +nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizeHostname(const nsACString & hostname, + nsACString & _retval) +{ + nsAutoCString unescaped; + if (!NS_UnescapeURL(PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(), + PromiseFlatCString(hostname).Length(), + 0, unescaped)) { + unescaped.Assign(hostname); + } + + nsAutoCString cleaned; + CleanupHostname(unescaped, cleaned); + + nsAutoCString temp; + ParseIPAddress(cleaned, temp); + if (!temp.IsEmpty()) { + cleaned.Assign(temp); + } + + ToLowerCase(cleaned); + SpecialEncode(cleaned, false, _retval); + + return NS_OK; +} + + +nsresult +nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizePath(const nsACString & path, + nsACString & _retval) +{ + _retval.Truncate(); + + nsAutoCString decodedPath(path); + nsAutoCString temp; + while (NS_UnescapeURL(decodedPath.get(), decodedPath.Length(), 0, temp)) { + decodedPath.Assign(temp); + temp.Truncate(); + } + + SpecialEncode(decodedPath, true, _retval); + // XXX: lowercase the path? + + return NS_OK; +} + +void +nsUrlClassifierUtils::CleanupHostname(const nsACString & hostname, + nsACString & _retval) +{ + _retval.Truncate(); + + const char* curChar = hostname.BeginReading(); + const char* end = hostname.EndReading(); + char lastChar = '\0'; + while (curChar != end) { + unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar); + if (c == '.' && (lastChar == '\0' || lastChar == '.')) { + // skip + } else { + _retval.Append(*curChar); + } + lastChar = c; + ++curChar; + } + + // cut off trailing dots + while (_retval.Length() > 0 && _retval[_retval.Length() - 1] == '.') { + _retval.SetLength(_retval.Length() - 1); + } +} + +void +nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseIPAddress(const nsACString & host, + nsACString & _retval) +{ + _retval.Truncate(); + nsACString::const_iterator iter, end; + host.BeginReading(iter); + host.EndReading(end); + + if (host.Length() <= 15) { + // The Windows resolver allows a 4-part dotted decimal IP address to + // have a space followed by any old rubbish, so long as the total length + // of the string doesn't get above 15 characters. So, "10.192.95.89 xy" + // is resolved to 10.192.95.89. + // If the string length is greater than 15 characters, e.g. + // "10.192.95.89 xy.wildcard.example.com", it will be resolved through + // DNS. + + if (FindCharInReadable(' ', iter, end)) { + end = iter; + } + } + + for (host.BeginReading(iter); iter != end; iter++) { + if (!(isxdigit(*iter) || *iter == 'x' || *iter == 'X' || *iter == '.')) { + // not an IP + return; + } + } + + host.BeginReading(iter); + nsTArray<nsCString> parts; + ParseString(PromiseFlatCString(Substring(iter, end)), '.', parts); + if (parts.Length() > 4) { + return; + } + + // If any potentially-octal numbers (start with 0 but not hex) have + // non-octal digits, no part of the ip can be in octal + // XXX: this came from the old javascript implementation, is it really + // supposed to be like this? + bool allowOctal = true; + uint32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) { + const nsCString& part = parts[i]; + if (part[0] == '0') { + for (uint32_t j = 1; j < part.Length(); j++) { + if (part[j] == 'x') { + break; + } + if (part[j] == '8' || part[j] == '9') { + allowOctal = false; + break; + } + } + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) { + nsAutoCString canonical; + + if (i == parts.Length() - 1) { + CanonicalNum(parts[i], 5 - parts.Length(), allowOctal, canonical); + } else { + CanonicalNum(parts[i], 1, allowOctal, canonical); + } + + if (canonical.IsEmpty()) { + _retval.Truncate(); + return; + } + + if (_retval.IsEmpty()) { + _retval.Assign(canonical); + } else { + _retval.Append('.'); + _retval.Append(canonical); + } + } + return; +} + +void +nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalNum(const nsACString& num, + uint32_t bytes, + bool allowOctal, + nsACString& _retval) +{ + _retval.Truncate(); + + if (num.Length() < 1) { + return; + } + + uint32_t val; + if (allowOctal && IsOctal(num)) { + if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%o", &val) != 1) { + return; + } + } else if (IsDecimal(num)) { + if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%u", &val) != 1) { + return; + } + } else if (IsHex(num)) { + if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), num[1] == 'X' ? "0X%x" : "0x%x", + &val) != 1) { + return; + } + } else { + return; + } + + while (bytes--) { + char buf[20]; + SprintfLiteral(buf, "%u", val & 0xff); + if (_retval.IsEmpty()) { + _retval.Assign(buf); + } else { + _retval = nsDependentCString(buf) + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".") + _retval; + } + val >>= 8; + } +} + +// This function will encode all "special" characters in typical url +// encoding, that is %hh where h is a valid hex digit. It will also fold +// any duplicated slashes. +bool +nsUrlClassifierUtils::SpecialEncode(const nsACString & url, + bool foldSlashes, + nsACString & _retval) +{ + bool changed = false; + const char* curChar = url.BeginReading(); + const char* end = url.EndReading(); + + unsigned char lastChar = '\0'; + while (curChar != end) { + unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar); + if (ShouldURLEscape(c)) { + _retval.Append('%'); + _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c / 16)); + _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c % 16)); + + changed = true; + } else if (foldSlashes && (c == '/' && lastChar == '/')) { + // skip + } else { + _retval.Append(*curChar); + } + lastChar = c; + curChar++; + } + return changed; +} + +bool +nsUrlClassifierUtils::ShouldURLEscape(const unsigned char c) const +{ + return c <= 32 || c == '%' || c >=127; +} |