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authorMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
committerMatt A. Tobin <mattatobin@localhost.localdomain>2018-02-02 04:16:08 -0500
commit5f8de423f190bbb79a62f804151bc24824fa32d8 (patch)
tree10027f336435511475e392454359edea8e25895d /security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js
parent49ee0794b5d912db1f95dce6eb52d781dc210db5 (diff)
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Add m-esr52 at 52.6.0
Diffstat (limited to 'security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js')
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1 files changed, 223 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js
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+/* Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+ * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */
+
+var prefs = Cc["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"]
+ .getService(Ci.nsIPrefBranch);
+
+Services.scriptloader.loadSubScript("chrome://mochitests/content/browser/" +
+ "security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_utils.js", this);
+
+/*
+ * This test is for executing system calls in content processes to validate
+ * that calls that are meant to be blocked by content sandboxing are blocked.
+ * We use the term system calls loosely so that any OS API call such as
+ * fopen could be included.
+ */
+
+// Calls the native execv library function. Include imports so this can be
+// safely serialized and run remotely by ContentTask.spawn.
+function callExec(args) {
+ Components.utils.import("resource://gre/modules/ctypes.jsm");
+ let {lib, cmd} = args;
+ let libc = ctypes.open(lib);
+ let exec = libc.declare("execv", ctypes.default_abi,
+ ctypes.int, ctypes.char.ptr);
+ let rv = exec(cmd);
+ libc.close();
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+// Calls the native fork syscall.
+function callFork(args) {
+ Components.utils.import("resource://gre/modules/ctypes.jsm");
+ let {lib} = args;
+ let libc = ctypes.open(lib);
+ let fork = libc.declare("fork", ctypes.default_abi, ctypes.int);
+ let rv = fork();
+ libc.close();
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+// Calls the native open/close syscalls.
+function callOpen(args) {
+ Components.utils.import("resource://gre/modules/ctypes.jsm");
+ let {lib, path, flags} = args;
+ let libc = ctypes.open(lib);
+ let open = libc.declare("open", ctypes.default_abi,
+ ctypes.int, ctypes.char.ptr, ctypes.int);
+ let close = libc.declare("close", ctypes.default_abi,
+ ctypes.int, ctypes.int);
+ let fd = open(path, flags);
+ close(fd);
+ libc.close();
+ return (fd);
+}
+
+// open syscall flags
+function openWriteCreateFlags() {
+ Assert.ok(isMac() || isLinux());
+ if (isMac()) {
+ let O_WRONLY = 0x001;
+ let O_CREAT = 0x200;
+ return (O_WRONLY | O_CREAT);
+ } else {
+ // Linux
+ let O_WRONLY = 0x01;
+ let O_CREAT = 0x40;
+ return (O_WRONLY | O_CREAT);
+ }
+}
+
+// Returns the name of the native library needed for native syscalls
+function getOSLib() {
+ switch (Services.appinfo.OS) {
+ case "WINNT":
+ return "kernel32.dll";
+ case "Darwin":
+ return "libc.dylib";
+ case "Linux":
+ return "libc.so.6";
+ default:
+ Assert.ok(false, "Unknown OS");
+ }
+}
+
+// Returns a harmless command to execute with execv
+function getOSExecCmd() {
+ Assert.ok(!isWin());
+ return ("/bin/cat");
+}
+
+// Returns true if the current content sandbox level, passed in
+// the |level| argument, supports syscall sandboxing.
+function areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level) {
+ let syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 0;
+
+ // Set syscallsSandboxMinLevel to the lowest level that has
+ // syscall sandboxing enabled. For now, this varies across
+ // Windows, Mac, Linux, other.
+ switch (Services.appinfo.OS) {
+ case "WINNT":
+ syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1;
+ break;
+ case "Darwin":
+ syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1;
+ break;
+ case "Linux":
+ syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ Assert.ok(false, "Unknown OS");
+ }
+
+ return (level >= syscallsSandboxMinLevel);
+}
+
+//
+// Drive tests for a single content process.
+//
+// Tests executing OS API calls in the content process. Limited to Mac
+// and Linux calls for now.
+//
+add_task(function*() {
+ // This test is only relevant in e10s
+ if (!gMultiProcessBrowser) {
+ ok(false, "e10s is enabled");
+ info("e10s is not enabled, exiting");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ let level = 0;
+ let prefExists = true;
+
+ // Read the security.sandbox.content.level pref.
+ // If the pref isn't set and we're running on Linux on !isNightly(),
+ // exit without failing. The Linux content sandbox is only enabled
+ // on Nightly at this time.
+ try {
+ level = prefs.getIntPref("security.sandbox.content.level");
+ } catch (e) {
+ prefExists = false;
+ }
+
+ // Special case Linux on !isNightly
+ if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) {
+ todo(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists");
+ if (!prefExists) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists");
+ if (!prefExists) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Special case Linux on !isNightly
+ if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) {
+ todo(level > 0, "content sandbox enabled for !nightly.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ info(`security.sandbox.content.level=${level}`);
+ ok(level > 0, "content sandbox is enabled.");
+ if (level == 0) {
+ info("content sandbox is not enabled, exiting");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ let areSyscallsSandboxed = areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level);
+
+ // Special case Linux on !isNightly
+ if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) {
+ todo(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandbox enabled for !nightly.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Content sandbox enabled, but level doesn't include syscall sandboxing.
+ ok(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandboxing is enabled.");
+ if (!areSyscallsSandboxed) {
+ info("content sandbox level too low for syscall tests, exiting\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ let browser = gBrowser.selectedBrowser;
+ let lib = getOSLib();
+
+ // use execv syscall
+ // (causes content process to be killed on Linux)
+ if (isMac()) {
+ // exec something harmless, this should fail
+ let cmd = getOSExecCmd();
+ let rv = yield ContentTask.spawn(browser, {lib, cmd}, callExec);
+ ok(rv == -1, `exec(${cmd}) is not permitted`);
+ }
+
+ // use open syscall
+ if (isLinux() || isMac())
+ {
+ // open a file for writing in $HOME, this should fail
+ let path = fileInHomeDir().path;
+ let flags = openWriteCreateFlags();
+ let fd = yield ContentTask.spawn(browser, {lib, path, flags}, callOpen);
+ ok(fd < 0, "opening a file for writing in home is not permitted");
+ }
+
+ // use open syscall
+ if (isLinux() || isMac())
+ {
+ // open a file for writing in the content temp dir, this should work
+ // and the open handler in the content process closes the file for us
+ let path = fileInTempDir().path;
+ let flags = openWriteCreateFlags();
+ let fd = yield ContentTask.spawn(browser, {lib, path, flags}, callOpen);
+ ok(fd >= 0, "opening a file for writing in content temp is permitted");
+ }
+
+ // use fork syscall
+ if (isLinux() || isMac())
+ {
+ let rv = yield ContentTask.spawn(browser, {lib}, callFork);
+ ok(rv == -1, "calling fork is not permitted");
+ }
+});