Nuke the sandbox

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 731 deletions

diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index a31d1fc66..000000000
--- a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,731 +0,0 @@
-/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
-/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
- * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-
-#include "SandboxBroker.h"
-#include "SandboxInfo.h"
-#include "SandboxLogging.h"
-#include "SandboxBrokerUtils.h"
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifdef XP_LINUX
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_GONK
-#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
-#include "mozilla/DebugOnly.h"
-#include "mozilla/Move.h"
-#include "mozilla/NullPtr.h"
-#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
-#include "mozilla/ipc/FileDescriptor.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h"
-
-namespace mozilla {
-
-// This constructor signals failure by setting mFileDesc and aClientFd to -1.
-SandboxBroker::SandboxBroker(UniquePtr<const Policy> aPolicy, int aChildPid,
-                             int& aClientFd)
-  : mChildPid(aChildPid), mPolicy(Move(aPolicy))
-{
-  int fds[2];
-  if (0 != socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, fds)) {
-    SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("SandboxBroker: socketpair failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-    mFileDesc = -1;
-    aClientFd = -1;
-    return;
-  }
-  mFileDesc = fds[0];
-  aClientFd = fds[1];
-
-  if (!PlatformThread::Create(0, this, &mThread)) {
-    SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("SandboxBroker: thread creation failed: %s",
-                      strerror(errno));
-    close(mFileDesc);
-    close(aClientFd);
-    mFileDesc = -1;
-    aClientFd = -1;
-  }
-}
-
-UniquePtr<SandboxBroker>
-SandboxBroker::Create(UniquePtr<const Policy> aPolicy, int aChildPid,
-                      ipc::FileDescriptor& aClientFdOut)
-{
-  int clientFd;
-  // Can't use MakeUnique here because the constructor is private.
-  UniquePtr<SandboxBroker> rv(new SandboxBroker(Move(aPolicy), aChildPid,
-                                                clientFd));
-  if (clientFd < 0) {
-    rv = nullptr;
-  } else {
-    aClientFdOut = ipc::FileDescriptor(clientFd);
-  }
-  return Move(rv);
-}
-
-SandboxBroker::~SandboxBroker() {
-  // If the constructor failed, there's nothing to be done here.
-  if (mFileDesc < 0) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  shutdown(mFileDesc, SHUT_RD);
-  // The thread will now get EOF even if the client hasn't exited.
-  PlatformThread::Join(mThread);
-  // Now that the thread has exited, the fd will no longer be accessed.
-  close(mFileDesc);
-  // Having ensured that this object outlives the thread, this
-  // destructor can now return.
-}
-
-SandboxBroker::Policy::Policy() { }
-SandboxBroker::Policy::~Policy() { }
-
-SandboxBroker::Policy::Policy(const Policy& aOther) {
-  for (auto iter = aOther.mMap.ConstIter(); !iter.Done(); iter.Next()) {
-    mMap.Put(iter.Key(), iter.Data());
-  }
-}
-
-// Chromium
-// sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_file_permission.cc
-// Async signal safe
-bool
-SandboxBroker::Policy::ValidatePath(const char* path) const {
-  if (!path)
-    return false;
-
-  const size_t len = strlen(path);
-  // No empty paths
-  if (len == 0)
-    return false;
-  // Paths must be absolute and not relative
-  if (path[0] != '/')
-    return false;
-  // No trailing / (but "/" is valid)
-  if (len > 1 && path[len - 1] == '/')
-    return false;
-  // No trailing /.
-  if (len >= 2 && path[len - 2] == '/' && path[len - 1] == '.')
-    return false;
-  // No trailing /..
-  if (len >= 3 && path[len - 3] == '/' && path[len - 2] == '.' &&
-      path[len - 1] == '.')
-    return false;
-  // No /../ anywhere
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-    if (path[i] == '/' && (len - i) > 3) {
-      if (path[i + 1] == '.' && path[i + 2] == '.' && path[i + 3] == '/') {
-        return false;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::Policy::AddPath(int aPerms, const char* aPath,
-                               AddCondition aCond)
-{
-  nsDependentCString path(aPath);
-  MOZ_ASSERT(path.Length() <= kMaxPathLen);
-  int perms;
-  if (aCond == AddIfExistsNow) {
-    struct stat statBuf;
-    if (lstat(aPath, &statBuf) != 0) {
-      return;
-    }
-  }
-  if (!mMap.Get(path, &perms)) {
-    perms = MAY_ACCESS;
-  } else {
-    MOZ_ASSERT(perms & MAY_ACCESS);
-  }
-  if (SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kVerbose)) {
-    SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("policy for %s: %d -> %d", aPath, perms, perms | aPerms);
-  }
-  perms |= aPerms;
-  mMap.Put(path, perms);
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::Policy::AddTree(int aPerms, const char* aPath)
-{
-  struct stat statBuf;
-
-  if (stat(aPath, &statBuf) != 0) {
-    return;
-  }
-  if (!S_ISDIR(statBuf.st_mode)) {
-    AddPath(aPerms, aPath, AddAlways);
-  } else {
-    DIR* dirp = opendir(aPath);
-    if (!dirp) {
-      return;
-    }
-    while (struct dirent* de = readdir(dirp)) {
-      if (strcmp(de->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(de->d_name, "..") == 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      // Note: could optimize the string handling.
-      nsAutoCString subPath;
-      subPath.Assign(aPath);
-      subPath.Append('/');
-      subPath.Append(de->d_name);
-      AddTree(aPerms, subPath.get());
-    }
-    closedir(dirp);
-  }
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::Policy::AddDir(int aPerms, const char* aPath)
-{
-  struct stat statBuf;
-
-  if (stat(aPath, &statBuf) != 0) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  if (!S_ISDIR(statBuf.st_mode)) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  nsDependentCString path(aPath);
-  MOZ_ASSERT(path.Length() <= kMaxPathLen - 1);
-  // Enforce trailing / on aPath
-  if (path[path.Length() - 1] != '/') {
-    path.Append('/');
-  }
-  int origPerms;
-  if (!mMap.Get(path, &origPerms)) {
-    origPerms = MAY_ACCESS;
-  } else {
-    MOZ_ASSERT(origPerms & MAY_ACCESS);
-  }
-  int newPerms = origPerms | aPerms | RECURSIVE;
-  if (SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kVerbose)) {
-    SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("policy for %s: %d -> %d", aPath, origPerms, newPerms);
-  }
-  mMap.Put(path, newPerms);
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::Policy::AddPrefix(int aPerms, const char* aDir,
-                                 const char* aPrefix)
-{
-  size_t prefixLen = strlen(aPrefix);
-  DIR* dirp = opendir(aDir);
-  struct dirent* de;
-  if (!dirp) {
-    return;
-  }
-  while ((de = readdir(dirp))) {
-    if (strncmp(de->d_name, aPrefix, prefixLen) == 0) {
-      nsAutoCString subPath;
-      subPath.Assign(aDir);
-      subPath.Append('/');
-      subPath.Append(de->d_name);
-      AddPath(aPerms, subPath.get(), AddAlways);
-    }
-  }
-  closedir(dirp);
-}
-
-int
-SandboxBroker::Policy::Lookup(const nsACString& aPath) const
-{
-  // Early exit for paths explicitly found in the
-  // whitelist.
-  // This means they will not gain extra permissions
-  // from recursive paths.
-  int perms = mMap.Get(aPath);
-  if (perms) {
-    return perms;
-  }
-
-  // Not a legally constructed path
-  if (!ValidatePath(PromiseFlatCString(aPath).get()))
-    return 0;
-
-  // Now it's either an illegal access, or a recursive
-  // directory permission. We'll have to check the entire
-  // whitelist for the best match (slower).
-  int allPerms = 0;
-  for (auto iter = mMap.ConstIter(); !iter.Done(); iter.Next()) {
-    const nsACString& whiteListPath = iter.Key();
-    const int& perms = iter.Data();
-
-    if (!(perms & RECURSIVE))
-      continue;
-
-    // passed part starts with something on the whitelist
-    if (StringBeginsWith(aPath, whiteListPath)) {
-      allPerms |= perms;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Strip away the RECURSIVE flag as it doesn't
-  // necessarily apply to aPath.
-  return allPerms & ~RECURSIVE;
-}
-
-static bool
-AllowOperation(int aReqFlags, int aPerms)
-{
-  int needed = 0;
-  if (aReqFlags & R_OK) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_READ;
-  }
-  if (aReqFlags & W_OK) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE;
-  }
-  // We don't really allow executing anything,
-  // so in true unix tradition we hijack this
-  // for directories.
-  if (aReqFlags & X_OK) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_CREATE;
-  }
-  return (aPerms & needed) == needed;
-}
-
-static bool
-AllowAccess(int aReqFlags, int aPerms)
-{
-  if (aReqFlags & ~(R_OK|W_OK|F_OK)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  int needed = 0;
-  if (aReqFlags & R_OK) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_READ;
-  }
-  if (aReqFlags & W_OK) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE;
-  }
-  return (aPerms & needed) == needed;
-}
-
-// These flags are added to all opens to prevent possible side-effects
-// on this process.  These shouldn't be relevant to the child process
-// in any case due to the sandboxing restrictions on it.  (See also
-// the use of MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC in SandboxBrokerCommon.cpp).
-static const int kRequiredOpenFlags = O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY;
-
-// Linux originally assigned a flag bit to O_SYNC but implemented the
-// semantics standardized as O_DSYNC; later, that bit was renamed and
-// a new bit was assigned to the full O_SYNC, and O_SYNC was redefined
-// to be both bits.  As a result, this #define is needed to compensate
-// for outdated kernel headers like Android's.
-#define O_SYNC_NEW 04010000
-static const int kAllowedOpenFlags =
-  O_APPEND | O_ASYNC | O_DIRECT | O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL | O_LARGEFILE
-  | O_NOATIME | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | O_SYNC_NEW
-  | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC | O_CREAT;
-#undef O_SYNC_NEW
-
-static bool
-AllowOpen(int aReqFlags, int aPerms)
-{
-  if (aReqFlags & ~O_ACCMODE & ~kAllowedOpenFlags) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  int needed;
-  switch(aReqFlags & O_ACCMODE) {
-  case O_RDONLY:
-    needed = SandboxBroker::MAY_READ;
-    break;
-  case O_WRONLY:
-    needed = SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE;
-    break;
-  case O_RDWR:
-    needed = SandboxBroker::MAY_READ | SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE;
-    break;
-  default:
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (aReqFlags & O_CREAT) {
-    needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_CREATE;
-  }
-  return (aPerms & needed) == needed;
-}
-
-static int
-DoStat(const char* aPath, void* aBuff, int aFlags)
-{
- if (aFlags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
-    return lstatsyscall(aPath, (statstruct*)aBuff);
-  }
-  return statsyscall(aPath, (statstruct*)aBuff);
-}
-
-static int
-DoLink(const char* aPath, const char* aPath2,
-       SandboxBrokerCommon::Operation aOper)
-{
-  if (aOper == SandboxBrokerCommon::Operation::SANDBOX_FILE_LINK) {
-    return link(aPath, aPath2);
-  } else if (aOper == SandboxBrokerCommon::Operation::SANDBOX_FILE_SYMLINK) {
-    return symlink(aPath, aPath2);
-  }
-  MOZ_CRASH("SandboxBroker: Unknown link operation");
-}
-
-size_t
-SandboxBroker::ConvertToRealPath(char* aPath, size_t aBufSize, size_t aPathLen)
-{
-  if (strstr(aPath, "..") != NULL) {
-    char* result = realpath(aPath, NULL);
-    if (result != NULL) {
-      strncpy(aPath, result, aBufSize);
-      aPath[aBufSize - 1] = '\0';
-      free(result);
-      // Size changed, but guaranteed to be 0 terminated
-      aPathLen = strlen(aPath);
-    }
-    // ValidatePath will handle failure to translate
-  }
-  return aPathLen;
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::ThreadMain(void)
-{
-  char threadName[16];
-  SprintfLiteral(threadName, "FS Broker %d", mChildPid);
-  PlatformThread::SetName(threadName);
-
-  // Permissive mode can only be enabled through an environment variable,
-  // therefore it is sufficient to fetch the value once
-  // before the main thread loop starts
-  bool permissive = SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kPermissive);
-
-#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_GONK
-#ifdef __NR_setreuid32
-  static const long nr_setreuid = __NR_setreuid32;
-  static const long nr_setregid = __NR_setregid32;
-#else
-  static const long nr_setreuid = __NR_setreuid;
-  static const long nr_setregid = __NR_setregid;
-#endif
-  if (syscall(nr_setregid, getgid(), AID_APP + mChildPid) != 0 ||
-      syscall(nr_setreuid, getuid(), AID_APP + mChildPid) != 0) {
-    MOZ_CRASH("SandboxBroker: failed to drop privileges");
-  }
-#endif
-
-  while (true) {
-    struct iovec ios[2];
-    // We will receive the path strings in 1 buffer and split them back up.
-    char recvBuf[2 * (kMaxPathLen + 1)];
-    char pathBuf[kMaxPathLen + 1];
-    char pathBuf2[kMaxPathLen + 1];
-    size_t pathLen;
-    size_t pathLen2;
-    char respBuf[kMaxPathLen + 1]; // Also serves as struct stat
-    Request req;
-    Response resp;
-    int respfd;
-
-    // Make sure stat responses fit in the response buffer
-    MOZ_ASSERT((kMaxPathLen + 1) > sizeof(struct stat));
-
-    // This makes our string handling below a bit less error prone.
-    memset(recvBuf, 0, sizeof(recvBuf));
-
-    ios[0].iov_base = &req;
-    ios[0].iov_len = sizeof(req);
-    ios[1].iov_base = recvBuf;
-    ios[1].iov_len = sizeof(recvBuf);
-
-    const ssize_t recvd = RecvWithFd(mFileDesc, ios, 2, &respfd);
-    if (recvd == 0) {
-      if (SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kVerbose)) {
-        SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("EOF from pid %d", mChildPid);
-      }
-      break;
-    }
-    // It could be possible to continue after errors and short reads,
-    // at least in some cases, but protocol violation indicates a
-    // hostile client, so terminate the broker instead.
-    if (recvd < 0) {
-      SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("bad read from pid %d: %s",
-                        mChildPid, strerror(errno));
-      shutdown(mFileDesc, SHUT_RD);
-      break;
-    }
-    if (recvd < static_cast<ssize_t>(sizeof(req))) {
-      SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("bad read from pid %d (%d < %d)",
-                        mChildPid, recvd, sizeof(req));
-      shutdown(mFileDesc, SHUT_RD);
-      break;
-    }
-    if (respfd == -1) {
-      SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("no response fd from pid %d", mChildPid);
-      shutdown(mFileDesc, SHUT_RD);
-      break;
-    }
-
-    // Initialize the response with the default failure.
-    memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
-    memset(&respBuf, 0, sizeof(respBuf));
-    resp.mError = -EACCES;
-    ios[0].iov_base = &resp;
-    ios[0].iov_len = sizeof(resp);
-    ios[1].iov_base = nullptr;
-    ios[1].iov_len = 0;
-    int openedFd = -1;
-
-    // Clear permissions
-    int perms;
-
-    // Find end of first string, make sure the buffer is still
-    // 0 terminated.
-    size_t recvBufLen = static_cast<size_t>(recvd) - sizeof(req);
-    if (recvBufLen > 0 && recvBuf[recvBufLen - 1] != 0) {
-      SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("corrupted path buffer from pid %d", mChildPid);
-      shutdown(mFileDesc, SHUT_RD);
-      break;
-    }
-
-    // First path should fit in maximum path length buffer.
-    size_t first_len = strlen(recvBuf);
-    if (first_len <= kMaxPathLen) {
-      strcpy(pathBuf, recvBuf);
-      // Skip right over the terminating 0, and try to copy in the
-      // second path, if any. If there's no path, this will hit a
-      // 0 immediately (we nulled the buffer before receiving).
-      // We do not assume the second path is 0-terminated, this is
-      // enforced below.
-      strncpy(pathBuf2, recvBuf + first_len + 1, kMaxPathLen + 1);
-
-      // First string is guaranteed to be 0-terminated.
-      pathLen = first_len;
-
-      // Look up the first pathname but first translate relative paths.
-      pathLen = ConvertToRealPath(pathBuf, sizeof(pathBuf), pathLen);
-      perms = mPolicy->Lookup(nsDependentCString(pathBuf, pathLen));
-
-      // Same for the second path.
-      pathLen2 = strnlen(pathBuf2, kMaxPathLen);
-      if (pathLen2 > 0) {
-        // Force 0 termination.
-        pathBuf2[pathLen2] = '\0';
-        pathLen2 = ConvertToRealPath(pathBuf2, sizeof(pathBuf2), pathLen2);
-        int perms2 = mPolicy->Lookup(nsDependentCString(pathBuf2, pathLen2));
-
-        // Take the intersection of the permissions for both paths.
-        perms &= perms2;
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Failed to receive intelligible paths.
-      perms = 0;
-    }
-
-    // And now perform the operation if allowed.
-    if (perms & CRASH_INSTEAD) {
-      // This is somewhat nonmodular, but it works.
-      resp.mError = -ENOSYS;
-    } else if (permissive || perms & MAY_ACCESS) {
-      // If the operation was only allowed because of permissive mode, log it.
-      if (permissive && !(perms & MAY_ACCESS)) {
-        AuditPermissive(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-      }
-
-      switch(req.mOp) {
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_OPEN:
-        if (permissive || AllowOpen(req.mFlags, perms)) {
-          // Permissions for O_CREAT hardwired to 0600; if that's
-          // ever a problem we can change the protocol (but really we
-          // should be trying to remove uses of MAY_CREATE, not add
-          // new ones).
-          openedFd = open(pathBuf, req.mFlags | kRequiredOpenFlags, 0600);
-          if (openedFd >= 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_ACCESS:
-        if (permissive || AllowAccess(req.mFlags, perms)) {
-          // This can't use access() itself because that uses the ruid
-          // and not the euid.  In theory faccessat() with AT_EACCESS
-          // would work, but Linux doesn't actually implement the
-          // flags != 0 case; glibc has a hack which doesn't even work
-          // in this case so it'll ignore the flag, and Bionic just
-          // passes through the syscall and always ignores the flags.
-          //
-          // Instead, because we've already checked the requested
-          // r/w/x bits against the policy, just return success if the
-          // file exists and hope that's close enough.
-          if (stat(pathBuf, (struct stat*)&respBuf) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_STAT:
-        if (DoStat(pathBuf, (struct stat*)&respBuf, req.mFlags) == 0) {
-          resp.mError = 0;
-          ios[1].iov_base = &respBuf;
-          ios[1].iov_len = req.mBufSize;
-        } else {
-          resp.mError = -errno;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_CHMOD:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK, perms)) {
-          if (chmod(pathBuf, req.mFlags) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_LINK:
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_SYMLINK:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK, perms)) {
-          if (DoLink(pathBuf, pathBuf2, req.mOp) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_RENAME:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK, perms)) {
-          if (rename(pathBuf, pathBuf2) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_MKDIR:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK | X_OK, perms)) {
-          if (mkdir(pathBuf, req.mFlags) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_UNLINK:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK, perms)) {
-          if (unlink(pathBuf) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_RMDIR:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(W_OK | X_OK, perms)) {
-          if (rmdir(pathBuf) == 0) {
-            resp.mError = 0;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SANDBOX_FILE_READLINK:
-        if (permissive || AllowOperation(R_OK, perms)) {
-          ssize_t respSize = readlink(pathBuf, (char*)&respBuf, sizeof(respBuf));
-          if (respSize >= 0) {
-            resp.mError = respSize;
-            ios[1].iov_base = &respBuf;
-            ios[1].iov_len = respSize;
-          } else {
-            resp.mError = -errno;
-          }
-        } else {
-          AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-        }
-        break;
-      }
-    } else {
-      MOZ_ASSERT(perms == 0);
-      AuditDenial(req.mOp, req.mFlags, perms, pathBuf);
-    }
-
-    const size_t numIO = ios[1].iov_len > 0 ? 2 : 1;
-    DebugOnly<const ssize_t> sent = SendWithFd(respfd, ios, numIO, openedFd);
-    close(respfd);
-    MOZ_ASSERT(sent < 0 ||
-               static_cast<size_t>(sent) == ios[0].iov_len + ios[1].iov_len);
-
-    if (openedFd >= 0) {
-      close(openedFd);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::AuditPermissive(int aOp, int aFlags, int aPerms, const char* aPath)
-{
-  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kPermissive));
-
-  struct stat statBuf;
-
-  if (lstat(aPath, &statBuf) == 0) {
-    // Path exists, set errno to 0 to indicate "success".
-    errno = 0;
-  }
-
-  SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("SandboxBroker: would have denied op=%d rflags=%o perms=%d path=%s for pid=%d" \
-                    " permissive=1 error=\"%s\"", aOp, aFlags, aPerms,
-                    aPath, mChildPid, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-SandboxBroker::AuditDenial(int aOp, int aFlags, int aPerms, const char* aPath)
-{
-  if (SandboxInfo::Get().Test(SandboxInfo::kVerbose)) {
-    SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("SandboxBroker: denied op=%d rflags=%o perms=%d path=%s for pid=%d" \
-                      " error=\"%s\"", aOp, aFlags, aPerms, aPath, mChildPid,
-                      strerror(errno));
-  }
-}
-
-
-} // namespace mozilla