Nuke the sandbox

6 files changed, 0 insertions, 688 deletions

diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a9d01cc5..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
-# vim: set filetype=python:
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-
-SOURCES += [
-    'sandboxBroker.cpp',
-]
-
-EXPORTS += [
-    'sandboxBroker.h',
-]
-
-for var in ('UNICODE', '_UNICODE', 'SANDBOX_EXPORTS'):
-    DEFINES[var] = True
-
-LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
-    '/security/sandbox/chromium',
-]
-
-DISABLE_STL_WRAPPING = True
-
-OS_LIBS += [
-    'dbghelp',
-]
-
-if CONFIG['_MSC_VER']:
-    CXXFLAGS += [
-        '-wd4275', # non dll-interface class exception used as base for dll-interface class
-    ]
-
-FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul'
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index d3aab815f..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,471 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "sandboxBroker.h"
-
-#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
-#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
-#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/security_level.h"
-
-namespace mozilla
-{
-
-sandbox::BrokerServices *SandboxBroker::sBrokerService = nullptr;
-
-static LazyLogModule sSandboxBrokerLog("SandboxBroker");
-
-#define LOG_E(...) MOZ_LOG(sSandboxBrokerLog, LogLevel::Error, (__VA_ARGS__))
-
-/* static */
-void
-SandboxBroker::Initialize(sandbox::BrokerServices* aBrokerServices)
-{
-  sBrokerService = aBrokerServices;
-}
-
-SandboxBroker::SandboxBroker()
-{
-  if (sBrokerService) {
-    mPolicy = sBrokerService->CreatePolicy();
-  } else {
-    mPolicy = nullptr;
-  }
-}
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::LaunchApp(const wchar_t *aPath,
-                         const wchar_t *aArguments,
-                         const bool aEnableLogging,
-                         void **aProcessHandle)
-{
-  if (!sBrokerService || !mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Set stdout and stderr, to allow inheritance for logging.
-  mPolicy->SetStdoutHandle(::GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
-  mPolicy->SetStderrHandle(::GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
-
-  // If logging enabled, set up the policy.
-  if (aEnableLogging) {
-    ApplyLoggingPolicy();
-  }
-
-#if defined(DEBUG)
-  // Allow write access to TEMP directory in debug builds for logging purposes.
-  // The path from GetTempPathW can have a length up to MAX_PATH + 1, including
-  // the null, so we need MAX_PATH + 2, so we can add an * to the end.
-  wchar_t tempPath[MAX_PATH + 2];
-  uint32_t pathLen = ::GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH + 1, tempPath);
-  if (pathLen > 0) {
-    // GetTempPath path ends with \ and returns the length without the null.
-    tempPath[pathLen] = L'*';
-    tempPath[pathLen + 1] = L'\0';
-    mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                     sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, tempPath);
-  }
-#endif
-
-  // Ceate the sandboxed process
-  PROCESS_INFORMATION targetInfo = {0};
-  sandbox::ResultCode result;
-  result = sBrokerService->SpawnTarget(aPath, aArguments, mPolicy, &targetInfo);
-  if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // The sandboxed process is started in a suspended state, resume it now that
-  // we've set things up.
-  ResumeThread(targetInfo.hThread);
-  CloseHandle(targetInfo.hThread);
-
-  // Return the process handle to the caller
-  *aProcessHandle = targetInfo.hProcess;
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-#define SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, message) \
-  do { \
-    MOZ_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result, message); \
-    if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) \
-      return false; \
-  } while (0)
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForPluginProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel)
-{
-  if (!mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  sandbox::JobLevel jobLevel;
-  sandbox::TokenLevel accessTokenLevel;
-  sandbox::IntegrityLevel initialIntegrityLevel;
-  sandbox::IntegrityLevel delayedIntegrityLevel;
-
-  if (aSandboxLevel > 2) {
-    jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED;
-    accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LIMITED;
-    initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
-    delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
-  } else if (aSandboxLevel == 2) {
-    jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED;
-    accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE;
-    initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
-    delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
-  } else {
-    jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_NONE;
-    accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_NON_ADMIN;
-    initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM;
-    delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM;
-  }
-
-  sandbox::ResultCode result = mPolicy->SetJobLevel(jobLevel,
-                                                    0 /* ui_exceptions */);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Setting job level failed, have you set memory limit when jobLevel == JOB_NONE?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
-                                  accessTokenLevel);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Lockdown level cannot be USER_UNPROTECTED or USER_LAST if initial level was USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS");
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(initialIntegrityLevel);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(delayedIntegrityLevel);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "SetDelayedIntegrityLevel should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP;
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
-
-  // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
-  // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
-  // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // The NPAPI process needs to be able to duplicate shared memory to the
-  // content process and broker process, which are Section type handles.
-  // Content and broker are for e10s and non-e10s cases.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
-                            L"Section");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER,
-                            L"Section");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // The following is required for the Java plugin.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"\\??\\pipe\\jpi2_pid*_pipe*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // These register keys are used by the file-browser dialog box.  They
-  // remember the most-recently-used folders.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ComDlg32\\OpenSavePidlMRU\\*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ComDlg32\\LastVisitedPidlMRULegacy\\*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel)
-{
-  if (!mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  auto result = mPolicy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "SetJobLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
-  auto level = (aLevel == Restricted) ?
-    sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED : sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN;
-  result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, level);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "SetTokenLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Failed to create alternate desktop for sandbox.");
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
-  MOZ_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
-             "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
-
-  result =
-    mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
-
-  sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP;
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
-
-  mitigations =
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
-    sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
-
-  result = mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
-
-  // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
-  // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
-  // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-  // The plugin process can't create named events, but we'll
-  // make an exception for the events used in logging. Removing
-  // this will break EME in debug builds.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY,
-                            L"ChromeIPCLog.*");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-#endif
-
-  // The following rules were added because, during analysis of an EME
-  // plugin during development, these registry keys were accessed when
-  // loading the plugin. Commenting out these policy exceptions caused
-  // plugin loading to fail, so they are necessary for proper functioning
-  // of at least one EME plugin.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\LanguageConfiguration");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SideBySide");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-
-  // The following rules were added because, during analysis of an EME
-  // plugin during development, these registry keys were accessed when
-  // loading the plugin. Commenting out these policy exceptions did not
-  // cause anything to break during initial testing, but might cause
-  // unforeseen issues down the road.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\MUI\\Settings");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Control Panel\\Desktop");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\PreferredUILanguages");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SideBySide\\PreferExternalManifest");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-  // The following rules were added to allow a GMP to be loaded when any
-  // AppLocker DLL rules are specified. If the rules specifically block the DLL
-  // then it will not load.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"\\Device\\SrpDevice");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Srp\\GP\\");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-  // On certain Windows versions there is a double slash before GP in the path.
-  result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                            L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Srp\\\\GP\\");
-  SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
-                         "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
-
-
-  return true;
-}
-#undef SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::AllowReadFile(wchar_t const *file)
-{
-  if (!mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  auto result =
-    mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                     sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                     file);
-  if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
-    LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add read access to: %S", result, file);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::AllowReadWriteFile(wchar_t const *file)
-{
-  if (!mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  auto result =
-    mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                     sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                     file);
-  if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
-    LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add read/write access to: %S",
-          result, file);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::AllowDirectory(wchar_t const *dir)
-{
-  if (!mPolicy) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  auto result =
-    mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
-                     sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY,
-                     dir);
-  if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
-    LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add directory access to: %S", result, dir);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool
-SandboxBroker::AddTargetPeer(HANDLE aPeerProcess)
-{
-  if (!sBrokerService) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  sandbox::ResultCode result = sBrokerService->AddTargetPeer(aPeerProcess);
-  return (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result);
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::ApplyLoggingPolicy()
-{
-  MOZ_ASSERT(mPolicy);
-
-  // Add dummy rules, so that we can log in the interception code.
-  // We already have a file interception set up for the client side of pipes.
-  // Also, passing just "dummy" for file system policy causes win_utils.cc
-  // IsReparsePoint() to loop.
-  mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
-                  sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, L"dummy");
-  mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
-                  sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, L"dummy");
-  mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
-                  sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
-                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\dummy");
-  mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC,
-                  sandbox::TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, L"dummy");
-  mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
-                  sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, L"dummy");
-}
-
-SandboxBroker::~SandboxBroker()
-{
-  if (mPolicy) {
-    mPolicy->Release();
-    mPolicy = nullptr;
-  }
-}
-
-}
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f1f1597f..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#ifndef __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXBROKER_H__
-#define __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXBROKER_H__
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <windows.h>
-
-namespace sandbox {
-  class BrokerServices;
-  class TargetPolicy;
-}
-
-namespace mozilla {
-
-class SandboxBroker
-{
-public:
-  SandboxBroker();
-
-  static void Initialize(sandbox::BrokerServices* aBrokerServices);
-
-  bool LaunchApp(const wchar_t *aPath,
-                 const wchar_t *aArguments,
-                 const bool aEnableLogging,
-                 void **aProcessHandle);
-  virtual ~SandboxBroker();
-
-  // Security levels for different types of processes
-  bool SetSecurityLevelForPluginProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel);
-  enum SandboxLevel {
-    LockDown,
-    Restricted
-  };
-  bool SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel);
-
-  // File system permissions
-  bool AllowReadFile(wchar_t const *file);
-  bool AllowReadWriteFile(wchar_t const *file);
-  bool AllowDirectory(wchar_t const *dir);
-
-  // Exposes AddTargetPeer from broker services, so that none sandboxed
-  // processes can be added as handle duplication targets.
-  bool AddTargetPeer(HANDLE aPeerProcess);
-
-  // Set up dummy interceptions via the broker, so we can log calls.
-  void ApplyLoggingPolicy();
-
-private:
-  static sandbox::BrokerServices *sBrokerService;
-  sandbox::TargetPolicy *mPolicy;
-};
-
-} // mozilla
-
-#endif
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/moz.build b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/moz.build
deleted file mode 100644
index 7315a34ed..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/moz.build
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
-# vim: set filetype=python:
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-
-EXPORTS.mozilla += [
-    'sandboxTarget.h',
-]
-
-SOURCES += [
-    'sandboxTarget.cpp',
-]
-
-LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
-    '/security/sandbox/chromium',
-    '/security/sandbox/chromium-shim',
-]
-
-FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul'
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.cpp b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index a989b3625..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#define TARGET_SANDBOX_EXPORTS
-#include "sandboxTarget.h"
-
-namespace mozilla {
-
-// We need to define this function out of line so that clang-cl doesn't inline
-// it.
-/* static */ SandboxTarget*
-SandboxTarget::Instance()
-{
-  static SandboxTarget sb;
-  return &sb;
-}
-
-}
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.h b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f46a2ce70..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxtarget/sandboxTarget.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#ifndef __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXTARGET_H__
-#define __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXTARGET_H__
-
-#include <windows.h>
-
-#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
-#include "base/MissingBasicTypes.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
-
-namespace mozilla {
-
-class SandboxTarget
-{
-public:
-  /**
-   * Obtains a pointer to the singleton instance
-   */
-  static SandboxTarget* Instance();
-
-  /**
-   * Used by the application to pass in the target services that provide certain
-   * functions to the sandboxed code.
-   * The target services must already be initialized.
-   *
-   * @param aTargetServices The target services that will be used
-   */
-  void SetTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* aTargetServices)
-  {
-    MOZ_ASSERT(aTargetServices);
-    MOZ_ASSERT(!mTargetServices,
-               "Sandbox TargetServices must only be set once.");
-
-    mTargetServices = aTargetServices;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Called by the library that wants to "start" the sandbox, i.e. change to the
-   * more secure delayed / lockdown policy.
-   */
-  void StartSandbox()
-  {
-    if (mTargetServices) {
-      mTargetServices->LowerToken();
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Used to duplicate handles via the broker process. The permission for the
-   * handle type and target process has to have been set on the sandbox policy.
-   */
-  bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE aSourceHandle, DWORD aTargetProcessId,
-                             HANDLE* aTargetHandle, DWORD aDesiredAccess,
-                             DWORD aOptions)
-  {
-    if (!mTargetServices) {
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    sandbox::ResultCode result =
-      mTargetServices->DuplicateHandle(aSourceHandle, aTargetProcessId,
-                                       aTargetHandle, aDesiredAccess, aOptions);
-    return (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result);
-  }
-
-protected:
-  SandboxTarget() :
-    mTargetServices(nullptr)
-  {
-  }
-
-  sandbox::TargetServices* mTargetServices;
-};
-
-
-} // mozilla
-
-#endif