Update NSS to 3.35-RTM

1 files changed, 273 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26c3eb546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * Handling of cipher specs.
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+
+/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher.
+ *
+ * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than
+ * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the
+ * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only
+ * rarely hit this limit.  See bug 1268745 for details.
+ */
+#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX  /* 2^48-1 */
+#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */
+#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20)    /* For weak ciphers. */
+/* clang-format off */
+static const ssl3BulkCipherDef ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[] = {
+    /*                                        |--------- Lengths ---------| */
+    /* cipher             calg                :  s                        : */
+    /*                                        :  e                  b     n */
+    /* oid                short_name mr       :  c                  l     o */
+    /*                                        k  r                  o  t  n */
+    /*                                        e  e               i  c  a  c */
+    /*                                        y  t  type         v  k  g  e */
+    {cipher_null,         ssl_calg_null,      0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX},
+    {cipher_rc4,          ssl_calg_rc4,      16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_RC4,         "RC4", MR_LOW},
+    {cipher_des,          ssl_calg_des,       8, 8, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_DES_CBC,     "DES-CBC", MR_LOW},
+    {cipher_3des,         ssl_calg_3des,     24,24, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW},
+    {cipher_aes_128,      ssl_calg_aes,      16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128},
+    {cipher_aes_256,      ssl_calg_aes,      32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128},
+    {cipher_camellia_128, ssl_calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128},
+    {cipher_camellia_256, ssl_calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128},
+    {cipher_seed,         ssl_calg_seed,     16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_SEED_CBC,    "SEED-CBC", MR_128},
+    {cipher_aes_128_gcm,  ssl_calg_aes_gcm,  16,16, type_aead,   4, 0,16, 8,
+     SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128},
+    {cipher_aes_256_gcm,  ssl_calg_aes_gcm,  32,32, type_aead,   4, 0,16, 8,
+     SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128},
+    {cipher_chacha20,     ssl_calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead,  12, 0,16, 0,
+     SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX},
+    {cipher_missing,      ssl_calg_null,      0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+     SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,     "missing", 0U},
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+const ssl3BulkCipherDef *
+ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef)
+{
+    SSL3BulkCipher bulkCipher = suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg;
+    PORT_Assert(bulkCipher < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_bulk_cipher_defs));
+    PORT_Assert(ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[bulkCipher].cipher == bulkCipher);
+    return &ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[bulkCipher];
+}
+
+/* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
+static const ssl3MACDef ssl_mac_defs[] = {
+    /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */
+    /* mac      mmech       pad_size  mac_size                       */
+    { ssl_mac_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, 0, 0, 0 },
+    { ssl_mac_md5, CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 },
+    { ssl_mac_sha, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 },
+    { ssl_hmac_md5, CKM_MD5_HMAC, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 },
+    { ssl_hmac_sha, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 },
+    { ssl_hmac_sha256, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256 },
+    { ssl_mac_aead, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, 0, 0, 0 },
+    { ssl_hmac_sha384, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384 }
+};
+
+const ssl3MACDef *
+ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(SSL3MACAlgorithm mac)
+{
+    /* Cast here for clang: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16154 */
+    PORT_Assert((size_t)mac < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_mac_defs));
+    PORT_Assert(ssl_mac_defs[mac].mac == mac);
+    return &ssl_mac_defs[mac];
+}
+
+const ssl3MACDef *
+ssl_GetMacDef(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef)
+{
+    SSL3MACAlgorithm mac = suiteDef->mac_alg;
+    if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+        switch (mac) {
+            case ssl_mac_md5:
+                mac = ssl_hmac_md5;
+                break;
+            case ssl_mac_sha:
+                mac = ssl_hmac_sha;
+                break;
+            default:
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    return ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(mac);
+}
+
+ssl3CipherSpec *
+ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection direction,
+                          DTLSEpoch epoch)
+{
+    PRCList *cur_p;
+    for (cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+         cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs;
+         cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) {
+        ssl3CipherSpec *spec = (ssl3CipherSpec *)cur_p;
+
+        if (spec->epoch != epoch) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (direction != spec->direction) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        return spec;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+ssl3CipherSpec *
+ssl_CreateCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection direction)
+{
+    ssl3CipherSpec *spec = PORT_ZNew(ssl3CipherSpec);
+    if (!spec) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    spec->refCt = 1;
+    spec->version = ss->version;
+    spec->direction = direction;
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: new %s spec %d ct=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SPEC_DIR(spec), spec,
+                 spec->refCt));
+    return spec;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_SaveCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+    PR_APPEND_LINK(&spec->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_InitState. */
+/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection dir)
+{
+    ssl3CipherSpec *spec;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+
+    spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, dir);
+    if (!spec) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Set default versions.  This value will be used to generate and send
+     * alerts if a version is not negotiated.  These values are overridden when
+     * sending a ClientHello and when a version is negotiated. */
+    spec->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+    spec->recordVersion = IS_DTLS(ss)
+                              ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE
+                              : SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+    spec->cipherDef = &ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null];
+    PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null);
+    spec->macDef = &ssl_mac_defs[ssl_mac_null];
+    PORT_Assert(spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null);
+    spec->cipher = Null_Cipher;
+
+    spec->phase = "cleartext";
+    dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
+
+    ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec);
+    if (dir == CipherSpecRead) {
+        ss->ssl3.crSpec = spec;
+    } else {
+        ss->ssl3.cwSpec = spec;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+    ++spec->refCt;
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: Increment ref ct for %s spec %d. new ct = %d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->refCt));
+}
+
+static void
+ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *keyMaterial)
+{
+    PK11_FreeSymKey(keyMaterial->key);
+    PK11_FreeSymKey(keyMaterial->macKey);
+    if (keyMaterial->macContext != NULL) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(keyMaterial->macContext, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+ssl_FreeCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: Freeing %s spec %d. epoch=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->epoch));
+
+    PR_REMOVE_LINK(&spec->link);
+
+    /*  PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */
+    if (spec->cipherContext) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+    PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->masterSecret);
+    ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(&spec->keyMaterial);
+
+    PORT_ZFree(spec, sizeof(*spec));
+}
+
+/* This function is never called on a spec which is on the
+ * cipherSpecs list. */
+void
+ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+    if (!spec) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Assert(spec->refCt > 0);
+    --spec->refCt;
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: decrement refct for %s spec %d. epoch=%d new ct = %d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->epoch, spec->refCt));
+    if (!spec->refCt) {
+        ssl_FreeCipherSpec(spec);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(PRCList *list)
+{
+    while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) {
+        ssl3CipherSpec *spec = (ssl3CipherSpec *)PR_LIST_TAIL(list);
+        ssl_FreeCipherSpec(spec);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, CipherSpecDirection dir,
+                             DTLSEpoch epoch)
+{
+    ssl3CipherSpec *spec;
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: releasing %s cipher spec for epoch %d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                 (dir == CipherSpecRead) ? "read" : "write", epoch));
+
+    spec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, dir, epoch);
+    if (spec) {
+        ssl_CipherSpecRelease(spec);
+    }
+}